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Foreword
During the past fifteen years, the labour market has undergone major changes. The 
rise of flexible labour has proven unstoppable. The permanent employment con-
tract as the standard option for work has been overtaken by a wide range of contract 
forms, which sometimes fit in with classic labour law and sometimes do not. Quite 
a lot of part-time work, a great deal of temporary agency work, many secondments 
and payroll workers, a vast number of self-employed workers – some with real, other 
with false self-employment status – have entered the labour market. The proportion 
of people in the Dutch labour market that have permanent employment contracts 
has been reduced to approximately 60% and is still declining. About 25 years ago, that 
proportion still amounted to 85%.
This trend is certainly not unique to the Netherlands. It is equally evident in other 
European countries, and in other parts of the world. ‘The non-standard has become 
standard.’ It was in this way that the Director-General van de ILO summarised the 
trend some years ago. By then, the ILO had several studies carried out on the phe-
nomenon of the flexibilisation of the labour market.
Fred van Haasteren’s study relates to those studies. He focuses on Conven-
tion 181, which the ILO established in 1997 with respect to temporary agency work. 
This convention was not plucked out of a hat. It had a long and intensive history, 
which has been described graphically in this book. As a subject of negotiations with 
trade unions, temporary agency work has long been ‘tainted’. They felt that labour is 
not a commodity and that no one should make a living out of facilitating the labour 
market. Only the government should be allowed to act there, they believed.
This point of view was untenable in a period of deregulation, privatisation, de- 
collectivisation, individualisation and, particularly, globalisation. And thus, a con-
vention was realised after all, supported by the trade unions.
This study, which was defended successfully at Leiden University as a doctoral PhD 
thesis, reviews the impact of this convention during the past two decades. Has the 
convention had an effect, and was this the effect that had been intended?
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However, the book also extends its scope in other directions, posing several highly 
relevant questions relating to the future of the labour market and its regulation in the 
Netherlands, in Europe and globally.
In various regions of the world, the labour market has long been at the top of 
the political priority lists. Likewise, it has ranked high on the ILO’s priority list. Since 
this organisation is strongly committed to Decent Work, and since this concept now 
forms part of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 2030, there is a great deal of 
work to be done in the international context.
Fred van Haasteren’s study can play an important role in the further develop-
ment of thinking about and policy-making on Decent Work in connection with flex-
ible labour and its regulation, both internationally and nationally. That is why it is 
important that this study is not only available in Dutch, but also in English, so that 
many interested parties and stakeholders can consult it.
Paul F. van der Heijden
Professor International Labour Law Leiden University
June 2017
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Preface
In 1973, I received my law degree from Leiden University. As I had written my Mas-
ter’s dissertation about private employment agencies, I was presented with the oppor-
tunity to participate in the Arbeid à la carte1 study, which I conducted together with 
my colleague Martin van Overeem at the Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming 
(SMO, Society and Enterprise Foundation). This publication turned out to be an im-
portant stepping-stone towards a lengthy career in the private employment sector.
During my student years, I had already worked at a private employment agency 
as what is now called an ‘intermediary’. Thanks to my dissertation and the Arbeid à 
la carte study, I embarked on a fascinating and long career, the main part of which I 
spent working at Randstad. When I started there in 1982, Randstad had  approximately 
300 staff and employed 4,000 temporary workers daily. Before long, Randstad had 
expanded across the globe. In 2012 it had branches in over forty countries. By the 
time I retired in 2012, numbers had increased to approximately 30,000 permanent 
staff and exceeded more than 600,000 temporary workers per day. At Randstad, my 
main occupation was to give shape and substance to social policy, with regard to both 
temporary workers and our ‘own’ staff members.
Many years later, the need arose to make a scientific inventorisation on the de-
velopment of the social domain with respect to temporary agency work. I regard 
the creation of Convention 181 as ILO’s main international achievement. This study 
mainly focuses on the history and subsequent evaluation of the convention. From 
Arbeid à la carte to Decent Flexibility is a road paved with questions and challenges but 
 ultimately, with definite solutions. It will become clear that this study bears the mark of 
my excessive involvement with temporary work agencies. Nevertheless, I hope that my 
scientific detachment has managed to bring about sufficient neutrality and objectivity.
Firstly, I would like to thank colleagues Frits Goldschmeding and Frits Drost for de-
ciding to hire me as Chief Personnel Officer in 1982. This decision resulted in an 
interesting and multifaceted career with many challenges. Likewise, I wish to thank 
Sieto de Leeuw and Annemarie Muntz as well as other colleagues, including Ben 
Noteboom and Fred Farber, who in many ways assisted in developing the regulatory 
framework with regard to temporary agency work.
1 Van Haasteren & Van Overeem (1976). The title translates as ‘Tailor-made labour’.
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I am deeply indebted to all staff at VNO-NCW, viz. Niek-Jan van Kesteren, Ton  Huntjes, 
Chiel Renique and Loes van Embden-Andres, for including me in employers’ dele-
gations at annual ILO conferences on numerous occasions. This proved an invaluable 
source of inspiration for the creation of this thesis.
Of course, I thank my scientific mentor Paul van der Heijden, who constantly 
encouraged me and helped me stay on course by periodically supervising my pro-
gress and for providing the required scientific support. I thank the members of the 
thesis committee, viz. Guus Heerma van Voss, Nico Schrijver, Klara Boonstra and 
Ferd Grapperhaus, who allowed me to defend my thesis so soon after its completion, 
following a thorough examination of the final version. I also thank Gijs van Wezen-
beek, who was of tremendous assistance to me when I wrote the chapter about IFAs.
Last but most certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife Fia who turned 
everything I wrote into a readable typewritten document, which Frits Fritschy, to 
whom I also owe my thanks, could then convert into a printer’s proof. If I mention 
that there were ten consecutive versions before the final manuscript could be pro-
duced, you will appreciate the full extent of my gratitude.
Our national football hero-turned-philosopher Johan Cruyff once postulated 
that ‘when you’ve been married for so many years, your back is covered’. I was often 
reminded of this quotation when I saw everything that Fia did on my behalf. Her 
support has been invaluable.
Fred van Haasteren, July 2016
This study was originally written in Dutch. The proposal to have it translated into 
English came from within the circle of the supervisory committee. Guus Heerma 
van Voss in particular considered it important that the study would become widely 
 accessible through an English-language version. My supervisor, Paul van der  Heijden, 
rightly argues in his foreword that this study can play an important role in the further 
development of thinking about and policy making on Decent Work in connection 
with flexible work and its regulation, both internationally and nationally.
Thanks to funding by the Goldschmeding Foundation, Adecco, Randstad and 
the Dutch Labour Standards Foundation, SNA, this has become financially feasible, 
for which I am immensely grateful. I also want to express my thanks and  appreciation 
to Josee Koning for her translation, and Frits Fritschy, acting as the unsurpassed 
 editor-in-chief, who in the time available have buried themselves in the subject mat-
ter to such an extent that a sound translation could be produced. Finally, I would like 
to thank Kluwer Law International for their willingness to publish this study inter-
nationally, and their publisher Suzanne Leppen for all her efforts.
Fred van Haasteren, July 2017
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1.1 SUPPLY AND DEMAND
This study focuses on the development and adherent complications regarding the 
regulatory framework for temporary agency work. Specific attention is due to the 
role that ILO convention 181 plays in this respect. In 1997, this convention caused a 
major turnabout in the global attitude towards temporary agency work. Two decades 
later, it is important to examine how much store we should set by this prominent 
 convention.
Temporary agency work is characterised by a tripartite relationship. Usually, the 
jobseeker registers at a temporary employment agency, which then sets out to find 
him or her a job. As soon as an assignment has been found, the private employment 
agency hires the jobseeker and assigns him or her to a commissioning client, also 
known as a user company. Thus, the temporary employment agency plays an inter-
mediary role in the process of matching supply and demand in the labour market.
There are various ways to align supply and demand.1 This ranges from tapping 
private contacts for assignments and candidates, to involving anonymous intermedi-
aries who bridge the gap between supply and demand. Historically, several  approaches 
can be distinguished.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, we might refer to Molenaar.2 He states that, ac-
cording to records dating back to the time of Hammurabi (± 1700 BC), the First 
Baby lonian Dynasty both hired labourers on the basis of agarum agreements and, 
for harvesting, worked with so-called service provision agreements, on the basis of 
a šubanti form: harvest workers would join an organisation in which the overseer 
assigned his subordinates to sites according to existing needs. This made the overseer 
1 Lucassen (2000), p. 43 ff
2 Molenaar (1953), p. 8.
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a distant precursor of the labour subcontractor. Thus, Babylonian employment rela-
tions could be bipartite, using the agarum agreement, or tripartite, using the šubanti 
form. This brings to mind the tripartite relationship of the temporary employment 
agency in current labour law.
In 13th-century France, private forms of labour intermediation occurred in the ‘Rue 
des commandaresses’, where women (recommandaresses) ‘placed’ girls as domestic 
servants.3
In 17th-century Paris, both private individuals and institutions engaged in  labour 
market allocation in the form of the ‘bureaux d’adresses’. The focus was on professions 
outside the guild system, for instance in domestic services, trade and hospitality.4 
The Livre commande des adresses the Paris pour 1692 lists, among others, mediation 
bureaus and labour exchanges for the hiring-in and hiring-out of workers.
Van Bekkum points out the rich diversity of intermediaries organising the  labour 
allocation to match the specific needs of the various labour market segments. Thus, 
the Dutch East India Company employed sailors who were signed on by so-called 
‘crimps’. He also points out the role of innkeepers and landlords who supplied labour 
mediation services as a sideline. In project labour, an intermediary matched the sup-
ply and demand of seasonal and peak labour in agriculture, land development and 
shipbuilding, setting and paying wages. Apart from that, he also organised super-
vision by labour contractors, pit bosses, seasonal work overseers, foremen, et cetera.
Historically, the guilds5 had professionally engaged not only in training and edu-
cating young talents, but also in matching supply and demand. Following the ban on 
guilds in nineteenth-century France, a so-called compagnonnage system (appren-
ticeships) took over this role.6 Similar systems existed in Germany, organised by the 
‘Innungen’,7 that had succeeded the German guilds. Before World War One, they rep-
resented approximately 25% of German manual workers.
Likewise, employers and workers’ organisations have professionally matched 
supply and demand.8 In early nineteenth-century England, for instance, employers’ 
clubs played an intermediary role on a private, not-for-profit basis. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, Paris hosted a ‘labour exchange’ that was funded by the city, but 
run by the trade unions.
3 Van Bekkum (1996), p. 42.
4 Van Bekkum (1996), p. 42.
5 Lucassen (2000), p. 46.
6 Lucassen (2000), p. 49.
7 Lucassen (2000), p. 49.
8 Lucassen (2000), p. 50.
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It is hard to determine when temporary agency work first came into being. Most 
probably, this type of services originated in the Anglo-American world.9 Manpower 
claims it pioneered temporary agency work as we now know it. Two lawyers from 
Milwaukee, Elmer Winter and Aaron Scheinfeld, laid the foundation by starting a 
temporary employment agency in 1948. Samuel L. Workman also played an impor-
tant role in the development of American labour relations. By 1920, he had founded 
the ‘Temporary Help Service’, hiring workers whom he then temporarily posted else-
where. From 1920 he did this as a sideline next to his job at a calculator factory, but 
by 1930 it had become his main occupation.10
By the 1960s, the temporary agency model had crossed from the United States to 
Europe. Henri-Ferdinand Lavanchy in Switzerland (Adia), Philippe Foriel-Destezet 
in France (Ecco) and Frits Goldschmeding in the Netherlands (Randstad) pioneered 
temporary agency work in Europe.
1.2 FIGURES
For some years, CIETT (Confédération Internationale des Entreprises de Travail 
Temporale)11 has published an annual economic report,12 based on data largely sup-
plied by its members. These reports were often estimates.
Early in 2016, the data for 2014 was published. It revealed that an average of 
70 million people had worked through HR services provided by temporary employ-
ment agencies, 67 million of whom as temporary agency workers. India, the United 
States and China were the main markets, with 27.8, 14.6 and 8.1 million workers re-
spectively. Europe represented 11.3 million workers.13 From 2013 to 2014, the market 
increased by 3% worldwide. The United Kingdom (4,189,000), France (2,051,000), 
Poland (920,000), Germany (839,000) and the Netherlands (701,000) constituted the 
main markets in Europe (see figure 1).14
9 Van Haasteren & Van Overeem (1976), p. 10.
10 Van Haasteren & Van Overeem (1976), p. 10.
11 As from 21 September 2016, CIETT has been renamed World Employment Confederation (WEC).
12 CIETT (2015).
13 CIETT (2016), p. 8.
14 CIETT (2016), p. 9.
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Figure 1 Total number of individuals working through HR services CIETT (2016)
1 2013 data
2 2012 data
3 2011 data
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In terms of turnover, the largest temporary employment agencies are Adecco (19.5 
billion euro), Randstad (16.6 billion euros) and Manpower (15 billion euros). This 
top three represents 16% of the worldwide private employment turnover. Together, 
the following seven temporary employment agencies from the top 10 represent 9% 
of turnover: Allegis Group 7.9 billion; Recruit 4.6 billion; Hays PLC 4.3 billion;  Kelly 
Services 4.1 billion; Robert Half 2.8 billion; USG People 2.3 billion and Tempstaff 2 bil-
lion euros.15
Worldwide, temporary agency work has a 1.6% penetration rate. This percent-
age indicates the number of temporary agency workers in proportion to the total 
active population (see figure 2). Following a lapse caused by the worldwide recession 
since 2007, the market is recovering to pre-financial crisis levels (see figure 3). Thus, 
the United States has achieved a 2.2% penetration rate, Japan 2% and Europe 1.8%.16 
Other wise penetration rates paint a variegated picture. The United Kingdom (3.9%), 
Australia (3.7) and the Netherlands (2.7%) score highest, whereas Brazil (0.1%), 
Greece (0.2%) and Lithuania (0.2%) score lowest.17
In 2014, HR services – including temporary employment services, recruitment 
and selection, RPO (Recruitment Process Outsourcing) and outplacement – generat-
ed a total turnover of 450 billion euro, an increase of 1.5% in comparison with 2013. 
Temporary employment accounted for 316.6 billion euro.
Temporary agency workers tend to be young people. Worldwide, 40% are under 25 
and 65% are under the age of 30. Out of the temporary agency workers, 26% had 
higher education, 54% finished secondary school and 20% had dropped out.18
Larger companies make more use of temporary agency workers than smaller- 
sized enterprises (34% of the user companies have more than 500 employees; 32% 
have 100–499 employees). The smaller the company, the fewer temporary agency 
workers it hires (22%: 50–99 employees; 17%: 10–49 employees; 9%: 1–9 employees).19 
The main reasons for using temporary agency workers are the need for flexibility, 
the need for sudden adjustments, dealing with peak cycles of productivity, the need 
for additional staff and creating an opportunity to ‘try before you buy’.20 Hiring tem-
porary agency workers is not the only way for companies to create flexibility within 
their workforce. Companies can also enter into fixed-term contracts directly or hire 
self-employed workers.
15 CIETT (2015), p. 17.
16 CIETT (2016), p. 10.
17 CIETT (2016), p. 11.
18 CIETT (2015), p. 58, 59, 60.
19 CIETT (2015), p. 64.
20 CIETT (2015), p. 65.
Chapter 1: Introduction
6
Figure 2 Evolution in key markets 1996–2014 CIETT (2016)
Figure 3 Temporary employment penetration rates CIETT (2016)
(1) 2013 data (2) 2012 data
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Canada, Japan and most European countries have a flexible workforce amounting 
to 20–30% of the total personnel. Flex work is popular in the Mediterranean coun-
tries (more than 30%), in Poland (46%) and the Netherlands (37%). The United States 
have the smallest share worldwide (10%), followed by Australia (16%) and the United 
Kingdom (20%)21 (see figure 4).
Figure 4 Flexible employment relations, 2000–2014 (in %) Blanchflower (2015)
1.3 REGULATION
According to Randstad, the need for flex work and outsourcing are factors that drive 
the growth of temporary agency work. Similarly, demographic development, causing 
both deficiencies and surpluses, require intermediary facilities to bridge the gap. An-
other growth factor appears to be the need for a total HR support package. Finally, 
regulation is often a deciding growth factor.22
This pertains to the domain of social law. Van Esveld23 distinguishes three  phases 
in the development of social law: repressing the worst kinds of malpractice; repair-
ing contractual balance (the protection from potential malpractice) and, lastly, with 
21 Blanchflower (2015), p. 170.
22 Presentation by J. van den Broek, CEO Randstad; Capital Markers Day, London, 17-11-2015, slide 11.
23 Van Esveld (1968).
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regard to welfare – the development of the individual worker. Van Esveld refers to 
Thorbecke, who states:
If we want to regulate, we must have and keep in mind a principle. With respect to 
labour law, that principle should be the protection of the socially weaker accord-
ing to the standards of social justice, enhancing their power and developing their 
personality.24
In this respect, Heerma van Voss and Barentsen, as well as many others, refer to the 
notion of inequality compensation. This is a key concept, meaning that social law 
should attempt to compensate for economic inequality.25
Van der Heijden and Noordam observe seventeen ‘-ations’ that influence the 
formation of social law.26 They are:
 – individualisation,
 – flexibilisation,
 – decentralisation,
 – horizontalisation and informalisation,
 – informatisation and computerisation,
 – internationalisation, Europeanisation and globalisation,
 – privatisation and decollectivisation,
 – work-life integration,
 – economisation and activation,
 – deregulation,
 – intensification.
All of these ‘-ations’ also play an important role in the creation of the regulatory 
framework for temporary agency work. In particular, individualisation, flexibilisa-
tion, informatisation and computerisation, internationalisation, Europeanisation 
and globalisation, economisation and activation, and deregulation are influential.
Van der Heijden and Noordam discuss various rationalities. They observe that 
value, legal, economic and political rationalities all play individual roles in the back-
ground to the creation of social law.27 This is reminiscent of the ‘suite of fifteen as-
pects’ that Dooyeweerd developed in his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought.28
24 Van Esveld (1968), p. 303.
25 Heerma van Voss & Barentsen (2015), p. 22; see also Betten (1997).
26 Van der Heijden & Noordam (2001), p. 7 ff.
27 Van der Heijden & Noordam (2001), p. 69.
28 Dooyeweerd (1935), p. 46; see also Rupert et al. (2015).
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In creating social law, Van der Heijden and Noordam rank responsibility, socio- 
economic security, protection, solidarity, non-discrimination and participation as 
some of the basic values that must be taken into account.29
All of these elements should be covered. Van der Heijden and Noordam look 
upon the circle of those protected, the level of protection, the protected risks and 
reciprocity as variables entailing choices.
Lastly, there is the toolbox of social law creation that both facilitates and requires 
making choices regarding a public and/or private approach, through imperative law, 
semi-imperative law and regulatory law, through a form of central standardisation, 
adaptive labour law, vague norms and the option of validation.
1.4 FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
Temporary agency work as an object of international social law creation has an un-
ruly history. In the ILO, temporary agency work was always closely linked to the issue 
of private commercial placement, and this has hardly been off the agenda since it 
was established. The phenomenon of temporary agency work developed against the 
current of international regulation. National governments attempted to formulate an 
adequate regulatory answer.
I have always wondered why it took so long before temporary agency work was grant-
ed a fully-fledged and regulatory framework.
The underlying reason lies in the fact that throughout history, social law has 
mainly focused on the ‘bipartite employment relations’ existing between  employer 
and employee. When we discuss ‘protecting the socially weak according to the stand-
ards of social justice, enhancing their strength and developing their personality’, 
our primary concern is the relationship between employers and employees. Van der 
Heijden and Noordam’s basic values were also focused on this relationship. In due 
course, an impressive social structure has been erected, which pivots on this bipar-
tite employment relationship. The interior was designed and the garden around it 
landscaped. At such a point in time, it is difficult to suddenly accept a third party 
who makes havoc of the design and raises various questions, to which the answers 
previously seemed so clear. Thinking from the perspective of tripartite employment 
relations demands an adjustment to the state of mind and some renovation of the 
social structure. It demands the distribution and clarification of responsibilities.
Both internationally and nationally, the discussion pivoted on the question as to 
whether it was even possible to distinguish the temporary employment agency as the 
formal employer from the commissioning client, or user company, as the material 
29 Van der Heijden & Noordam (2001), p. 76 ff.
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employer.30 The real issue was including the temporary agency model into labour law 
as an accepted business model.
The underlying reason is that temporary agency services were seen as job me-
diation for profit. The fact that money was made on it disrupted one of the main 
ILO principles – ‘labour is not a commodity’. Over the years, this underlying reason 
retreated into the background. In 1972, Albeda31 stated that it was hard to defend this 
attitude as long as the system of corporate production continued to be accepted.
Nowadays, economists tend to refer to ‘disruptive innovation’. This takes place when 
‘you change something that is mainstream and create a new mainstream’.32 Clayton 
Christensen referred to this idea in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma33 to describe 
innovations that create new markets and serve new clients.
Once it came into existence, the temporary employment agency was one of 
those disruptive innovations, and by all appearances it is still going strong. Tech-
nology, i.e. informatisation and computerisation, plays a leading role. Interestingly, 
these technologies in turn create new ways to match supply and demand. Jobs can be 
outsourced by means of an app, and flowers, taxi drivers and doctors can be called 
upon when needed. The so-called ‘demand economy’ is making huge strides.34 It is 
also known as the ‘gig economy’, including crowd work and work on demand through 
apps.35 Regulation will contribute to its chance of success, its continued existence, as 
well as an effective labour protection.
After many years’ discussion, the ILO has finally regulated temporary agency 
work as a manifestation of disruptive innovation within Convention 181.
Among other things, Convention 181 states in its preamble: ‘Recognizing the role 
which private employment agencies may play in a well-functioning labour market’ 
and ‘Recalling the need to protect workers against abuses’ and aims: ‘to allow the op-
eration of private employment agencies as well as the protection of the workers using 
their services, within the framework of its provisions’.
The convention has become the foundation for a flourishing industry that has 
continued to grow in both size and professionalism. Nevertheless, we should not 
be oblivious to questions that demand further analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to 
30 Van Haasteren & Van Overeem (1976), p. 101
31 Albeda e.a. (1972), p. 53.
32 Sprengers (2013).
33 Christensen (2011).
34 Van Noort (2015). see also: The Economist (2015).
35 De Stefano (2016).
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 assess the value of Convention 181. Nearly twenty years after its creation, a further 
analysis is appropriate to be able to answer the following question:
Viewed from the perspective of more recent international developments in social 
law as well as from a Dutch context, is Convention 181 (still) an effective instru-
ment for the international regulation of temporary agency work?
First, I shall indicate in part I how the development and the corresponding com-
plications of a regulatory framework for temporary agency work have taken place 
within the ILO. In part II, I shall work out which major developments have occurred 
in international social law and what these mean for Convention 181. Part III will be 
wholly dedicated to a Dutch perspective on Convention 181. In eight chapters spread 
over these three parts, I shall go into a number of related sub-questions.
In part I, chapter 2 I shall present the question:
How has the ILO regulation for temporary agency work developed over the years?
In part I, chapter 3, this is followed by:
Which complications can be observed in relation to this framework?
In part II, I shall dedicate four chapters to a series of developments in international 
social law and their effects on Convention 181. Since this convention was created, 
international social law has evolved with respect to the following ‘-ations’, as Van der 
Heijden put it:
1. decent-isation: the introduction of the concept of decent work in international 
social law (chapter 3);
2. human right-ification: the increasing importance of the theme of human rights 
in international social law (chapter 4);
3. IFA-isation: the creation of worldwide agreements in the area of international 
social law, the so-called IFAs (chapter 5);
4. European-isation: the consequences of European cooperation for international 
social law (chapter 6).
More specifically, the question in part II is how these so-called ‘-ations’ have had 
influence on Convention 181. Does this convention still have any value and is it still 
adequate if we compare these ‘-ations’ to its contents?
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ad 1. Decent Work has become a catch-all phrase that tries to give substance to the 
improvement of working conditions in general. Many discussions both within and 
beyond the ILO are modified by this notion.
The opposite of decent work is the precarisation of work. Temporary agency 
work is often classed as precarious work. As a result of the complication in respect of 
the ILO framework for temporary agency work, the following sub-question for part 
II, chapter 4 appears indispensible:
What do we mean by ‘decent work’ and how can this be contrasted with temporary 
agency work under ILO convention 181?
ad 2. Human rights increasingly influence the behaviour of (multinational) com-
panies. By way of the OECD guidelines, which now include the Ruggie framework 
‘protect, respect and remedy’, the Bill of Rights has become a guideline that enter-
prises increasingly must take to heart. This begs the question as to whether Con-
vention 181 can still be considered a valuable instrument now that companies are 
also subject to the desired regulation due to the obligation to observe human rights. 
Therefore the sub-question presented in part II, chapter 5 reads:
Which developments with respect to human rights have occurred specifically for 
companies and how can their results be valued in relation to the achievements of 
ILO convention 181?
ad 3. Subsequently, more and more multinational companies enter into IFAs (Inter-
national Framework Agreements) together with various international trade unions. 
These agreements cover a wide range of subjects within social policy. Sub- question 
in part II, chapter 6, then, reads:
How has the Global Social Dialogue developed and how does this development 
relate to ILO convention 181? Are the corresponding IFAs substitutes for and/or 
additions to ILO convention 181?
ad 4. International social law has attained an essential European dimension that has 
had, and still has, a vast influence on the creation of social law. Apart from the ILO, 
Europe has exhaustively discussed temporary agency work. The exact relationship 
between European labour law and ILO convention 181 requires further analysis. This 
should focus specifically on the question as to whether Convention 181 still has value, 
knowing that much European legislation has been drawn up with respect to tempor-
ary agency work. Hence, the sub-question that must be dealt with in part II chapter 
7 reads:
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In which direction does the creation of social law with respect to temporary em-
ployment develop at European level and what does that mean for the value and 
scope of ILO convention 181?
Following these discussions on international social law, in part III I aim to dwell on 
the Dutch social law context with regard to temporary agency work. ILO Director- 
General Guy Ryder recently stated that: ‘No country has as many self-employed 
people, temporary agency workers and part-time workers as the Netherlands.’ He 
considers the rapidly expanding flexibilisation in the Netherlands as a forerunner of 
what awaits other European countries. ‘You cannot reverse this trend, merely stream-
line it in an acceptable way.’
According to Ryder, the future labour market will be dominated by casual, tem-
porary employment arrangements. The employee with a permanent contract belongs 
to a shrinking minority. Ryder argues that this has huge repercussions for social 
secur ity, but also for the consultation model of employers and employees. In this 
respect, the Netherlands can be a testing ground. Is it possible to link those flex types 
to protection and legislation in such a way that they become high-quality alternatives 
for a permanent position? That question has yet to be answered. I will not deny that 
this is extremely complicated, however, you cannot reverse flexibilisation either.36
Thus, the Netherlands serves as a forerunner for developments elsewhere and 
subsequently as a testing ground. Against the background of these remarks, I intend 
to discuss the following sub-question with regard to the Netherlands in part III, 
chapters 8/9.
How has the temporary agency legislation developed in the Netherlands; which 
complications have presented themselves and how can they be evaluated in relation 
to ILO convention 181?
Lastly, I intend to synthesise my observations and answer the question as to whether, 
in the light of my observations, ILO convention 181 still has value and is an ade-
quate founda tion for the international temporary agency sector. The subject is high-
ly  dynamic and developments take place in rapid succession. It should therefore be 
noted that the final version of this manuscript is entirely up to date until the end of 
June 2016.
36 Leupen (2015), interviewing Ryder for Het Financieele Dagblad, a daily Dutch newspaper that 
focuses on business and financial topics.
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Chapter 2
Development
How has the ILO framework for temporary agency work developed over the years? 
This chapter takes stock of discussions held within the ILO. Private employment 
 agencies, particularly those run on a for-profit basis, have been under debate  within 
the ILO since its earliest days. Initially, temporary agency work as such was not the 
issue, but the corresponding phenomenon of placement was. In due course this 
changed, resulting in ILO convention 181 in 1997.
This chapter will pay attention to the development and impact of the convention 
and to how social partners and governments appreciated ILO convention 181. Sub-
sequently, chapter 3 will present questions with regard to the convention that have 
since arisen.
2.1 PROGRESSING FROM CONVENTION 2 TO CONVENTION 181
2.1.1 The fundamental principles of the ILO37
The ILO was established at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as a means to promote 
social progress, i.e. by resolving social and economic conflicts through dialogue and 
cooperation. Its founders opted for a worldwide consultation model, as opposed to 
the conflict model that prevailed at that time. They sought common rules, policies 
and implementation in the interest of employers, employees and governments. Peace 
and justice go hand in hand; war – they found – does not always result from injustice. 
Conversely social justice is emphatically essential to universal and lasting peace.
In the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the fundamental principles of the ILO, 
as adopted in the ILO constitution, were further developed. These principles are:
 – Lasting peace cannot be achieved unless it is based on social justice, grounded in 
freedom, dignity, economic security and equal opportunity.
 – Labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or an article of commerce.
37 Rodgers et al.(2009), p. 6 and 7.
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 – There should be freedom of association, for both workers and employers, along 
with freedom of expression, and the right to collective bargaining.
These principles are fully applicable to all human beings, irrespective of race, creed 
or sex. Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere, and must be 
addressed through both national and international action.
2.1.2 The ILO policy concerns 38
The fundamental principles listed above need to be implemented in several fields. 
The ILO constitution stresses seven central policy concerns:
 – the promotion of full employment and rising standards of living, in occupations 
in which workers can apply their capabilities and contribute to the common 
well-being – along with equal opportunity for men and women in achieving this 
end, and facilities for training and for migration;
 – the provision of an adequate living wage for all those employed, calculated to 
ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all;
 – the regulation of hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum 
working day and week, and of weekly rest;
 – the protection of children, young persons and women, including the abolition 
of child labour, limitations on the labour of young persons and the provision for 
child welfare and maternity protection;
 – protection of the economic and social interests of those workers who are em-
ployed away from the country of birth;
 – the adequate protection of all workers against sickness, death and injury arising 
out of employment;
 – the extension of social security measures to provide for old age and ill health, a 
basic income to all those in need of protection, and comprehensive medical care.
2.1.3 Four means of governance 39
The ILO realises its goals by means of four governance instruments:
 – tripartism: the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal sta-
tus with that of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic 
 decision on social and economic measures, and collaborate in increasing pro-
ductive efficiency;
38 Rodgers et al.(2009), p. 8.
39 Rodgers et al.(2009), p. 9.
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 – the adoption of international conventions and recommendations to be submit-
ted to national authorities for ratification or other actions;
 – a system of supervision to ensure enforcement of the laws and regulations con-
cerned;
 – cooperation among international bodies to ensure that all economic and finan-
cial policies contribute to social progress and well-being.
2.1.4  1919, discussing placement of workers: preference for public and aversion 
to private placement 40
Ever since the ILO was established, there has been much debate about placement. 
Ever since the first ILO conference, which took place in Washington in 1919, the 
participants have discussed placement of workers as part of the dialogue about in-
struments to tackle unemployment. With regard to the role of public employment 
services instituted in various countries, one speaker underlined their vast importance 
and stated that they should be strongly promoted. Thus, a convention on unemploy-
ment should pay much attention to instituting public employment services in ratify-
ing countries – where these were not already in place. In view of public employment 
services the existence of private employment agencies were of particular concern. 
The speaker argued that this kind of worker exploitation occurred mainly in Europe, 
and that action must be taken to stop it. In any case, a licensing regime should be in 
place. Where some participants criticised placement carried out for profit, others 
applauded it. For instance, the Brazil delegate failed to understand why fee-charging 
employment agencies should be forbidden if this activity was being undertaken fairly 
and according to regulations, the more so since the freedom of enterprise had been 
included in the Brazilian constitution.
Eventually, the conference proposed the following convention text with respect 
to employment agencies:
(Draft Convention no. 2)
The states ratifying the present convention or acceding thereto shall establish in 
their respective countries a system of free public employment agencies under the 
control of a central authority. Committees, which shall include representatives 
of employers and representatives of the workers, shall be appointed to advise on 
matters concerning the carrying on of the work of such agencies. In States where 
both public and private free employment agencies engage in the work of finding 
employment for the unemployed, such States shall take measures to coordinate the 
operations of any or all of such agencies on a national scale. The operations of the 
40 ILC (1919), p. 132, 144, 145, 192.
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several national systems shall be coordinated by the International Labour Office in 
agreement with the States concerned.41
Subsequently, a recommendation proposed the following text:
(Draft Recommendation no. 1)
The General Conference recommends that each Member of the International  Labour 
Organisation take measures to prohibit the establishment of employment agencies 
which charge fees or which carry on the business of an employment agency for profit. 
As regards the States in which agencies of this nature already exist, the conference 
recommends:
That these agencies shall operate only under licenses granted by the State, and that 
all practicable measures shall be taken to abolish such agencies as soon as possible.42
Ultimately, both texts were included in Convention 2 and Recommendation 1. Over-
all, in 1919 there was a clear preference for public placement; if private agencies were 
in place, it was recommended that their activities should be subject to licensing and 
that Member States should do their best to ensure that private agencies disappear as 
soon as possible.
2.1.5 1920, abolition of private placement in the Maritime Convention 43
During its second session in Genoa in 1920, the ILO went a step further. Maritime 
matters were under discussion, and the principle of abolishing fee-charging agencies 
was included in full in the convention issued on this subject. The convention stipu-
lated that:
[…] the business of finding employment for seamen shall not be carried on by a 
person, company or other agencies as a commercial enterprise for pecuniary gain 
[...] Notwithstanding [these] provisions [...] any person, company or agency, which 
has been carrying on the work in finding employment for seamen as a commercial 
enterprise for pecuniary gain, may be permitted to continue temporarily under 
Government licence, provided that such work is carried on under Government 
inspection and supervision so as to safeguard the rights of all concerned.
41 ILC (1919), Appendix, chapter II, p. 235.
42 ILC (1919), Appendix, chapter II, p. 235.
43 ILC (1932a), p. 1.
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Each member which ratifies this convention agrees to take all practicable measures 
to abolish the practice of finding employment for seamen as a commercial enter-
prise for pecuniary gain as soon as possible.
And thus, the prohibition of fee-charging employment agencies was set down in an 
ILO convention for the first time.
Ten years later, during the 48th session of the Governing Body, the German 
government again drew attention to the fact that the Washington convention had 
not prescribed abolition of fee-charging agencies and that this did not tally with Ger-
man national legislation, which was to abolish them as per 1 January 1931.44 It was 
proposed to review the 1919 unemployment convention, or develop a new one. The 
German government was willing to waive a review if the Governing Body were pre-
pared to enter the subject on the agenda for one of the following conferences. In 1930 
the Governing Body finally decided to enter the subject on the agenda for the 1932 
conference.
2.1.6 Widespread abuses in private placement
It was clear that fraud, abuses and immorality in connection with fee-charging em-
ployment agencies were rife, and this soon necessitated national ‘prohibition’ legis-
lation.45
Instances of abuse that were noted were: demanding exorbitant fees, demanding 
fees without actually rendering services, misrepresenting working conditions, failing 
to place truthful adverts, unfair treatment of candidates, iterating placement by shar-
ing fees with employers and foremen, placing applicants in non-existing or immoral 
jobs, violence, trafficking in women, placement to replace striking workers, bias and 
discriminating between organised and unorganised workers, granting credits under 
bad conditions, keeping back wages and identity papers, provision of housing and 
lodging facilities to applicants by people with whom the placing agency has deals, 
forced purchase of shoes and other articles.46
All these abuses inspired the idea that national governments were best suited 
to organise the labour market by means of freely accessible employment facilities.47 
The 1919 Washington convention had already laid this down, and it had by then been 
implemented far and wide. Exceptions remained in place for specific occupations, 
which the government had not dealt with at the time.
44 ILC (1932a), p. 2.
45 ILC (1932a), p. 8.
46 ILC (1932a), p. 9; see also p. 111.
47 ILC (1932a), p. 11.
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Initially, national legislation provided guarantees against abuses, but later the focus 
shifted to banning fee-charging employment agencies, since that was the most ef-
fective way to end the abuses. Their operating activities were considered to be in-
consistent with human dignity and in breach of social justice, as well as hampering 
the efficient organisation of the labour market and the principle of freely accessible 
placement.48
2.1.7 Questionnaire about approach
The decision to put the issue on the agenda for the 1932 ILC resulted in national gov-
ernments being sent a questionnaire that included the following questions:
 – Should there be a convention or a recommendation?
 – What definition should or should not be included for fee-charging and non- 
fee-charging employment agencies?
 – Should the scope be defined by means of specifying the occupations concerned?
 – What exceptions are there?
 – At what time will the ban on fee-charging employment agencies come into force?
 – What transitional measures and penalties are necessary?49
At the time, the committee had unanimously supported the decision to put the issue 
on the agenda for the 1932 ILC. However, not all committee members were negative 
about fee-charging employment agencies. A Belgian employers’ delegate wondered 
whether the abuses should be tackled or rather the fee-charging employment agen-
cies themselves.50
There were also other points of view regarding the fee-charging agencies. Some 
of them rendered valuable services and could not be accused of abusing their posi-
tion. Implementing a licensing system was also a way of preventing abuses. The ILO 
Office report had also provided examples of licensing. Thus, in view of increasing un-
employment, the question arose as to whether abolishing private employment agen-
cies that did not imply any dangers and provided a good service was actually prudent.
It was said to be remarkable that these fee-charging agencies existed alongside – and 
therefore could successfully compete with – the public employment services, even 
though the former charged fees while the latter was free. Thus, the governments must 
also answer the question as to whether they thought these operating activities should 
be allowed. Although this vision was contested at some point during the delibera-
48 ILC (1932a), p. 12.
49 ILC (1932a), p. 129–130.
50 ILC (1932b), p. 287.
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tions, the questionnaire still left room for a decision to be made about private em-
ployment agencies, both those operating for profit and those not operating for profit.
The questionnaire was despatched to the governments in May 1932. The idea 
was to take the results of the questionnaire into consideration during the 1933 delib-
erations. In the end, 29 Member States filled in the questionnaire, i.e. Australia (the 
states New South Wales and Victoria), Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, In-
dia, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Seven of these 
Member States (Australia, Austria, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa 
and Switzerland) were ultimately against an ‘abolition convention’, or at least had 
certain objections to abolition. The vast majority of 22 Member States were in favour 
of such a convention.51
Even though the Member States proved to have a marked preference for abol-
ishing private employment agencies, total abolishment did not obtain a majority. It 
was suggested to restrict abolishment to private ‘for-profit’ agencies carried out for 
profit and to allow the not-for-profit agencies to continue under certain conditions. 
A number of governments saw this type of services as a useful addition to public 
employment services.
2.1.8 1933, Convention 34 on ‘fee-charging employment agencies’ 52
The eventual convention distinguished fee-charging employment agencies carried 
out for profit from the non-profit-making type. The first type was to be abolished and 
the second to be put under supervision. Fee-charging employment agencies carried 
out for profit were described as: ‘any person, company, institution, agency or other 
organization which acts as an intermediary for the purpose of procuring employ-
ment for a worker or supplying a worker for an employer with a view to deriving di-
rectly or indirectly any pecuniary or other material advantage from either employer 
or worker’, on the understanding that newspapers were exempt, unless they could be 
seen as intermediaries.
By fee-charging, not-for-profit employment agencies were meant: ‘the placing 
services of any company, institution, agency or other organization which, though not 
conducted with a view to deriving any pecuniary or other material advantage, levies 
from either employer or worker for the above service an entrance fee, a periodical 
contribution or any other charge.53
51 ILC (1933a), p. VI, 81.
52 C034 (1933).
53 ILO (1951), p. 179.
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The key provision in the Convention is article 2, stating that: ‘Fee-charging employ-
ment agencies should be abolished within three years from the date on which the 
Convention comes into force for the Member concerned’. During this three-year- 
period, no new fee-charging employment agencies must be established and any exist-
ing agencies were subject to government supervision and a government-approved fee 
structure.
Article 3 lists exceptions to the key provision of abolishment after three years 
with regard to special worker categories defined by national laws or regulations. 
However, no new placement activities must be established after three years. The ex-
ceptions were subject to supervision and must apply annually for a new licence for a 
maximum period of ten years, must adhere to a government-approved fee structure, 
and could only undertake cross-border activities if they were licensed to do so, and if 
a bilateral agreement to that effect was in place.
Article 4 refers to fee-charging but not-for-profit private employment agen-
cies, which continued to be allowed, albeit subject to government supervision and a 
 government-approved fee structure.
In article 5, an obligation to report is introduced for all employment agencies.
The recommendation accompanying this convention (no. 42), includes measures54 
‘to adapt the free public employment offices to the needs of the occupations in which 
recourse is often had to the services of fee-charging employment agencies’, for in-
stance farm workers, domestic workers, salaried employees, professional workers, 
artists, musicians and nurses. Persons engaging in prostitution, the hotel industry, 
activities with regard to selling second-hand goods or credit facilities must not en-
gage in placement.
The committee’s rapporteur, Mrs Letelier, stated that the adoption of the con-
vention would put a stop to a large part of the abuses reported early on in the 
deliberations. The convention was to complete the work started by the 1919 Wash-
ington convention, deciding for public employment services and logically abolishing 
fee-charging employment agencies, as had been included in the recommendation at 
that time.
2.1.9 1944, a more comprehensive labour market approach is called for 55
The way of thinking about how placement could play an optimum role in the labour 
market did not stand still. The war situation had produced huge shifts in the labour 
market, and within the ILO the outlook had taken root that a post-war policy must 
54 ILC (1933b), p. 139–140.
55 ILC (1944).
 Chapter 2: Development
 25
be formulated to normalise the labour market relations. This went far beyond merely 
underlining the need for a labour market institution, resulting in a complete labour 
market programme consisting of 11 chapters and 45 agenda items. The programme 
went down in history as Recommendation (no. 71) concerning Employment Organisa-
tions in the Transition from War to Peace.
Its starting point was ‘the promotion of full employment with a view to satisfy-
ing the vital needs of the population and raising the standards of living throughout 
the world’. Thus, matching supply and demand in the labour market should be or-
ganised effectively.56
The widest possible use of employment service facilities was crucial,57 as was 
providing training facilities and industrial policies, and paying specific attention to 
young people, women and disabled workers.
The ILO encouraged national governments to collect the necessary information 
regarding supply and demand in the labour market; moreover, it strived for a system-
atic approach to demobilising the armed forces while converting a wartime economy 
into a normal economy.
As this comprehensive labour market approach required efficient employment 
services to have good infrastructure, a separate recommendation – Recommendation 
(no. 72) concerning the Employment Service – focused on this. The essential respons-
ibilities of the employment services were listed as follows:58
– collecting and making available information concerning labour supply, em-
ployment opportunities, the skills required to do particular jobs, changes in 
skill requirements within the different industries, employment and unemploy-
ment trends, the regularisation of employment and the causes of unemploy-
ment, and other information of value in promoting full employment;
– assisting workers to find suitable employment and employers to find suitable 
workers;
– assisting in developing and in determining the content of training and retrain-
ing courses;
– developing methods of facilitating the transference, where necessary, of  workers 
from one occupation or area to another;
– helping to achieve the best possible distribution of manpower within each in-
dustry and area;
– co-operating as may be required in the administration of unemployment insur-
ance and assistance;
56 ILC (1944).
57 ILC (1944).
58 ILC (1944).
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– assisting other public and private bodies in planning the location of industry, 
public works, housing projects, social amenities, and other social and economic 
measures.
It is remarkable that neither recommendation pursued the distinction between pub-
lic employment services and private agencies. This was expressed particularly well in 
paragraph IV of Recommendation 71:
In the organisation of full employment in the transition period and thereafter the 
widest possible use of employment service facilities by employers seeking workers 
and by workers seeking employers should be encouraged by the competent author-
ities and by employers and workers organizations.59
In effect, a convention now existed alongside two recommendations that pivoted on 
the role of public employment services. Whereas the promotion of public employ-
ment agencies was set down in the 1919 convention, both 1944 recommendations fur-
ther specified the agenda of a more comprehensive labour market policy, including a 
steering role for the public employment agencies.
At the time, the 1919 Washington convention was ratified by 31 countries and was 
widely emulated in the years after. In 1947, the Governing Body entered the employ-
ment service organisation on the ILC agenda, aiming to have a convention adopted 
about this subject.
The war situation had certainly not boosted public placement60 and moreover 
Nazi Germany had ‘benefited’ from the existing infrastructure of public employment 
services. A Czechoslovakian delegate had stated that the employment services had 
become one of the most hated symbols of the German occupation, and thus it was 
not easy to invest these employment services with a new spirit and secure a positive 
public perception.
Nevertheless, the need that arose by 1946 to tackle the labour market problems result-
ed in remarkable efforts that boosted the employment service in ways intended in the 
1944 Recommendations 71 and 72. Earlier, President Roosevelt had aptly expressed 
this by stating that the employment services should operate like a corner shop green-
grocer,61 the specialist in labour market affairs, in order to play a vital and urgent role 
in full employment planning.
59 ILC (1944).
60 ILC (1946), p. 12.
61 ILC (1946), p. 13.
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2.1.10 Employment services survey 62
In 1947, the ILO conducted an extensive employment services survey among the 
 national governments, the results of which were to inform the deliberations during 
the 1948 ILC. A questionnaire inquired whether a convention possibly accompanied 
by recommendations was desirable. Also the questionnaire asked about matters such 
as: aim of labour market policies, desired organisational structure, involvement of 
employers’ and employees’ organisations, specialisation by occupations, collection 
of information with regard to promoting labour mobility (including geographical 
mobility), cooperation on unemployment insurance, commitment to employment 
policy, ways of involving jobseekers and employers, international cooperation and 
the role of private employment agencies.
This last topic was included in the questionnaire63 at the request of the Swedish 
government, which had had issues with the international placement of musicians 
and artists. The 1933 convention (no. 34), which Sweden had ratified, laid down that 
exempted private for-profit employment agencies were only allowed to conduct 
cross-border mediation if their government had licensed them to do so and entered 
into bilateral agreements with the countries concerned. Sweden’s attempts to make 
such agreements with (neighbouring) countries had not been successful. As a  result, 
the government feared that the placement of musicians and artists from Sweden 
would shift to other countries that had an advantage over Sweden by not ratifying the 
convention. The ILC complied with Sweden’s request, so that this part – the revision 
of the 1933 Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention – was also put on the 
agenda at the 1948 ILC deliberations on the employment service in general.
2.1.11 1948, Convention 88 and Recommendation 83 64
The 1948 ILC eventually proposed a convention and a recommendation concerning 
the employment services organisation. The convention obligated ratifying Member 
States to institute a public employment service and, in cooperation with other private 
and public parties to organise matters in such a manner as to achieve the aim of full 
employment. They should, among other things, have a local network, seek advice 
from employers’ and workers’ organisations, develop labour market policies, conduct 
placement activities, organise occupational and geographical labour mobility, collect 
labour market data, enable specialisation with regard to occupations and industries, 
hire staff and guarantee cooperation with private not-for-profit employment agencies.
62 ILC (1946), p. 13.
63 ILC (1946), p. 220–233.
64 ILC (1947a, b).
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The ILC recommended that national governments establish a head office and local 
offices, formulate a policy for young and disabled workers, collect labour market in-
formation, arrange funding, maintain neutrality in the event of strikes and facilitate 
mobility.
It was also suggested that the 1933 Fee-Charging Agencies Convention (no. 34) 
be amended, replacing the three-year period after which the for-profit employments 
agencies were to be abolished with a provision that left the decision for the time 
frame for the abolition to the national governments.
Furthermore, new agencies might establish themselves provided they special-
ise in worker categories that the public employment services could not place. Inter-
national placement should be allowed to proceed under conditions provided by 
national law.
The proposed convention was adopted in 1948 and went down in history as Con-
vention 88; the recommendation was also adopted, as Recommendation 83.
2.1.12 Revising Convention 34 65
At the request of employers, the relevant committee accepted the revision of the 1933 
Fee-Charging Employment Agencies Convention (no. 34) with 26 in favour and 24 
against,66 following a discussion among the committee that strained mutual relations. 
During the 1948 revision discussion, the English employers had submitted a far- 
reaching amendment; rather than abolishing the private for-profit employment agen-
cies over the course of time, they wanted to facilitate them subject to government 
supervision, licensing and a government-approved fee structure. All the employ-
ers sided with this proposition. They were convinced that the fee-charging agencies 
played a useful role in the labour market. Furthermore, they stressed that only six 
countries had ratified Convention 34. The governments of New Zealand, India and 
South Africa endorsed the amendment.
The employees stated that here were widespread abuses and that the private 
for-profit employment agencies were responsible for exploiting workers. The Belgian, 
French, Polish and Turkish government representatives endorsed this point of view. 
The United States government abstained from voting; it had always been against an 
‘abolition convention’, but did not think it would do the ILO’s work any good if a con-
vention be revised so soon afterwards. The United Kingdom government endorsed 
this point of view.
Eventually, the 1948 ILC was to reject the revision of the 1933 Fee-Charging 
Employment Agencies Convention (no. 34) by a small margin of 39 to 35 (5 absten-
65 ILC (1947a); ILC (1947b), p. 76; ILC (1948).
66 ILC (1947a); ILC (1947b), p. 76; ILC (1948), p. 10.
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tions).67 The limited success of Convention 34 and the failure to revise it necessitated 
a renewed discussion during the 1949 conference, for which a resolution was submit-
ted and adopted.68
2.1.13  1948, questionnaire regarding revision of Convention 34; 
1949, Convention 96 as a compromise 69
In preparation to the discussion, a questionnaire was despatched to the governments. 
Nineteen governments, i.e. Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Egypt, Finland, 
France, India, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South  Africa, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom proved to be in favour of 
regulation, including regulation of the private for-profit employment agencies. The 
 remaining thirteen appeared to prefer the abolition variant. This outcome induced 
the ILO office to present a compromise text, opting for a two-variant convention.
One variant, part II, was based on abolition of the private for-profit employment 
agencies at a date yet to be determined. To the extent that private for-profit employ-
ment agencies continued to exist, they were to be subject to supervision and to a pre-
scribed fee structure. Exemptions for certain categories of workers continued to be 
possible, with the proviso that supervision, annually renewable licences also applied 
to them. A requirement for permission and for prescribed fee structures applied to 
not-for-profit employment agencies.
The other variant, Part III, was based on the regulation of the private,  for-profit 
employment agencies conditional on supervision, licensing and a prescribed fee 
structure. This variant also included the option of private not-for-profit employment 
agencies requiring government authorisation and compliance with a scale of charges 
fixed by national government.
Thus, Member States who wanted to ratify the convention could comfortably remain 
on the fence by choosing between both variants. Although the majority were in favour 
of the abolition variant, they obviously did not want to risk there being a total ban on 
the private for-profit employment agencies. The 1948 discussion, which did not yield a 
convincing majority for either option, together with the fact that the strict Convention 
34 had led to few ratifications, apparently prompted the ILO Office to compromise.
After forty years’ discussion about whether or not to allow fee-charging employ-
ment agencies, a solution appeared to be at hand by passing this ILC-adopted revised 
version.
67 ILC (1948), p. 34.
68 ILC (1948), p. 2.
69 C096 (1949).
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2.1.14 Focusing on temporary agency work
It took 43 years for the ILO to put the topic of private employment agencies back on 
the agenda; the Governing Body took this decision during its 254th session in Novem-
ber 1992.70
In the interim period, the topic did excercise many minds within the ILO. In 
1966, the Swedish government, confronted with the increasing role of temporary em-
ployment agencies within its borders, inquired whether these operational activities 
could be considered to fall under Convention 96, under the concept of fee-charging 
employment agency. The Director-General of the ILO took the view that it did, and 
therefore that the relevant exemption clause in the convention must be reconsidered. 
Many countries did not agree with this view, since a temporary employment agency 
is, after all, not an intermediary but an employer that lends its workers to another 
commissioning employer. Thus, the convention would not apply, which is why vari-
ous countries developed specific legislation of their own.
In 1973, the Member States voted on a draft resolution71 containing the proposal 
to analyse in more detail the role that temporary employment agencies played and to 
put this topic on the agenda of one of the following conferences. However, the res-
olution was shelved due to a lack of the requisite quorum. Since then, this topic has 
repeatedly come up for discussion within the ILO, but no decision has ensued. In the 
interim the temporary employment sector continued to grow.
In 1991 however, during the 250th and 251st sessions of the Governing Body, this 
changed, as the idea came up to view temporary agency work from the wider per-
spective of placement and to enter this topic on the 1993 ILC agenda. The difference 
between that and earlier attempts was the idea to first have a general discussion on 
the topic.72
2.1.15 The Ricca report 73
The ILO prepared this discussion by means of a study by Sergio Ricca that had been 
rounded off in 1944 and was therefore appropriate for treatment in a general discus-
sion in that year. Ricca was working for the ILO at the time and had been requested by 
the Office to conduct this study. In his report The role of private employment agencies 
in the functioning of the labour market, Ricca challenged the monopolistic approach 
to thinking about placement. In his report he had included an inventory of no fewer 
70 ILC (1994), p. 1.
71 ILC (1994), p. 1.
72 ILC (1994), p. 3.
73 ILC (1994), p. 1.
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than fifteen types of intermediary services that existed at the time. Apart from the 
fee-charging employment agencies, he listed:
Overseas employment agencies, agencies for the recruitment and placement of for-
eigners, temporary work agencies (TWAs), contract labour agencies, staff leasing 
agencies, executive search agencies, outplacement agencies, job search consultants, 
personnel management consultants, training and placement institutes, job shops 
or cooperatives, employment advertising agencies, computerized job database 
agencies, career management agencies, employment enterprises or intermediary 
associations.74
Ricca stated that this list was not exhaustive and that there were certainly overlaps; 
moreover, while some types faded away, others emerged. The analysis made it clear 
that the world of the intermediary services was hugely dynamic.
He also provided an analysis of the backgrounds of these old and new types 
of intermediary services. As growth factors he listed: the need for flexibility, quick 
changes in skills structures, reducing production costs, reducing labour costs, chang-
es in organisational methods of enterprises, a new role for the State, proliferation 
of agencies, structural adjustment programmes, rising unemployment, innovative 
services, reconsideration of the role of public employment services, the notion of 
the state as a client, self-regulation of private agencies and new lifestyles (behaviour 
shifts).75 Ricca also pointed out the legal aspects of these intermediary services, in-
cluding the triangular relations that are inherent in temporary agency work.76
He observed eight arguments against and seven in favour of intermediary ser-
vices. First, he listed the arguments against:77
 – Private agencies are skimming off the market; they are not interested in those 
who are less fit for work.
 – There is no further investment in people by means of training.
 – The promotion of labour mobility is only motivated by profit.
 – Precariousness is on the increase.
 – Collecting labour market information is made difficult.
 – Competition creates too many negative effects.
 – Agencies circumvent the law.
 – Agencies abuse the situation.
74 ILC (1994), p. 11.
75 ILC (1994), p. 31.
76 ILC (1994), p. 40.
77 ILC (1994), p. 49.
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As arguments in favour Ricca listed:
 – Intermediary services create scope for experiments in transitional periods.
 – The market function is much improved.
 – There is a lower cost/benefit ratio compared to monopolies.
 – There is freedom of choice
 – Good and bad market players are easier to tell apart.
 – The State does not function optimally either.
 – The market has the last word.
Ricca concluded that a partial or total ban no longer has any value. He stated:
Now that it is clearly no longer practicable, the prohibition approach should reas-
onably be discarded. But how can this be done without at the same time aban-
doning the principals that inspired the supporters of a ban, i.e. the principals of 
protecting vulnerable unemployed workers, of defending the interests of all those 
involved in the labour market and not just those of private groups and of equal 
opportunity in employment for all? This is certainly the heart of the problem. Our 
hopes of finding a way out of this controversy which has exercised so many minds 
for so many years, depend directly on our ability to come up with a valid answer 
tot this question.
He went on as follows:
The problem is to define a model of labour market organization that will reconcile 
the activity of private agencies with the priority of public over private interest. For-
midable as it may seem, the problem is not insoluble to start with. A definition of a 
model should be based on a number of clear principals.78
At that stage in his report, Ricca presented the notion of shared labour market man-
agement, including regulation and control of private agencies by the State, and a com-
plementary role aimed at cooperation for the private agencies. He also advocated a 
new ILO standard that, from a practical point of view, would mean a revision of Con-
vention 88 and Recommendation 83 relating to the employment services, together 
with Convention 96 (revised) relating to the Fee-Charging Employment Agencies.79
78 ILC (1994), p. 57.
79 ILC (1994), p. 60.
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2.1.16 1994, scope for variety 80
The report was discussed during the 1994 ILC. On that occasion, the relevant com-
mittee declared that the time had come to acknowledge that there was a rich vari-
ety of activities to help jobseekers find employment and assist employers in hiring 
workers, and that the activities in the market place should increase. Both public and 
private parties should have market positions as complementary partners. However, 
the Member States had a fundamental responsibility to ensure that the labour market 
functions properly and to take that responsibility by guaranteeing the presence of a 
properly funded and well-functioning public no-cost employment service. The com-
mittee supported the principles of Convention 88 and in particular the duty of the 
employment service to ensure the best possible organisation of the labour market in 
cooperation with other public and private parties.
It stated that, in view of the labour market dynamics during the past years, it 
had become clear that the increasing role and position of well-functioning private 
employment agencies could be positive and that the essential role of the public em-
ployment agencies must be maintained. According to most Member States, only a 
public institution may be responsible for unemployment insurance, labour market 
information, the management of specific labour market programmes in order to get 
young people into work, and the management of subsidised job plans. Therefore, 
private employment agencies could not be considered in isolation from public em-
ployment services.
Well-functioning private employment agencies can certainly contribute to an 
effective labour market. They can:
 – shorten the time involved in filling vacancies;
 – show vacancies;
 – appreciate changes in the labour market and react quickly;
 – bring together supply and demand, without losing time;
 – fill a need that public employment services cannot fill;
 – bridge a gap between unemployment and permanent positions, mainly through 
temporary jobs and gradually (re)integrating jobseekers in the labour market;
 – enhance information about jobs;
 – shorten the time between jobs by means of outplacement techniques, contribut-
ing to improved labour mobility;
 – provide short-term training, bridging the gap between the supply of and de-
mand for skills.
80 ILC (1997a).
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However, the circumstances under which private placement took place and the devel-
oping labour relations with jobseekers could well result in exploitation and im proper 
conduct. Employees made accusations, stating that private employment agencies 
skirted the law by lowering wages, making it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out 
trade union work, ignoring equal opportunities legislation, failing to acknowledge 
terms of employment that workers were entitled to, and replacing permanent posi-
tions with temporary jobs. New standards must therefore pay ample attention to the 
protection of agency workers without getting entangled by over-regulation. Also, the 
cooperation between private and public parties must be promoted.
Most committee members considered the principles of Convention 96 to have 
lost their relevance; they no longer reflected the current state of affairs, with the ex-
ception of the principle that workers should not pay placement fees. Part II of Con-
vention 96 differed most from the new practice, as had become clear from the recent 
denunciations by countries such as Finland, Germany, Sweden, Ivory Coast and the 
Netherlands. But likewise, part III no longer fitted in with the new reality:  limited 
scope (only placement in a strict sense), inflexible supervision (only a licensing 
system); bureaucratic (only an annual licence); insufficient market orientation (fee 
structure).
2.1.17 Revision of Convention 96 is called for 81
All in all, Convention 96 must be revised. The following targets were formulated:
 – Respond to the dynamics of the changing labour market and redefine the role 
of the actors.
 – Describe the ‘parameters’ of the public and private employment agencies and the 
nature of their relationship with their clients.
 – Develop general principles and provide guidance that
• protects labour markets from unethical behaviour;
• protects the interests of workers, including in situations jeopardising the 
 stability of labour relations (particularly in the case of ‘tripartite relationships’, 
including arrangements for contract labour, TWA and staff leasing);
• protects migrant workers.
 – Create an environment that invites improved functioning of all employment 
agencies.
 – Ensure that national governments are free to choose their own policies towards 
realising these targets.
81 ILC (1997a), p. 70.
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On the basis of the Ricca report, in 1995 the Governing Body decided to place the 
topic on the agenda of the 80th ILC in 1997. Remarkably it opted for a single discus-
sion procedure. In contrast to earlier discussions that had been effected in two stages, 
it now assumed that a result could be achieved in one attempt. The ILO Office pro-
duced a discussion report82 in which the elements of the 1994 discussion recurred.
2.1.18  Questionnaire about revising Convention 96: 
1997, Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 83
The ILO Office conducted a comprehensive survey among the national governments. 
Generally, the majority reacted positively to all 36 questions. Therefore, on the face 
of it, the ILO Office had a broad popular mandate to develop the approach it had in 
mind. Particularly the most important questions 1 and 2 – respectively, whether there 
should be a convention and a recommendation about private employment agencies 
– evoked positive answers from 63 out of 68 and 59 out of 67 responding countries.84
Eventually, Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 were adopted. The con-
vention defines the private employment agency (art. 1) as:
1. […] any natural or legal person, independent of the public authorities, which 
provides one or more of the following labour market services:
(a) services for matching offers of and applications for employment without the 
private employment agency becoming a party to the employment relationship 
which may arise therefrom;
(b) services consisting of employing workers with a view to making them avail-
able to a third party, who may be a natural or legal person (referred to below 
as a ‘user enterprise’) which assigns their tasks and supervises the execution of 
these tasks;
(c) other services relating to jobseeking, determined by the competent author-
ity after consulting the most representative employers and workers organiza-
tions, such as the provision of information that do not set out to match specific 
offers of and applications for employment.85
Crucially, the definition is no longer restricted to private employment agencies alone, 
but also comprises the triangular relations that may arise if the employment agency 
is also acting as a formal employer.
82 ILC (1997a).
83 C181 (1997).
84 ILC (1997a).
85 ILO (2007a), p. 52.
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The convention applies to all private employment agencies, except for seafarers; as its 
purposes, it states allowing private employment agencies and the protections of the 
workers using their services (Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3). Under certain circum-
stances, private employment agencies may be prohibited ‘from operating in respect of 
certain categories of workers or branches of economic activity in the provision of one 
or more of the services referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1’(Article 2, paragraph 4a) 
and workers from specific branches of economic activity or branches thereof may be 
excluded ‘from the scope of the Convention or from certain of its provisions, provid-
ed that adequate protection is otherwise assured for the workers concerned’ (Article 
2, paragraph 4b).
Article 3 requires that the legal status of private employment agencies as well as 
the conditions governing their operations shall be determined (by means of licens-
ing, certification, or otherwise) (Article 3, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 respectively).
Article 4 ensures workers’ right to freedom of association and their right to col-
lective bargaining.
Article 5 contains non-discrimination provisions, with the exception of positive 
action.
Article 6 ensures workers’ rights to privacy and careful use of their personal 
data.
Article 7 contains the key provision that private employment agencies may not 
charge fees to the workers. Exceptions may be made for certain categories of workers 
after consulting the employer and employee.
Article 8 deals with the position of migrant workers. Member States must pro-
tect them and prevent abuses, for instance on the basis of bilateral agreements with 
the countries concerned.
Article 9 calls for measures to preclude child labour.
Article 10 ensures that a complaints procedure is in place to investigate abuses 
and fraud.
Article 11 focuses on specific worker protection in relation to freedom of associ-
ation, collective bargaining, minimum wages, working time and other working con-
ditions, social security, training, occupational safety and health, compensation in 
case of occupational accidents or disease, compensation in case of insolvency, mater-
nity and parental protection as well as benefits.
Article 12 stipulates that Member States allocate the above responsibilities to the 
parties concerned.
Article 13 is aimed at the promotion of public and private cooperation, with the 
proviso that the public authorities retain final responsibility.
The remaining provisions – articles 14 through 29 – deal with enforcement and 
procedural provisions.
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Recommendation 188 functions as a more detailed manual to promote good prac-
tices. The main elements include:
 – working with written contracts;
 – refraining from strike-breaking;
 – refraining from employing workers for hazardous situations;
 – providing migrant workers with reliable information;
 – refusing discriminatory commissions;
 – paying attention to positive action;
 – preventing non-functional records;
 – formulating a recruitment and selection policy;
 – ensuring free mobility;
 – encouraging public and private cooperation.
The realisation of Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 has concluded an almost 
ninety-year discussion about whether or not to allow fee-charging private employ-
ment agencies. Interestingly, a total ban was never achieved during this long period. 
Resistance to a total ban continued to be vast over the years, and practical experience 
superseded the theory of the international legal framework.
2.2 FLESHING OUT THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The realisation of Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 has created a global regu-
latory framework for private placement and temporary employment agencies. How 
have they developed since then, and what can be said about the results?
2.2.1 Licensing, certification and scope 86
The key provision is Article 3, stating:
1. The legal status of private employment agencies shall be determined in accord-
ance with national law and practice, after consulting the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers.
2. A member shall determine the conditions governing the operation of private 
employment agencies in accordance with a system of licensing or certification 
except where they are otherwise regulated by appropriate national law and 
practice.
86 ILO (2007a), p. 5 ff.
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In an explanation, the ILO states that licensing and certification must be executed 
objectively and transparently, i.e. in such a way that the agencies can function ap-
propriately and adequately. The basis for legislation is found in existing law or can be 
found in ordinances and decrees.
The ILO points out that in order to enforce the rules the national government will 
have to take its available capacity into account. Setting up a concise regulation that 
is easy to enforce is preferable to a regulation that is difficult to monitor effectively.
Article 3 also indicates that the Member State will consult the social partners involved 
before drafting legislation. Many countries where temporary employment agencies 
are operational have a licensing or certification requirement in place. An analysis 
regarding the members of CIETT makes clear that such a requirement exists in nearly 
all the countries where CIETT has members. Remarkably, not all these countries have 
ratified Convention 181.87
Article 2 (4) (9) of Convention 181 indicates that after consulting the most rep-
resentative social partners, temporary employment agencies may be prohibited from 
operating in certain industries or for certain categories of workers.88 The ILO states 
that such a prohibition is only sensible if the need for placement can actually be met 
by public employment services and if there is support for this.
By now, such prohibitions are in place, albeit on a modest scale. Of the coun-
tries that ratified Convention 181, prohibitions are known for Algeria (public sector, 
management and migrants), Hungary (creative industries, education) and Panama 
(cross-border activities). Belgium, the Czech Republic and Morocco have included 
the prohibition option in their legislation, but so far have not made use of it. Italy also 
has it, and in 2006, it opened its agricultural sector and construction industry on an 
experimental basis.89
2.2.2 Definition
Article 1 of the convention states that:
‘for the purpose of this convention the term private employment agency means any 
natural or legal person, independent of the public authorities, which provides one 
or more of the following labour market services’.90
87 Internal analysis by CIETT.
88 ILO (2007a). p. 6.
89 ILO (2010), p. 80 e.v.
90 ILO (2010), p. 73 e.v.
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Subsequently, three activities are listed:
a. job matching services without the private employment agency concluding a 
 labour agreement;
b. employing workers with the aim of making them available to a third party, the 
user enterprise;
c. other services relating to jobseeking.
Activity a comprises the real employment activities, including overseas and the exec-
utive searchers; activity b includes temporary employment agencies, but also services 
known as staff leasing, job shops, career management agencies, employment enter-
prises and outplacement agencies; activity c comprises the rest, but no examples are 
known.
2.2.3 Worker protection 91
Articles 4, 11 and 12 all safeguard employee protection for the temporary agency 
workers involved. Article 4 specifically guarantees the rights to freedom of associ-
ation and collective bargaining. Article 11 compels the ratifying Member States to 
take measures resulting in adequate protection for workers in relation to:
a. freedom of association;
b. freedom of collective bargaining;
c. minimum wages;
d. working hours;
e. social security;
f. training facilities;
g. health and safety;
h. compensation for occupational diseases and accidents;
i. compensation for insolvency;
j. maternity and paternal protection and benefits.
In relation to these rights, with the exception of ad a, article 12 asks for a closer defini-
tion of roles and allocation of the respective responsibilities in the triangular relations 
of temporary agency employer, temporary agency employee and commissioning cli-
ent (user enterprise). This provision relating to worker protection particularly pro-
vokes criticism. The British Trades Union Congress (TUC) states that protection from 
unfair dismissal is restricted and that temporary agency workers are in a weak posi-
tion when industrial disputes occur. The ILO stipulates that – on the basis of article 11 
mentioned above in combination with article 14 calling for further implementation 
91 ILO (2010), p 76 ff. See also ILO (2007a), ad. 110, p. 24 ff
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of the convention by means of laws or regulations – it is for the national governments 
of the ratifying Member States to take action.92
Furthermore, Recommendation 188, section II, paragraph 6 states that temporary 
 employment agencies are not allowed to act as strike breakers. ‘Private employment 
agencies should not make workers available to a user enterprise to replace workers 
of that enterprise who are on strike’. This provision has been included in the recom-
mendation  because, both internationally and within the ILO, the right to strike 
is  under discussion.93 In this context, an issue has come up in the United States. 
 American  temporary agency workers do not automatically become members of the 
same  bargaining unit that represents permanent staff, and although they can establish a 
bargaining unit of their own, this disparity essentially places them at a  disadvantage.94 
In this context, the Canadian CSN (Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux) also refers 
to an interesting judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada:
… situations involving tripartite relationships can cause problems when it comes 
to identifying the real employer if the labour legislation is incomplete in this re-
gard. The tripartite relationship does not fit very easily into the classic pattern of 
bilateral relationships. The Labour Court (of Quebec) was essentially designed for 
bipartite relationships involving an employer and an employee. It is not very help-
ful when a tripartite relationship must be analysed. The traditional characteristics 
of an employer are shared by two separate entities – the personnel agency and its 
client – that both have a certain relationship with the temporary employee. When 
faced with such a legislative gaps, tribunals have used their expertise to interpret 
the often terse provisions of the statute. In the final analysis, however, it is up to the 
legislature to remedy those gaps.95
Therefore, it is for the national governments to clarify the matters listed in the articles 
11 and 12. In any case, these rights are also guaranteed when these matters have been 
dealt with by ratifying other conventions.96
92 ILO (2010), p 76, items 309 and 310.
93 Van der Heijden (2013).
94 ILO (2010), p. 77, item 311.
95 ILO (2010a), p. 77, item 312; see also Pointe-Claire (City) v. Quebec (Labour Court) (1997) S. C. R. 
1015, § 63.
96 ILO (2010a), p. 78.
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Table 2.1 Matters listed in Article 12 and the most current respective Conventions97
Freedom of association 
(to which reference is also made 
in Article 4 of Convention no. 181)
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
 Organise Convention, 1948 (no. 87)
Collective bargaining 
(to which reference is also made 
in Article 4 of Convention no. 181)
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 
(no. 98)
Minimum wages – Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (no. 100)
– Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (no. 26)
– Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (no. 131)
Working time and other  
working conditions
– Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919 (no. 1), Hours 
of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1930 (no. 
30), Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) 
Convention, 1979 (no. 153)
– Holidays with Pay Convention (Revised), 1970 (no. 132)
– Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 
(no. 106),
– Night Work Convention, 1990 (no. 171), Protocol of 1990 
to the Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948
– Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (no. 175)
Statutory social security benefits – Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 
(no. 102)
– Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors’ Benefits Convention, 
1967 (no. 128), Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
Convention, 1969 (no. 130), Employment Promotion and 
Protection against Unemployment Convention, 1988 (no. 
168)
– Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 
(no. 157)
Access to training – Paid Educational Leave Convention, 1974 (no. 140),
– Human Resources Development Convention, 1975 (no. 142)
Protection in the field of occupa-
tional safety and health
– Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (no. 
155), Protocol of 2002 to the Occupational Safety and 
Health Convention, 1981
– Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and 
Health Convention, 2006 (no. 187)
Compensation in case of occupa-
tional accidents or diseases
– Employment Injury Benefits Convention, 1964 (no. 121),
– Medical Care and Sickness Benefits Convention, 1969 
(no. 130)
– Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 
(no. 157) 
Compensation in case of insol-
vency and protection of workers 
claims
– Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (no. 95)
– Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) 
Convention, 1992 (no. 173)
Maternity protection and bene-
fits, and parental protection and 
benefits
– Maternity Protection Convention (Revised), 1952 (no. 103)
– Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (no. 183)
97 ILC (2010a).
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2.2.4 Social dialogue
A fair amount of legislation can also be effected through negotiations, following 
 social dialogue. 19 out of the 38 CIETT members conduct a kind of social dialogue. 
This takes place on the temporary agency sector level, on a cross-sector level as well 
as on a national level, whether the user enterprises – the commissioning employers 
– are involved or not.98 In that respect, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Germany 
are at the forefront of landmark collective agreements.
2.2.5 Data protection 99
Article 6 of the convention stipulates that the processing of personal data of workers 
must be restricted to matters regarding their qualifications and work experience. The 
collection, storage and presentation must be in line with national legislation. In sec-
tion II, articles 11 and 12, Recommendation 188 lists more specific guidelines.
It is also important to mention that article 7 of that same section calls for govern-
ments to combat unfair and misleading advertising practices, including advertising 
for non-existing jobs.
2.2.6 ‘No fee to worker’ 100
Another key provision of the Convention is Article 7, anchoring the no fee to worker 
principle. This means that private employment agencies must not charge workers 
with costs or other fees. In the interests of the workers concerned exceptions are pos-
sible, after consulting the social partners.
About one third of the ratifying countries turn out to use this option, which 
allows asking jobseekers for fees, or to consider using it.
2.2.7 Fundamental rights 101
Convention 181 also encompasses the ILO core conventions in the field of freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, forced labour, child labour and equal op-
portunities. Above, we discussed the articles 4, 11 and 12, anchoring the principles of 
Conventions 87 and 98.
98 BCG (2011), p. 71, figure 48.
99 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 31; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 78.
100 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 29; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 81.
101 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 24; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 35 ff.
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The preamble to Convention 181 recalls the provisions of the 1930 Forced Labour 
Convention (no. 29) that is aimed against forced labour and exploitation: ‘Thus, tem-
porary employment agencies have to abstain from illegal practices that tie workers 
forcibly to their own agencies or to specific employers, for example through debt 
bondage (possibly linked to the illegal imposition of recruitment fees or illegal wage 
deductions), the illegal retention of identity documents or other forms of threats.’102
Also, temporary employment agencies must abstain from activities relating to 
child labour, as included in Convention 182 in respect of the ‘worst forms of child 
labour’. To this end, article 9 states: ‘a member shall take measures that child labour is 
not used or supplied by private employment agencies’.
2.2.8 Non-discrimination
Furthermore, article 5 of the Convention states that private employment agencies 
‘should treat workers without discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, reli-
gion, political opinion, national extraction, social origin or any other form of dis-
crimination covered by national law and practice, such as age or disability’. This right 
to non-discrimination is of fundamental importance, particularly for women and for 
migrants who find it difficult to realise their rights with respect to wages, working 
conditions and more generally the freedom of association.
2.2.9 Migrant workers 103
Article 8 of the Convention directs attention to migrant workers. A Member State 
must, after consulting the representative social partners, take measures within its 
jurisdiction and, where appropriate, in collaboration with other Member States, to 
provide adequate protection to migrant workers and to prevent abuses of migrant 
workers who have been placed in their countries by agencies. These measures must 
also imply liability to punishment, including a ban on agencies that engage in fraudu-
lent practices and abuses. Article 8 refers to the UN convention of December 1990 
concerning Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their 
 Families.
A later UN convention, dated 1 July 2003, aims to realise equal treatment, includ-
ing equal working conditions for both national and migrant workers, as well as equal 
access to protective measures. Equally important in this context is article 5 from 
 Recommendation 188, calling for written contracts and giving workers  adequate in-
formation about their working conditions before their assignment begins.
102 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 25
103 ILO (2007a), ad 110. p. 26; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 88.
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2.2.10 Complaints procedure 104
Article 10 supplies the need for an adequate complaints procedure. It asks for ‘ad-
equate machinery and procedures, involving as appropriate the most representative 
employers and workers organizations for the investigation of complaints, alleged 
abuses and fraudulent practices…’ Taking the case to court need not be the only op-
tion. Often alternative dispute settlements often give more comfort.
2.2.11 Public/private cooperation 105
Article 13 aims to promote the cooperation between public employment services and 
private employment agencies in the labour market, with the proviso that the pub-
lic employment services stay in charge of formulating the labour market policy and 
the usage of funds. Convention 88 has a similar provision in article 11, in which the 
authori ties are called on to realise an effective cooperation between public employ-
ment services and private, not-for-profit employment agencies. This provision, which 
does not cover cooperation with for-profit private employment agencies, appears to 
have been superseded by article 13 from Convention 181, but must be seen in its his-
torical context.
Paragraph 17 from Recommendation 188 gives examples of cooperation, includ-
ing:
 – pooling of information;
 – exchanging vacancy notes;
 – launching joint projects;
 – outsourcing by public to private, such as projects for the integration of long-
term unemployed;
 – training of staff;
 – consulting with a view to improving professional practices.
By now, there are many clear examples of these types of cooperation. They tend to 
particularly aim at exchanging candidates and vacancies.
In Belgium, agreements have been in place since 1999, which were renewed re-
cently. In Denmark, cooperation likewise focuses on exchanging information, but 
also increasingly on outsourcing jobs from the public employment services to the 
private agencies. In France, a similar form of cooperation existed, which also drew 
criticism. Apart from outsourcing, the cooperation involves exchanging information, 
which, as laid down in agreements, must remain confidential. Germany has a frame-
104 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 37; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 64.
105 ILO (2007a), ad 110, p. 45 ff; see also ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 57 ff.
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work agreement between the German federation of temporary employment agencies, 
the BAP, and the public employment services. Exchange of information, collabora-
tion on placing target groups, organisation of joint job fairs and regular strategic con-
sultations comprise the main elements of the cooperation. In Italy the cooperation 
has taken shape mainly at a local level, i.e. in Lombardy, the province of Florence and 
the Marche region. It mainly relates to the public funding of private outplacement 
and education projects.
The Netherlands is likewise evincing increasing cooperation. It started in the 
1980s with public co-funding of target groups placement by the private sector. By 
now, temporary employment agencies also take part in the 33 mobility centres across 
the country. The job website werk.nl run by the public employment services is being 
supplied with a generous number of vacancies by the temporary employment agen-
cies. A service point called Flex has been founded that acts as a knowledge centre to 
facilitate and promote the cooperation between private and public. Moreover, agree-
ments are being made with municipalities to tackle the rising youth unemployment 
at a local level and more generally, to place more specific target groups. To promote a 
better match between supply and demand, so-called ‘speed-dating sessions’ are held 
on the public service premises, in an attempt to bring the jobseeker into contact with 
the existing demand quickly and efficiently.
In Spain, negotiations are ongoing on far-reaching forms of cooperation. Al-
though in Sweden, whilst cooperation has not yet been formalised, certain forms are 
being used in practice, such as the exchange of information on the local level as well 
as joint outplacement and coaching programmes.
In the United Kingdom the cooperation between the British temporary employ-
ment confederation REC and the public Job Centre Plus was sealed with a  renewed 
Memorandum of Understanding. Specific support programmes were set up together 
with private parties to combat the rising unemployment, following earlier experi ences 
with information exchange and seeing applicants on the Job Centre Plus  premises. 
Strategic labour market consultations likewise contribute to further cooperation.
Lastly, the European Commission is promoting this cooperation and putting it 
at the top of its agenda.106 Article 13 stipulates that the private employment agencies 
are to supply information at regular intervals ‘to allow the competent authority to be 
aware of the structure and activities of private employment agencies in accordance 
with national practices’. This information can contribute to creating a better picture 
of the labour market in general.107
106 The examples have been taken from CIETT data.
107 See also Koeltz (2013).
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2.2.12 Implementation
Article 14 calls for an adequate implementation by means of laws or regulations that 
are consistent with national practice, for supervision by the labour inspection ser-
vices or another supervisory public body, as well as measures, including penalties, to 
prevent violations.108
2.2.13 Revision
Article 16 provides that this Convention 181 revises the Fee-charging Employment 
Agencies Convention (revised), 1949 and the Fee-charging Employment Agencies 
Convention 1933.
2.3 IMPACT
2.3.1 Number of ratifications
If we consider the impact that Convention 181 has had, it is important to see how 
many countries have now ratified this convention. As per June 2016, that number 
amounted to 32.
The question is how significant this number is. The ratifying countries only 
make up 17% of ILO’s 186 Member States. One might conclude that, so far, the impact 
has been modest. However, it is important to regard this number in relation to other 
ILO conventions; on the basis of 32 ratifications as per mid-2016, where does Con-
vention 181 rank?
Table 2.2 Countries that have ratified Convention 181
1999 Albania 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
Japan 
Morocco  
Netherlands 
Panama 
Spain
30 June 
24 March 
25 May 
28 July 
10 May 
15 September 
10 August 
15 June
2000 Czech Republic 
Italy
9 October 
1 February
2001 Moldavia 19 December
2002 Georgia 
Portugal
27 August 
25 March
108 See ILO (2010), ad 113, p. 65.
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2003 Hungary 19 September
2004 Belgium 
Lithuania 
Uruguay
28 September 
19 March 
14 June
2005 Bulgaria 24 March
2006 Algeria 
Surinam
6 June 
12 April
2008 Poland 15 September
2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Slovak Republic
18 January 
 
22 February
2012 Israel 
(fyr) Macedonia
4 October 
3 October
2013 Fiji 
Serbia 
Zambia
21 January 
15 March 
23 December
2015 Mongolia 
Nigeria 
France
17 April (effective as of 17 April 2016) 
14 May (effective as of 14 Mei 2016) 
28 October 2015 (effective as of 28 October 2016)
2016 Mali 12 April 2016 (not yet effective)
At the beginning of 2016, of the 177 so-called technical ILO conventions, Conven-
tion 181 ranked 59th. At that time, the technical conventions saw an average of 28 
ratifications, and with its 32 ratifications, Convention 181 tops that. We can also con-
sider all conventions concluded since 1990. What picture emerges? Convention 182 
concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labour from 1999 and the Maritime Labour 
Convention are well ahead of Convention 181 by 180 and 70 ratifications respectively. 
As a result, Convention 181 shares the third position with Convention 185 concerning 
the Seafearers’ Identity Documents (Revised) from 2003.
If we look at the ILO conventions that cover specific forms of labour, such as 
part-time work, home work and domestic work, these conventions, i.e. Part-Time 
Work Convention 1994 (no. 175), the Home Work Convention 1996 (no. 177) and 
the Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (no. 185) turn out to have been ratified by 
a few as 14, 10 and 22 Member States, thus lagging far behind the 32 ratifications for 
Convention 181.
These reasonably healthy positions may be partly influenced by a waning eager-
ness to ratify ILO conventions during the past years; still they have been achieved.
2.3.2 Prospects
In 2010, the ILO conducted a survey among its Member States regarding their inter-
est in ratifying at a later date. On this occasion 38 Member States came forward as 
prospects, i.e.:
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Table 2.3 Prospects for ratification of Convention 181 in 2010
They include countries such as Serbia, Israel, Mongolia, Nigeria and France, which 
have since ratified the convention, but also countries such as Chile, Peru and Sweden, 
which may possibly see no further impediments to future ratification.
Nevertheless, impediments to ratification remain. After all, 23 countries adopted 
Convention 96, 15 of which opted for the strict Part III that is aimed at total prohibi-
tion of private employment agencies carried out for profit. As we saw earlier, the ILO 
takes that to include the commercial temporary employment agencies.
Table 2.4 Ratifications of Convention 96 that are still in force 109
Part II Part III
Bangladesh Guatemala Argentina
Bolivia Luxembourg Ireland
Costa Rica Libya Ivory Coast
Cuba Mauretania Malta
Djibouti Pakistan Mexico
Egypt Swaziland Senegal
Gabon Syria Sri Lanka
Ghana Turkey
Of the countries that have ratified Convention 96 there are four that are listed among 
the prospects for Convention 181, i.e. Ivory Coast (Part III) and Bolivia, Egypt and 
Syria (Part II). Countries that have ratified Convention 96 and not yet ratified Con-
vention 181 continue to be bound to follow the obligations of Convention 96. Only 
upon ratification of Convention 181 the obligations of Convention 96 automatically 
cease, as this ratification also counts as a denunciation of Convention 96.
By now, France has ratified Convention 181 and thus taken leave ‘ipso jure’ of 
Convention  96.110 The French government had pre-empted this by removing the 
state monopoly in the field of employment services and instituting the Pôle Emploi. 
109 ILO (2010), ad 129.
110 La Tribune (2015).
Bangladesh
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroon
Central African Rep.
Chile
Egypt
Eritrea
Estonia
France
Honduras
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Latvia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mongolia
Montenegro
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nigeria
Peru
Rwanda
St Vincent and the 
 Grenadines
Serbia
Sudan
Sweden
Syria
Tunisia
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Venezuela
Yemen
Zimbabwe
 Chapter 2: Development
 49
However, in 2012, the Committee on Applications and Recommendations had to re-
mind the French government that it was not in line with international law. In a direct 
request in 2013, the Committee addressed the governments of Egypt, Brazil and Syria 
in similar terms. In France, by the way, parliamentary scrutiny did draw criticism. 
Members of parliament particularly raised objections to the so-called ‘marchandisa-
tion’ of the unemployed.111
Countries on this Convention 96 list, such as Cuba and Guatemala, indicated 
that they did not intend to allow temporary agency work. Even though they now 
have laws or regulations regarding temporary employment agencies, other countries 
stated that they do not wish to ratify, since their legislation is not fully in line with 
Convention 181 and they do not intend to align it. For instance, Canada, Denmark, 
South Korea, New Zealand, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States 
have issues with the no fee to workers principle; South Korea, Mali and Mexico do not 
want to implement provisions with regard to migrant workers. Moreover, the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland have issues with articles 11 and 12 and the correspond ing 
requirements regarding collective bargaining. Furthermore, Canada states that its 
legislation is implemented regionally and that not all regions comply with Conven-
tion 181.112
It is ascertainable that thanks to its 32 current ratifications Convention 181 has more 
Member State support than Convention 96, which is clearly losing ground; at one 
point 42 Member States had ratified it, but by now 19 of those have renounced this 
convention. If the remaining 33 prospects actually were to decide to ratify Conven-
tion 181, it would arrive at 65 ratifications, which will then far exceed the 19 remaining 
adherents of Convention 96, and is considerably higher than the current average of 
28 ratifications per convention.
2.3.3 Survey: more ratifications needed for Convention 181 113
During its 99th ILC session in 2010, the ILO gave attention to the topic of employ-
ment instruments, in the context of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization. The ILC regularly focuses on this declaration by putting related topics 
on the agenda. This time, it was a survey of a number of employment instruments, 
which were examined by Committee of Experts in the Application of Conventions 
and Recommendations (CEACR).
111 Chaignon & Rousseau (2014).
112 This was derived from data from the correspondence between ILO and its Member States, with 
reference to Survey ad 113, which I perused.
113 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 27–49.
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There were discussions about the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (no. 122); the 
Human Resources Convention, 1975 (no. 142); the Employment Service Convention, 
1948 (no. 88), and the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (no. 181). Like-
wise, attention was given to the Job Creation in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
Recommendation, 1998 (no. 189) and the Promotion of Cooperatives Recommenda-
tion, 2002 (no. 193).
Many of the above data are derived from the survey report. Interestingly, Con-
vention 181 was seen in the wider context of international standards that are essential 
to the desired labour market policy. The preamble of the 1964 Employment Policy 
Convention refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948, which 
states that ‘everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment’. This con-
vention focuses on full employment and free choice of employment.
These principles can also be found in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Right, adopted in 1966, which provides that the right to employ-
ment implies that everybody has the right to build a life by means of work that they 
have chosen or accepted freely, and that the Member States take adequate measures 
to ensure that right. Note that this does not entail an absolute right to work, but 
rather free choice of employment, meaning that everyone is free to freely accept or 
choose employment without being forced into a job. ‘Right to employment’ also im-
plies a system guaranteeing that everybody has access to employment.
Such a system in turn requires efforts in the field of adequate education and 
training. The latter is anchored in the 1975 Human Resources Development Conven-
tion (no. 142) and can also be found in the articles 11 and 12, sub e, commissioning the 
Member States that have ratified Convention 181 to ensure that the necessary training 
takes place.
The CEACR report shows the mutual commitment between public employment ser-
vices and private employment agencies, as well as the connection between the 1948 
Employment Service Convention (no. 88) and the 1997 Private Employment Agen-
cies Convention (no. 188). Earlier on, we noted that Article 11 of Convention 88 relat-
ing to public-private cooperation in the labour market is a mirror image of Article 13 
of Convention 181.
Deliberations
During the ILC deliberations, the employers appealed to their governments to  ratify 
Convention  181.114 They also remarked that the Convention did not contain any 
114 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 35, item 117.
 Chapter 2: Development
 51
 regulations concerning strikes.115 Article 6 of Recommendation 188, which aims to 
prevent the replacement of workers who are on strike by temporary agency workers, 
was merely advisory. Moreover, they stated that adequate employee protection did 
not guarantee that temporary agency workers’ protection should equal that of other 
workers.116 Furthermore, they asked for supervision of Article 7 of the Convention 
– the no fee to worker principle – as well as for attention to the potential extraterritor-
ial effect of Article 8 regarding types of migration between countries.117
Referring to Conventions 88 and 181, the employees stressed that the role private em-
ployment agencies play in achieving full and productive employment should not be 
considered decisive, or that the public employment services should be  overrated. It 
had become clear that abuses by private employment agencies were ongoing, particu-
larly in cross-border activities, which the governments as yet had failed to get a grip 
on. There was also a relation with the more general and polymorphous phenomenon 
of precarious employment that emerged in many countries and about which little was 
yet known.118 The employees also requested attention to the 2006 Employment Re-
lations Recommendation (no. 198) that aims to prevent that atypical forms of  labour 
lack employee protection.119 For a labour market to be effective, it was necessary 
to link the services of private employment agencies to a licensing and certification 
requirement.
The government of the United Kingdom reacted to allegations that  temporary 
agency workers in particular lacked rights by stating that they are free to join a trade 
union and that they do not need to inform their employer. They can ask trade union 
representatives for support everywhere, and the employer is not allowed to discrimin-
ate on the grounds of trade union membership. On the basis of studies, many tem-
porary agency workers are thought to prefer the flexibility of temporary agency work. 
The United Kingdom likewise has regulations and facilities for labour protection, also 
for migrant workers.120
A key priority for the employees turned out to be that more Member States were 
to ratify the relevant Conventions, including Convention 181.121 Also, they requested 
attention to the serious problems related to the labour market, which is becoming 
more and more precarious and segmented, and for the problems that the tripartite re-
lations of Convention 181 evoke. The 2006 Employment Relations Recommendation 
115 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 36, item 118 and item 122.
116 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 36, item 119.
117 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 36, items 120 and 121.
118 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 36, item 130.
119 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 36, item 131.
120 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 39, item 133.
121 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 42, item 149.
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(no. 198) should be taken forward. A thorough survey should take place, followed by 
a discussion about what the ILO might be able to do about it. Moreover, it should look 
at guaranteeing the freedom of association and collective bargaining for temporary 
agency workers, also in relation to their involvement in strikes.122
The employers emphasise that more jobs are the only way to face the economic un-
certainties, and this requires better thought out and more effective regulations that 
manage to combine flexibility and social protection.123
Eventually, the chairman of the committee in charge of the discussion about the 
report on the employment instruments stated that it had been logical to include Con-
vention 181 in the deliberations, even though only 23 Member States had ratified it at 
that moment and had not yet acquired a great deal of experience with the convention. 
The committee posited that private employment agencies should undoubtedly play 
an increasingly important role in bringing supply and demand together; it was to be 
hoped that more Member States would choose to ratify Convention 181.124
2.3.4 Consequences of ratification
Interestingly, some countries that have ratified the convention do not yet meet the 
requirements to implement it, as is the case with Uruguay and Surinam.
For that matter, ratification does not automatically mean that legislation or regu-
lations are directly in accordance with the provisions of Convention 181. This may 
involve a lengthy process, in which efforts are made to work towards this agreement. 
It has been indicated above that this applied to Surinam and Uruguay. It likewise 
applies to Morocco, which ratified the Convention simultaneously with the Nether-
lands in 1999, but does not yet have legislation in place that is up to standard.125 This 
is also the case in, for instance, Surinam, which ratified the employment agency con-
vention in 2006, but so far has only produced a draft law.126
On the other hand, non-ratification does not preclude adequate legislation. 
 Sweden, for example, has fairly far-reaching legislation that matches the principles 
of Convention 181.127 Sweden wishes to consider ratification in relation to its imple-
mentation of the European Temporary Work Directive.
122 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 43, items 154 and 155.
123 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 44, item 157.
124 ILC (2010b), Part I, p. 45, item 162.
125 Ahmed (2011).
126 The draft roughly translates as: ‘draft law for placement of workers by intermediaries’, 2009.
127 Van Liemt (2013), p. 21 ff.
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Non-ratification may also indicate that there is yet work to be done to ensure accept-
able temporary employment relations. In South Africa, discussions about this topic 
are ongoing. As early as 1983, this country did acknowledge temporary agency work 
on the basis of tripartite relations. Sadly this phenomenon increasingly left employees 
vulnerable to abuse. Moreover, legislation has been adjusted for triangular relations, 
making commissioning clients jointly and severally liable for wage payments (1995), 
yet implementing the legislation proved difficult. The government cannot implement 
the solution proposed in Convention 181 that the national government is to allocate 
responsibilities. In 2010 this resulted in a de facto ban on temporary employment 
agencies by no longer classifying them as formal employers. Since then, the govern-
ment has dropped this provision and proposed a maximum placement period of 
3 months, later extended to 6 months. Trade unions resisted this proposal, favouring 
the prohibition of temporary employment agencies. On the other hand, employers 
prefer a maximum placement period of 24 months. Moreover, there is the proposal to 
apply the no fee to worker principle, together with the ensuring of data protection.128 
The discussion and the bills have not yet resulted in a solution that is acceptable to 
all parties. Thus, ratification of Convention 181 is by no means imminent in South 
Africa.
A similar discussion is taking place in India. This country has had outsourcing 
legislation in place since 1970,129 but it hardly takes into account the alternative role 
that temporary agency work plays. Therefore, ratification of Convention 181 and spe-
cific national legislation for temporary employment agencies are being advocated.130
2.3.5 Supervision by the CEACR
Ratifying a convention begins a process in which a Member State commits itself to 
aligning its legislation with the provisions of the convention. Within the ILO gov-
ernance structure, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR)131 monitors that this actually happens. In the frame-
work of its supervisory role, the Member States must report periodically on their 
compliance with the ratified conventions: every other year regarding the eight fun-
damental and the four priority conventions, and at five-yearly intervals in respect of 
the other conventions.
In its supervisory role, the Committee can make use of direct requests and 
observations. Analysing the report in relation to Convention 181, it becomes clear 
128 Benjamin (2013), p. 2 ff.
129 The contract labour (regulation and abolition) Act 1970. Act no.37 of 1970.
130 ISF (2012). See also: Papapostolou & Nurthen (2012).
131 Van der Heijden (1999b); Van der Heijden (2014a)
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that the majority of the questions deal with Articles 11 and 12 (employee protection), 
 Article 7 (no fee to workers principle), Article 13 (public-private cooperation), Article 
8 (migrant workers), Article 10 (complaint procedures) and Article 5 (equal treat-
ment). In this respect, the committee requests further particulars.
2.4 2009 WORKSHOP: PROMOTING CONVENTION 181
In 2009, the ILO organised a workshop to promote further ratifications of Conven-
tion 181. A special issues paper was produced for that purpose, entitled: Private Em-
ployment Agencies, Temporary agency workers and their contribution to the labour 
market. This paper went into the background of the various provisions in Convention 
181, the regulations themselves, the sectoral aspects, the impact of the economic crisis 
and the social dialogue.132 In respect of the benefits of the Convention it stated that:
The Convention can be an engine for job creation, structural growth, improved 
efficiency of labour markets, better matching of supply and demand for workers, 
higher labour participation rates and increased diversity.
It also sets a clear framework for regulating, licensing and self-regulation,  thereby 
encouraging reliability; ensuring effective protection of workers against unfair 
practices, for example as regards pay, contract conditions, safety and health by un-
scrupulous providers or user enterprises of temporary agency workers; discour-
aging human trafficking; and promoting cooperation between public and private 
employment services.
Private employment agencies can act as an entry-port to the labour market, espe-
cially for disadvantaged jobseekers, and can enhance worker employability by facil-
itating access to training and offering opportunities for professional experience in 
different working environments.133
Thus, it stated the significance of Convention 181 plainly and clearly. 28 governments, 
together with 26 employee representatives and 34 employer representatives particip-
ated in the workshop. The points under discussion related to: the contribution to the 
labour market, legislation, employees’ rights, the economic crisis, how to promote 
further ratifications and finding points of consensus. With regard to the contribution 
to the labour market it was established that the services of private agencies that re-
spect the principles of the convention can contribute to:
 – matching supply and demand in the labour market, including the necessary flex-
ibility for enterprises;
132 WPEAC (2009).
133 WPEAC (2009), p. 41.
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 – implementing active labour market policies and creating pathways between un-
employment and employment by:
• helping jobseekers (re)entering the labour market;
• helping disadvantaged people entering into the labour market;
• creating more job opportunities for more people;
 – facilitating the transition between education and the labour market by giving 
students and other young people the opportunity to gain work experience;
 – providing temporary agency workers with vocational training;
 – converting types of contracts, e.g., transition from a temporary agency contract 
to a fixed-term or permanent contract;
 – promoting life-work balance, e.g., by providing flexible working time arrange-
ments;
 – fighting undeclared work;
 – decent working condition for cross-border work;
 – implementing national policies to promote public-private cooperation.
It was also established that appropriate regulations by national governments, de-
veloped either jointly or independently, incorporate the principles, rights and obliga-
tions in Convention 181.
The participants passionately advocate engaging in ratification and implementa-
tion of Convention 181, aided by means of various actions including help from the 
ILO.
2.5 MARITIME CONVENTION AND DOMESTIC WORKERS 
CONVENTION
Apart from Convention 181, temporary agency work has also required attention in 
respect of the creation of other conventions. On page 20 I mentioned that in 1920 
a ban on private placement was included in the Maritime Convention. It took until 
1996 for this ban to be lifted. In 1996, prior to the creation of Convention 181, the 
Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers Convention (no. 179) was created, making 
further provisions for private recruitment and placement services for seafarers. Con-
vention 179 included essentials such as no fee to workers and privacy, licensing and 
certification requirements. Ten Member States ratified this convention, until its in-
tegration into the comprehensive Maritime Labour Convention in 2006 caused its 
abolition. The latter convention provides that private placement as well as temporary 
agency work is allowed.134
134 Heerma van Voss et al. (2006), p. 26.
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Since then, 78 Member States have ratified this convention. The Netherlands ratified 
the convention in 2011, and specified arrangements regarding placement and provi-
sion of workers in a government resolution dated 27 August 2012.135
In 2011, the Domestic Workers Convention (no. 189) was created. Article 15 gives spe-
cific attention to the role that private employment agencies play in combating abuses. 
By now, this convention has 22 ratifications.
135 Resolution dated 27 August 2012, containing rules on seafarers’ entitlements, placement and pro-
vision of seagoing workers, and on amending the Working Hours Decree and the Working Con-
dition Decree with reference to the implementation of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, 
Dutch law gazette (Staatsblad) (2012) 397, art. 9 to 11.
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Chapter 3
Complications
Chapter 2 outlined the development towards a new convention for private placement 
and for temporary agency work in particular. This chapter will explore the ensuing 
complications.
While Convention 181 was nearing its completion, a discussion started about 
contract labour, which overlapped the phenomenon of temporary agency work and 
actually also needed further regulation. This discussion turned into a consultation 
that led to a recommendation in respect of the employment relationship. Simultan-
eously, however, a newer, broader discussion began about precarious work, which 
was thought to supersede standard employment to an increasing extent. Subsequent-
ly, temporary agency work was also categorised as being a type of precarious work.
In addition, the stances social partners take, the potential bottlenecks and the 
introduction of the novel concept of Non-Standard Forms of Employment (NSFE), 
will be discussed.
3.1 CONTRACT LABOUR
3.1.1 Attention for contract labour 136
The Adoption of Convention 181 meant that private placement was finally allowed 
and that regulations were drawn up for the triangular employment relationships that 
are attendant on the fact that in temporary agency work three parties tend to play a 
role, i.e. the temporary worker, the temporary agency and the user company.
In article 1b, the Convention phrases this as follows:
[…] services consisting of employing workers with a view to making them avail-
able to a third party, who may be a natural or legal person (referred to as a “user 
enterprise”) which assigns their tasks and supervises the execution of these tasks.
136 Governing Body 262\92–2A E95 IV 2, p. 68 ff.
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Essential in this passage are the placing agent who also acts as the employer and the 
workers who actually work for a third party that acts as commissioning client and 
supervises the work that needs to be done. The breeding ground for this triangular 
employment relationship is the allocation of labour, i.e. bringing supply and demand 
together in the labour market, which is characteristic of all the conventions named 
in chapter 2.
However, it had also become clear that these allocation services involve inter-
mediaries acting as employers, so that regulations also had to be drawn up for them. 
And this touches on the other issue that was occupying the ILO at the time: contract 
labour. It has always been hard to interpret this concept. Contract labour can take 
a great many shapes, and the problem was and still is that no clear-cut definition is 
available.
Apart from placing temporary agency workers as defined in Convention 181 (art. 
1b), temporary employment agencies also engage in contract labour. That is why fur-
ther analysis of the contract labour discussion is relevant. Moreover, the concepts of 
temporary agency work and contract labour overlap.
The Governing Body of the ILO did not only place the revision of the  Fee-Charging 
Employment Agencies Convention (no. 96) on the agenda, but also the issue of con-
tract labour. This had to do with the obscurity of the concept, which would not yield 
sufficient social protection for the workers concerned. The Governing Body dis-
cussed the topic at their 258th and 259th sessions (in November 1993 and March 1994 
respect ively), concluding that further research on the subject was necessary to find 
our whether the development of an international standard would be feasible.
At the March 1994 session, the Governing Body anticipated the various discus-
sions by distinguishing three types of labour relationships, i.e.:
 – on the basis of a ‘employment agreement’,
 – on the basis of ‘labour only contracting’;
 – on the basis of ‘job contracting’.
In case of an ‘employment agreement’, the worker agrees to work for and under the 
authority of the employer. The employer is responsible for providing the necessary 
working materials, paying the wages, ensuring that occupational health and safety 
regulations are observed and also for taking care of social security arrangements.
‘Labour only contracting’ is only about providing manpower, which makes it 
compatible to temporary agency work. It involves a worker who is assigned to a third 
party (commissioning client) by an intermediary who also acts as the employer.
‘Job contracting’ involves a subcontractor, who can be a large or small business or a 
self-employed worker rendering services to a contractor. From a formal legal perspect-
ive, this involves a commercial contract by which the enterprise outsources work to a 
subcontractor who employs the workers under his supervision or acts independently.
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In reality, however, it is often hard to distinguish ‘labour-only contracting’ from ‘job 
contracting’, as many hybrid forms are conceivable. In some countries, ‘labour-only 
contracting’ is banned, and in such cases, parties will resort to fictitious ‘job con-
tracting’. Likewise, it is hard to distinguish between ‘contracting of service’, which 
makes use of an employment or services contract, and a ‘contract for services’ (i.e. job 
contracting). Meanwhile the distinction is quite relevant as it indicates exactly who 
is responsible for what.
‘Contract labour’ is a commonly used term and denotes both ‘labour only con-
tracting’ and ‘job contracting’. According to the ILO Office’s report to the Governing 
Body in March 1995137, ‘contract labour’ is a rising phenomenon that is mostly found 
in sectors such as construction, the clothing industry, plantations, forestry, the oil 
and gas industry and transport; it is also common in the IT sector.
Reasons to opt for outsourcing include capitalising on cyclicity, cost manage-
ment, the need for flexibility, enhancing the job security of the core-team, the need to 
minimise risks and anticipating growing insecurity.138
Generally, the report observes that this increasingly popular form of organising 
labour jeopardises worker protection. Hence the call on the ILO to pay attention to 
this growing phenomenon.
3.1.2 Extensive report of 1997 conference
The ILO Office compiled an extensive report on contract labour139 for the 1997 ILO 
conference. The topic was examined in 1997 according to a so-called  double-discussion 
procedure, which meant that the topic would recur on the agenda for the 1998 confer-
ence. The report provides an extensive analysis of the phenomenon, linking up with 
earlier reports to the Governing Body.
Again, the concepts of ‘job contracting’ and ‘labour only contracting’ are discussed. 
With regard to ‘job contracting’, a distinction is made between ‘contracting in’ and 
‘contracting out’; if the former applies, the work is carried out at the premises of the 
commissioning client; in the latter case, the work is carried out at the premises of the 
subcontractor.140
The ‘contract labour’ arrangements can be tripartite or bipartite in nature. A tri-
partite relationship either involves a worker, a user company and a third party – being 
an established business supplying goods and services – or a worker, a user company 
137 Governing Body 262\92–2A E95 IV 2, p. 282.
138 Governing Body 262\92–2A E95 IV 2, p. 287.
139 ILC (1997b).
140 ILC (1997b), p. 8.
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and a third party that specialises in providing manpower. The bipartite form involves 
an individual who provides the user company with labour. These are the main cat-
egories, but they do not exhaust the full spectrum of possibilities.141 Thus, in practice, 
it is often difficult to ascertain which form of contract labour we are dealing with, 
especially if employment relationships are informal.
In the report, temporary agency work is looked upon as a form of ‘labour only 
contracting’, which has given rise to controversies in legal literature. Specifically, the 
question arose as to whether the temporary employment agency as a mediator and 
employer actually implies an acceptable form of employer practice and whether the 
user company should be considered to be the employer instead.142
This critical note may be considered remarkable, as efforts were made simul-
taneously to regulate temporary agency work in the framework of the Convention 96 
revision and in essence to assign the role of employer to the temporary work agency.
The ILO report names the factors that influence the supply of contract labour. It 
mentions the high levels of unemployment143 that cause people to be generally more 
receptive to forms of so-called non-standard work, work that deviates from the stand-
ard of open-ended careers on a full-time basis. Female labour and the ageing labour 
force also make non-standard work more popular. There is a younger generation of 
workers with a different outlook on work, although many still prefer the old pattern.
The demand for contract labour144 is driven by the global trend towards en-
hanced flexibility, decentralisation and specialisation of manufacturing processes, 
the rise of new technologies and new working methods that arise from an increas-
ing global economic competition and a growing interdependence of economic and 
finan cial markets.
The report also gives examples145 of how labour law and collective bargaining have 
capitalised on the phenomenon of ‘contract labour’. Essential in that respect is the 
judgment of the court as to whether a commercial contract or an employment con-
tract applies. The report concludes146 that adequate legislation is needed in view of an 
increasing use of contract labour. It lists three important reasons:
 – the dependence on the material employer;
 – the obscure role of the third party/ intermediary;
 – the difficulty if interpreting the phenomenon in general.
141 ILC (1997b), p. 9.
142 ILC (1997b), p. 11.
143 ILC (1997b), p. 15.
144 ILC (1997b).
145 ILC (1997b), p. 26 ff.
146 ILC (1997b), p. 73 ff.
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Although this analysis also appears to acknowledge forms of temporary agency work, 
the ILO Office turns out to have taken a different view. According to the report, it 
is legitimate to exclude temporary employment agencies from new contract labour 
legislation, since the status of temporary agency worker means that social law applies 
and the revision of Convention 96 will imply an unambiguous worker protection.147
3.1.3  Survey among member states 148
In order to draft a proposal for adequate international regulations, the ILO Office 
carried out a survey among the member states. Questions were asked, among others, 
about:
 – the need for either a convention, a recommendation or a convention supple-
mented by a recommendation;
 – whether the preamble should include adequate worker protection as an objective;
 – what should be taken into consideration with respect to the implementation of 
new standards;
 – which topics must be regulated;
 – whether contract labour may be prohibited;
 – whether a registration and licensing requirement may be feasible;
 – whether equal treatment is required and who must be the benchmark;
 – how the responsibilities with regard to the financial, employer, occupational 
safety and health, social security and liability obligations should be allocated;
 – whether measures for migrant workers are needed.
84 member states responded to the questionnaire. 74 of which reacted positively to 
the question about an instrument, 15 wanted a convention and 27 preferred a recom-
mendation; 34 wanted a convention supplemented by a recommendation. In any case, 
78 wanted a new standard aimed at worker protection; for implementation methods, 
62 wanted legislation, collective agreements, arbitration and jurisdiction; 61 wanted 
unambiguous definitions of ‘contract worker’, ‘subcontractor’ and ‘intermediary’; 55 
wanted a general application, but 52 wanted to allow for exceptions.149 In this re-
spect, the ILO Office remarked that the provision was aimed at the temporary agency 
activities that were to be covered the new Convention 181. In view of the intended 
definitions, temporary agency workers would be included in both conventions and 
that would require an exception.150 72 member states agreed with the substantive 
147 ILC (1997b), p. 75.
148 ILC (1997b), p. 77 ff. See also: ILC (1997c)
149 ILC (1997b), p. 13 ff.
150 ILC (1997b), p. 49 ff.
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proposals; 51 supported a registration and licensing requirement and 54 agreed with 
an obligation to guarantee equality of treatment; 37 member states were in favour of 
distribution of responsibilities; 53 wanted protection for migrant workers.151
3.1.4 A laborious discussion on  worker protection 
Th e Committee on Contract Labour presented the above-mentioned reports at the 
1997 ILC. It set out to explain the topic by means of a slide presentation.152
It became clear that the main issue concerns the contractual status of the work-
ers involved and the corresponding worker protection. Arrangements on the basis 
of an employment relationship with either the user company or the subcontractor 
are conceivable. Other arrangements, however, do not involve employment relation-
ships with the subcontractor or the intermediary, even though they supply labour 
that benefi ts the user company. Nor does an employment relationship apply if the 
worker supplies his labour or services directly to the user company, as is the case for 
a self-employed subcontractor (fi gure 3.1). To determine whether worker protection 
was in place, the concepts of subordination and dependency were introduced.
Figure 3.1 Scope of possible instrument(s) Slide presentation on worker protection at 1997 ILC
151 ILC (1997b), p. 98.
152 Slide presentation worker protection at 1997 ILC.
worker
user
one-person
subcontractor
subcontractor
non-employee
employee
intermediary
labour
job?dependencyand/or
subordination
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From the start, the employers’ attitude in the Committee on Contract Labour has 
not been positive.153 The employers’ spokesperson reminded the Committee that the 
Governing Body’s decision to place contract labour on the agenda in April 1995 had 
certainly not been unanimous. At the time, the employers had opposed the employ-
ees’ proposal, and many national government had also had doubts. There was a fair 
amount of conceptual, definition-related and practical problems, and even the Office 
itself was thought to have serious doubts about the feasibility of regulating this phe-
nomenon by means of ILO standards.
In fact, the employers could not provide a good definition. They did spot oppor-
tunities to tackle so-called bogus arrangements, fraud and illegal activities that took 
place to evade legal obligations and that encroached on workers’ rights.154 However, 
the present proposal was not satisfactory in that respect. The proposal was contrary 
to national legislations and practices; it created issues with tax and premiums, lim-
ited outsourcing of work and harmed employment. Producing an adequate definition 
proved impossible and the solution of working with an evolving criterion of depend-
ency was unworkable. Achieving consensus would not be feasible, particularly for 
employers and various governments.
By contrast, the employees were happy155 with the fact that the topic had been 
placed on the agenda; they took the view that the ILO Office had acquired sufficient 
knowledge and had presented a clear concept as a basis for a potential standard. They 
harked back to the ILO principle that labour is not a commodity and that the em-
ployment contract imposes an obligation on the employer to protect employees ad-
equately, which is a measure of social justice that benefits society as a whole.
The employees’ spokesperson argued that the employment relationship was at 
risk due to the increasing use of ‘co-employment’ and ‘triangular employment re-
lationships’, which could place workers outside the scope of labour legislation. The 
employees argued that even though subordination and dependency resulted, in prin-
ciple, in protection for many workers by ILO instruments, many other workers were 
by now excluded, and therefore a new instrument was needed to extend worker pro-
tection. There were no negative consequences for employment and, at worst, con-
tract labour was simply a form of fraud in order to evade employers’ obligations. Still 
according to the employees the complexity of the issue should not be exaggerated 
either.
The national governments156 gave various reactions based on a wide range of 
experiences. For instance, the national governments of Australia and New Zealand 
153 ILC (1997d), p. 3 ff.
154 ILC (1997d), p. 4.
155 ILC (1997d), p. 5 ff.
156 ILC (1997d), p. 6 ff.
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were not enthusiastic, while the EC countries aimed for a positive approach to the 
discussion on the basis of the proposals. In view of the negative results of contract 
labour in their region, the national government of Trinidad & Tobago, speaking also 
on behalf of the Caribbean community, advocated measures. Canada and Japan were 
in favour of a recommendation.
The francophones were having difficulties with the French translations of the 
definitions, which were not clear. A number of national governments, including 
those of Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Hungary, Mauritius, the Netherlands (speaking on 
behalf of the EC), Switzerland and the United States likewise asked for clarification 
of definitions. The French government argued that well-defined subcontracting be-
tween two companies was beyond the scope of the proposed convention, but might 
come under the recommendation and thus they asked for clarification.
All in all, the attitudes of the governments did nothing to lessen the employers’ con-
cerns; in many respects they were actually exacerbated. The employers also realised 
that a third category of workers was emerging. The first category relates to the clearly 
independent worker, the second category to the worker who is working on the basis 
of an employment relationship, while the third category relates to the worker who 
does not have employee status, but who should have the corresponding advantages.
The employees opposed the introduction of a third category.157 The employers 
held the view that international legislation should not concern itself with commer-
cial contracts if this meant that the corresponding advantages were also taken from 
workers. The employers stressed that they did not want to support illegal, fraudulent 
or ‘bogus’ labour practices.158
The employees indicated that the essential problem was the existence of ‘dis-
guised’ employment and ‘triangular’ employment relationships, which had shown 
a sharp increase in the years preceding the conference and undermined the basis of 
labour legislation. If the ILO could not remedy this, then obviously the ILO could not 
adjust to the changing world of work.159
By means of an amendment, the employers tried to have article 1 of the draft 
convention changed; this article stipulates that the International Labour Conference 
should adopt standards for contract labour, and the employers wanted this section 
struck off as soon as the discussion began. However, the amendment was rejected 
with 4072 votes in favour and 7260 against (44 abstentions). Thus, the playing field 
was staked out for the time being.160
157 ILC (1997d), p. 11.
158 ILC (1997d), p. 12.
159 ILC (1997d), p. 12.
160 ILC (1997d), p. 13.
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3.1.5 Temporary agency work is excluded
A further interesting point is that in the proposals for a convention, temporary  agency 
work is excluded from its application. By ‘contract labour’ the draft convention 
means:161
5. For the purpose of the proposed convention the term ‘contract labour’ should 
mean work performed for a natural or legal person (referred to as a ‘user enter-
prise’) by a person (referred to as a ‘contract worker’) pursuant to a contractual 
arrangement other than a contract of employment with the user enterprise, un-
der actual conditions of dependency on or subordination to the user enterprise, 
where these conditions are similar to those that characterize an employment 
relationship under national law and practice.
6. The proposed convention should apply to all branches of economic activity and 
to all contract workers. It should not apply to employees of private employment 
agencies, who are made available to a user enterprise to perform contract labour.
At the employers’ request, the committee eventually extended this exclusion to all 
workers who are working on the basis of an employment relationship. One proposed 
amendment read: ‘It should not apply to workers who in accordance with national 
law and practice have a recognized employment relationship’. By means of a sub- 
amendment this was later changed to: ‘It should not apply to workers who in accord-
ance with national law and practice have a recognized contract of employment’.
This would have been a logical continuation of the exclusion of temporary agency 
workers who are working on the basis of an employment relationship. However, fol-
lowing a suggestion made by the South African government, the employees request-
ed adding the words ‘with the user enterprise’ at the end as a sub-amendment. This 
proposal was carried with 14,364 in favour and 13,965 against, a modest majority.162
The employers’ representatives much regretted this outcome regarding such an 
essential and fundamental part of the proposal. They stated that the ILO works on the 
basis of tripartism and consensus, which was why they found it disappointing that 
half of the governments did not vote. The governments only made up a small part 
of the majority vote, supplemented by employees. Thus, tripartism hardly applied in 
this case. The employees’ representatives even proposed an amendment in an attempt 
to get the exclusion of temporary agency work struck off. However, this proposal was 
not carried.
161 ILC (1997e), p. 133.
162 ILC (1997d), p. 27 ff.
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3.1.6 The proposition is still controversial
In the event, the discussion did yield the odd amendment. Apart from a clarification 
of the definition, the scope (see paragraph 3.5), a provision about equality of treat-
ment was adopted; moreover, the worker protection was extended.163
The spokesperson for the employers164 was opposed to an instrument and regret-
ted that the discussion had not managed to change this attitude in the least; the em-
ployers continued to have issues with the definitions, the concept of dependency and 
subordination, the introduction of an equality of treatment provision, the allocation of 
responsibilities, the licensing requirement and the ban on replacing striking employees.
Likewise, the participation by the national governments – especially where fun-
damental issues were concerned – was disappointing. The employees were better sat-
isfied and continued to hope for a positive outcome. In a joint resolution the parties 
made an appeal to again place the topic on the 1998 ILO conference.165
3.1.7 Second reading in 1998 166
In preparation for the 1998 conference, the member states received three proposals to 
comment on. Generally, the ILO Office has the possibility to revise proposals in view 
of the second reading. However, the ILO Office refrained from revision due to the 
doubts that emerged with regard to the draft convention, its sheer complexity and the 
requests for clarification. While some comments were of a technical nature; others 
were so fundamental in nature that the ILO Office preferred, partly because of a lack 
of time, to firstly have a discussion and to leave the proposal texts largely unchanged.
Nearly half of the approximately fifty general comments made by the member 
states and other organisations proved to be negative or to contain requests for further 
clarification. Thus, it looked like a hopeless task.
The American comment asked for a further discussion about the scope, the def-
inition and the obscure language. If there were to be anything to ratify, there had to be 
a clear understanding of the intentions of the convention and the recommendation.
What is also interesting is that the exclusion of temporary agency work was  rather 
controversial.167 Particularly the Dutch, Danish and Japanese trade unions were against 
it. The FNV argued that the fact that Convention 181 now existed was not a valid reason 
for the exclusions:
163 ILC (1997b), Proposed Conclusions, § V, art. 19 ff.
164 ILC (1997d), p. 64 ff.
165 ILC (1997d), p. 72 e.v.
166 ILC (1998a en b).
167 ILC (1998a), p. 54.
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 – since Convention 181 was more focused on the labour market situation than on 
worker protection;
 – that moreover, the conventions concerning private employment agencies and 
contract labour should be considered separately; after all, ratification of the con-
tract labour convention did not automatically mean that Convention 181 would 
be ratified, and that meant that temporary agency workers could end up being 
marginalised;
 – and furthermore, Convention 181 would not take into account the factual rela-
tionship between the temporary agency worker and the user company, which 
the new contract labour convention did set out to do.
The provision with regard to equality of treatment seems equally controversial. It 
raised more questions than answers.168 The subsequent discussion did not bring the 
parties closer together. The employers insisted that the semantic and conceptual prob-
lems, the definition questions, made clear that this topic was not suitable for the new 
ILO standards. However, the employees persisted that the problems could certainly be 
overcome. Contract workers lacked adequate social protection; it was absolutely worth 
a new discussion. The basic principles and the justification of the employee contract 
could not pass over the changing world of work. The discussion was repetitive.
3.1.8 A last attempt 169
During the discussion, the ILO Office made a highly remarkable attempt by pre-
senting a new, much abbreviated drafting proposal. It proposed a part I containing 
general provisions and a part II containing provisions for contract workers who are 
employed by another company.
Part I considers guaranteeing worker protection in the fields of freedom of as-
sociation, collective bargaining, non-discrimination, minimum age, occupational 
health and safety, compensation in case of occupational accidents or diseases, and 
social charges, for those who factually work as an employee for a user company, but 
are not actually employees. Temporary agency work continued to be excluded ac-
cording to Convention 181. Also, there should be regulations to determine whether 
or not an employee relationship exists.
Part II considers the regulation of triangular employment relationships, in view 
of which the member states should allocate responsibilities. Member states could 
choose between parts I or II.170
168 ILC (1998a), p. 60 e.v.
169 ILC (1998b), Addendum.
170 ILC (1997b), Annex: Suggested changes to the text of the proposed instruments.
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3.1.9 A ‘delaying resolution 171
However, this much-simplified text possibly came too late. The parties concerned 
were no longer able to conduct an in-depth discussion.
Eventually, the Conference adopted a resolution to the effect that, among other 
things, the Committee on Contract Labour has identified situations where worker 
protection has been requested, that the Committee has made progress on this topic 
and therefore is inviting the ILO Governing Body to place this topic back on the 
agenda of the ILO conference within four years, with a view to possibly adopting a 
convention supplemented by a recommendation. In such a case, the resolution asked 
the Governing Body to request the Director-General of the ILO:
 – to organise meetings of experts to examine the following issues that have risen 
from the deliberations:
• which workers in situations so far identified by the Committee need protec-
tion;
• appropriate ways in which workers can be protected, possibly dealing with 
the various situations separately;
• how to define these workers, taking into consideration the various legal sys-
tems and language differences;
 – to take other measures with a view to completing the work that the Committee 
started.
Thus, this resolution provisionally concluded a lively and complex discussion that 
had not yet yielded any tangible results. Now it was up to the ‘experts’. They met in 
2000.
3.1.10 2000 Meeting of experts 172
When the meeting of experts took place in May 2000, it unanimously issued a state-
ment containing policy guidance on the various actions, including ILO support, that 
were needed to ensure that employment law grants adequate protection to workers. 
Moreover, the statement included the possibility of adopting instruments, i.e. a con-
vention and/or a supplementary recommendation.
During the meeting, the experts observed that the global phenomenon of ‘trans-
formation’ of the nature of work has led to situations in which the scope of employ-
ment law (which determines whether or not workers are entitled to protection) does 
not correspond with the reality of the labour relations. There is a trend where workers 
171 ILC (1998c), p. 21.
172 ILO (2000). See also: ILC (2003a), annex 2.
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in need of the protection of labour law, do not legally or actually receive it. The gov-
ernment and employee experts noted an increasing trend, but the employer experts 
were not convinced. The perceived discrepancy between law and reality varies from 
country to country and from industry to industry. And while it became clear that 
some national governments had adjusted the scope of their employment law, this had 
not taken place in every country.
The meeting noted that much information had become available by now, but 
that the ILO should be authorised to conduct additional studies, synthesize the stud-
ies, and promote exchanges between the authors of the country reports, as well as 
other experts and representatives of social partners, including the organisation of an 
ILO conference.
The experts also established that countries should develop policies to clarify – 
and if necessary adapt – the scope of their employment contract legislation at regular 
intervals; social partners should be allowed to participate in this. Any national policy 
should at least include the following elements:
 – providing guidelines regarding employment law, particularly with respect to the 
distinction between dependent and self-employed workers;
 – providing appropriate protection to workers;
 – combating disguised employment, which deprives dependent workers of their 
protection;
 – refraining from hinder to genuine commercial contracts or genuine independ-
ent contracting;
 – making available appropriate mechanisms to determine the status of workers.
The meeting took the view that the ILO could play a key role in ensuring that employ-
ment law provides adequate protection to workers.
This may imply the adoption of instruments, i.e. a convention and/or a supple-
mentary recommendation, providing technical cooperation and assistance in devel-
oping policies and gathering information.
3.1.11 2003, the scope of the employment relationship 173
In March 2001, the Governing Body decided to place the scope of the employment 
relationship on the agenda of the 2003 International Labour Conference .
Thus, the Governing Body focused the discussion, emphasising the labour pro-
tection of dependent workers, particularly their rights, claims and obligations as stat-
ed in law, regulations and collective agreements on the basis of employment law. This 
concerns the relationship between an employer and an employee. In preparation to 
173 ILC (2003a), p. 2.
Part I An ILO framework for temporary agency work: development and complication 
70
the discussion, the ILO Office drew up a report. This report relates to the growing 
phenomenon of the dependent worker who lacks labour protection as a result of one 
or more of the following factors:
 – The scope of the law is too narrow or is too narrowly interpreted.
 – The law is formulated poorly or ambiguously, so that the scope is not clear.
 – The employment relationship is disguised.
 – Due to ambiguity, there is doubt about the nature of the employment relation-
ship.
 – An employment relationship exists, but it is unclear as to who the employer is, 
what rights the worker has and who is responsible for ensuring that they have 
these rights.
 – There is a lack of compliance and enforcement.174
In its report, the Office clearly indicates that the above phenomena are on the rise and 
contribute to increasing insecurity and poverty. They also have an adverse impact on 
the competitiveness and viability of businesses. Likewise, the report refers to the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, in which the Con-
ference has officially established the general applicability of the ILO instruments re-
gardless of the worker’s status.175 Furthermore, it observes a growing insecurity. The 
lack of worker protection undermines productivity and distorts competition. The 
workers’ commitment deteriorates, which leads to increasing and costly turnover of 
workers. Workers receive less training and occupational heath and safety regulations 
are disregarded.
Ultimately, the crux is to find a balance between equity and adaptability.176 This 
balance must be found by achieving consensus through social dialogue.
Although the ILO Office indicated in its report that the phenomenon of the de-
pendent worker was on the rise, further on it produced study data demonstrating 
that stable and sustainable employment relationships still prevailed in industrialised 
countries. The data make clear that the employment tenure averaged 10.4 years in 
2000 (ranging from an minimum of 8.2 to a maximum of 13.5 years), which does not 
deviate much from the 1992 figure. While the average share of employees with less 
than one year’s tenure increased by 11.3%, the share of employees with more than ten 
years’ tenure increased by 1.1%177 (see table 3.1).
174 ILC (2003a), p. 2.
175 ILC (2003a), p. 4.
176 ILC (2003a), p. 16.
177 ILC (2003a), p. 20.
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Whether an employment contract applies is determined by the facts and not by what 
the contract is called. The ILO Office calls this the ‘primacy of fact’.178 Disputes about 
the nature of the working relationship may have to do with ‘disguised’ or simply ‘ob-
jectively ambiguous’ employment relationships. Labour relations are given ‘an ap-
pearance that is different from the underlying reality with the intention of nullifying 
or attenuating the labour protection afforded by the law’.179
Table 3.1  The scope of the employment relationship. Average employment tenure (years) 
and share of employees with less than one year and more than ten years (%)
Country
Average 
tenure
Change 
%
Under 
one year
Change 
%
Ten years 
and over
Change 
%
1992 2000 1992– 
2000
1992 2000 1992– 
2000
1992 2000 1992– 
2000
Belgium 11.0 11.5 4.5 10.4 13.6 30.8 45.3 46.2 2.0
Denmark 8.8 8.3 –5.7 17.9 23.0 28.5 33.6 31.1 –7.4
FinlandB 10.7 10.1 –5.6 17.6 21.6 22.7 39.6 42.1 6.3
France 10.4 11.1 6.7 13.8 15.8 14.5 42.9 44.8 4.4
Germany 10.7 10.5 –1.9 14.0 14.8 5.7 41.7 39.7 –4.8
Greece 13.5 13.5 0.0 7.2 9.4 30.6 53.0 53.2 0.4
Ireland 11.1 9.4 –15.3 12.1 21.8 80.2 42.1 33.6 –20.2
Italy 11.9 12.2 2.5 7.0 11.1 58.6 48.8 50.7 3.9
JapanB 10.9 11.6 6.4 9.8 8.3 –15.3 42.9 43.2 0.7
Luxembourg 10.1 11.4 12.9 17.4 11.6 –33.3 38.8 45.5 17.3
Netherlands 8.9 9.1 2.2 14.5 20.5 41.4 34.5 36.1 4.6
Portugal 11.1 11.8 6.3 17.0 13.9 –18.2 48.8 44.6 –8.6
Spain 9.9 10.1 2.0 23.6 20.7 –12.3 39.7 40.3 1.5
SwedenB 10.6 11.5 8.5 14.8 15.7 6.1 39.7 46.7 17.6
United Kingdom 8.1 8.2 1.2 15.6 19.3 23.7 31.5 33.3 5.7
United StatesC,D 6.7 6.6 –1.5 28.8 27.8 –3.5 26.6 25.8 –3.0
European Union (eu-14)E 10.5 10.6 1.3 14.5 16.6 14.7 41.4 42.0 1.4
Average 10.3 10.4 1.5 15.1 16.8 11.3 40.6 41.1 1.1
1 Data refer to 1995, change from 1995 to 2000.
2 Average tenure data refer to 1991 instead of 1992.
3 For United States and Japan, data refer to 1998 instead of 2000.
4 Without Austria.
Source: P. Auer & S. Cazes, Employment stability in an age of flexibility: 
 Evidence from industrialized countries, Geneva: ILO (2003).
The report gives examples to illustrate the changes in status that have taken place. 
Truck drivers, for instance, have experienced a shift towards self-employment. The 
ILO Office indicates that ‘disguise’ and ‘ambiguity’ cannot be contributed solely to 
178 ILC (2003a), p. 23.
179 ILC (2003a), p. 24-25.
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obscurity and issues relating to the scope of the law, but that it also has to do with 
failure to comply with the law and with lack of enforcement.180
The problems are exacerbated in case of ‘triangular’ employment relationships, 
the Office argues in this report. Examples are derived from construction, clothing, 
sales staff in department stores as well as supermarkets and hypermarkets. Relevant 
questions are: who is the employer; what are the worker’s rights; who is responsible 
for what? Some ILO conventions address these questions; the examples include the 
1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (no. 181) that allocates the duties and 
responsibilities to the various parties.181
In 2000, the experts advocated clear guidelines to clarify the scope of the working 
relationship. Responses have included redefining the scope of the employment rela-
tionship more precisely, staking out the boundary between dependent and independ-
ent work, combining both elements and introducing specific legislation with regard 
to certain types of work.182
The report gives examples of broader definitions in New Zealand and Finland of 
the interpretation of the employment relationship. From Ireland it derives an  example 
of clear guidelines to establish the appropriate status of the workers. South Africa is 
working with a ‘legal presumption in favour of employee status’, i.e. an employment 
relationship applies if one or more of seven factors exist. Specific legislation has been 
formulated in Chile, New Zealand, Venezuela and Peru. The report gives specific 
examples of how the issue has been solved when three parties are involved,183 i.e. 
the worker, the employer and the user company. It must become clear who the em-
ployer is and which rights and obligations must be allocated to whom. American and 
Argentinian examples indicate that in this instance, too, the new Convention 181 is 
considered to be the best practice.
3.1.12 Conclusions relating to employment relationship 184
The deliberations about the employment relationship, partly as a result of the above- 
mentioned report, produced the following conclusions:
 – The protection of workers is one of the ILO’s key duties. The Decent Work  Agenda 
provides that all workers, regardless of their status, must work in conditions of 
‘decency and dignity’. Self-employed and independent work based on commer-
cial and civil contracts are excluded.
180 ILC (2003a), p. 33 ff.
181 ILC (2003a), p. 50.
182 ILC (2003a), p. 54.
183 ILC (2003a), p. 65 ff.
184 ILC (2006a), Annex 2, Resolution concerning employment relationship. See also: ILC (2003b), p. 52.
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 – The criteria to determine whether there is an employment relationship must be 
sufficiently clear.
 – Changes in the labour market and in the way work is being organised may ob-
scure the nature of the working relationship.
 – There is a growing phenomenon of workers who in fact perform dependent 
work, but are not protected by an employment relationship. This is a form of 
false self-employment.
 – Clear rules are needed for the wide variety of work arrangements, in connection 
with:
• the fact that the law is unclear, too narrow in scope or otherwise inadequate;
• the fact that the employment relationship is disguised as a civil or commer-
cial contract;
• the fact that the working relationship is obscure;
• the fact that the worker is an employee, but that it is unclear who the em-
ployer is, what rights the worker has and who is responsible for these rights;
• lack of compliance and enforcement.
 – Clear and predictable legislation is in everyone’s interest.
 – Disguised employment occurs when the person who commissions the work mis-
represents the employment relationship; this should be combated unequivocally.
 – ‘Ambiguous’ labour relations occur when there is genuine doubt about the exist-
ence of an employment relationship;
 – In the case of triangular employment relationships it must be verified whether lack 
of worker protection occurs. It must be determined who the employer is, what 
rights the employee has and who is responsible for which of them. Mechanisms are 
needed to ascertain with whom the responsibilities lie. With respect to temporary 
agency work this has been arranged in Convention 181 and  Recommendation 188.
 – Respect for the law is a fundamental principle.
 – Attention for enforcement mechanisms is needed; appropriate training is im-
portant in this respect as well.
 – All major parties must be involved in the realisation of law and regulations.
 – Attention must be paid to women in vulnerable positions; see also the relevant 
ILO convention.
 – Attention must be given to clear guidelines, effective worker protection, com-
bating disguised employment, non-interference with genuine commercial con-
tracts and an adequate dispute settlement mechanism.
 – More efforts should be made with regard to data collection.
 – Compliance and enforcement must be monitored at regular intervals.
 – The ILO must look for an international response to this issue. The Committee con-
siders a recommendation to be an appropriate response. The  recommendation 
should focus on the ‘disguised’ employment relationship. It must be flexible 
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and take into account the wide variety of employment relationships; however it 
should not interfere with genuine commercial contracting arrangements. Also, 
it should promote social dialogue and collective bargaining as means of solving 
the issue. The Governing Body is invited to place the topic of the employment 
relationship on the agenda. Otherwise, the issue of triangular employment rela-
tionships was not yet solved.
On the basis of the discussion about the scope of the employment relationship yield-
ing the above conclusions, a resolution was adopted to place the topic on the agenda 
of a subsequent ILC.
3.1.13 Recommendation within reach
The main point was that a recommendation had come within reach. A standard 
for contract labour had met with opposition for a long time. This concept continu-
ed to be unclear and it still was not possible to define it more clearly. Moreover, it 
was feared that a new category of workers was emerging alongside employees and 
self-employed workers. However, the employees’ experts held the view that some-
thing urgently needed to be done about this growing phenomenon that deprived 
more and more workers of an employment relationship even though they were in a 
position of dependence. National governments remained ambivalent, but thought 
something might be arranged.
Through a meeting of experts the focus shifted from contract labour to the scope 
of the employment relationship.
It is actually rather surprising that an agreement was reached. Employers gave 
up their ‘total resistance’ and employees apparently settled for the less far-reaching 
instrument of a recommendation. The consensus about this was the result of a Finn-
ish amendment.185 In a constructive social dialogue, the employers proved willing to 
commit to this aspiration, although they continued to be worried about the viability 
of a standard. The employees considered this result to be a sound basis for further 
action. Some national governments were negative, but most supported the results, 
including the desire to work on a recommendation.186
3.1.14 2006, recommendation fleshed out
In March 2004, the employment relationship was placed on the agenda of the 95th 
ILO Conference in 2006. To that end, the ILO Office prepared a report about legis-
185 ILC (2003b), p. 48.
186 ILC (2003b), p. 48.
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lation and practices the various member states. The report included a questionnaire 
inquiring about the experiences so far.187
The questionnaire contained 18 questions. They related to the national policy 
that must be implemented or continued with regard to worker protection in the em-
ployment relationship and to which role the tripartite partners played in it, how it 
should be determined that an employment relationship existed, the manner in which 
disputes should be settled, compliance with and enforcement of the regulations and 
the inviolability of commercial agreements.
78 countries replied to the questionnaire; 68 countries were positive about the 
question as to whether the ILC should adopt a national instrument concerning the 
employment relationship; 7 countries were negative: 2 countries held other views. 
68 countries answered affirmatively to the question as to whether there should be a 
national policy to periodically clarify and review the measures to maintain worker 
protection in the context of an employment relationship; 61 countries were in favour 
of a new mechanism that should also involve the social partners. 66 member states 
affirmed that the instrument should provide criteria to determine the employment 
relationship; according to 53 countries the instrument should provide a list of indic-
ators to help establish these criteria. 65 countries were in favour of including a dispute 
arrangement; 62 countries were positive about adopting compliance and enforce-
ment measures and 56 countries agreed that the new instrument should not restrain 
the establishment of civil or commercial contractual relationships.
Table 3.2 Replies from governments
Question Affirmative Negative Other Question Affirmative Negative Other
1 68  7 2 6(2)(e) 70  2 2
2 67  6 2 6(2)(f) 68  4 1
3(1)(a) 55 18 0 7 58 16 2
3(1)(b) 52 19 1 8 61  9 0
3(1)(c) 54 14 3 9(a) 49 21 0
3(2) 58 16 0 9(b) 59 11 0
3(3) 62 12 0 9(c) 55 16 0
3(4) 66  6 0 10 67  4 4
3(5) 67  6 1 11(1) 66  6 1
3(6) 58 13 1 11(2) 53 21 0
4 68  5 1 12 50 21 2
5 67  6 1 13 65  5 4
6(1) 70  4 0 14 67  8 0
6(2)(a) 68  5 1 15 62  6 4
6(2)(b) 71  3 0 16 56 14 2
6(2)(c) 57 13 5 17 10 58 1
6(2)(d) 62  6 2 18 10 57 3
187 ILC (2006a en b).
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The answers to the questionnaire indicated that most governments were positive 
about the development of an instrument. The employers stressed that the instrument 
was to tackle disguised employment in particular and that must not restrict the lib-
erty to enter into genuine commercial contracts. The employees argued that, if labour 
relations are ambiguous or unclear, it is important to have an instrument that defines 
the scope of the employment relationship.
On the basis of the answers to the questionnaire, the elements for the intended 
recommendation were established.
3.1.15 Essential provisions of the recommendation 188
The ILO presented the draft recommendation to the meeting for further discussion. 
The draft contained 18 provisions with respect to:
 – formulating a national policy;
 – establishing the existence of an employment relationship;
 – monitoring and implementing;
 – international information exchange.
With respect to formulating a national policy the ILO particularly met the desire to 
at least have guidelines that may help establish the existence of an employment rela-
tionship and distinguish between employed and self-employed workers. Also, there 
should be measures to combat disguised employment. With respect to triangular 
employment relationships, measures should make clear who is responsible for what; 
there must be a dispute settlement mechanism, and effective compliance with and 
application of these laws and regulations is desired.
Special attention must be paid to groups that are affected most, for instance, 
women, young workers, older workers, undeclared workers, migrants and generally 
the most vulnerable workers. The national policy must be realised in cooperation 
with employers and employees. National policy must not interfere with genuine civil 
and commercial relationships.
The facts relating to the execution of and payment for the work play a guiding 
role in establishing the existence of an employment relationship. The member states 
must clearly define what conditions apply for establishing the existence of an employ-
ment relationship; specific indicators may be helpful in that respect, for instance the 
fact that the work is carried out under the supervision and control of another party; 
that the worker is integrated in the organisation of the enterprise; that the work is be-
ing carried out solely or mainly for the benefit of another party; that the work must be 
carried out personally; that the work must be carried out during specific hours at the 
188 ILC (2006c).
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workplace of the party requesting the work; that the work is of a particular duration 
and has a certain continuity; and that the work requires the availability of the worker.
Another indicator can be the fact that the party requesting the work makes tools, 
materials and machinery available to the worker. Likewise, periodic payments; the 
fact that it is the worker’s only income and provision of food, lodgings or transport 
are indicators, as are the recognition of rest periods, annual holidays, travel costs and 
absence of financial risks for the worker.
Member states must provide facilities to establish an employment relationship 
quickly. Apart from using indicators they can use measures such as ‘legal presump-
tions’. Dispute arrangements must grant access to the relevant legal and arbitration 
authorities. The national government must adopt measures to guarantee, particularly 
through the labour inspectorate, that the relevant laws and regulations are respected 
and implemented.
Collective bargaining also needs to play a role in clarifying the existence of an 
employment relationship. Member states should put a mechanism in place to mon-
itor developments related to work and employment; social partners must be closely 
involved. Moreover, the member states need to carry out research on the changes 
in the patterns and structure of work. The ILO likewise needs to provide up-to-date 
information about this.
Recommendation 198 was realised more or less along the lines set out above. One 
important amendment adopted during the discussion related to the temporary em-
ployment agencies. The employers wanted to make sure this new instrument would 
not change Convention 181 or Recommendation 188, which had been realised in 1998.
Even though there were doubts about the legal necessity, it was established that 
‘this Recommendation does not revise the Private Employment Agencies Recom-
mendation 1997 (no. 188) nor can it revise the Private Employment Agencies Con-
vention 1997 (no. 181)’.
3.1.16 Recommendation 198 189
The employers turned out not to endorse Recommendation 198. They felt the draft 
text went way too far. For one thing, they objected to establishing indicators and 
criteria, as well as to the so-called legal presumptions. In their view, the current text 
could result in abuses, turning too many self-employed workers into employees. This 
was threatening too many operational activities in the services sector. The instrument 
had ‘degenerated’ into a bipartite instrument, i.e. something between governments 
and employees. Ironically, the employees had been the ones who had sought solu-
tions for specific problems in cooperation with the employers rather than with the 
189 ILC (2006d).
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governments. This way, an important new instrument was realised, but one that was 
badly damaged by lack of support by the employers.190
3.1.17 Resolution emphasising support
Towards the end of the deliberations, a resolution191 was adopted asking the ILO Office 
for support with monitoring and implementing the Recommendation, collecting and 
supplying information and undertaking comparative studies on changes in the patterns 
and structure of work, and particularly with collecting information on the criteria that 
are used to determine whether or not an employment relationship applies. In Novem-
ber 2006, this resolution featured on the Governing Body agenda192 and the Director- 
General was asked to pursue this resolution, both substantively and financially.
The recommendation and resolution appear to end what had been a lengthy 
discussion about what began with contract labour and, for the time being, ended with 
the scope of the employment relationship. In his book The Employment Relationship, 
a Comparative Overview, Guiseppe Casale comments as follows:
Comparative research and debate, including those within the ILO, have recognised 
that the employment relationship remains one of the challenging issues in the la-
bour market. The question of whether an employment relationship exists between 
two parties is of crucial importance for many reasons, not least of which is that 
most jurisdictions link worker protection and access to social security to the ex-
istence of such a relationship. From a comparative viewpoint, the trend towards 
more flexible working arrangements generated to a great extent by globalization 
has affected the employment relationship debate. It is no longer a matter of purely 
academic interest, but it touches the day-to-day life of workers and employers in 
the world of work. Whereas many countries have already adopted measures to deal 
with this issue, many others are interested in finding a balanced approach to the 
development of national policies to address it. The ILO is expected to give initial 
guidance on this matter and the adoption of Recommendation no. 198 is an im-
portant step in this direction.193
The contract labour discussion has resulted in Recommendation 198. During that 
discussion, everyone has tried continuously to exclude temporary agency work, as 
regulated in Convention 181, from the definition of contract labour.
190 ILC (2006d), Proposed Recommendation concerning the employment relationship.
191 ILC (2006d), p. 80.
192 ILO (2006a).
193 Casale (2011), p. 33. See also: ILO (2007b).
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It is hard for (user company) employers to accept more legislation and regulations 
about contracting. It lies at the very heart of freedom of enterprise. The fact that the 
employers declined to endorse Recommendation 198 may be hard to defend, but it is 
understandable.
However, true to their nature, the trade unions managed to lead the fight once 
more using a new paradigm: precarious work. Supported by the social sciences, they 
now hold that precarious work will lead to the loss of standard full-time employment. 
We shall analyse this assumption below.
3.2  PRECARIOUS WORK: THE STANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT ON THE WAY DOWN?
We have seen before that the lengthy deliberations at ILO level about the phenome-
non of contract labour have resulted in the Employment Relationship Recommenda-
tion 2006 (no. 198). This recommendation is an instrument for member states to 
tackle ‘disguised’ and ‘objectively ambiguous’ employment relationships.
In his speech for the 2013 ILC,194 Director-General Guy Ryder quoted the CEO 
of Gallup, who stated: ‘What everyone in the world wants is a good job’. Ryder won-
dered, however, what a decent job is supposed to be if the world economy continues 
to evolve and the standard full-time job with a single employer culminating in a pen-
sion no longer reflects reality, however desirable it may be. ‘Nor was it ever the reality 
for most working people, who are more likely to have been occupied in rural and 
informal settings, often with minimal protection or security.’ The ILO has estimated 
that 82% of all jobs in South Asia are informal, 66% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 65% in 
East and Southeast Asia (excluding China), 51% in Latin America and 10% in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (see also p. 159).
Ryder went on to state that today, about half the global workforce has salaried 
employment, but many workers do not work full-time for a single employer. What 
once was ‘atypical’ has become standard, while the ‘standard’ has become the excep-
tion. And there is a marked lack of agreement about what this means for realising the 
Decent Work Agenda, and whether anything can be done about this.
Ryder mentions the laborious discussions about this issue that have taken place 
in the context of the ILO over the past years. The ILO adopted a number of conven-
tions regarding part-time employment, homework and private employment agencies 
and lastly, following many years of discussion about contract labour and without 
the endorsement of the employers, it adopted the Employment Relationship Recom-
mendation detailed above. Ryder’s words likewise hold true for the Termination of 
Employment Convention 1982 (no. 158) that goes to the heart of so-called external 
194 ILO (2013).
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flexibility issues. If the ILO wants to continue to be relevant, consensus will have to be 
achieved on this topic, states Ryder.
Interestingly, Ryder uses the words ‘standard’ and ‘atypical’, but refrains from 
using the word ‘precarious’, which is quite common in this context. In the discussions 
about the future of labour, it is mostly the trade unions and science that express the 
problems inherent to new forms of employment by speaking of precarious work. We 
need a clearer definition of precarious work as it has been interpreted by scientific 
literature as well as by key stakeholders such as the trade unions and employers to 
make full sense of it.
3.2.1 Reference literature 195
In recent years there have been extensive discussions about the concept of precar-
iousness.196 In the 1970s, French sociologists associated the concept of precarité with 
poverty. Only later did they start using this concept to refer to specific labour relations.
Barbier argues that the term ‘de-standardisation of labour’ vies with alternative 
descriptions such as: atypical, precarious, vulnerable, and various other terms in dif-
ferent languages. The real issues of this discussion were labour market segmentation 
and the ‘dual’ labour market.
From a Francocentric perspective, Barbier expresses his amazement at the fact 
that until the turn of the century sociologists throughout the world had hardly ever 
paid attention to ‘precariousness’. For instance, Sennett197 gave his opinion about the 
consequences of flexibility for mankind, without using the word ‘precariousness’. His 
Anglo-American background repressed the French, Italian and Spanish perspect-
ives that did connect to this concept. Likewise from a Francocentric perspective, 
Bourdieu198 stated: ‘la précarité est partout’ while it became more common in France 
to refer to ‘situations précaires’ and ‘statuts précaires’.
From the 1970s onward, the concept gained a political significance in French 
relations, while the concept was not used beyond France until the late 1990s. Only the 
ETUC and the European Commission used the concept when they were working with 
French sociologists. Later on, activist and radical groups in many European countries 
and in the United States appropriated the concept. Barbier also refers to German 
195 Sources used apart from the ones quoted below: Koch & Fritz (2013); Fashouin et al. (2013); Stone 
& Arthurs (2013). See also: Ross (2009); Thornley et al. (2010); Lew Chuk et al. (2011); Garcia 
(2012); Doussard, M. (2013).
196 See Barbier (2013) on this topic.
197 Sennett (1999).
198 Bourdieu (1998).
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 relations where the word ‘Prekariat’ symbolised everything that ensued from capital-
ism and was harmful to mankind.
In the United States and Canada, the concept of ‘precarious work’ also boomed 
thanks to the writings of Kalleberg199 and Vosko.200 To Kalleberg, precarious work 
means ‘employment that is uncertain, unpredictable and risky from the point of view 
of the worker’.
Vosko distinguishes two ways of thinking in literature. Both assume that specific 
job characteristics result in precariousness, but the one only looks at the degree of job 
insecurity, while the other takes more characteristics into account. Thus, the one is 
one-dimensional and the other is multi-dimensional. According to Vosko, the multi- 
dimensional approach is dominant. In connection to this, she quotes Rodgers201 who 
distinguishes four dimensions of precarious work:
 – short-term horizon, limited duration or high risk of job loss;
 – little or no control over working conditions, pace of work or wages;
 – little or no worker protection (by law, through collective agreements, in terms of 
access to social security);
 – low income jobs at or below the poverty line.
Laparra202 also takes a multi-dimensional approach, distinguishing between:
 – a time-related facet (duration/continuity of employment (prospects));
 – a social facet (social rights and social protection);
 – an economic facet (security of income);
 – a working conditions aspect.203
Thus, the one-dimensional approach only looks at the specific forms of non-standard 
work and contrasts them with standard work. Standard full-time employment is then 
viewed as the norm and as the ideal model.
Johnson and Nijberg204 argue that all work can be potentially precarious and 
consequently that precariousness occurs in three gradations, i.e.:
 – highly precarious: no rights to the social system (undocumented workers);
 – moderately precarious: basic rights to the social system (housewives);
 – least precarious: full rights to the social system.
199 Kalleberg (2009 and 2011).
200 Vosko (2000 and 2006); Vosko et al. (2009).
201 Rodgers (1989).
202 Laparra et al. (2004).
203 Vosko et al. (2009); McKay et al. 2010, p. 82. See also Barbier (2011).
204 Johnson & Nijberg (2009).
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Subsequently, four areas determine the degree of precariousness:
 – job insecurity: the result of time (contract length) or uncertainty in the form of 
unpredictability ;
 – low wages: below minimum pay rates and lack of opportunity to improve pay;
 – subordinate work: work that gives no access to social rights or labour protection 
laws;
 – no representation: no effective negotiating power in collective bargaining and 
difficulty in accessing social rights.205
For Porthé 206 too, an important aspect is that the negotiating power is much weaker 
in the case of precarious work than for workers engaged in standard employment.
On the basis of the 2006 Eurobarometer Survey, Fullerton207 argues that insecur-
ity is higher in countries with high unemployment, weak trade unions, few part-time 
jobs, low spending on unemployment benefits, as well as in the post-socialist countries.
The multi-dimensional approach takes more aspects into account, and thus, any job 
can, in principle, be precarious, including standard employment. Clement et al.208 
also take the multi-dimensional approach and argue that:
Precarious lives include precarious employment and the social conditions in which 
it is embedded. These social conditions include household structures, kinship net-
works and access to welfare services, independent of labour market status. We de-
fine ‘precarious’ as being in a situation that is not autonomously sustainable, where 
the situation includes the labour market, the social support system and conditions 
affecting both entities into and exit out of the labour market.
Social vulnerability potentially includes such things as divorce (change in house-
hold circumstances), responsibility for children or dependent adults and/or issues 
concerning shelter and health. All these vulnerabilities interact with precarious 
employment, that is non-sustainable jobs or forms of contingent employment.
For Vosko209 these approaches indicate that the concept of precariousness is broader 
than insecurity in the sense of job loss. Clement et al. likewise argue that  precariousness 
is related to so-called ‘new social risks’. These are the risks one runs as a consequence 
205 McKay et al. (2010), p. 83; see also Porthé et al. (2010).
206 Porthé et al. (2010).
207 Fullerton et al. (2011); see also McKay et al. (2010).
208 Clement et al. (2010); see also: McKay et al. (2010), annex C: A review of recent literature for the 
study on precarious work and social rights, p. 5.
209 Vosko (2010), p. 9.
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of the economic and social changes inherent to the transition to post-industrial so-
ciety. New social risks used to be marginal, but now affect larger groups of people. 
Old risks had to do with retirement insecurity and illness, i.e. risks that affected older 
people. New social risks are more widespread and occur upon labour market entry. 
They have to do with job insecurity, duties of care, weakening trade unions with 
diminishing negotiating powers; all elements that can be attributed to the ‘new eco-
nomy’. This results in losses in welfare:
 – within the family circle, where care and income obligations must be balanced;
 – in the labour market, where people lack the skills that are needed to find well-
paid and secure employment;
 – in social security, for people who have a-typical careers and do not build up 
pensions.
The main problem is that the current welfare state no longer protects people from 
these new risks. All these people have to fend for themselves and need to sort out 
provisions for child-minding, pensions and training for themselves.
Standing210 refers to various types of insecurity that determine precariousness, 
as indicated in the box below. In his book The Precariat, the new dangerous class, 
Standing lists seven different classes, i.e. the Elite, the Salariat, the Profician, the Man-
ual Worker, the Precariat, the Jobless and the Hopeless. If one of the securities men-
tioned below is missing, one is doomed to be part of the Precariat.
Forms of labour security under industrial citizenship
Labour market security – Adequate income-earning opportunities; at the macro- 
level, this is epitomised by a government commitment to ‘full employment’.
Employment security – Protection against arbitrary dismissal, regulations on hiring 
and firing, imposition of costs on employers for failing to adhere to rules and 
so on.
Job security – Ability and opportunity to retain a niche in employment, plus bar-
riers to skill dilution, and opportunities for ‘upward’ mobility in terms of status 
and income.
Work security – Protection against accidents and illness at work, through, for ex-
ample, safety and health regulations, limits on working time, unsociable hours, 
night work for women, as well as compensation for mishaps.
Skill reproduction security – Opportunity to gain skills, through apprenticeships, 
employment training and so on, as well as opportunity to make use of compet-
encies.
210 Standing (2011), p. 10.
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Income security – Assurance of an adequate stable income, protected through, for 
example, minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social 
security, progressive taxation to reduce inequality and to supplement low in-
comes.
Representation security – Possessing a collective voice in the labour market, 
through, for example, independent trade unions, with a right to strike.
3.2.2 Temporary agency work is also precarious
It is bound to be clear that according to various sociological sources temporary 
agency workers also belong to the group of precarious workers, especially from the 
one-dimensional perspective. However, some differentiation is in order: precarious-
ness is also a matter of perception; it is all in the eye of the beholder.
Table 3.3 Perceptions of precarious forms of employment (percentages)
Not precarious Slightly precarious More precarious Most precarious
Informal/Undeclared  1  3 11 83
Bogus self-employment  1  4 28 63
Casual  2  7 29 59
Zero hours  4  8 20 54
Temporary agency  4 24 37 29
Seasonal  8 32 34 24
Fixed term 13 31 38 14
Posted 16 31 36 12
Part time 27 41 22  5
Source: London Metropolitan University (2012), Study on precarious work and social rights
A study that was commissioned by the European Commission and conducted by the 
London Metropolitan University makes clear that temporary agency work cannot be 
classed among the worst forms of precariousness.211 Seasonal work, telework, casual 
work, zero-hours contracts, bogus self-employment and informal work score signific-
antly worse.212 The study includes a survey among experts that makes clear that, on 
a number of dimensions, temporary agency work scores nearly as high as standard 
full-time employment.
211 McKay et al. (2010), p. 77.
212 McKay et al. (2010), p. 78, 79.
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Table 3.4  Perceptions vs. reality: employment relationships and rights in 12 member 
states, 2011, average ratings between 1 (no rights) and 5 (full rights)
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Informal 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2
Bogus self-employed 1.2 1.4 1.3 2.5 2.9 2.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.7
Zero hours 1.7 1.5 2.3 3.8 2.9 3.2 1.7 2.6 2.5 2.5
Casual 2.4 1.8 3.0 3.7 2.9 3.4 1.9 2.6 3.0 2.7
Teleworkers 2.5 2.1 3.7 4.5 3.9 4.1 2.3 2.8 3.4 3.3
Seasonal 2.4 1.9 3.9 4.4 3.7 4.0 2.3 3.5 3.9 3.3
Agency 3.0 2.0 4.3 4.7 4.0 4.5 2.7 4.0 3.8 3.7
Fixed term 3.1 2.2 4.6 4.7 4.4 4.5 2.6 4.0 4.2 3.8
Part-time indefinite 3.2 2.3 4.5 4.8 4.4 4.6 2.6 3.8 4.3 3.8
Full-time indefinite 3.8 2.3 4.7 4.8 4.4 4.8 2.3 4.4 4.0 3.9
Average ratings 2.6 2.0 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.6 2.0 2.9 3.4 3.0
Source: McKay et al. (2010)
Furthermore, OECD research shows that more security in terms of job security and 
job protection does not automatically mean that people actually feel more secure. 
The OECD states that unemployment benefits are appreciated more than job protec-
tion. In terms of the OECD, UI – Unemployment Insurance – is positively correlated 
to perceived job security, which in turn has a negative correlation with EPL – Em-
ployment Protection Legislation.213 The OECD states more generally that job security 
and employment protection cannot be seen in isolation from unemployment protec-
tion and an active labour market policy. The requirement of employment protection 
should not be exaggerated; an active labour market policy promoting rapid re-entry 
of those who recently lost their jobs is more effective. Olsthoorn argues that in the 
current flexible labour market, the universal systems of unemployment benefits are 
to be preferred to the insurance systems.214
What is also interesting in this context is the proposal by the Brabants- Zeeuwse 
Werk geversvereniging (BZW)215 to radically change the labour market. In their 
 set-up, everybody should be given an individual mobility budget, to be funded from 
social security funds, education and training funds and the transition compensa-
tions.216 What is certain is that since the 1980s and especially since the 1990s all social 
213 OECD (2004b), p. 92.
214 Olsthoorn (2015), p. 227.
215 Employers’ organisation for two of the southern Dutch provinces.
216 Leupen & Hinrichs (2016).
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security arrangements that guarantee income security have deteriorated, as much as 
by 35%.217 The issue also affects the basic income discussion. In the Netherlands, ex-
periments in this field with the Dutch Social Assistance Act – now succeeded by the 
Dutch Participation Act – are ongoing. Although not economically viable, the basic 
income may turn out to be a solution, and it is worthy of further research.218
For the rest, measures to enhance labour market flexibility may lead to fierce 
resistance, as they did in France in May 2016. In this context, decreasing job security, 
partly as a result of lack of prospects, has also been related to the number of sui-
cides.219
Figure 3.2 Unemployment benefits re-assure workers while EPL makes them worry
Recently, the OECD stated that temporary agency workers benefit from more  training/ 
development than workers with fixed-term contracts do, and that they are also sup-
ported in getting new commissions. Moreover, temporary agency workers tend to 
217 Vrooman (2016), p. 10.
218 Bregman (2014), p. 51 ff. De Graaf (2015).
219 Prick (2016), p. 207. See also: Pouchard (2016).
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work on the basis of permanent contracts, benefiting from continued payment for 
the duration of the contract (for instance in Austria, Italy, Slovenia and Sweden). In at 
least eight countries, the permanent contract with a temporary employment agency 
prevails (see figure 3.2).220
Table 3.5  Permanent and fixed-term contracts with a temporary employment agency. 
Percentage of all employees, average 2006–2010
Permanent contract Fixed-term contract
Not with a 
 temporary 
 employment agency
With a temporary 
employment 
agency
Not with a 
 temporary 
 employment agency
With a temporary 
employment 
agency
Austria 89.3 1.6 8.8 0.2
Belgium 91.8 0.0 6.5 1.7
Czech Republic 90.7 0.8 8.3 0.2
Denmark 90.4 0.9 8.3 0.4
Estonia 97.2 0.1 2.6 0.0
Finland 84.3 0.7 14.6 0.5
France 85.2 0.0 12.6 2.2
Germany 83.8 1.6 13.9 0.7
Greece 88.3 0.2 11.4 0.1
Hungary 91.5 0.4 7.8 0.3
Ireland 91.3 0.5 7.9 0.2
Italy 87.0 0.1 12.5 0.5
Luxembourg 92.9 0.5 6.2 0.5
Netherlands 81.6 0.5 15.0 3.0
Norway 91.4 0.0 8.4 0.1
Poland 72.7 0.0 26.7 0.6
Portugal 76.7 0.7 21.2 1.4
Slovak Republic 94.3 0.7 4.5 0.5
Slovenia 82.1 0.5 12.2 5.2
Spain 69.1 1.8 27.1 1.9
Sweden 82.9 0.7 16.0 0.4
Switzerland 86.3 0.5 12.9 0.3
Turkey 88.5 0.0 11.5 0.0
Source: OECD calculations based on EU-LFS microdata and OECD Labour Force Statistics Database.
Also, in the OECD countries, temporary agency work turns out to be to more highly 
regulated than fixed-term contracts are. These regulations mainly relate to the max-
imum number of hours in temporary agency jobs, equal treatment regulations, re-
strictions to the extension of assignments, and licensing and reporting requirements 
(see figures 3.3 and 3.4).221
220 OECD (2013a), p. 24.
221 OECD (2013a), p. 25.
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Figure 3.3 Regulation on temporary contracts
Source: OECD Employment Protection Database, 2013 update
Figure 3.4 Regulation on temporary-work-agency employment
Source: OECD Employment Protection Database, 2013 update
All in all, the sociological literature does not paint a rosy picture of temporary agency 
work, which generally belongs to the forms of precarious work that have expanded 
enormously over the past years. However, some differentiation is called for. As be-
comes clear from tables 3.3 and 3.4, job security is a matter of perception; with regard to 
social policy elements, experts perceive temporary agency work to be almost equal to 
standard full-time employment. From a security perspective, the OECD  considers job 
security to be less relevant than unemployment protection. The OECD also  indicates 
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that, in OECD countries, temporary agency work is more strictly regulated than per-
manent contracts are.222
3.2.3 Causes
Sociological literature presents a variegated picture of precarious work. The same 
goes for the answer to the question what causes this changing world of work.
Rodgers & Rodgers223 attribute the changes to the deterioration of the labour 
market situation, increasing unemployment and changing work organisation. Walter-
man224 also points at the deregulation process in Germany and other EU countries, 
which has led to an increase of precarious work. This liberalisation was deployed to 
combat unemployment, resulting in more temporary agency work, temporary em-
ployment, marginal employment and part-time employment. Barbier225 argues that 
the issue of precarious work is generally oversimplified and that it has more to do 
with the increasing and diverse forms of inequality in today’s world. Outsourcing and 
subcontracting are seen as major drivers of precarious work, resulting in economically 
dependent workers.226 McDowell and Christopherson227 rather see the growth of com-
plex organisations and inter-organisational networks of co-production as its causes.
Kalleberg228 lists six main causes:
 – the neo-liberal globalised economy that increased competition between enter-
prises and resulted in outsourcing to lower-wage countries, thus opening up 
‘new labor pools through immigration’;
 – technological changes;
 – changes in laws and regulations;
 – the decline of the trade unions, weakening the labour protection of workers;
 – increasing individualism emphasising personal responsibility for work and  family;
 – the growth of the services industry, leading to an information-based economy 
organised around flexible production.
Apart from these structural causes, the economic recession is pointed out as a factor. 
The recession results in so-called low-road approaches to competition, new forms of 
subcontracting and outsourcing and new types of management and contracts.
222 OECD (2013a), p. 27
223 Rodgers & Rodgers (1989).
224 Waltermann (2010).
225 Barbier (2013).
226 Perulli (2003).
227 McDowell & Christopherson (2009).
228 Kalleberg (2009), p. 2 ff.
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Another essential cause is said to be the financialisation of the  socio-economic re-
lations. The work framework has changed more and more from a balance between 
management and labour to a balance between management and shareholders. Prior-
itising so-called shareholder value leads to changes on the work floor, including out-
sourcing and trans-nationalisation of the production chain. This must be seen in 
combination with the weakening of the labour factor, the strengthening of manage-
ment, the decrease in government involvement and increased scope for the private 
sector, growing labour market flexibility and deregulation of the financial markets as 
well as access to new regional markets.
3.2.4 Kalleberg’s periods
Kalleberg argues that until the end of the Great Depression in the 1930s, most jobs 
in the United States were precarious. Pensions and health insurance hardly featured; 
they were favours rather than rights. The creation of the market-based economy in 
the nineteenth century exacerbated precariousness during this period.229
The ‘Great Transformation’ – a term coined by Polany230 – set things in motion, 
actually there was a ‘double movement’: one side of the movement was directed to-
wards economic liberalism and ‘laissez-faire’; the other side was directed towards 
social protections in response to the psychological, social and ecological disruptions 
that the free market entailed (figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5 The double movement Source: Kalleberg (2009)
229 Kalleberg (2009).
230 Polany (1944).
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This resulted in the New Deal politics and other protections in the 1930. According to 
Kalleberg, the ‘Great Transformation’ was succeeded by a transitional period stretch-
ing from 1940 to 1970, called the ‘Great Compression’, that brought most people more 
equality thanks to more social security. Since 1970, we find ourselves in the ‘Contem-
porary Period’, in which precariousness is characterised in fundamentally different 
ways from before the Second World War. Kalleberg characterises them as follows:
 – Production is no longer location-based, so-called ‘Spatialisation’. Thanks to ad-
vanced telecommunications and new technologies, today’s world is much larger 
than before and choosing a production location has become much easier.
 – The rise of the services sector has brought new jobs and new services.
 – Dismissal, whether or not collective, has become more widespread and is now a 
basic component of the employers’ strategy. It reflects short-termism: lowering 
labour costs without clarity about what this will mean in the long run.
 – In the earlier precarious period, there were clear ideologies that indicated what 
the world would look like without market domination. These concepts have now 
been discredited, so that we no longer know what to do about precariousness.
 – In the past, precarious work was described in terms of the dual labour market. 
Nowadays, precarious work has spread to all sectors of the economy; it can be 
found among both professionals and managers as well.231
3.2.5 What, who, where, how much?
It is not easy to come up with a precise definition of precarious work. There is a wide 
range of definitions. Academic literature does make clear which worker groups could 
be most vulnerable to precariousness. Young workers, women, temporary workers, 
older people and migrants are mentioned most frequently. The above-mentioned 
study by the European Commission made clear that the most vulnerable people in 
this context are various groups of migrants, followed by young workers and older 
female workers.232 According to the same study, the cleaning industry is the most 
precarious sector (table 3.7)233
To gauge the extent of precarious work, reference is made to research by SEO,234 
which has been collecting data regarding flexible work relations (temporary employ-
ment, temporary agency work and self-employed workers) for some time. SEO ar-
rives at approximately 20 to 25%, with some higher findings in the Mediterranean 
countries and a lower result in the United States. These figures indicate that during 
231 ILO (2006a), p. 4.
232 McKay et al. (2010), p. 48
233 McKay et al. (2010), p. 47.
234 SEO (2013).
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the last decade, and especially the last five years, no spectacular increase occurred. 
This trend can also be seen in later publications. Only the Netherlands takes up an 
exceptional position in this respect, which will be discussed further in part III.235
Table 3.6  Groups of workers perceived as being at risk of precarious work (% of survey 
responses)
Not 
 precarious
Precarious More 
 precarious
Highly 
 precarious
Undocumented migrants 2 2 6 83
Third country migrant woman workers 2 7 33 55
Third country migrants 2 11 43 40
Young workers 7 19 33 37
Older women workers 12 22 37 24
Trainees 10 26 36 24
Interns 14 27 32 22
Apprentices 15 41 25 14
Working students 14 40 27 14
Women workers 13 32 37 13
Older workers 15 31 38 11
Economically dependent autonomous workers 11 32 40 11
Women who are pregnant or returning from  
 maternity leave
20 32 34 9
Workers with caring responsibilities 13 38 35 8
Source: McKay et al. (2010)
Table 3.7  Sectors in 12 member states and perception of their degree of precariousness, 
2011 (% of survey responses)
Not 
 precarious
Precarious More 
 precarious
Highly 
 precarious
Cleaning 4 15 34 43
Construction 3 20 35 40
Agriculture 4 17 41 36
Hotels, catering and tourism 3 18 45 31
Private security services 9 26 38 23
Retail 7 39 41 9
Transport 11 45 35 5
Not for profit sector 13 39 31 7
Private health care 22 41 27 5
Logistics 17 52 23 4
Public sector education 40 37 16 2
Public sector health 39 39 15 2
Information technology 42 44 9 1
Public sector administration 58 27 9 1
Source: McKay et al. (2010)
235 Blanchflower (2015); CIETT (2015), p. 13.
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Table 3.8 Share of flexible labour relations in total employment (percentages)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
United States 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.0
Canada 21.5 21.6 21.1 21.2 21.5 21.1 21.1 20.4 20.9 20.9 20.9 20.9
Japan 26.9 27.1 27.1 27.0 26.9 24.1 25.6 25.0 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8
eu27 25.3 25.2 25.5 26.2 26.7 27.3 27.2 26.7 26.1 26.8 26.8 26.6
eu-Anglosaxon 17.6 17.2 17.4 17.4 17.1 17.5 17.9 17.5 17.8 18.5 18.6 19.1
Scandinavia 21.2 21.1 21.3 21.3 21.6 22.5 22.3 21.3 20.9 21.2 21.2 20.9
eu-Rhineland 21.1 20.8 21.2 22.0 23.3 23.5 23.8 24.0 23.8 24.4 24.4 24.0
eu-Francophone 22.7 22.0 21.9 21.5 22.1 23.6 23.4 22.9 22.5 23.5 24.0 23.9
eu-Mediteranean 37.6 37.4 36.8 38.6 39.0 39.4 38.6 37.8 35.4 35.4 35.7 35.2
Eastern Europe 24.3 25.0 26.2 27.2 27.5 27.6 27.4 26.7 27.0 28.0 27.8 27.9
Source: Berkhout et al. (2013), p. 15.
* For the USA, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are not used because of the incompatibility of definitions.
Figure 3.6 Share of flexible labour relations in total employment (percentages)
Source: Berkhout et al. (2013), p. 15.
If we focus on temporary agency work, the penetration rate generally averages 2 to 
3%. However, in South Africa, the penetration rate of temporary agency work exceeds 
7%. This spectacular increase does not hold for the other non-European countries 
concerned, let alone for most Western European countries. More recent sources do 
not suggest otherwise.236 (See table 3.9 and figure 3.7.)
236 Blanchflower (2015), p. 189; CIETT (2015), p. 28 and 29.
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Table 3.9 Share of temporary agency workers in total employment (percentages)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United States 1.3 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.9
Argentina 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
Brazil 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
South Africa 2.3 2.2 2.1 3.4 6.4 7.1 7.2
Japan 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.5
South Korea 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Australia 2.8 2.7 2.8
eu27 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.6
eu-Anglosaxon 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 3.7
Scandinavia 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.2
eu-Rhineland 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 2.2
eu-Francophone 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.2
eu-Mediterranean 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9
Eastern Europe 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.1
Source: Berkhout et al. (2013), p. 22.
Figure 3.7 Workforce in temporary employment, selected European countries
Source: Berkhout et al. (2013), p. 22.
This leads to the following conclusion by SEO:
There is no clear evidence that the strong growth in the share of flexible labor relations 
between 2002 and 2007 points at a worldwide trend towards a larger share of flexible 
labor at the expense of traditional open-ended labor contracts. The growth in flexible 
labor varies too much between countries and periods to draw such a  conclusion. In 
0
1
2
3
4
5
A
ve
ra
ge
 w
or
k 
(%
)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EU-Mediterranean
Eastern Europe
EU-Francophone
Japan
EU-Rhineland
Scandinavia
EU-Anglosaxon
United States
 Chapter 3: Complications
 95
most countries in Europe, in North America and Japan, the share of flexible labor 
has declined during the recent economic recession that started after 2007.237
While SEO sees no clear indication that flexible work grows at the expense of the 
open-ended employment relationship, others argue against SEO’s findings. Stone238 
for example, considers these findings to be controversial, and thinks she has sufficient 
evidence to underpin this trend.
From 1995 tot 2005, the so-called contingent workforce in the United States de-
creased in various definitions (definition 1, from 2.2% to 1.8%: definition 2, from 2.8% 
tot 2.5% and definition 3, van 4.9% to 4.1%). Nevertheless, among older people – aged 
45 to 54 – Stone notices an increase by 3 to 7 percentage points.
Within Europe, temporary employment, which includes all forms, has more than 
doubled between 1985 and 2009 in France, the Netherlands and Italy. Moreover, a 
marked increase could be observed in countries such as Germany, Japan and Spain 
(but not in the United Kingdom or Denmark). This involves vast numbers: in Ger-
many from 10% in 1985 to 14% in 2009; in Italy from 5% in 1985 to 12% in 2009 and in 
Spain from 16% in 1987 to 33% in 2005, after which it decreased again to 25% in 2009. 
From another recent record covering the period from 2001 to 2012, countries such as 
Poland (+183%), Italy (+53%), the Netherlands (+47%) and Germany (+28%) emerge 
as high-growth countries with regard to temporary employment. However, in Spain, 
temporary employment has plummeted (-30%).239
Stone also observes that increasingly fewer workers below the age of 25, who have just 
entered the labour market, start working in standard employment. This holds true in 
the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands. A contrary 
development applies to Denmark and Spain.
With respect to Australia, Stone quotes Buchanan, who argues that in the course of 
the 1980s and 1990s precarious work has grown more than full-time permanent em-
ployment. Stone also produces figures about temporary agency work. In the United 
States, the number of temporary agency workers increased from over 1 million in 
1990 to over 2 million in 2008. In Europe, temporary agency work also increased; 
from 1992 to 2002, the number of temporary agency workers in Denmark, Spain, 
 Italy and Sweden increased fivefold, and in Austria it quadrupled. In Japan, the num-
ber of dispatched workers increased from 400.000 in 1994 to nearly 2 million in 2005.
237 SEO (2013), pp. 9, 15, 22.
238 Stone & Arthurs (2013), p. 5, see also Stone (2013b).
239 Vacas-Soriano (2015), p. 8
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a Data for Spain for the period 1987–2009.
Figure 3.8 Workforce in temporary employment, selected European countries
Source: Stone & Arthurs (2013), p. 372.
Part-time employment likewise soared between 1985 and 2009. The Netherlands 
beats the other countries, growing from approximately 20% in 1985 to nearly 40% in 
2009. However countries such as Germany (+11.8%), Italy (+8.7%), Spain (+8.2%), 
the United Kingdom (+3.7%) and Canada and France (each +2.2%) also showed a 
marked increase.
Moreover, Stone also researched whether the job tenure – the length of time 
someone has been in his or her job – has changed. She discovered that the duration of 
employment in European countries such as France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom has generally increased.
Table 3.10 Average years on job, 1992–2009. Men and women, all ages
Country 1992 2009 % change
Denmark 7.94 7.63 –3.9
France 9.95 11.64 17.0
Germany 10.31 11.12 7.9
Italy 10.75 11.72 9.1
Netherlands 8.31 10.86 30.8
Spain 8.48 9.61 13.3
United Kingdom 7.77 8.53 9.8
Source: OECD.Sstat: Job Tenure for Dependent Employment
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The United States likewise presented a stable overall picture. However, from 1983 to 
2010, the average job tenure for men in mid-career had decreased from 13-16 years to 
approximately 8-10 years (in the age brackets 55–64 and 45–54 respectively). Women 
presented a completely opposite picture: their job tenure increased in all age brackets. 
Comparable figures are available for Europe and Canada. Between 2000 and 2009, 
the average job tenure for Australian men in all age brackets decreased.
Stone also dwells on the relationship with union density and collective bargain-
ing coverage and notes that they have declined since 1970, especially in the Nether-
lands, the United States and Japan. In Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom they also declined, except for an interlude in the late 
1970s. The question is whether non-standard work is the cause or the consequence 
of the weakened trade unions and collective bargaining structure. If people switch 
jobs more often, they may be less interested in joining trade unions. Conversely, the 
changing world (neo-liberal, deregulating, anti-trade unions/social policies) may 
also result in fewer open-ended employment contracts.
Furthermore, Stone notes a trend towards decreasing income disparity, accom-
panied by the decline of standard work. The picture of the waning importance of 
the standard employment contract is ambiguous. Even though many countries show 
evidence of a trend towards more temporary employment, temporary agency work, 
part-time employment and self-employed workers, it remains to be seen whether this 
trend will endure. With regard to flexible work (temporary employment, tempor-
ary agency work and self-employed workers) SEO shows in figure 3.6 that the first 
years of the past decade showed an increase of non-standard work, followed by a 
decrease in more recent years. Indeed, Stone is right if we consider the past 20 years, 
but the increase of non-standard work during the last 10 years was not spectacular. 
This only changes if we include part-time employment in non-standard work. Part-
time employment has grown, but the question is whether this type of employment is 
as non-standard as the other types of flexible work.
Likewise, the figures relating to temporary agency work turn out to be relative. 
Although it has grown during a prolonged period, if we include the last years (since 
2007), there are no marked increases of the penetration rate of temporary agency work. 
According to CIETT data, the weighted average penetration rate of temporary agency 
work in 2009 was (back) at the level of 2000/2001 i.e. 1.5%, rising to 1.6% in 2013.240
The job tenure figures likewise fail to convince. The general picture does not 
appear to produce any spectacular changes. While it is true that male job tenure con-
tinues to decrease in mid-career, i.e. 8 to 10 years, the job tenure for women in mid- 
career has been 6 to 10 years for a long time. And the latter figure has never been an 
indication for the proposition that the permanent contract is clearly on the way down.
240 CIETT (2014).
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3.2.6 Solutions
Still, if 20 to 25% of the workers have flexible work and if 10 to 40% work part-time, 
the policy that may have to be developed for these groups does deserve some thought.
Stone241 points at the dangers of the dual labour market, the increasing risks of 
unemployment, the decline of the trade unions and the increasing income disparity. 
She advocates a new regulatory framework to promote fairness at work and to ensure 
a new kind of social safety net. This entails the introduction of new forms of contract 
that balance the needs for corporate flexibility and job security. In Europe, this has 
resulted in placing the flexicurity concept242 on the agenda as a means to find the 
right balance.
Also, there are plans to reorganise unemployment insurance243 and supply a 
severance pay as transition compensation. The important thing is to consider social 
programmes that support the increasingly indispensable labour market transitions. 
Types of regional cooperation by labour pooling are options, too.244
Vosko assesses three approaches to the Standard Employment Relationship 
(SER), i.e. a tiered SER, a flexible tier and the ‘beyond employment’ approach. The 
tiered SER is about new forms of employment derived from the SER, for instance the 
partial and pro rata protection with regard to part-time and temporary employment.
Figure 3.9  Functions of the old and the new SER. (Additional functions of the new SER 
are in italics.) Source: Bosch (2004)
241 Stone (2013a), p. 12 ff.
242 Wilthagen (2007).
243 Stone (2013a), p. 18 ff.
244 Vosko (2010), p. 212 ff.
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The flexible tier approach245 fits the ideas Bosch developed in response to the eclipse 
of the SER as the dominant form of employment. As regards the position of the work-
ers, in addition to the current welfare and security arrangements that are applicable, 
the new forms of employment encompass concepts such as employability and work-
life balance.
For companies, cooperating with workers and investing in human capital continue to 
be relevant, as is internal flexibility. For society as a whole, reducing inequality and 
creating human capital are relevant, on the understanding that the human capital 
of both men and women must be used. This approach specifically calls for child- 
minding, flexible work, lifelong learning, the option to choose working hours and the 
individualisation of social security.
The beyond employment approach fits in with the ideas of the French professor 
of labour law Alain Supiot.246 In 1999, the European Commission asked him and 
a number of fellow-professors of labour law from the EU to think about the future 
of work and the corresponding legislation. The Supiot report comprised a number 
of recommendations of which the notion of the ‘social drawing rights’ has raised 
the most eyebrows. This idea entails that workers can accumulate a reserve during 
their career from which they can draw when switching from one job to another or in 
family- related situations. The recommendation did not specify how the plan was to 
be funded, and so far it has hardly been developed.
Also deserving of special attention is the concept of the single employment contract 
that can be seen as a special development of the notion of flexicurity. This concept is 
(has been) particularly under discussion in Italy, France and Spain, with the aim of 
arriving at a new form of employment contract that rebalances the corporate need 
for flexibility on the one hand and sufficient security for workers on the others. How-
ever, all provisos conceived in this context result in cost increases that entrepreneurs 
consider problematic. These cost increases arise from the introduction of automatic 
financial compensation upon dismissal without any option of legal settlement of the 
labour dispute. Thus, these provisos beg the question as to whether this is in line with 
the ILO Termination of Employment Convention (Convention 158) and article 30 of 
the European Charter of Human Rights. In this regard, Casali and Perulli247 argue 
that the:
245 Vosko (2010), p. 215, and Bosch (2004).
246 Vosko (2010), p. 218, and Supiot (1999).
247 Casali & Perulli (2014).
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… pros and cons of the single employment contract will continue to be debated. 
What is really needed at this stage is a new balance between flexibility and security, 
but from a point of view of labour protection based on the employment relationship 
and not on the economic market alone. This would require the rethinking of social 
protection systems, creating the conditions for a more inclusive society in terms of 
income guarantees in the event of unemployment, along with a  reconsideration of 
the nature of work, overcoming excessive fragmentation and insecurity. All these 
issues are unavoidable and common to all European legal systems.
There is a need for European and international institutions to take a more active 
role in addressing this task, and for a wider involvement of organizations repres-
enting the various interests involved, with a view to finding a broadly applicable 
and sustainable compromise to the current jobs crisis. The world of work needs it.
Interestingly, Italy appears to have made progress with its new Jobs Act that, thanks 
to introducing a ‘contratto a tutele crescenti’, has yielded a major liberalisation of 
labour law, and as a result of which open-ended employment contracts are said to be 
on the rise again.248
Broadly speaking, the phenomenon of temporary agency work constitutes one of 
many changes in the world of work. And traditional labour law offers less and less 
grip to shape these changes. In that respect, Van der Heijden249 points at the increase 
of a grey area of economically dependent workers, the eroding notion of subordina-
tion in employment law, the reciprocity and the ‘private-lawisation’ of labour law, 
the increasing participation and the need for pluralism and differentiation. In that 
respect, he refers to the farewell collection for judge Mancini, in which T. Koop-
mans250 observes that a new pluralism is on the rise and that watersheds between the 
various fields of law are becoming obscure; old boundaries between these fields are 
disappearing and Anglo-Saxon doctrines are influencing the continental fields of law. 
Instead of legislation, case law is also needed to solve the problems.
Van der Heijden also refers to Gérard Lyon-Caen,251 who wrote in 1996 that, as a 
legal sub-discipline, labour law is no longer able to assess all societal changes. If they 
want to be able to follow all transitions, practitioners of labour law must widen their 
scope to multiple legal disciplines. Furthermore, he refers to Rood,252 who foresees 
248 Cheyvialle (2016).
249 Van der Heijden (1999a). 
250 Koopmans (1999).
251 Lyon-Caen (1996).
252 Rood (1998).
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that the future in various forms of employment contracts probably lies in pluralism 
and differentiation.
The conceptual framework for labour law on the basis of the Fordist production 
structure is outmoded, Van der Heijden argues. There is a need for individualisation, 
flexibilisation and de-solidarisation. This requires a tailor-made approach, granting 
freedom to professionals who want to shape their own future and making adjust-
ments as soon as possible to keep up with global competition.
Van der Heijden advocates a new legal order of labour. He argues that the new 
labour law paradigm will be guided more by private law than by public law, more by 
labour law created at corporate level than by labour law that has arisen at other levels, 
more by pluralism than by unity, more by case law than by legislation, and more in 
keeping with economic dependence than with legal subordination.
And thus, he observes how the outlines of a new legal order pertaining to labour 
are being created. Interdisciplinary scientific labour studies will have to assist in fur-
ther deepening, development and realisation of this new legal order.253
3.3 THE ILO DELIBERATES
3.3.1 The position of trade unions: watershed 2012
Under the motto ‘From Precarious work to Decent work’ a so-called ACTRAV sym-
posium was held in 2011 on Policies and Regulations to Combat Precarious Em-
ployment.254 In his introduction to this symposium, the then ILO Director-General 
Somavía argued that the informal economy is the biggest source of precariousness.255 
On behalf of the trade unions, Ron Oswald, General Secretary at the IUF, argued that 
the destruction of the direct, open-ended contracts should be countered. He said:
Permanent, direct employment is on the way out. It is increasingly replaced with 
‘temporary’ contracts which in fact can last for decades or whole lifetimes; by out-
sourced agency contracts, which conceal the real employment relationship and 
hence the balance of power in the workplace and in society; with ‘seasonal’ con-
tracts which are year round, bringing all seasons together in a single workplace; 
with bogus ‘self employment’ schemes which turn wage earners into ‘contractors’, 
with stand-by and on-call work; and with phony ‘apprenticeships’ often dressed up 
in the language of ‘life-long learning’.
253 Van der Heijden (1999a), p. 19.
254 ILO (2012a).
255 ILO (2012a), p. 9
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And further on:
Language, as I have said, is essential. The opposite of decent is indecent, and anoth-
er word for indecent is obscene. It is indecent to suggest that private employment 
agencies, often incorrectly termed ‘temporary’ agencies, somehow create jobs, ‘fuel’ 
social progress or contribute to decent work. It is investment, and capital’s need 
for labour, which creates employment. What kind of jobs in turn depends on the 
wider environment, including the degree of basic protection, including protection 
for the right to organize and bargain. We see social regression rather than progress, 
and the less progress we see the more agency work we find. Agency work is by 
definition precarious – the ‘user enterprise’ can terminate the relationship at will. 
Private job agencies are not contributing to decent work: they are undermining it 
by institutionalizing insecurity, concealing the true employment relationship and 
blocking effective access to rights.256
This statement marks a clear turnabout on the part of the trade unions: in the new 
approach, temporary agency work leads to more job insecurity and weakens the legal 
position of the workers as well as that of the trade unions.
Sharon Burrow, General Secretary of ITUC, asks for one or more ILO instru-
ments with respect to disguised, ambiguous and triangular employment that go bey-
ond recommendation no. 198 (2006), possibly a convention on precarious work.
Only the introduction by Luc Cortebeeck,257 the chairman of the ILO Workers 
Group, refers to Convention 181, which is said to have a limited scope, because it has 
no provisions against excessive use of temporary employment.
3.3.2 Focus
The ACTRAV symposium focused on two categories of contractual arrangements, i.e. 
the limited duration of the contract (fixed-term, short-term, temporary, seasonal, 
day-labour and casual labour) and the nature of the labour relations (triangular and 
disguised employment, bogus self-employment, subcontracting and agency con-
tracts). Furthermore, the symposium looked at four precarious working conditions, 
i.e. low wages, poor employment protection, poor social protection (often associated 
with standard full-time employment) and lack of possibilities to exercise one’s rights 
at work.
The study shows a spectacular growth of temporary employment from 1987 to 
2007 and calculates that the weighted average for the entire OECD area grew from 
256 Ilo (2012a), p. 12
257 ILO (2012a), p. 18
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9.4% in 1985 to 12% in 2007. While permanent salaried employment increased by 21% 
during that period, temporary employment increased by 55%. Higher growth figures 
apply for the European Union.
According to the report, ‘precarious work has a deep impact on workers and 
on societies. Over the past years, economic crises and turbulences on the financial 
markets have led to widespread anxiety among workers. Increasing rates of unem-
ployment and precarious work arrangements deteriorate the quality of working and 
living conditions.’258 Particularly, temporary workers cannot make effective plans to 
get married, have children or buy a house, because their prospects are uncertain and 
their wages tend to be low. Precarious work can also lead to health problems and to 
unhealthy and dangerous working conditions. Relatively speaking, this phenomenon 
affects women more.
Furthermore, all these developments have a weakening effect on society as a 
whole. A sense of powerlessness and fear discourages the precarious workers to join 
trade unions or other organisations promoting social participation, which results in 
social exclusion. Technological and institutional changes are the drivers of this devel-
opment. Neo-liberal thinking has boosted it even more.
To put a stop to this development, the following key elements are advocated: 
restoring full employment as the pivot of economic policy; restricting the so-called 
financialisation of the world order; balancing the tax burden; public investments in 
sustainability; pay rises in line with increasing productivity.
For the labour market, the report advocates a level playing field without unfair 
competition. Imposing quotas for external hiring, 5% for instance, as well as demand-
ing valid reasons for it could be the answer. If no valid reason for external hiring is 
evident, a permanent contract should automatically start after a maximum of three 
months.
3.3.3 Legislation
The ACTRAV report states that labour law has not kept abreast with the reality of new 
forms of work, which results in an increase of precarious work. In some cases, certain 
categories of work are excluded from the current labour legislation, which applies 
to farm workers and domestic staff for instance, and in other cases, practices have 
arisen that are not covered by the definition of employee and/or employer. More-
over, hiring temporary employees and forms of subcontracting are not sufficiently 
restricted, which renders workers vulnerable to unjust dismissal, low job security, 
low wages and little or no social security. It also results in erosion of trade union 
258   ILO (2012a), p. 35
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power.  According to the report, there are various routes towards tackling this, i.e. the 
national route, the international route and the legal route.
At a national level, exclusions for certain categories of workers can be rectified. 
Likewise, ambiguous employment can be tackled by tightening up the definitions of 
employees and employers. In this case, triangular employment relationships demand 
special attention.
The Global Unions reached an agreement on this, providing that ‘the primary 
form of employment should be permanent, open-ended and direct; agency workers 
should be covered under the same collective bargaining agreement as other workers 
in the user enterprise: temporary agency workers should receive equal treatment in 
all respects; the use of temporary agencies should not increase the gender gap on 
wages, social protections, and conditions; temporary work agencies must not be used 
to eliminate permanent and direct employment relationships; and the use of agency 
workers should never be used to weaken trade unions or to undermine organising or 
collective bargaining rights’.259
The report refers to legislation in Belgium where hiring temporary agency 
 workers is restricted to special circumstances, such as replacement, covering peaks 
of work, work of unusual nature, artistic work. In France, Belgium’s first and second 
 restrictions apply, plus ‘intrinsically time-limited posts’. Moreover, in France, tempor-
ary agency work must become a permanent contract after 18-24 months.  According 
to the report this is an improvement compared with European countries such as 
 Poland, Romania and Italy, where the limit is set between 2 and 3 years. Taking meas-
ures that offer more income security, e.g., statutory minimum wages, and measures 
to enhance labour law enforcement is also important.
Most international labour standards appear not to distinguish between forms of 
employment, but to protect all workers. According to the report, international law 
seems not to protect against precarious work as such.
Furthermore, the use of temporary employment and temporary agency work 
is not sufficiently restricted, while existing instruments lose protective power due to 
poor ratification rates and inadequate implementation.
The report lists various conventions that include regulations for specific categor-
ies of workers, for instance:
 – the Migration for Employment Convention (revised) 1949 (no. 97) and the 
 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (no. 143);
 – the Workers with Family Responsibility Convention, 1981 (no. 156);
 – the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons) Convention 
1983 (no. 159);
 – the Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (no. 183);
259 ILO (2012a), p. 51
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 – the Home Work Convention, 1996 (no. 177);
 – the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (no. 189).
Likewise, the above international instruments all pivot on the principle of equal 
treatment. This is expressed in several ways, but the principle stipulates that workers 
should not be discriminated against ‘on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, polit-
ical opinion, national extraction, social origin or any other form of discrimination 
covered by national law and practice’. Controversially, this equal treatment principle 
does not apply to differences in contract form.260
With respect to Convention 181, the ACTRAV report states that it ‘constitutes 
an effort to address abuses’ and that licensing, certification, guaranteeing workers’ 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining as well as the allocation of 
responsibilities by governments are important elements in dealing with any unscru-
pulous agencies. Still, the convention does not restrict the use of temporary agency 
workers. Nor does it include provisions with respect to how the responsibilities in the 
matter of collective bargaining must be allocated.
Furthermore, the report argues that international labour law fails to provide an 
instrument on temporary employment. A new ILO convention and recommendation 
should first address the conditions under which employers are allowed to hire tem-
porary employees or agency workers, and it should impose quantitative restrictions 
on the number of workers hired on precarious contracts at a given enterprise and on 
the maximum duration of temporary contracts, after which the workers concerned 
must be given permanent contracts. In line with Recommendation 198, such a bind-
ing  instrument should also include clear criteria to define employment relationships. 
Furthermore, such an instrument should ensure that workers are treated equally 
and pay special attention to social security, occupational health and safety and trade 
 union rights, including the right to collective bargaining.
Until the time such a convention has been created, priority should be given to 
Convention 158 on termination of employment and the accompanying Recommenda-
tion 166. The latter instrument recommends limiting fixed-term contracts to those 
cases in which the nature of the work or the working conditions necessitate tempor-
ary contracts and, if the rules are broken, to provide that a permanent contract is 
deemed to exist.
To conclude, the ACTRAv report lists the ILO jurisprudence regarding right to 
organise and bargain collectively. This makes clear that both the CEACR and the CFA 
have respected the rights of precarious workers in several reviews. This is particu-
larly striking in relation to a case the CFA reviewed in Colombia. Here, the Union 
of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industry Workers wanted to be registered by the 
260 Rossman (2013).
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authorities. Its objectives stated that they wanted to include temporary agency work-
ers. The government held the view that the Union could only represent workers who 
had contracts of employment with companies belonging to the same industry, which 
did not apply to temporary agency workers. The CFA ruled that the conditions under 
which workers are hired should not affect their right to join a trade union and take 
part in its activities.261
The ACTRAV symposium concluded that the ILO is to develop a new economic 
paradigm that is in line with ILO’s Global Jobs Pact and the four pillars of the Decent 
Work Agenda. The symposium requested further research on the obstacles that pre-
carious workers come up against with regard to collective bargaining. It also placed 
on the agenda the promotion of a number of existing instruments – apart from the 
ones for specific categories listed above, for instance:
 – the Employment Policy Convention 1964 (no. 122);
 – the Employment Relationship Recommendation 2006 (no. 198);
 – the Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (no. 158);
 – the Collective Bargaining Convention 1981 (no. 175);
 – the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970 (no. 131);
 – the Labour Inspection Convention 1947 (no. 81) and the Labour Inspection 
(Agri culture) Convention 1969 (no. 129);
 – the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts) Convention 1949 (no. 94).
Lastly, the report expresses the need to examine the meaning, scope, impact and ap-
plication of Convention 181 in the light of the rapid growth of triangular employment 
relationships through temporary agency work.
3.3.4 The employer position
Meanwhile, employers have also considered their position. In 2014, the IOE pub-
lished a position paper on flexible forms of work.262 Precarious work is not a work-
able topic for employers. They even worry about the lack of clarity and usefulness of 
the definition of ‘precarious work’ and about the frequently made suggestion that all 
flexible forms of employment are systematically precarious.
Employers argue that flexible forms of employment, such as fixed-term con-
tracts, part-time employment and temporary agency work all form part of the labour 
market and make up useful and much-needed additions to the full-time permanent 
contract.
261 CFA case no. 2556.
262 IOE (2014a). See also: BDA (2012), which shows that in 2011 alone 675,000 mainstream jobs and 
122,000 temporary jobs were created.
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Flexibility matters not only to employers, but to employees as well, because it contrib-
utes to the quality of working life and the employability of the workers. It improves 
the work-life balance, enhances workers’ opportunities to find new employment and 
increases their chances of gaining work experience. Flexible work, employers argue, 
helps the most vulnerable groups, such as young people, long-term unemployed  people 
and low-skilled workers to (re)gain a foothold in the labour market. Flexible work 
enables enterprises to retain and create jobs while staying adaptable and competitive.
Flexible work does not automatically mean precarious work, and thus lack of 
social benefits, low wages and high occupational health and safety risks, in short, lack 
of decent working conditions and fringe benefits. Poor working conditions apply to a 
much greater extent to informal and illegal work. To employers, decent work is based 
on:
 – compliance with national labour law and effective enforcement of legal rights, 
including national laws that implement international legal standards;
 – respect for the internationally acknowledged rights as included in the ILO’s Dec-
laration on Fundamentals Principals and Right at work (1998);
 – a legal framework that promotes the integration in the labour market of people 
with varied needs and meets the corporate need for flexibility.
Moreover, employability and career advancement are much more relevant to an in-
creasingly dynamic labour market than focusing on one’s current job is. This is the 
work-security concept that pivots on transitions in the labour market. Temporary 
employment agencies invest in training and development and thus in the employabil-
ity of their workers.
Employers argue that flexible work does not supersede the traditional forms of 
employment. Figures are available showing that the number of mainstream jobs far 
exceeds the number of temporary jobs.263 Flexible forms of employment often con-
stitute a ‘stepping stone’ into the labour market.
Furthermore, employers argue that while flexible workers earn lower wages, this 
has to do with the workers’ schooling and skills levels, which tend to be lower.
Flexible work enables companies to respond quickly and efficiently to demand 
fluctuations. It is a stabilising factor that helps employers retain permanent staff; it 
offers various replacement opportunities due to illness, holidays or maternity leave. 
Moreover, research shows that a wider variety of labour contracts results in increased 
job creation and higher labour market participation.264 Furthermore, flexible work 
and temporary agency work help the search processes in the labour market run more 
efficiently and effectively.
263 BDA (2012).
264 Schmid (2010), p. 130; Berkhout & Van den Berg (2010).
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3.3.5 2011 Global Dialogue Forum
In 2011, the ILO organised a GDF (Global Dialogue Forum) about temporary agency 
work. The Governing Body had taken the decision in 2009. 144 participants attend-
ed the Forum, 25 of whom represented governments, as well as 62 employee and 50 
employer representatives.265 Whereas the 2009 workshop was characterised by a pos-
itive attitude, resulting in a lot of common ground, the 2011 Global Dialogue Forum 
made it clear that the trade unions took up a much more critical position. They had 
by then considered a joint attitude with regard to precarious work, as became abund-
antly clear during the consultation.
For this meeting a paper was produced: Private Employment agencies, promotion 
of decent work and improving the functioning of labour markets in private services sec-
tors. The report explores the various trends that cause the growing phenomenon of 
temporary agency work, supplies economic data regarding various sectors, explores 
who the workers are and dwells on the social aspects of temporary agency work and 
its contribution to the labour market.
The following issues were placed on the agenda:266
1. temporary employment agencies’ contribution to job creation and, more in gen-
eral to decent work;
2. legislation;
3. temporary agency workers’ rights: how to comply with legislation and how to 
effectively link the sector’s development to improved worker protection;
4. how to promote the social dialogue regarding temporary agency work at all 
 levels.
Ad 1, job creation and decent work
With respect to job creation, it was tentatively suggested that if well-regulated and 
effectively respecting the workers’ rights that have been recognised in international 
labour standards, temporary employment agencies267 can play a role. Therefore, it is 
important not to get mixed up in casuistry and keep looking at the bigger picture.
Research is needed on the scope and impact of Convention 181 on the labour 
market.
Combating rogue agencies and illegal practices serves a common cause; there is 
a need for social dialogue as well as for reinforcing freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining, provided that commissioning clients must also take part in the 
social dialogue with temporary workers.
265 GDFPSS/ILO (2011a).
266 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b).
267 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 8.
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The fundamental principles and rights at work must be respected in all cases; this also 
applies to temporary employment agencies.
The participants failed to achieve consensus on a number of points. For instance, 
on the so-called reasons of use that would need to be implemented, i.e. criteria for 
when temporary agency workers can be hired, and on imposing limits on the extent 
of hiring them. Temporary agency work was neither the best nor the worst form 
of temporary employment. Employment was created by investments on the part of 
commissioning clients, i.e. the user companies, while temporary employment agen-
cies merely matched the supply and demand for labour. Some agencies do actually 
operate within the law, but still violate workers’ rights, the employee representatives 
argued.
Ad 2, legislation
In the first instance, the participants more or less achieved consensus on the fact 
that there is broad recognition of the need for regulation268 on the basis of relevant 
international standards. Regulation must be balanced, must promote decent work 
and grant employees labour rights, the rights to social security, pension, leave and 
training. Meanwhile, the temporary employment agencies must also be able to real-
ise labour flexibility. Ratification of Conventions no. 87, no. 98 and no. 181 as well 
as effective implementation of Recommendations 188 and 198 must be promoted. 
Likewise, social dialogue must play a role and codes of conduct may make a useful 
contribution.
Ad 3, temporary agency workers’ rights
With respect to the issue of workers’ rights, several agency employers presented ex-
amples from the various countries to make clear that appropriate regulation fully 
guarantees workers’ rights.
The Argentinian employer participant advocated ratification of Convention 181 
and argued that informal work is a much bigger issue in his country than tempor-
ary agency work. An estimated 40% of the working population did unregistered 
work. The worker spokesperson argued269 that real-world examples were needed 
from outside Europe and from non-CIETT members. According to him, the devel-
opment of the temporary agency industry undermined freedom of association and 
collective bargaining and replaced open-ended contracts by precarious work. The 
spokes person stressed the importance of equal treatment, which comprised more 
than fair treatment, as the (agency) employers had underlined earlier. The direct 
open-ended contract should be the norm; temporary employment agencies should 
268 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 13.
269 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 14.
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not charge workers any fees; workers should be given written contracts; temporary 
agency workers should be given information on occupational health and safety and 
be treated equally, which included freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing.270 In  respect of worker’s rights the chairperson established that consensus had 
been achieved about the necessity of appropriate regulation to ensure respect for the 
fundamental principles and rights at work, supplemented by special measures to that 
to be agreed on in ‘a spirit of mutual respect and recognition’; furthermore, that equal 
treatment for temporary agency workers regarding pay, occupational health and 
 safety, training, hiring and firing as well as information about vacancies registered 
by the commissioning clients; and temporary employment agencies, commission-
ing clients and trade unions are to collaborate on sector-level collective agreements. 
 National governments are responsible for promoting this.
Temporary agency work should be decent, safe and legal, and should hold out 
the prospect of direct, open-ended employment if possible; temporary employment 
agencies should not charge fees; written contracts should be obligatory, containing 
information that enables workers to assess whether they are being treated equally.
Ad 4, social dialogue
Lastly, tripartite dialogue is needed to meet the decent work challenge and promote 
effective implementation of Convention 181.
With regard to this dialogue, the employee representative remarked that tempor-
ary agency work disrupts the collective nature of bargaining. It proved to be really 
difficult to organise collective bargaining among temporary agency workers when 
they were assigned to a user company through various agencies, especially if the 
working relationship between employers and temporary agency workers could easily 
be terminated at any time. The real bargaining takes place between the commission-
ing client and the temporary employment agency. In future, all social partners should 
be involved in collective bargaining, including the trade unions of the user company 
and employers’ representatives.271
The issue was further clarified from the workers’ perspective by means of an 
example at Unilever in Pakistan, where a temporary agency worker did not receive 
equal treatment. Only when Unilever was willing to take responsibility and no longer 
distanced itself from this issue, could the solution be found.272 The employer rep-
resentative commented that there was an excessive focus on the bilateral nature of 
labour relations and that the triangular employment relationship inherent in tempo-
rary agency work should by now be taken into account. Article 12 of Convention 181 
270 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 17.
271 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 19.
272 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 20.
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covers this relationship and has the member states allocate the respective respons-
ibilities. The Unilever issue as described above would possibly never have arisen if 
Pakistan had ratified and implemented Convention 181.
The chairperson summarised that temporary employment agencies, govern-
ments, commissioning clients and trade unions all acknowledge the importance of 
social dialogue. As a result, collective agreements can be concluded at a national, 
sectoral and corporate level to define the terms and conditions of employment. Rati-
fication of Convention 181 and other international labour standards is desirable and 
must be promoted. However, there is also a clear need for effective implementation 
and enforcement. Practical solutions flowing from social dialogue call for acknow-
ledgement by all social partners.
It proved impossible to achieve consensus on granting the agency sector the 
right to unrestricted collective bargaining. Social dialogue in triangular employment 
relationships should be organised differently.
3.3.6 No agreement
At the end of the dialogue, an attempt was made to limit so-called points of con sensus 
to five key points:273
1. The points of consensus of the 2009 workshop to promote ratification of Con-
vention 181 are confirmed.
2. To the extent that temporary employment agencies are employers, they must be 
recognised as legitimate social partners in the social dialogue; user companies 
can be involved as social partners according to national law and practice.
3. Ratifying Conventions 87, 98 and 181 must be promoted, as well as implement-
ing Recommendations 188 and 198. Social dialogue should be instrumental in 
achieving this.
4. The ILO must expand its knowledge base through research on regulation in both 
developed and developing countries; this should serve to promote Convention 
181.
5. The Forum requested that the ILO organise within three years an expert meet-
ing on the role of temporary employment agencies. The Forum recognises the 
importance of social dialogue and collective bargaining in relation to temporary 
agency work. This dialogue should involve governments, temporary employ-
ment agencies, commissioning clients and trade unions.
In the event, it proved impossible to achieve consensus on these five points. Particu-
larly point 2, on social dialogue and which parties would need to be involved in it, led 
273 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 23.
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to a difference of opinion. The trade unions wanted to oblige the user companies, i.e. 
commissioning clients, to be involved in collective bargaining. Employers thought 
that this was a step too far. They did want involvement, but not as a worldwide ob-
ligation. Involvement should be voluntary, in line with national law and practice.274
To conclude, the chairperson remarked that the deliberations during the Forum had 
not been easy. However, they had contributed to a better understanding of how vari-
ous countries perceived temporary agency work, and how the employers’, workers’ 
and government groups viewed it. The reflections could contribute to future work, 
even though no consensus had been achieved.275
3.3.7 Trade unions redefine their positions
Some time after this GDF, the joint global unions adopted their Global Union Prin-
ciples on Temporary Work Agencies.
General principles
 – The most important form of employment is permanent, open-ended and direct 
employment. Temporary employees must be treated equally and are entitled to 
equal pay for equal work, in line with the terms and conditions accorded to 
permanent employees. They are also entitled to a written contract specifying the 
terms and conditions of employment. Where temporary employment agencies 
are allowed to operate, they need to be strictly regulated, which includes licens-
ing.
 – Temporary employment agencies must not be used to supersede permanent and 
direct employment, to erode terms and conditions of employment, to counter 
collective bargaining or to prevent trade union membership. Before hiring tem-
porary agency workers, employers must consult trade unions on the use of these 
workers and on its effects on permanent employment, working conditions or 
collective agreements.
 – The use of temporary employment agencies must be restricted to instances of 
 legitimate need. As a minimum, specific restrictions must be imposed with re-
gard to both the use and the duration of temporary agency work.
 – Temporary agency workers must be ensured access to information on health 
and safety measures in the commissioning client’s workplace and must be pro-
vided with the same equipment and facilities as permanent employees.
274 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 24.
275 GDFPSS/ILO (2011b), p. 28.
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 – Employers and national governments must ensure social protection for tempor-
ary agency workers, including social security coverage.
 – Temporary employment agencies must treat their workers without discrimina-
tion; to ensure this, an appropriate regulator framework must be in place, in-
cluding the minimum standards of Convention 181.
 – In view of the over-representation of women in temporary agency work, special 
attention must be given to the disparity in wages between permanent employees 
and temporary agency workers, particularly to the application of Convention 
100, including equal pay for work of equal value.
 – The ILO must play a more active role in ensuring that temporary employment 
agencies respect the basic labour standards, and collect data on abuses, best 
practices and trends in public and private employment services. The Global 
 Unions must participate in this work.
 – Temporary agency workers must not be hired to replace striking workers.
 – Temporary employment agencies must not charge workers any fees for their 
 services.
 – The commissioning client must be held liable for all financial and other obliga-
tions that are not met by the temporary employment agency.
Government responsibilities with respect to temporary agency work
 – National governments must work at stable labour relationships and ensure the 
application of labour law. They may restrict or ban temporary agency work in 
order to protect societal interests.
 – Governments must set strict regulations and if temporary agency work is al-
lowed, they must impose licensing conditions. Governments must consult with 
trade unions about matters relating to the terms and conditions of (assigning) 
temporary agency work.
 – If an employment relationship exists between the temporary employment 
 agency and the agency worker, the several roles, obligations and rights of the 
temporary agency workers, the commissioning client and the temporary em-
ployment agency need to be clarified.
 – National governments must ensure that temporary agency workers can effect-
ively exercise their trade union rights, including membership of a union that 
has a collective bargaining relationship with the commissioning client, being 
part of the negotiating unit for direct employees on the commissioning client’s 
premises and being included in the collective bargaining agreements that apply 
to the commissioning client.
 – National governments must reinforce labour inspection and supply adequate 
means to apply labour law and agency regulations effectively.
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 – Governments must develop mechanisms for the application of the occupational 
health and safety conditions and ensure that the same conditions apply to tem-
porary agency workers and permanent employees alike.
 – There must be sanctions in place for commissioning clients that fail to comply 
with these requirements.
Migrant workers
 – Migrant workers must be given details about their living and working condi-
tions in their native language before leaving their country of origin.
 – National governments must take measures to combat human trafficking and ex-
ploitation by intermediaries, including temporary employment agencies.
 – Governments must ensure that immigration legislation does not impose restric-
tions on migrant workers’ trade union rights that conflict with labour law.
 – Migrant workers must not be asked for ‘pay-deposits, visa fees, transportation 
fees and hiring fees’.
 – Migrant workers must have full rights to legal redress in the country where they 
are working.276
3.4 INTERIM REVIEW: BOTTLENECKS
Surveying the above developments it becomes clear that, following the failed contract 
labour dialogue that did actually result in Recommendation 198 in 2006, in the con-
text of the issue of precarious work widespread criticism was directed against changes 
in the labour market that would lead to the loss of the open-ended contract.
A number of sociologists have taken the lead in a discussion that appears to be 
ongoing. It is doubtful whether the relevant literature is right about the postulation 
that permanent employment is on the way out. It became clear above that, on the 
basis of figures about the period 2000-2012, SEO (p. 94) sees no further increase in 
the displacement of permanent employees by flexible workers.
On reflection, the tenor in the literature is not really borne out by the figures. 
The most remarkable figures are those relating to the German labour market, indic-
ating that in 2011 alone, Germany gained 675,000 mainstream jobs, five times the 
number of 122,000 temporary workers that were added during that same period.
If temporary employment stabilises in general, this applies especially to tempor-
ary agency work in the more developed regions, such as the United States, Japan and 
the European Union as a whole. Only the relatively new markets in Eastern Europe 
are growing. However the penetration rates of temporary agency work tend to aver-
age 1 to 2%, sometimes nearer 3%, and hardly ever exceed that level. The figures do 
276 CGU (2012).
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not justify the anxiety that emanates from the views expressed in the literature and 
by the trade unions.
But even though temporary employment in general tends to stabilise and the 
volume of temporary agency work tends to be small, it is still useful and necessary to 
keep reflecting on the criticisms that are being expressed.
3.4.1 Aspects of ongoing discussion demanding further analysis
Taking into account science and the points of view of the social partners, particularly 
those of the trade unions, and the ILO deliberations on this score, four key aspects 
from the above discussion invite further analysis:
 – employment is insecure;
 – wages are not equal;
 – the trade union movement, particularly collective bargaining, is weakened;
 – the use of temporary agency work is insufficiently restricted.
In the paragraphs above, it was said that security is all about perception. According to 
the OECD the sense of security does not increase proportionally to additional secur-
ity protection (employment protection) but rather depends on the social safety net 
( social benefits), which generates income security. Also, the sense of security does 
not increase in proportion to job tenure. Moreover, temporary agency work turns out 
to score no worse than open-ended employment in general. In this respect, informal 
work and bogus self-employment turn out to score worst.
The OECD also indicates that temporary employment agencies offer open-ended con-
tracts in a number of countries. Thus, security is a relative concept that is determined 
by more aspects than the contract alone.
Honourable though the principle of equal treatment – equal pay for equal work 
– may be, the question always remains what to compare to. In the labour market, 
differences simply will occur. A secretary of the same age with equal experience and 
qualifications can earn more with the one employer than with the other. And tempor-
ary employment agencies must always take into account the re-assignability of their 
workers. Particularly if they offer open-ended contracts, they need to minimise their 
risk of under-utilisation, which results in their ‘own’ wages policy.
Article 12 of Convention 181 has come with a solution to this: member states 
are to allocate responsibilities, including that for collective bargaining, to the parties 
concerned. Many European countries have enacted the principle of the ‘user pay’ 
and this is currently also a starting point in the 2008 EU Temporary Agency Work 
Directive.
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Non-discrimination with respect to remuneration has been entrenched in Conven-
tions 100 and 111 that provide that discrimination based on characteristics such as sex, 
nationality, et cetera is forbidden. Still, a general ban on discrimination based on dif-
ferences in contract, which actually occur with respect to temporary agency work, has 
also been advocated. Support for this point of view can be found in article 7a(i) of the 
icESCR that entitles workers to ‘fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal 
value, without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed condi-
tions of work not inferior to those engaged by men, with equal pay for equal work’.
This concerns a provision that may become relevant in the case of operations in 
breach of the OECD Guiding Principles. It seems highly doubtful whether this view 
is feasible. Firstly, the precise meaning of ‘equal pay for equal work of equal value’ 
will need to be established; with whom exactly do you compare; with another worker 
hired by the temporary employment agency or with an employee of the commission-
ing client’s? Secondly, are the conventions on the freedom of association and collect-
ive bargaining at stake if an agency-specific wage policy for its workers is established 
and agreed on in a collective agreement? What should prevail in that case?
Furthermore, precarious work, together with temporary agency work, are said 
to erode the position of the trade unions, and the question is whether these forms of 
employment institutionalise the waning trade union power and influence. As  became 
clear above, this is a much-used argument, and during the last GDF this was what 
 divided (temporary agency) employers and workers. In practice, various types of 
 social dialogue exist between (temporary agency) employers and workers.
Table 3.11 Types of bargaining arrangements
Bargaining 
arrangement
Social partners Collective agreement Coverage
Multi-employer 
inter-sectoral
Employers’ federations, 
union confederations 
and federations
Belgium: Inter-professional 
agreement, feb/vbo, unizo, 
ucm & bb, fgtb/abvv, csc/
acv, cgslb/aclvb (2011–
2012)
All private sector em-
ployees (including part-
time, fixed-term, tempor-
ary agency workers)
Associations of tempo-
rary employment agen-
cies, union federations
Spain: National Collective 
Agreement on temporary 
work agency workers, agett, 
aett, fedett, agett & ccoo, 
ugt (2008)
Temporary agency 
workers
Multi-employer 
sectoral
Sectoral employers’ 
federations and one or 
more trade unions
Germany: Stahl & ig  Metall 
(2010, 2011) for North Rhine- 
Westphalia, Lower Saxony 
and Bremen: general pay 
increase, regulates use of 
taw and equal pay for work of 
equal value.
All fixed-term regular em-
ployees and temporary 
agency workers in the 
sector in three regions
 Chapter 3: Complications
 117
Bargaining 
arrangement
Social partners Collective agreement Coverage
Temporary work em-
ployers’ organizations 
and trade union
Germany: bap and igz & ig 
Metall (2012): sectoral bonu-
ses for temporary workers in 
the metal industry depending 
on the length of their assign-
ment.
Temporary agency wor-
kers in the metal industry
Enterprise Enterprise and trade 
union(s)
Japan: Post Holdings & 
enterprise union (2007, 
2010): 2,000 yen monthly 
wage increase for fixed-term 
employees, hire 2,000 fixed-
term as regular.
All fixed-term salaried 
employees (including 
non-unionized) at enter-
prise
Turkey: ups and Tümtis 
(Türkiye Motorlu Tasit 
Iscileri) supported by itf 
(2011–2013): regulates use 
of subcontracting; 260 sub-
contracted workers become 
regular employees.
All members
twa and trade union Germany: ig Metall and 
Adecco for Audi (2007): 
equal pay for work of equal 
value (departing from indus-
try agreement for Bavaria 
that derogates from equal 
treatment)
Temporary agency wor-
kers at enterprise
Source: Hayter & Ebisui (2013)
Table 3.12 Employment, pay and equal treatment
Issue Outcome Agreement
Employment Limit 
 segmentation
South Africa: saa & satawu/aiwu: use of labour brokers to be 
phased out over 18 months from 1 April 2009. During phase out, 
ratio of broker employees: permanent employees to be 20:80 for 
cabin crew, 40:60 for cargo and 30:70 for other division.
United States: ikea Swedwood & iamaw supported by bwi 
(2012): limits the number of temporary workers that can be hired 
and requires them to undertake safety training before entering 
plant.
Transition 
to regular 
 employment
India: GlaxoSmithKline & Milk Food Factory Workers’ Union 
supported by iuf (2010): regularization of 443 temporary agency 
workers in a phased manner.
France: Caterpillar & fo, cftc and cgt – Grenoble and Echirolle 
plants (2012): transformation of 80 precarious labour contracts 
to convert in 2012 into permanent contracts.
Germany: Deutsche Post & Ver.di (2011): 1,500 part-time em-
ployees to receive regular full-time contracts.
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Issue Outcome Agreement
Wages and 
working time
Equal pay Germany: Adecco for Audi & ig Metall (2007): equal pay for equal 
work. In July 2012, Audi announced intention to cut hundreds of 
temporary jobs.
South Africa: Metal Engineering and Industries Bargaining 
Council (2011–2014): all workers procured through Temporary 
Employment Service to enjoy existing terms and conditions of 
employment outlined in the Main Agreement. Duration limited 
to four months, after which employment regularized. Portable 
entitlements to industry fund.
Narrowing pay 
gap
Netherlands: abu & fnv, cnv, De Unie and lbv (2012–2017): 
initially derogated from the principal of equal pay. Renewed 
agreement signed in November 2012 introduces users (equal) 
pay ‘hirer’s remuneration’ from the first day with the hiring com-
pany. Implementation date as of first week of 2015.
Germany: ig Metall & bap and igz (2012): sector-related sup-
plement to close the pay gap between regular and temporary 
workers, works agreement to agree on engagement of temporary 
agency workers.
Benefits Equal access to 
benefits, pen-
sion and skill 
development
South Africa: ameo & numsa (2009/2010): short-term workers 
entitled to participate in industry’s multi-skilling programme and 
social security and medical aid extended to them.
Japan: Aeon & enterprise union (2004 and ongoing): equal train-
ing opportunities previously limited to regular workers.
Source: Hayter & Ebisui (2013)
On the basis of these arrangements, it would go too far to ignore completely the bar-
gaining rights of temporary agency employers and leave them to the commissioning 
clients. On the other hand, it is not defensible for agency employers to claim these 
bargaining rights exclusively, also in view of the existing arrangements. In practice, 
the various usable forms need to develop and the best practices must be held up as 
examples.
In view of the weakened position of the trade unions as a consequence of temporary 
agency work, a judgment by the Supreme Court in Namibia and the specific Amer-
ican context deserve further consideration. Likewise, a review of the OECD Guidelines 
through a case that was reported to the German NCP, concerning possibly excessive 
use of temporary agency work, is worth mentioning.
3.4.2 Namibian case
In Namibia, the Supreme Court examined arguments that the trade unions have 
difficulties organising temporary agency workers and that temporary agency work 
should be banned for that reason. Although this country has a modest position in 
the world ranking of countries, this judgment is deserving of some attention. The 
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Supreme Court found that the trade unions’ inability to organise temporary agency 
workers cannot be a reason to ban temporary agency work.
The substance of the respondents’ complaint [...] is that the structure and mobility 
of agency work make it more difficult for unions to access and organise agency 
workers. These difficulties manifest themselves [...] throughout the employment 
spectrum in Namibia, especially where employees are thinly scattered over vast 
and often remote areas – such as farm and domestic workers. Challenging as it may 
be for labour unions to access and organise them, it does not diminish the freedom 
of workers in those ‘difficult’ sectors to form and join trade unions entrenched in 
Article 21 (1)(e) of the Constitution and it can not be said that these  organisational 
difficulties caused by employment in those sectors is ‘inimical’ to the State’s ‘duty’ 
under Article 95 (c) to actively encourage the formation of independent trade 
 unions – and, needless to note, it is hardly a reason to ban domestic or farm  labour 
altogether. By parity of reasoning the difficult challenges presented to trade unions 
[...] are not inimical to policies regarding the formation of trade unions contem-
plated in Article 95 (c) of the Constitution. The respondents’ submission to the 
contrary and their contention that agency work should be banned on that basis 
cannot be sustained.277
3.4.3 American context
It looks as if much of the criticisms directed against the poor trade union position are 
also caused by the special situation that has arisen in the United States. Although US 
law has banned discriminating workers on the grounds of their trade union member-
ship or collective bargaining activities since 1935,278 and the freedom of association 
has been a fundamental right since 1958 and is protected by the First Amendment in 
the Constitution279, in practice this is open to question. In 2004, the NLRB280 took a 
decision that makes it difficult for temporary agency workers to join the commission-
ing client’s bargaining unit, unless that client and the temporary employment agency 
approve. Thus, this does create a practical problem, which can explain why relatively 
few workers in the United States actually participate in a collective agreement.281
277 Supreme Court of Namibia, Africa Personnel Services (PTY) Ltd v. Government of Republic of 
Namibia and others (SA51/2008) (2009) NASC 17; (2011) BLLR 15 (NMS); (2011) 32 ILS 2005 (MNS) 
(14 December 2009), http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NASC/2009/17.html.
278 National Labour Relations Act (Wayner Act).
279 NAACP v. Alabama, 1958, Supreme Court.
280 Oakwood Care Center, 343 NZRB 76 (2004).
281 Sweeney, S. (2006). See also: Compa (2010); reactions from the companies concerned can be 
found on www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/01/45-european-corporatehypocrisy; and Compa (2000).
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For that matter, the so-called Oakwood decision by the NLRB of 2004, to restrict 
the admission of temporary agency workers to the commissioning client’s bargaining 
unit, has been challenged. Opponents argue that this decision is inconsistent with 
international labour standards, as they have been entrenched in Convention 181 and 
the Fundamental Declaration on Principles and Rights at work. Although the United 
States have not ratified Convention 181, they would be held to it through endors-
ing the Fundamental Declaration as an ILO member. After all, the ILO obliges all its 
member states ‘to respect, to promote, and to realize the freedom of association and 
the right to bargain collectively’. Another provision states that these rights must be 
granted ‘without distinction whatsoever’, that the workers may join organizations of 
their own choosing without previous authorisation. Through the years, the CFA, the 
Committee on Freedom of Association, has supported and interpreted these prin-
ciples. However, a reversal of the Oakwood case and readopting the 2000 M.B. Sturgis 
standard is advocated. On the basis of this case a temporary agency worker being 
‘jointly employed and commonly interested, possesses an unqualified right to join 
the unit, notwithstanding employer resistance’.282 Ratification of Convention 181 by 
the American senate is also advocated, as well as its implementation by law by the US 
Congress, so that Article 4 will be in force, providing that the member states must take 
measures to ‘ensure that the workers recruited by private employment agencies […] 
are not denied the right to freedom of association and the right to bargain col lectively’. 
Likewise Article 11 of the convention will apply in that case, which also ensures ade-
quate protection on this score.283
However, the specific problem with regard to the United States is that traditionally 
they hardly ever ratify ILO conventions, although the Americans do tend to support 
the ILO’s efforts. The reason is that in the United States, treaties must be ratified by 
each of its 52 states individually, and this system hinders ratification by the United 
States itself.
3.4.4 German case
Another key criticism concerns the absence or lack of conditions under which tem-
porary agency workers may be hired. It was noted before that various countries, in-
cluding Belgium and France, have restrictive regulations in place with regard to the 
extent of hiring that is allowed. For that matter, provisions like that may also have 
negative effects on employment.284
282 M.B. Sturgis, 331 NLRB – 1308.
283 Lafler (2014).
284 Andersson, Elffers & Felix (1982).
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In this case, the judgment of the German NCP (National Contact Point) in respect of 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is also interesting.
Considered that the deployment of agency workers does not represent a direct 
violation of the OECD Guidelines or other internationally applicable standards, 
deployment of agency workers is not expressly prohibited under the OECD Guide-
lines, nor is its extent regulated. Similarly, the internationally recognised human 
rights and the International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 (core labour standards) do not contain any 
provisions in this regard. Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies, which 
covers the deployment of agency workers, has not been ratified by Germany or the 
majority of ILO member states.
Even this Convention, however, does not prohibit or quantitatively restrict the em-
ployment of agency workers. To the NCP there were no hints to a widespread use 
of agency workers – and thus an intention to refuse regular pay or avoid trade 
union rights, either. Therefore, the NCP did not accept the complaint for further 
evaluation.285
In any event, there is a lot to be said against the criticisms. Temporary employment 
agencies employ many people who find it easy to work this way, and commissioning 
clients also benefit from this form of work. It looks as if temporary agency work is 
scapegoated286 by the prevailing western wind287, further enhanced by the economic 
crisis that started in 2008.
Deregulation and labour market flexibilisation have become widely accepted in 
recent years and temporary agency work moves with this fluctuation. In part, tem-
porary agency work is a reaction to increasing unemployment. Deregulation is also 
criticised, and temporary employment agencies are blamed for bringing a growing 
number of workers into precarious situations. Some people wonder if this may just be 
a guilty verdict of the messenger bringing the bad news. For instance, Bergström288 
argues that although temporary employment agencies offer less favourable working 
conditions if the labour market is out of balance, they change this when the market 
285 Joint final statement by the German National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional enterprises (NCP) Uni Global (UNI) and International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) 
and Deutsche Post DHL (DP-DHL) on the complaint by UNI/ITF against DP-DHL/Bonn; Berlin 
2014.
286 The most explicit attack on temporary agency work is to be found in Holdcroft (2012). The most 
recent attack can be found in Spooner (2014).
287 Van der Heijden (2004).
288 Bergström et al.(2007), p. 214 ff.
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rights itself. Rather than considering this to be a characteristic of temporary agency 
work, this must be traced back to the general labour market situation.
When the ‘high tide’ in the labour market is coming in once more, better terms 
of employment will be offered; however, they will get worse if the supply of (tempor-
ary agency) workers exceeds the demand. In other words: temporary agency work is 
the result of all the changes in the world of work rather than being the cause or driver 
of all these perceived changes.
3.5 EXPERTS TO MAKE A MOVE
A new discussion at ILO level concerns the NSFE, Non-Standard Forms of Employ-
ment. During the 101st ILC, a resolution was adopted asking:
… to organize a meeting of experts, undertake research and support national stud-
ies on the possible positive and negative impacts of employment on fundamental 
principles and rights at work and identify and share best practices and their regula-
tions.
In June 2014, the Officers of the Governing Body proposed to plan this meeting for 
February 2015, intending to let the conclusions play a role in the preparations for the 
recurrent discussion on labour protection that was placed on the agenda for the 104th 
ILC in June 2015.
3.5.1 Non-Standard Forms of Employment (NSFE); listing the facts
The earlier report for discussion that the ILO had issued289 argues that there is no 
official definition of non-standard forms of employment. Actually, these concern all 
forms of employment other than a standard employment relationship, which is full-
time, open-ended and dependent. The following forms of employment were included 
in the discussion (1) temporary employment, (2) temporary agency work and other 
contract types involving multiple parties, (3) ambiguous forms of employment and 
(4) part-time employment. Self-employed workers were not included, as they are not 
employees.
It looks as if this designation opts for a more neutral terminology than the con-
cept of precarious work. Temporary agency work and similar forms of employment 
are included as well. These are defined as follows.
289 ILO (2015a).
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Workers who are not directly employed by the company to which they provide 
their services may be performing work under contractual arrangements involving 
multiple parties, such as when a worker is deployed and paid by a private employ-
ment agency to perform work for a user firm. In most countries, the agency and 
the worker enter into an employment contract or relationship, whereas the agency 
and the user firm conclude a commercial contract. Although there is generally no 
employment relationship between temporary agency workers and user firms, some 
jurisdictions impose legal obligations on user firms vis-à-vis temporary agency 
workers, especially in respect of health and safety. The user firm pays fees to the 
agency, and the agency pays the wages and social benefits to the worker. In some 
countries, temporary agency work is referred to by the term ‘labour dispatch’ (such 
as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea), ‘labour brokerage’ (South Africa) and 
‘labour hire’ (Namibia). Although temporary agency workers are commonly recog-
nized as being in an employment relationship, there may be limitations imposed 
on the rights of the worker or confusion regarding these rights because multiple 
parties are involved, particularly if the worker has provided services at the user 
firm for an extended period of time.
The report indicates that, apart from the fact that NSFE creates scope for responding 
to seasonal fluctuations in production, there are three major reasons for organisations 
to make use of these forms of employment: cost advantages, flexibility and techno-
logical innovation. Temporary employees are often cheaper because of lower non-
wage labour costs. Using temporary employees meets the need for both numerical 
and functional flexibility, and technology enables virtual contacts across the world.
The report finds that, although these forms of employment are legitimate, the 
standard employment relationship, accounting for 70% of all jobs in Europe and the 
United States, is the dominant form of employment. In emerging markets such as 
Brazil and Argentina, mostly formal jobs with open-ended contracts have been creat-
ed since 2000. And in low-income countries self-employment and casual work con-
tinued to be the dominant form of employment.
The report refers to a study by the World Bank that shows widely diverging use 
of temporary employment (figure 3.10), ranging from 5% for counties such as Jordan, 
Lithuania and Sierra Leone to more than 25% in Mongolia, Peru and Vietnam.
With regard to temporary agency work, the study refers to CIETT figures that 
present a total of 36 million temporary agency workers in 2012 (11.5 million on a daily 
basis). The highest numbers can be found in the United States (11.5 million), followed 
by Europe (8.2 million), Brazil (7.1 million), Japan (2.5 million) and South Africa (2.2 
million). The report argues that these workers are only a part of the numbers hired 
across the world in these and similar tripartite relationships. These numbers only re-
flect the visible CIETT membership. The penetration rate of temporary agency work 
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is low and within Europe it ranges between 2.5% for the Netherlands and 0.3% for 
Greece, averaging 1.3% (figure 3.11).
Note: Data for 132 countries, for the latest available year, ranging from 2005 for Morocco and Egypt to 2014 for Af-
ghanistan and Myanmar. For the majority of countries (67), the data refers to 2009 or 2010. Industrialised countries 
were not surveyed. Computations based on the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2014
Figure 3.10  Incidence of temporary employment, as a percentage of total employment, in 
the private sector, circa 2010 Source: ILO (2015a), p. 9.
Figure 3.11  Temporary agency employment as a percentage of the working population, 
2012. Source: ELFS 2012, yearly data weighted for annual estimates
Source: ILO (2015a), p. 11.
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Young workers are relatively heavily represented in the temporary agency population 
(figure 3.12).
Note: Includes Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom (Source: ELFS)
Figure 3.12 Percentage of workers employed in temporary agency work by age, 2012.
Source: ILO (2015a), p. 12.
In the United States, the number of temporary agency workers doubled between 1990 
and 2000. In 2001, the penetration rate of temporary agency work was 2.1%. Other-
wise, there were vendor on premise workers290 (0.9%) and workers at professional 
employer organisations (0.9%).
In 2013, 3.5% of the working population of Korea were temporary agency work-
ers, a marked increase compared with 2.3% recorded in 2011. Apart from that figure, 
290 Worldwide, various terms are in use to refer to triangular employment relationships, other than 
temporary employment agencies. Vendor on premises is a type of contracting in which the  vendor 
takes over local management of specific duties or a division from the commissioning client. 
 Employers’ responsibilities are outsourced to a professional employer organisation, which acts as 
a formal employer, while the material employer remains in charge of recruiting and selecting 
workers. The term dispatched worker is almost synonymous to temporary agency worker, but is 
more commonly used in Japan and Asia. Agency-hires are the opposite of direct-hires, i.e. workers 
recruited by temporary employment agencies as opposed to workers hired directly by the employ-
er. Contractual workers are workers who carry out outsourced work on a contract basis, in which 
case they either work directly for or are managed and supervised by the commissioning client.
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2.9
1.3
0.7
15–24 years 25–54 years 55–64 years
Part I An ILO framework for temporary agency work: development and complication 
126
1.1% of the working population were dispatched workers. In 2009, 2.3% of the Japa-
nese workers belonged to the latter category, likewise a clear increase up from the 
0.7% recorded in the year 2000.
In 2012, 44% of all non-agrarian establishments in the Philippines had agency- 
hired workers. In addition, 16% of the workers in non-agricultural establishments 
were contractual or project-based workers. In 2011, one fifth (60 million) of the urban 
Chinese employees were dispatched workers, likewise a marked increase on the 27 
million recorded in 2007. For India, a strong growth of contract labour was recorded: 
from 13.5% in 1990–1991 to 26.5% in 2004–2005, and to 33.9% in 2010–2011.
In Israel the number of contract labourers is estimated at 5.4%. South Africa em-
ploys an estimated 6.7% of the workers through labour brokers. In Zambia in 2009, 
48% of the workers were working in the mining industry through contractors and 
labour brokers.
In Chile, the number of companies using temporary agency work increased from 
2.8% in 2008 to 3.6% in 2011. However, in companies with over 200 staff this propor-
tion had increased to 13.6%. Subcontracting occurred more often and increased from 
31% in 2008 to 38% in 2011.
The ILO report deals extensively with the impact that non-standard forms of employ-
ment (may) have on the position of workers and companies, as well as on the overall 
labour market. Non-standard forms of employment can be an excellent way for work-
ers to gain experience, for school leavers to enter the labour market and for  people 
who lost their job to reintegrate. Temporary employment agencies attract workers 
who have difficulty in finding a job, offering support services such as transport and 
providing the information that workers need to cover the distance between home and 
work. Part-time employment enables people to combine work with care responsibil-
ities. Thus, non-standard work can improve the work situation and promote a better 
work-life balance, providing the terms and conditions of employment are decent and 
the worker has chosen for this type of employment voluntarily. It only becomes a 
challenge, the report states, if people are forced into non-standard contracts and the 
options for transitioning into standard forms of employment are limited.
OECD data on temporary workers show that in Denmark, France, Sweden, Swit-
zerland and the United Kingdom approximately one fifth of all workers with fixed-
term contracts opted for this work because they do not want to have a permanent 
position, while the rest agreed to fixed-term contracts because they were on proba-
tion or could not find a permanent position. The percentage of temporary workers 
that could not find permanent employment ranged from 30% in Ireland, 40% in the 
Netherlands, 67% in Sweden to 90% in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In Australia, it be-
came clear in 2007 that 52% of the casual workers preferred to carry out casual work.
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Transitioning from non-standard to standard employment is a big worry for workers 
with fixed-term contracts and temporary agency workers. Instead of being a stepping 
stone, temporary employment and temporary agency work can also prove to be a 
dead end, causing workers to relapse into unemployment at the end of the assign-
ment or to be trapped in non-standard work, if their subsequent assignment is also 
non-standard. Various studies (see table 3.13) show that in most countries an annual 
transition does exist, albeit a modest one.
The stepping stone hypothesis is confirmed for countries such as Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United States, particularly for young graduates, immigrants 
and disadvantaged workers. They can benefit from lower screening, gaining general 
work experience and expanding their networks. This changes when temporary em-
ployment continues to be liberalised and the supply of temporary workers increases. 
This is the case in Japan and Spain, where transitions from non-standard work to un-
employment are more likely than would have been the case if the workers had started 
with a permanent contract.
Various studies on temporary agency work present a mixed picture. Out of the 
eight studies referred to in the ILO report, five appear to confirm the stepping stone 
hypothesis (Denmark, Germany, United States twice, Italy). Three studies, relating 
to temporary agency workers in Germany, the United States and Sweden, did not 
show a stepping stone effect. It should be noted that the German study did not show 
a higher risk of unemployment either.291
The ILO report also indicates that there are clear wage differences between non- 
standard and standard work. Various studies provide an insight into this income 
disparity. Six studies specifically focus on temporary agency work, four of which con-
firm the disparity. Two studies show that non-standard workers clearly get paid more 
than standard workers in similar circumstances. The studies relating to Germany and 
Italy do show that the differences diminish in the course of the assignment.
Workers can also experience differences with respect to social security coverage. 
Non-standard work often does not comply with the minimal criteria for access to 
certain social securities. With regard to temporary agency work, the ILO reports a 
less extensive access to pensions and health insurance for the United States and South 
Africa.
291 Other studies indicate either a positive or a negative stepping stone effect. García Pérez & Muñoz-
Bullón (2003) show a positive effect, while Givord & Wilner (2014) show a negative effect. The 
studies do state that the differences result from the study period, which can be more or less stimu-
lating with regard to this effect, the temporary agency worker’s profile and the study method.
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Table 3.13 Effects of temporary agency work
Transitions
Country Period Source Findings
1 Denmark 1997–2006 Jahn & Rosholm 
(2014)
Stepping-stone effect is confirmed while being with 
the temporary work agency, but not afterwards. 
Temporary agency work increases transition into per-
manent jobs by 19% for men and by 7% for women; 
the effect is largest for immigrants.
2 Germany 2010–2011 Eichhorst & 
 Tobsch (2013)
Yearly transitions to permanent jobs: 28%, rest 
remain in agency work.
1994–1996 Kvasnicka (2009) No stepping-stone effect, but no increased proba-
bility of unemployment either; temporary agency 
workers seem to remain in this type of employment 
relationship.
3 Italy 2001 Ichino et al. 
(2008)
Stepping-stone effect is confirmed, it is highest in 
Tuscany, in services, among youth transitioning from 
school to work.
4 Sweden 1997–2008 Hveem (2013) No stepping-stone effect: ‘Joining a temporary agency 
… decreases the probability of getting a regular job 
for years to come in general but not for non- western 
immigrants’; ‘women showed stronger and more 
persistent negative regular employments effects’.
5 United 
States
1993–2001 Andersson et al. 
(2007)
Stepping-stone effect confirmed; it is strongest for 
low-wage earners as it improves their access to 
higher wage employment.
To temporary agency work: 36,9–61,2% over three 
years, for workers for whom temporary agency is a 
primary employer.
1999–2003 Autor & House-
man, (2010)
No stepping-stone effect; increased churning: 
‘Rather than helping participants transition to direct- 
hire jobs, temporary help placements initially lead 
to more employment in the temporary-help sector, 
which serves to crowd out direct-hire employment’.
2000–2001 Cappell & Keller 
(2013)
Over 90% of establishments have converted tem-
porary agency workers to permanent employees… 
Hiring may be very important part of what temporary 
agencies do for their clients.
Wage differentials
Country Period Source Findings
Germany 1995–2008 Jahn & Pozzoli 
(2013)
wpnr*: 22% for men, 14% for women. Wage penalty 
decreases with tenure in taw.
Italy 2000–2002 Picchio (2006) wpnr: 13%, reduced by about 2,3% after one year.
Philippines 1994–2006 Hasan & Jandoc 
(2009)
wpr: up to 45–51%, highest wages in services.
South Africa 2001–2007 Bhorat et al.
(2013)
wpnr: 17–35% as compared to those employed in 
the formal sector.
United 
States
1994 Nollen (1996) wpnr: 34%.
1980–mid. 
1990
Carey & Hazel-
baker (1986)
Engineers and technicians frequently can earn more 
take-home pay in temporary jobs than they can in 
regular jobs.
 Chapter 3: Complications
 129
Training
Country Period Source Findings
European Countries (Aus-
tria,Belgium, Denmark,-
Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, United Kingdom)
2000 Nienhüser & 
 Matiaske (2006)
85% of temporary agency workers re-
ceived no training as compared to 63% 
of permanent workers over a year.
TAW: temporary agency work; WPR: wage premium for regular workers; WPNR: wage penalty for non-regular 
workers.
Source: this study data is derived from the surveys published by the ILO 
 in reports on NSFE for the Meeting of Experts in February 2015, pp. 22–24, 25, 28.
In the case of non-standard work, training is often also an issue. Workers in 
non-standard forms of employment generally receive less training. Specifically for 
temporary agency work, the ILO cites a European study292 showing that 85% of the 
temporary agency workers did not receive training, compared with 63% of the work-
ers with permanent contracts.
Another negative effect relates to occupational health and safety. In France, the 
accident rate involving temporary agency workers is 13.3%, compared with a national 
average of 8.5%. In Spain, between 1988 and 1994, the accident rate for temporary 
agency workers turned out to be 2.5 times higher than for workers with permanent 
contracts. In Belgium, in 2002, the accident rate for permanent manual workers was 
62 per 1000, compared with 125 for temporary agency workers.
Furthermore, the ILO reports that non-standard forms of employment can cause 
problems with respect to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The report 
points at fragmentation of the bargaining unit, resulting in diminished bargaining 
power and the undermining of the effective exercise of collective bargaining rights 
of the regular workers. In relation to this, the report specifically refers to anti-union 
practices in the United States. Non-standard forms of employment also have con-
sequences for the companies that use them. The ILO report mentions, among other 
things, that due to the increased use of NSFE, training and development as well as 
career planning are becoming more of an individual responsibility. Also, the report 
relates the use of non-standard work to a diminished innovation capacity.
Moreover, there is said to be a negative effect on job motivation and efforts made. 
This contrasts with the view that where monotonous work is concerned, it is better to 
hire temporary and part-time employees for this.
For the labour market in particular, non-standard forms of employment can 
increase labour market segmentation, which may also cause wage disparity and lower 
productivity.
292 Nienhüser & Matiaske (2006).
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The ILO report goes on to discuss the various instruments regulating non-standard 
forms of employment. They include:
 – The Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (no. 158) and the Termina-
tion of Employment Recommendation (no. 166)
 – The Employment Relationship Recommendation 2006 (no. 198)
 – The Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (no. 181) and the Private 
Employment Agencies Recommendation 1997 (no. 188)
 – The Part-time Work Convention 1994 (no. 175)
 – The Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (no. 183)
 – The Workers with Families Responsibilities Convention 1981 (no. 156)
 – The Social Protection Floor Recommendation 2012 (no. 202)
 – The Employment Policy Convention 1964 (no. 122)
 – The Labour Inspection Convention 1978 (no. 150)
 – Core Labour Standards.
Otherwise, the ILO refers to regional and national regulation of non-standard forms 
of employment. Specifically with respect to temporary agency work, it refers to regu-
lations that determine when the recourse to temporary agency work is justified and 
when it is not.
Table 3.14 Objective or temporary reason for recourse to temporary agency work
Type of reason Countries
Temporary reason Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Estonia, Finland, Luxem-
bourg, Morocco, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal and South Africa
Objective reason Austria, Slovakia and Spain
No limitation Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Zimbabwe
Source: ILO (2015a), p.42.
It also refers to regulations that maximise either the number of renewals of the tem-
porary agency assignments or the duration of the assignment.
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Table 3.15  Limitation regarding the number or renewals of assignments and the 
 maximum duration of assignments
Type of limitations Countries
Limitation on number of 
assignments/renewals:
Switzerland
Provision for a maximum 
duration of assignment (also 
cumulative) (number of 
months):
Belgium (variable: 3–18), Brazil (3), Colombia (12), Chile (varia-
ble 3–6), Czech Republic (12), Greece (36), Hungary (60), Israel 
(9–15), Italy (36)**, Republic of Korea (variable 3–24), Norway 
(48)*, Panama (12)*, Poland (variable 18–36), Portugal (variable 
6–24), Romania (36)
Both: (i) limitation on num-
ber of assignments; and (ii) 
max duration (number of re-
newals/number of months):
Estonia (2/120), Luxembourg (2/12)
No limitation Argentina*, Australia, Canada, China*, Denmark, Finland*, Ger-
many*, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Latvia*, Mexico, New 
Zealand*, Russian Federation*, Slovakia*, Slovenia*, South Africa, 
Spain*, Sweden*, United Kingdom and United States
*  Countries where a fixed-term contract between a temporary agency worker and an agency is subject, entirely 
or partially, to the limits applicable to direct fixed-term employment between a worker and a firm.
**  The 36-month limit in Italy refers to the duration of a single assignment; it is debatable whether a series of 
assignments would be subject to the 36-month limit.
Source: ILO (2015a), p. 43.
In many countries, the principle of equal pay for equal work is entrenched in legis-
lation.
Table 3.16 Principle of equal treatment
Type of limitations Countries
Basic terms and 
conditions of 
employment
Austria*, Belgium, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Finland, Germany*, Greece, Iceland, Hungary (six-month  qualification 
period may apply regarding pay), India, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands*, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal (two-month qualification period for full equality regarding pay), Slo-
vakia, Slovenia*, Spain, Sweden*, United Kingdom (three-month qualification 
period) and Uruguay
Partial Argentina (pay), Brazil (pay), China (pay), Ethiopia, Peru (exceptions possible), 
Romania (exceptions possible), Switzerland
No principle of 
equal treatment
Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Panama, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Singapore and United States
*  Significant derogation from the principle of equal treatment may be provided by collective bargaining agree-
ments. Source: ILO (2015a), p. 44.
Furthermore, the ILO report gives an overview of legal measures taken in Asia and 
South America to curb non-standard forms of employment.
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 – In 2012, Indonesia amended its legislation with regard to outsourcing, restrict-
ing it to auxiliary services that were not part of a commissioning client’s core 
business.
 – In 2013, Vietnam introduced legislation that limited labour dispatching to sev-
enteen job categories.
 – In 2012, Japan imposed a ban on hiring former employees on a dispatch basis 
within a year of terminating their employment.
 – In the Republic of Korea, a dispatched worker is entitled to obtain direct em-
ployment with the user company if the dispatched work was illicit.
 – The Philippines have introduced legislation concerning (sub)contracting.
 – Chile and Mexico have also laid down provisions in relation to (sub)contracting 
and temporary agency work. The commissioning client has a subsidiary liability 
and temporary agency work is only allowed for temporary reasons.
 – Uruguay introduced the principle of equal pay for equal work into its legislation.
 – As early as 2006, Argentina enacted a decree to restrict temporary agency work 
to temporary reasons.
Finally, the ILO report invites the Experts to discuss the following:
 – the trends and driving forces of non-standard forms of employment;
 – the practices that have developed, including legislation;
 – the main priorities for ILO action;
 – better use of existing ILO standards and identification of potential gaps;
 – NSFE-related aspects that warrant further research.
3.5.2 Expert deliberations 293
During the deliberations, the employee representative stated, among other things, 
that ‘the question was not to be in favour of or against flexibility, but to address the 
challenge of how tot ensure a balanced outcome’. The employer representative stated, 
among other things:
While other forms [of work] were increasingly labelled negatively, permanent full-
time work could no longer be viewed as the only effective approach to the  economic 
reality. The changing world of work was not paralleled by changes in regulations 
and institutions to support it, with protections and benefits of employment tied to 
the idea of the standard contractual relationship.
Furthermore, he stated:
293  ILO (2015c).
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Moreover, a fast growing economy was a precondition for job creation, which re-
quired labour market flexibility. In this regard, there should be no limits to types 
and rise of NSFEs as any job was better than no job.
The employee representative did not agree with the view that any job was better than 
no job and advocated quality jobs. Poor quality jobs had diminished the employees’ 
bargaining positions, which had negative outcomes for both social partners.
It was important to identify the deficits resulting from the proliferation of NSFE, 
as well as to investigate the conditions under which NSFE could be considered decent. 
She held the view, as did various governments, that there was a need for rigorous 
enforcement and compliance with the labour standards. She argued that the interna-
tional labour standards showed gaps that should be addressed. Firstly, she mentioned 
the principle of equal treatment for workers in NSFE and protection from discrimina-
tion on the basis of employment status; she argued that fixed-term contracts needed 
to be addressed not only by the Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (no. 
158), but also directly, in order to enhance protection. Secondly, the scope of regu-
lation of triangular employment relationships needed to be extended beyond tem-
porary agency work. Convention 181 did not suffice in that respect. Thirdly, the use 
of temporary agency work had to be regulated more extensively. Fourthly, collective 
bargaining rights needed to be clarified and strengthened, to ensure that – in case 
of triangular employment relationships – bargaining could take place with the em-
ployer(s) who actually determined the conditions of work. Lastly, forms of work that 
denied workers all their rights, such as zero-hour contracts, needed to be tackled.
All parties ended in agreeing that such gaps existed. Further research was in order. 
The employee representative suggested holding a Meeting of Experts that could help 
find solutions, particularly where regulating temporary employment and the dis-
crimination of NSFE workers were concerned.
During the Meeting of Experts held on this score, there turned out to be broad 
consensus regarding the deficits that needed tackling. It is questionable whether 
Convention 181 should be amended. This convention is clear, addresses the issues 
that need addressing and meets a growing need. Thus, as a minimum standard it can 
be considered adequate. The deficits respecting equal treatment and the use of tem-
porary agency workers can be solved by means of other instruments, as is currently 
the case. Article 12 in Convention 181 actually instructs member states to clarify the 
position of the trade unions. That still leaves the instruments needed for the fixed-
term contracts and triangular employment relationships in general.
The most obvious course of action would be to address the fixed-term contracts 
in connection with a revision of Convention 158 and Recommendation 166,  regarding 
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the termination of employment. They are already under discussion and it would be 
good to reassess them.
Where a separate instrument for triangular employment relationships in general 
is concerned: it is reminiscent of the attempts to regulate contract labour. The at-
tempts failed, but it may be worth a new try. In that case both bipartite and tripartite 
contracting should be addressed.
Both the employee and the employer representative wanted further information and 
research regarding the questions raised. The employee representative established 
that there was a considerable lack of study results in respect of the use of temporary 
employment and adequate protection. Issues where further research was needed in-
cluded existing practices and innovative concepts that counter the circumvention of 
employment protection through NSFE, existing practices and innovative concepts 
that avoid unfair competition, and the externalization of employment costs through 
NSFE. Similarly research was needed on the question of equal treatment and possible 
discrimination based on employment status.
3.5.3 Expert conclusions
The Meeting of Experts reaffirms the:
commitment of the ILO to implement its constitutional mandate, as reflected in the 
Decent Work Agenda, which applies to all workers, including those in non- standard 
forms of employment and whereby full productive and freely chosen employment 
is promoted simultaneously with fundamental rights at work, social dialogue, an 
adequate income from work and the security of social protection.
The experts state that the world of work has shown continuous development, which 
includes the growth of various forms of work and contractual arrangements in labour 
markets worldwide. Non-standard forms of employment have always existed and 
can serve various purposes, including use in seasonal sectors, replacing temporarily 
absent workers or offering more choices for balancing work and private life. These 
forms of employment have contributed to the adaptability and growth of businesses 
as well as to increasing labour market participation. Globalisation and yet other fac-
tors have boosted their growth.
However, there is also a downside to this development, in the sense that lack of em-
ployment protection occurs more often. Therefore non-standard forms of employ-
ment must meet:
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… legitimate needs of workers and employers and should not be used to undermine 
labour rights and decent work, including freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining, equality and non-discrimination and security of employment.
Adequate protection is achieved by having an appropriate regulatory framework, 
compliance with and strong enforcement of the law and effective social dialogue.
Well-designed and regulated forms of NSFE can help businesses to enhance their 
ability to adapt to the market. Businesses can use them for retaining and recruiting 
workers, as well as for quickly having the requisite skills and experience at their dis-
posal. This goes wrong when employers abuse these types of work to evade legal and 
contractual obligations and other employment-related responsibilities, thus eroding 
fair competition, which is harmful for ‘responsible businesses, workers and society 
at large’.
The many new forms of work facilitate workers’ entry into the labour market, par-
ticularly if those forms of work are well-regulated and freely chosen, for instance 
part-time employment and other forms of work that enable workers to balance work 
and private life. While in some cases NSFEs can serve as stepping stones to standard 
work, in many other cases they fail to do so. This warrants serious attention. Women, 
young workers and migrants, who are over-represented in these types of employ-
ment, are prone to discrimination and run a greater risk of getting stuck in these 
forms of employment against their will.
Non-standard forms of employment, in parts of the world, exhibit a higher incid-
ence of decent work deficits. These are often not sufficiently addressed by regu-
latory frameworks, enforcement and labour inspections systems, active labour 
market policies or the judicial system, all of which should be effective and accessi-
ble. A significant number of Member States have adopted adequate regulations and 
ratified the relevant Conventions, and are addressing the deficits and protecting 
workers. Workers in non-standard forms of employment may face barriers to col-
lectively addressing decent work deficits. These workers are more often than other 
workers unable to exercise their fundamental rights, including the right to freedom 
of association and to bargain collectively with the relevant employer(s). As a result, 
workers in non-standard forms of employment risk facing decent work deficits 
along one or more of the following dimensions of work: (1) access to employment 
and labour market transitions to decent work; (2) wage differentials; (3) access to 
social security; (4) conditions of work; (5) training and career development; (6) 
occupational safety and health; and (7) freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining. If left unchecked, these decent work deficits risk contributing to increased 
insecurity and greater inequality.
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Measures that need to be taken include:
 – Decent work. Government and social partners should work at ensuring continu-
ous progress towards decent jobs. Employers should provide adequate protec-
tion to workers in NSFE.
 – Labour market transitions. In order to promote labour market transitions, gov-
ernments and social partners should work at creating quality employment. They 
should invest in labour market policies that promote economic growth and de-
velopment, lifelong learning, skills training and development and access to de-
cent work.
 – Equality and non-discrimination. Action must be taken to promote equality and 
to ensure protection against discrimination for all employees, regardless of their 
contractual status.
 – Social security coverage. Restrictions on social security coverage for NSFE work-
ers should be eliminated, in the sense that NSFE workers are to be included in 
conditions that are equivalent to those for workers in standard employment.
 – Occupational health and safety. Governments and employers should take meas-
ures to ensure that NSFE workers have healthy and safe workplaces. They must 
receive adequate training, be provided with safety equipment and be fully integ-
rated into the health and safety systems and processes.
 – Freedom of association and collective bargaining. In reference to the Declaration 
of Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, the freedom of association and collect-
ive bargaining must also be warranted for NSFE workers. NSFE, and particularly 
some triangular employment relationships, may pose challenges where effective 
realisation of these freedoms is concerned. Governments, employers and work-
ers should take the initiative to develop regulations aimed at providing NSFE 
workers with access to ‘the protection afforded to them under the applicable 
collective agreements’.
These initiatives should include promotion of effective bargaining systems and 
mechanisms to determine the relevant employer(s) for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, in coherence with international standards, laws and regulations.
 – Labour inspection. Labour inspectorates should be given sufficient resources to 
develop various strategies, including sector-specific actions, taking into account 
that non-compliance occurs with NSFE.
 – Highly insecure forms. Special attention should be paid to preventing and elimin-
ating NSFE that fail to respect the fundamental rights at work and fail to comply 
with the elements of the Decent Work Agenda (‘is one in which freely chosen 
productive employment is promoted simultaneously with fundamental rights 
at work, an adequate income from work and the security of social protection’).
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The experts recommended that the ILO Office should develop a wide range of activ-
ities, such as data collection and reporting, to promote ratification of relevant ILO 
Standards, analysing whether there are gaps, identifying best practices, research and 
distribution of the study results, also with respect to approaching the labour inspect-
orate and experiences with social security. Furthermore, the ILO should support 
member states to identify and tackle decent work deficits. This should include the 
roles that men and women play. Furthermore, the ILO should document trends and 
analyse the effects of NSFE to promote better understanding. Lastly, the ILO should 
create a repository of data.
In June 2015, during the discussion about labour protection at the 104th ILC 
session, the conclusions of the above-mentioned meeting of experts were referred 
to.294 Also, the relevant resolution that was adopted during this ILC included the ILO 
priority of ‘Effective protection of workers in NSFE’.295
In a recent study regarding inequality296 the OECD also establishes a link with NSFE. 
This study observes a growing inequality, which hampers economic growth. The in-
crease of NSFE would influence this as well. The report likewise records lower  wages 
and diminished opportunities for skills training and transition. Another recent sur-
vey of the European labour market297 shows that temporary agency workers have 
equal access to social security, such as unemployment benefits, sick benefits, mater-
nity leave as well as healthcare and pension benefits, compared with permanent em-
ployees. Moreover, temporary agency workers end up receiving virtually the same 
amount of training298 as directly hired colleagues with open-ended or fixed-term 
contracts (77% versus 82 and 78%). Furthermore, this survey shows that temporary 
agency work clearly serves as a stepping stone299 into employment. Many temporary 
agency workers were jobless prior to their assignment. Temporary agency work is a 
more sustainable transition option than direct temporary employment.
Many temporary agency workers are still working one year after they started 
 working (either as a temporary agency worker, or in temporary or permanent employ-
ment). Compared with other forms of temporary employment or in comparison to 
unemployment, temporary agency work may be also ‘more efficient in facilitating 
trans itions to open-ended contracts’, albeit under certain conditions. Also remarkable 
is that 79% of the temporary agency workers are satisfied with their working conditions. 
This comes quite close to the general scores for workers with open-ended contracts.
294 ILC (2015a), p. 68, 69.
295 ILC (2015b).
296 OECD (2015), p. 31.
297 IDEA Consult (2015), p. 54.
298 IDEA Consult (2015), p. 55.
299 IDEA Consult (2015), p. 101.
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Figure 3.13 General satisfaction with working conditions IDEA Consult (2015), p. 83
Self-employment
TAW
Fixed-term contracts
Open-ended contracts
34% 52% 12% 3%
20% 59% 17% 4%
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Chapter 4
Decent work
In the previous chapter, we paid ample attention to the discussion on contract labour, 
precarious work and non-standard forms of employment (NSFE). We learned that 
the contract labour discussion resulted in a recommendation on the employment 
relationship, which ultimately failed to be endorsed by the employers.
In its pursuit of improving the position of workers, the trade union movement 
– supported by scientific reference literature – redefined its position on precarious 
work, including temporary agency work. Convention 181 was also called into ques-
tion since it was said to contain gaps.
In an attempt to gain a complete overview, experts made efforts to analyse all 
non-standard forms of employment. The term precarious work was studiously avoid-
ed, but the instruments continued to show gaps, including Convention 181. In spite of 
a name change, from precarious work to non-standard employment, the precarious 
work discussion still continues to play a role. The term is the opposite of decent work 
– a concept that implies that all requisites of adequate work are complied with.
Referring to Juan Somavía, the former Director General of the ILO who ex-
pressed himself in similar terms, Klara Boonstra300 describes decent work as follows:
It is the deepest desire of people in emerging and developed societies alike. It is 
the way ordinary men and women express their needs. If people in the streets or 
in the country are asked what they need in view of all the new insecurities that 
globalisation has brought us, they answer: work! Work that enables them to keep 
their families safe and healthy, to send their children to school, work that ensures 
an income once they have retired, a workplace that treats them justly and respects 
their rights. That is decent work.
According to Boonstra the term precarious work can serve as an antonym of decent 
work:
300 Boonstra (2014); see also Boonstra (2010), p. 11.
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On the one hand it is characterised by the frequent use of atypical forms of contract, 
such as fixed-term contracts, very short fixed-term contracts, seasonal work, day 
contracting and other forms of informal work. On the other hand, it is characterised 
by atypical forms of the labour relations themselves. For instance, triangular em-
ployment relations and payrolling services, subcontracting, bogus  self-employment 
and obscure forms of mediation and provision of labour services. These generally 
result in low wages, lack of employment protection and limited access to social 
security and facilities normally related to wage labour. In short, generally a slim 
chance of labour protection.
Furthermore, Boonstra argues that ‘precarious work has become rooted in the defi-
cits and weaknesses of both national and international labour law’.
How does the phenomenon of temporary agency work relate to this discussion? What 
should we mean by ‘decent work’ and how can this be viewed from the perspective of 
temporary agency work pursuant to Convention 181? Chapter 4 will focus on these 
questions.
4.1 ORIGIN, CONTENT, MEANING
4.1.1 Origin
Since the ILO was established, it has gone though several stages of development.301
In the first stage, from 1919 to 1944, the ILO focused on the social consequences 
of the emerging industrialisation. The ILO was established in the context of the Treaty 
of Versailles in 1919. The perception was that peace is not possible without social just-
ice: ‘Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal 
peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice…’ 302
The Declaration of Philadelphia marked a new stage, from 1944 to 1989. This 
declaration, issued in 1944, was annexed to the ILO constitution. Embracing the 
 motto ‘labour is not a commodity’, it extended the ILO’s field of activity to social 
policy as a whole, including employment, working conditions, social security, health 
care, nutrition, housing, schooling and equal treatment.
In the third stage, from 1989 onwards, the need for reorientation arose. In his 
report to the International Labour Conference, the Director-General argues:303
301 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 15.
302 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 15.
303 ILC (1999), p. 7.
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‘Except for a handful of Conventions most ILO standards are not well known. Rati-
fi cation is also a problem because of treaty congestion. Of the 23 Conventions and 
two Protocols adopted in the fifteen years from 1983 to 1998, only three have re-
ceived at least twenty ratifications. Even when ratified, many conventions are only 
weakly implemented.’
Moreover, declining interest in the ILO standards went hand in hand with an emerg-
ing and fast progressing globalisation of the economy. Furthermore, social law 
treaties no longer were the exclusive field of the ILO. To them had been added the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic,  Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
together with regional instruments such as the European Social Charter (1961).
The World Bank and the IMF had placed deregulation of the labour markets on the 
agenda, and a discussion started to include so-called social clauses in international 
trade agreements, such as GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and its 
1994 successor, the WTO (World Trade Organization). This also threatened the reason 
for the ILO’s existence. It was feared that non-compliance of ILO standards would 
no longer exist merely by the grace of the mobilisation of shame, but through trade 
sanctions.304
Following the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995, the 
WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 decided that:
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal 
with these standards, and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. 
(…) We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree 
that the comparative advantage of countries (…), must in no way be put into ques-
tion. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO secretariats will continue their 
existing collaboration.305
The developments resulted in a need for reorientation, which is characteristic of the 
third stage. If world peace had previously been paired to social justice, social justice 
now became an essential element of equal economic progress and poverty reduction.
This reorientation led to establishing and promoting a social minimum, estab-
lishing priorities and setting an international social agenda from a comprehensive 
approach. We are referring to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work and the Decent Work Agenda.
304 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 21 ff.
305 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 18.
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4.1.2 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 306
In 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work. This declaration contains four fundamental social principles that ILO member 
states must observe, even if they have not ratified the corresponding conventions. 
These fundamental principles are considered to be so essential to the creation of 
 social justice that they must be observed by all member states.
Thus, the declaration serves as a ‘point of reference for the entire global commun-
ity’. The declaration provides a framework for globalisation that is still socially just.
The Declaration pivots on the following fundamental principles:
 – the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining;
 – the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
 – the effective abolition of child labour;
 – the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
On the basis of these fundamental principles, the ILO has focused on eight conven-
tions that are connected to these principles. These fundamental conventions are 
numbers 29 and 105 (forced labour), 100 and 111 (discrimination) 138 and 182 (child 
labour) and 87 and 98 (freedom of association and collective bargaining).
The ILO calls on the member states to prioritise the ratification of these conven-
tions. But, as emphasised above, all member states must respect these conventions, 
even if they do not ratify them. By extension, it has been agreed that the non-ratifying 
member states are supposed to submit an annual report on the way they apply the 
principles. Also, the Director-General is submitting annual reports to the Interna-
tional Labour Conference on the compliance of one of the principles.
Table 4.1 ILO core conventions
Category Core convention
Freedom of association 
and the right to collective 
bargaining
No. 87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
 Organise Convention, 1948 
No. 98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
Elimination of all forms of 
 forced or compulsory labour 
No. 29 Forced labour Convention, 1930 
No. 105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
Effective abolition of child 
labour 
No. 138 Minimum age convention, 1973 
No. 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
Elimination of discrimina-
tion in respect of employ-
ment and occupation
No. 100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 
No. 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958 
306 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 19 ff.
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Table 4.2 Ratification of the core conventions
Category Number of ratifications 
(as per February 2016)
No. 87 Freedom of association 153
No. 98 Freedom of collective bargaining 164
No. 29 Forced labour 178
No. 105 Abolition of forced labour 175
No. 138 Minimum age 168
No. 182 Worst forms of child labour 180
No. 100 Equal remuneration 171
No. 111 Non-discrimination 172
The ILO core conventions turn out to be the most ratified conventions. The Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention (no. 182) leads with 180 ratifications, while the 
Freedom of Associations Convention (no. 87) lags behind with 153 ratifications. In 
view of the total number of 185 ILO member states, this makes clear that  automatically 
linking the ILO membership to the obligation to comply with the core conventions 
adds value in any case.
4.1.3 Decent Work Agenda 307
Apart from prioritising the fundamental principles and rights at work, the reorienta-
tion also necessitated refocusing on the objective. In his 1999 Decent Work report, 
the Director-General of the ILO states that a common purpose and an integrated 
approach are needed: ‘The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote opportunities 
for women and men to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, 
equity, security and human dignity’.
As the cornerstones of this objective, four strategic objectives were formulated 
that constitute the framework of the Decent Work Agenda. These elements are:
 – promoting and realising fundamental principles in relation to labour (funda-
mental labour standards);
 – creating better opportunities for women and men to find a job and generate an 
income (employment);
 – strengthening the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for everyone 
(social protection);
 – strengthening tripartism and social dialogue (social dialogue).
This Agenda is the answer to the globalising economy. As a new policy framework, 
the Agenda serves as the guiding principle for ILO activities.
307 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 20 ff.
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To assist the member states in an integrated way, the ILO developed Decent Work 
Country Programmes. These programmes also constitute the main instrument to 
integrate the ILO contribution to UN country programmes.
4.1.4 Millennium Development Goals 308
The Decent Work Agenda has further gained authority thanks to the support given 
by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization in 2004. This 
commission, which was established by the ILO, consisted of heads of government, 
Nobel Prize winners and other key stakeholders. In its report A fair globalization: cre-
ating opportunities for all 309 the commission recommends that the creation of Decent 
Work should be the overarching policy objective:
Decent Work for all should be made a global goal and be pursued through coherent 
policies within the multilateral system.
The UN adopted this proposal at its 2005 World Summit, and the Decent Work  Agenda 
was coupled to the so-called Millennium Development Goals:310
We (Heads of States and Governments) strongly support fair globalization and re-
solve to make the goal of full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
including for women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national 
and international policies as well as our national development strategies, including 
poverty reduction strategies as part of our efforts to achieve the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. These measures should also encompass the elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour, as defined in ILO convention 182 and forced labour. We also 
resolve to ensure full respect for the fundamental principles and rights at work.
In both 2005 and 2007, the UN Economic and Social Council made an appeal to 
include the Decent Work Agenda in all multilateral activities, in order to realise the 
Millennium Development Goals (particularly the one to eradicate poverty) in 2015. 
The European Union likewise supported the Decent Work Agenda.
As a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations for-
mulated the Sustainable Development Goals in September 2015, i.e. ‘17 goals to trans-
form our world’. Goal 8 relates to promoting ‘inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, employment and decent work for all’. Among other things, this means fight-
308 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 21.
309 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004).
310 Heerma van Voss (2008), p. 23, ILC (2001).
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ing the globally increasing unemployment and poverty by creating stable and well-
paid jobs, with the proviso that 470 million jobs are needed worldwide, just for the 
new entrants to the labour market between 2016 and 2030.311
4.1.5 Putting it in place
In 2001, the Director-General drew up a mid-term review.312 He called the concept a 
significant objective for people everywhere. It constitutes an important policy frame-
work consisting of essential (side-)objectives regarding employment, workers’ rights, 
social protection and social dialogue. Moreover, it is an important means to (re)or-
ganise the ILO’s activities. It constitutes an ambitious programme that is a signpost 
rather than a blueprint.
The essence of the Decent Work Agenda stems from the Declaration of Phil-
adelphia, which likewise affirms the right to ‘conditions of freedom and dignity, of 
economic security and equal opportunity’. It underscores the importance of ensuring 
‘a just share of the fruits of progress to all’.
Against this background, the Director-General draws attention to the global de-
cent work deficits, which reveal themselves as underemployment, insufficient social 
protection, denial of rights at work and shortcomings of social dialogue.313
Across the world, many people were still unemployed at the time (160 million, 
in 2001). Creating jobs must have the highest priority. Access to work is the best 
way to fight poverty. Apart from this employment gap, there is a rights gap, which 
can be adjusted by means of legislation and political action. Child labour in particu-
lar requires well-designed policies. The social protection gap is alarming enough, 
with only about 20% of the world’s workers having truly adequate social protection. 
The social dialogue gap mainly comes down to a ‘representational gap’; particularly 
for agricultural workers and domestic workers, SMEs and migrants. The report also 
draws attention to the workers in the informal economy. This includes the majority 
of workers worldwide.
The objective must be to reduce all these deficits. With the support of the inter-
national community, every country must contribute to this objective according to its 
means.314
311 Sustainable Development Goals – United Nations, www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment.
312 ILC (2001).
313 ILC (2001), p. 3 ff.
314 ILC (2001), p. 14.
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4.2 KNOWLEDGE IS POWER?
Since then, the concept of decent work has gained momentum. For many people in 
the world of work it has really inspired deliberation and action. However, soon after 
its introduction it became clear that the concept needed fleshing out. A concept is 
well and good, but how do you use it in day-to-day practice? How do you know that a 
country does or does not score highly on decent work and how do you measure pro-
gress or setbacks? And can you actually describe types of labour, such as temporary 
agency work, as decent or not? The ILO Office has made a substantial contribution 
to answering this question. In his report to the International Labour Conference in 
2001, the Director-General stated:
In order to effectively promote the goal of decent work for all, the office must be 
able to measure and monitor progress and deficits (...) At present our information 
systems provide only a partial, and sometimes only rudimentary picture of decent 
work deficits (...) If there is one place in the world where people can turn for quality 
information on decent work, it should be the ILO. We need to make a major invest-
ment in the design and implementation of our data and statistical base.
4.2.1 Working paper 2002 315
The need for a set of statistical indicators had already been passed on to the Director- 
General in 2001. A first step was taken in 2002 by issuing a working paper. It attempt-
ed to supply a framework to:
 – measure decent work by means of statistical indicators in order to gain a detailed 
picture of progress across the world;
 – acquire empirical material regarding the various aspects of decent work and re-
garding the connections between decent work, poverty and economic perform-
ance.
The working paper intended to translate the concept of decent work into easily un-
derstood work characteristics, and to establish statistical indicators of these charac-
teristics that can be measured with some consistency, accuracy and cross-national 
compatibility. Further statistical activities would need to be undertaken and indic-
ators would be required to improve the measuring activities in future.
315 Anker et al. (2002).
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4.2.2 Six dimensions
The primary objective of the ILO as presented in the Decent Work report, ‘opportun-
ities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of free-
dom, equity, security and human dignity’, comprises six dimensions:
1. Opportunities for work refers to the need for all persons (men and women) 
who want work to be able to find work, since decent work is not possible with-
out work itself. The underlying concept of work is a broad one, encompassing 
all forms of economic activity, including self-employment, economic unpaid 
family work and wage labour in both the informal and formal sectors.
2. Work in conditions of freedom underscores the fact that work should be freely 
chosen and not forced on individuals and that certain forms of work are not 
acceptable in the 21st century. It means that bonded labour and slave labour as 
well as unacceptable forms of child labour should be eliminated as agreed by 
governments in international declarations and labour standards. It also means 
that workers are free to join workers’ organisations.
3. Productive work is essential for workers to have acceptable livelihoods for 
themselves and their families, as well as to ensure sustainable development and 
competitiveness of enterprises and countries.
4. Equity in work represents the workers’ need to have fair and equitable treat-
ment and opportunity in work. It encompasses absence of discrimination at 
work and in access to work and ability to balance work with family life.
5. Security at work is mindful of the need to help safeguard health, pensions and 
livelihoods, and to provide adequate financial and other protection in the event 
of health and other contingencies. It also recognises the workers’ need to limit 
insecurity associated with the possible loss of work and livelihood.
6. Dignity at work requires that workers are treated with respect at work, and are 
able to voice concerns and participate in decision-making about working con-
ditions. An essential ingredient is workers’ freedom to represent their interests 
collectively.316
According to Anker, the first two dimensions (opportunities for work and freedom of 
choice of employment) relate to the availability of work and the acceptable scope of 
work. The other four dimensions (productive work, equity, security and dignity) re-
late to the quality of the work. Apart from these six dimensions, the socio-economic 
context also matters, since it determines what decency brings the society concerned 
and how it boosts national economic and social and labour market achievements.
316 Anker et al. (2002), pag 2 ff.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
150
4.2.3 Eleven characteristics
The working group established eleven characteristics or indicator groups that are 
generally considered to be decisive factors of decent work:317
 – employment opportunities,
 – unacceptable work,
 – adequate earnings and productive work,
 – decent hours,
 – stability and security of work,
 – combining work and family life,
 – fair treatment in employment,
 – safe work environment,
 – social protection,
 – social dialogue and workplace relations,
 – economic and social context of decent work.
In the context of these characteristics, more indicators have been established to give 
further shape and substance to this ‘measurement framework’.
4.2.4 Further measuring methods
Apart from this input provided by the ILO there have been other contributions to 
operationalising the concept of decent work. For instance, in an article dating from 
2003, we also find the forms of requisite security noted earlier in this study, the lack of 
which result in precarious work: ‘labour market security’, ‘employment security’, ‘job 
security’, ‘work security’, ‘skills reproduction security’, ‘income security’ and ‘voice 
representation security’.318 This measuring method yields a ranking of countries, a 
decent work index.
317 Anker et al. (2002), p. 7 ff.
318 Bonnet et al. (2003), p. 86.
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Figure 4.1 Decent work index (DWI) – 25 best scores 319
The same issue of the International Labour Review also includes a contribution that 
makes the measuring system more dependent on the decent work deficits, i.e. low 
pay, excessive working hours, national unemployment, non-enrolment rate, youth 
unemployment, male-female gap in labour force participation rate, old age without 
pension.320 Here, too, a country ranking ensues.
319 Bonnet et al. (2003), p. 230.
320 Bescond et al. (2003).
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Table 4.3  International comparisons of seven decent work indicators: an illustration of 
methodology 321
Country
1 
Non- 
enrollment 
rate
2 
Low pay
3 
Excessive 
hours of 
work
4 
Unemploy-
ment
5 
Youth 
unemploy-
ment
6 
Male- 
female gap 
in LFPR
7 
Old age 
without 
pension
Trim-
med 
mean
Sweden 0.0 … 7.8 4.1 8.3 3.5 … 5.1
Denmark 5.5 … 12.0 4.8 … 8.2 0.6 6.2
Iceland 6.5 … 30.8 2.8 6.0 9.5 … 7.3
Switzerland 12.7 5.6 … 2.5 5.7 18.6 … 8.0
France 4.2 … 8.9 8.9 20.2 13.4 0.0 8.9
Russian Federation … … 4.3 9.8 18.9 11.7 … 10.8
Finland 3.9 … 11.3 13.1 25.1 8.6 … 11.0
United Kingdom 7.2 9.3 21.8 5.2 12.2 15.8 … 11.1
Belgium 7.8 … 10.9 8.6 21.1 18.1 3.7 11.4
Germany 11.6 … 11.1 9.2 … 14.1 … 11.4
United States 8.2 … 18.2 6.0 12.4 15.1 … 11.9
Korea, Republic of 4.7 … 51.5 2.9 6.1 25.1 … 12.0
Canada 7.4 … 12.9 9.4 15.2 14.4 … 12.2
Macau, China … 10.9 44.0 6.2 10.0 16.0 … 12.3
Portugal 11.4 … 16.5 4.1 9.9 16.9 … 12.6
Japan 0.0 13.7 30.3 5.0 9.6 26.5 … 13.7
Tanzania, United Rep. of … … 48.2 3.4 7.2 4.6 29.4 13.7
Lithuania … … 12.4 14.1 26.5 13.6 … 13.9
Australia 8.7 … 20.5 6.0 12.4 16.2 48.4 14.5
Estonia 14.7 … 12.5 9.4 17.4 14.3 19.7 14.7
Thailand … … 54.3 5.0 13.5 17.8 13.0 14.8
Romania 22.4 … 12.2 6.4 18.4 14.0 … 14.9
Slovakia … … 10.6 19.5 38.5 15.6 … 17.6
Nepal 68.8 … 41.6 1.8 3.0 8.3 … 17.6
Ireland 11.8 … 11.8 11.8 18.6 30.0 48.6 18.1
Jamaica 23.6 … 18.4 15.7 33.6 16.3 … 19.4
Indonesia 24.9 … 30.0 4.9 14.6 27.7 … 22.4
Italy … … 19.4 11.3 32.4 28.5 20.6 22.8
Poland 5.1 … 29.7 17.9 40.1 14.0 31.3 23.2
Greece 12.0 … 35.6 10.3 32.2 26.7 … 23.6
Yemen, Rep. of … … 29.3 8.4 18.7 45.4 … 24.0
Hong Kong, China … … 42.2 6.9 27.2 20.9 … 24.1
Mauritius … … 23.8 9.8 46.8 38.6 0.0 24.1
Mexico 28.7 17.0 27.9 1.7 3.4 43.9 80.7 24.2
Spain … … 15.2 19.6 37.2 25.9 32.0 25.8
321 Bescond et al. (2003), p. 207. ‘The international comparisons in this table are given for illustrative 
purposes only. The limited number of indicators used in calculating the trimmed mean and the 
large number of missing values in certain cases preclude definitive conclusions as to the relative 
position of countries. A more complete set of data with a larger number of indicators may give 
different ranking of countries.’
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Country
1 
Non- 
enrollment 
rate
2 
Low pay
3 
Excessive 
hours of 
work
4 
Unemploy-
ment
5 
Youth 
unemploy-
ment
6 
Male- 
female gap 
in LFPR
7 
Old age 
without 
pension
Trim-
med 
mean
Costa Rica 39.5 11.5 62.1 5.2 10.9 39.7 59.9 32.3
Jordan 27.3 15.4 41.3 14.9 30.0 53.5 67.0 33.5
Sri Lanka 39.7 … 40.0 8.7 24.6 36.6 … 33.6
Turkey 39.1 … 42.1 7.9 13.6 46.7 77.1 35.4
Bangla Desh 72.8 … 43.9 3.4 … 58.9 … 51.4
Source: Compiled from national labour force surveys.
4.2.5 Tripartite expert meeting 322
In 2008, another important meeting took place on the measurement of decent work. 
The ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization reconfirmed that the 
ILO and its member states were committed to the four (sub-)targets of the Decent 
Work Agenda.
The Declaration stressed the importance of national and regional strategies for 
decent work and emphasised that member states may consider establishing appropri-
ate indicators and statistics, if need be with the assistance of the ILO, in order to mon-
itor and evaluate their progress. To this end, the ILO arranged a tripartite meeting of 
experts in order to set up a global methodology to chart the progress member states 
make with regard to decent work.
The report resulting from this expert meeting323 fits in with the earlier findings 
with regard to the eleven characteristics (see table 4.4).
322 ILO (2008a). See also: ILO (2008b).
323 ILO (2008a).
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Table 4.4 Measurement of decent work (September 2008)
Substantive element 
of the Decent Work 
Agenda
Statistical indicators Legal framework indicators
Numbers in brackets 
refer to ilo strategic 
objectives:
1. Standards and 
fundamental principles 
and rights at work;
2. Employment;
3. Social protection;
4. Social dialogue.
Selection of relevant statistical indicators that 
allow monitoring progress made with regard to 
the substantive elements.
M – Main decent work indicators
A – Additional decent work indicators
F – Candidate for future inclusion/developmental 
work to be done by the Office
C – Economic and social context for decent work 
(S) indicates that an indicator should be report-
ed separately for men and women in addition to 
the total.
L – Descriptive indicators 
providing information on rights 
at work and the legal framework 
for decent work. Description of 
relevant national legislation, pol-
icies and institutions in relation 
to the substantive elements of 
the Decent Work Agenda; where 
relevant, information on the 
qualifying conditions, the benefit 
level and its financing; evidence 
of implementation effectiveness 
(as recorded by ilo supervisory 
bodies); estimates of coverage 
of workers in law and in practice; 
information on the ratification of 
relevant ilo conventions.
Employment opportun-
ities (1 + 2)
M – Employment-to-population ratio, 15–64 
years (S)
M – Unemployment rate (S)
M – Youth not in education and not in employ-
ment, 15–24 years (S)
M – Informal employment (S)
A – Labour force participation rate, 15–64 years 
(1) [to be used especially where statistics on 
Employment-to-population ratio and/or Unem-
ployment rate (total) are not available]
A – Youth unemployment rate, 15–24 years (S)
A – Unemployment by level of education (S)
A – Employment by status in employment (S)
A – Proportion of own-account and contr. family 
workers in total
employment (S) [to be used especially where sta-
tistics on informal employment are not available]
A – Share of wage employment in non-agricultur-
al employment (S)
F – Labour underutilization (S)
Memo item: Time-related underemployment rate 
(S) grouped as A under ‘Decent Working Time’
L – Government commitment to 
full employment
L – Unemployment insurance
Adequate earnings and 
productive work (1 + 3)
M – Working poverty rate (S)
M – Low pay rate (below 2/3 of median hourly 
earnings) (S)
A – Average hourly earnings in selected occupa-
tions (S)
A – Average real wages (S)
A – Minimum wage as % of median wage
A – Manufacturing wage index
A – Employees with recent job training (past 
year/past 4 weeks) (S)
L – Minimum wage
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Substantive element 
of the Decent Work 
Agenda
Statistical indicators Legal framework indicators
Decent Working Time 
(1 + 3)*
M – Excessive hours (more than 48 hours per 
week; ‘usual’ hours) (S)
A – Usual hours worked (standardized hour 
bands) (S)
A – Annual hours worked per employed person 
(S)
A – Time-related underemployment rate (S)
F – Paid annual leave (developmental work to be 
done by the Office;
additional indicator)
L – Maximum hours of work
L – Paid annual leave (developmental work to be 
done by the Office; additional indicator)
L – Maximum hours of work
L – Paid annual leave
Combining work, family and 
personal life (1 + 3)
F – Asocial/unusual hours (De-
velopmental work to be done by 
the Office)
F – Maternity protection (devel-
opmental work to be done by the 
Office; main indicator)
L – Maternity leave (incl. weeks 
of leave, and rate of benefits)
L – Parental leave*
Work that should be 
abolished (1 + 3)
M – Child labour [as defined by icls resolution] 
(S)
A – Other worst forms of child labour (S)**
A – Hazardous child labour (S)
A – Forced labour (S)**
L – Child labour (incl. public 
policies to combat it)
L – Forced labour (incl. public 
policies to combat it)
Stability and security of 
work (1, 2 + 3)
Stability and security of work (developmental 
work to be done):
M – Precarious Employment rate**
A – Job tenure**
A – Subsistence worker rate**
A – Real earnings casual workers** (S)
Memo item: Informal employment grouped under 
employment opportunities.
L – Termination of employment* 
(incl. notice of termination in 
weeks)
Memo item: ‘Unemployment 
insurance’ grouped under em-
ployment opportunities; needs to 
be interpreted in conjunction for 
‘flexicurity’.
Equal opportunity and 
treatment in employ-
ment (1, 2 + 3)
M – Occupational segregation by sex
M – Female share of employment in senior and 
middle management* (isco88 groups 11 and 
12)
A – Gender wage gap
A – Share of women in wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector
A – Indicator for Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (Elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation) to be 
developed by the Office
A – Measure for discrimination by race/ethnicity/
of indigenous people/of (recent) migrant work-
ers/of rural workers where relevant and available 
at the national level.
F – Measure of dispersion for sectoral/occupa-
tional distribution of (recent) migrant workers
F – Measure for employment of persons with 
disabilities
Memo item: Indicators under other substantive 
elements marked (S) indicator should be report-
ed separately for men and women in addition to 
the total.
L – Equal opportunity and treat-
ment*
L – Equal remuneration of men 
and women for work of equal 
value*
Safe work environment 
(1 + 3)
M – Occupational injury rate, fatal
A – Occupational injury rate, nonfatal
A – Time lost due to occupational injuries
A – Labour inspection (inspectors per 10,000 
employed persons)
L – Employment injury benefits*
L – Safety and health labour 
inspection
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Substantive element 
of the Decent Work 
Agenda
Statistical indicators Legal framework indicators
Social security (1 + 3) M – Share of population aged 65 and above 
benefiting from a pension (S)
M – Public social security expenditure (% of gdp)
A – Healthcare exp. not financed out of pocket by 
private households
A – Share of population covered by (basic) health 
care provision (S)
F – Share of econ. active population contributing 
to a pension scheme (S)
F – Public expenditure on needs based cash 
income support (% of gdp)
F – Beneficiaries of cash income support (% of 
the poor)
F – Sick leave (developmental work to be done by 
the Office; additional indicator)
[Interpretation in conjunction with legal frame-
work and labour market statistics.]
L – Pension
L – Incapacity for work due to 
sickness/sick leave
L – Incapacity for work due to 
invalidity
Memo item: ‘Unemployment 
insurance’ grouped under em-
ployment opportunities.
Social dialogue, wor-
kers’ and employers’ 
representation (1 + 4)
M – Union density rate (S)
M – Enterprises belonging to employer organiza-
tion [rate]
M – Collective bargaining coverage rate (S)
M – Days not worked due to strikes and lockouts*
F – Indicator for Fundamental principles and 
rights at work (Freedom of association and col-
lective bargaining) to be developed by the Office
L – Freedom of association and 
the right to organize
L – Collective bargaining right
L – Tripartite consultations
Economic and social 
context for decent work
C – Children not in school (% by age) (S)
C – Estimated % of working age population who 
are hiv positive
C – Labour productivity (gdp per employed 
person, level and growth rate)
C – Income inequality (percentile ratio P90/P10, 
income or consumption)
C – Inflation rate (cpi)
C – Employment by branch of economic activity
C – Education of adult population (adult literacy 
rate, adult secondary-school graduation rate) (S)
C – Labour share in gdp
C (additional) – Real gdp per capita in ppp
 (level and growth rate)
C (additional) – Female share of employment by 
industry (isic tabulation category)
C (additional) – Wage/earnings inequality (per-
centile ratio P90/P10)
L – Labour administration**
Developmental work to be done 
by the Office to reflect environ-
ment for Sustainable enterprises, 
incl. indicators for (i) education, 
training and lifelong learning, 
(ii) entrepreneurial culture, (iii) 
enabling legal and regulatory 
framework, (iv) fair competition, 
and (v) rule of law and secure 
property rights. Developmental 
work to be done by the Office to 
reflect other institutional arrange-
ments, such as scope of labour 
law and scope of labour ministry 
and other relevant ministries.
During the meeting, the employers324 objected to the creation of an ILO-driven 
methodology that was to serve as a template to take countries’ measures with regard 
to progress towards decent work.
Some government experts and independent experts, as well as the union- 
nominated experts supported the framework that the Office proposed.
324 ILO (2008b), p. 3.
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The meeting did not lead to full acceptance of the proposed methodology. A report 
on the meeting was to be submitted to the Governing Body and the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians. Also, efforts would be made to clearly define in-
dicators and test them in a number of pilot-countries.
With funding by the European Union the ILO-implemented project Monitoring 
and Assessing Progress on Decent Work was to run from 2009 to 2013. To that end, a 
manual was developed in May 2012. The project covers nine countries, including two 
in Africa (Niger and Zambia), four in Asia (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines), one in Europe (Ukraine) and two in Latin America (Brazil and Peru).
4.2.6 Further criticism
In January 2014, the employers again drew attention to the fact that it is useful to 
gather more and better data on decent work, but that this cannot result in the cre-
ation of a measuring system for a concept as subjective as decent work.325
In the scientific reference literature326 the concept of decent work has likewise 
been criticised, as has the concept of precarious work. This makes clear that there 
is no adequate standard to measure the quality of labour. Although there is a lot of 
literature on the quality of labour, no consensus has been achieved on what actually 
constitutes a ‘good job’ and how this can be reliably measured.
Recently, the OECD has started a project that pivots on promoting the quality of 
labour. It fits in with characteristics such as: income disparities, labour market secur-
ity and working environment quality. The OECD argues that more research is needed 
to fathom the various dimensions of labour quality and to examine how they interact, 
and also how labour quality impacts on labour quantity.327
4.3 INFORMAL WORK
To gain a good insight, it is also important to relate the concept of decent work to 
the concept of informal work. After introducing the Decent Work Agenda, the ILO 
had already drawn attention to this. In its report Reducing the decent work deficit – a 
global challenge the ILO argues:328
While a majority of people worldwide work in the informal economy, most of them 
lack adequate protection, security, organization and voice. Yet I believe that the 
325 IOE (2014b).
326 Burchell et al. (2013).
327 OECD (2014), p. 47.
328 ILC (2001), p. 7.
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principles of decent work are as important in the informal as in the formal  economy. 
The right to organize, because it is an enabling right, also permits other goals to be 
attained.
The way people organize may be different in the formal and informal economies, 
because much informal work is not wage work and the immediate purposes of 
organization may vary. But the goal of voice and representation is the same. This is 
also true for other core labour standards. Discrimination, for instance, may limit 
access to credit, to land, to space for trading activities and to many other aspects 
of informal self-employment. Child labour prevents escape from low-income in-
formal activities.
The real issue then is, how to extend these rights to all people, not to limit their 
application.
4.3.1 What is informal work?
At the particular request of the employers in the Governing Body, the phenomenon 
of informal work has been placed on the agenda several times. Under the heading of 
‘Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy’ it was the subject of debate 
at the 2014 and 2015 International Labour Conferences329, with an eye to a recom-
mendation that was to serve as the guiding principle in promoting the transition 
from informal to formal work.
It was stated in 2002 that, even though no generally applicable, accurate or 
 accepted definition existed, there is still a broad understanding that the term ‘in formal 
economy’ represents a considerable variety of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs 
that share recognisable characteristics. They experience specific disadvantages and 
problems that vary in intensity.
Informal work concerns all the activities of workers and economic units that – 
by law or in practice – are not or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements. Their 
activities are not conducted in accordance with the law, which means that they fall 
outside the scope of the law; or they are not covered in practice, which means that 
although they fall inside the scope of the law, the law is not applied or observed; or 
that the law is not applied since it is not adequate, too onerous or too costly.
During the 2014 deliberations, the conference took the framework below, as de-
fined by the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians.330, to be the refer-
ence point for the conceptual framework.331
329 ILC (2014).
330 Hussmanns (2003).
331 Hussmanns (2003).
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Table 4.5 Conceptual framework: informal employment
Production 
units by type
Jobs by status in employment
Own-account 
workers Employers
 Contributing 
family 
 workers Employees
Members of 
 producers’ 
 cooperatives
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Informal Formal Informal Formal
Formal 
sector 
 enterprises
1 2
Informal 
sector 
 enterprises(a)
3 4 5 6 7 8
House-
holds(b) 9 10
(a)  As defined by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (excluding households employ-
ing paid domestic workers).
(b)  Households producing goods exclusively for their own final use and households employing paid domestic 
workers.
Note: Cells shaded in dark grey refer to jobs, which, by definition, do not exist in the type of production unit in ques-
tion. Cells shaded in light grey refer to formal jobs. Un-shaded cells represent the various types of informal jobs.
Informal employment: Cells 1 to 6 and 8 to 10.
Employment in the informal sector: Cells 3 to 8.
Informal employment outside the informal sector: Cells 1, 2, 9 and 10.
4.3.2 Extent of the informal economy
The ILO estimates332 the non-agrarian informal economy to comprise 82% of total 
employment in South Asia, 66% in sub-Saharan Africa, 65% in East and South-East 
Asia (excluding China), 51% in Latin America and 10% in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia. Within these regions, large differences can be measured between countries. In 
Latin America, these range from 40% in Uruguay to 72% in Bolivia. For sub- Saharan 
Africa, they range from 33% in South Africa to 82% in Mali; in South and East Asia 
(excluding China), from 42% in Thailand to 83.5% in India; in North Africa and the 
Middle East, from 30.5% in Turkey to 58.5% in the West Bank and Gaza.
If we include the agrarian sector (18% in Latin America and the Caribbean; 17% 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; 54% and 57% in South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa respectively) the informal work figures are even higher. The share of women 
in these figures is relatively high. In this context, the term undeclared employment333 
is also used, and Schneider estimates the size of the undeclared economy in figure 4.2.
332 ILC (2014), Report V(1), p. 6.
333 Renooy & Williams (2014).
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Figure 4.2 Size of the undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2013: by country
Renooy & Williams (2014), p. 21, gathered from Schneider (2013).
4.3.3 Approach 334
The informal economy entails high costs for business, workers and the community. 
The workers lack status, are vulnerable and dependent. The businesses lack access to 
the facilities of the formal sector and make insufficient profits to be able to innovate. 
334 ILC (2014), report v (1), p. 12 ff.
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This also leads to unfair competition, particularly since no taxes and premiums are 
paid, and the community as a whole is vastly disadvantaged by missing out on these 
revenues.
On the basis of the Decent Work Agenda the ILO has developed a policy frame-
work involving seven key avenues towards formalisation. They include:
 – growth strategies focusing on quality;
 – the regulatory framework;
 – organisation, representation and social dialogue;
 – promotion of equal treatment and addressing discrimination;
 – measures to support entrepreneurship, skills and finance;
 – extending social protection;
 – local development strategies.
Figure 4.3 Decent work strategies for the informal economy ILC (2014), p. 13.
Many of these elements can be found back in the Transition from the Informal to the 
Formal Economy Recommendation (no. 204, 2015). Interestingly, the ILO advises the 
member states to include employment services ‘when formulating and implementing 
an integrated policy framework’ (art. 12). In the annex to the recommendation, ILO 
convention 181 is listed among the instruments that ILO considers relevant to facilit-
ating the transition from the informal to the formal economy.
Regulatory environment, including enforcement of
international labour standards and core rights
Equality: Gender, HIV status, ethnicity, race, caste,
age, disability
Entrepreneurship, skills, finance, management,
access to markets
Extension of social protection: Building social
protection floors and social security systems
Growth strategies and quality employment generation
Organization, representation and social dialogue
Local (rural and urban) development strategies
IN
TE
G
R
AT
ED
  S
TR
AT
EG
IE
S
TRANSITION
TO
FORMALITY
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
162
4.4 A ROLE FOR TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK
The question arises as to how temporary agency work relates to the Decent Work 
Agenda. As we saw before, the concept of decent work is a subjective one. And the 
 social partners, let alone the scientific reference literature, have never achieved con-
sensus on what decent can be taken to mean. There is a certain feeling about what 
is or is not decent, but that may differ from one person to another. However, it is 
worthwhile to interpret what decent is, even though subjective elements will then still 
manifest themselves. Such an interpretation involves two questions, namely:
 – How must temporary agency work be considered in relation to the four ob-
jectives relating to employment, social protection, employee rights and social 
dialogue?
 – Can temporary agency work in particular be denoted as decent in accordance 
with certain indicators supplied by the ILO Office?
4.4.1 Decent work objectives: employment
Temporary agency work plays a role in the labour market. The Decent Work Agenda 
looks at promoting employment. There has been debate on the question as to  whether 
temporary agency work actually promotes employment. The unions argue that this 
is only the case if investments are made, and this is not what temporary employment 
agencies are doing. However, the Director-General does state in his 1999 report:335
Employment services have a great deal to offer in overcoming labour market in-
equality. Ideally they should be integrated with labour market policies, training and 
unemployment insurance within a single consistent framework. These are issues 
that need to be dealt with together so as to deliver a coherent package of pub-
lic information, counselling, placement and training services, capturing both the 
supply and the demand side of the labour market. An integrated approach would 
be particularly important for workers displaced by economic restructuring that 
will be addressed in the In Focus programme on skills. Integrated action is also 
important for other groups that face longer-term labour market disadvantages. A 
greater  effort to extend support to national policies in this field is needed, and the 
ILO could take the lead in promoting research at the international level on how to 
develop the necessary integrated institutions.
Thus, promoting employment does actually benefit from attention directed at balanc-
ing supply and demand, something in which temporary employment agencies can 
335 ILC (1999), p. 12
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also play an important role. When the ILO developed the Decent Work Agenda, Con-
vention 181 already existed, and article 13, which relates to promoting co operation 
between private and public employment services, is particularly relevant here.
It is also relevant to refer to the significant remarks made by Wim Kok in the 
Report of the Employment Taskforce, dated November 2003. In it, he states:336
Temporary agency work can be an effective stepping stone for new entrants into 
the labour market and hence contribute to increased job creation, for example by 
facilitating recruitment instead of overtime. Acting as human capital managers 
–  rather than mere manpower suppliers – these agencies can also play the role 
of new intermediaries in the recruitment and management of both qualified and 
unqualified staff, offering employers an attractive alternative to traditional recruit-
ment channels.
Temporary work agencies should have their place in a modern labour market as 
new intermediaries that can support flexibility and mobility of firms and of  workers, 
while offering security for workers in the form of improved job opportunities and 
high employment standards, including in terms of pay, working time and training 
opportunities. SMEs would particularly benefit from greater opportunity to use 
temporary work.
In some Member States, the development of temporary agency work is impaired 
by legal obstacles affecting the setting up of agencies, conditions imposed on firms 
using agency services and restrictions on the length of contracts that can be nego-
tiated. Removing obstacles to temporary agency work could significantly support 
job opportunities and job matching. This is the direction the Taskforce advises 
Member States to go. At the same time guaranteed minimum levels of protection 
and access to training for temporary workers would be required to ensure equal 
treatment of all workers and to raise the attractiveness of agency work. Collective 
agreements for temporary agency workers can support this.
Thus, Kok’s Taskforce makes a clear statement regarding the positive role that tempor-
ary employment agencies can play in enhancing job opportunities. Although they 
may not directly create employment, at least they will raise the employment rate.
Various studies show that if temporary employment agencies had not existed, 
the commissioning client would only in very few cases have resorted to permanent 
employment (14 to 26%) or another form of external flexibility (12 to 31%). Thus, 
temporary employment agency services have contributed to 55 to 62% extra work. 
Without the temporary employment agency this work would not have existed.337
336 Kok (2003), p. 29 ff. Wim Kok is a former prime minister of the Netherlands.
337 McKinsey & Cie (2003), p. 22; Bain & Cie (2007), p. 14.
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Furthermore, various studies show that, as a result of temporary agency work, em-
ployability or having work increases and the risk of unemployment decreases.338 This 
may make clear that a stepping stone effect does in fact exist, i.e. an easy stepping 
stone into open-ended employment.
However, there are also doubts about this effect. The OECD recently reported on 
perceptions339 of job insecurity, opportunities for new jobs and redundancy costs, con-
cluding that – compared with permanent employment, dependent self- employment 
and fixed-term contracts – temporary agency contracts involve the highest job inse-
curity, the slimmest chances of new jobs and the highest redundancy costs. Although 
there is a stepping stone effect, just as clearly, there are risks involved.
To what extent does national labour law contribute to the labour market efficiency, 
i.e. an optimum balance between the flexibility that temporary agency work may add 
and the required security for the workers involved?
In 2011, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) conducted a study commissioned 
by CIETT, from which a ranking may be derived concerning the differences in  national 
legislation with regard to labour market efficiency. This concept is substantiated by 
analysing the degree of freedom of establishment, collective bargaining and services 
provided, as well as the degree of involvement in the labour market, as reflected in 
national legislation, and by determining the relative shares for a large number of 
countries.
The updated figures below show that countries such as the Netherlands, Italy, 
Canada and the United States score high on the Regulatory Efficiency Index, while 
countries such as Turkey, Brazil and Vietnam score very low.
338 CIETT (2014), p. 36.
339 Bassanini & Cazes (2014), p. 41.
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1 Agency work
Figure 4.4  Regulatory Efficiency Index. Index assesses degrees of flexibility to operate 
and security for workers.
BCG (2011), p. 78, gathered from: National federations, BCG analysis
Figure 4.5 Regulatory efficiency index score 2015
 
BCG (2011) (update by CIETT), p. 78, gathered from: National federations, BCG analysis
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4.4.2 Decent work objectives: social protection
With regard to social protection in temporary agency work, many countries have 
a substantial amount of specific legislation in place. The survey below makes clear 
which conditions have been applied, and to what extent.
Figure 4.6 Applicable conditions on TAW/PrES
Source: internal analysis by CIETT on the basis of member state data.
A CIETT survey of member states and the key elements regarding legislation shows 
that the licensing/certification requirement and the application of the equal pay 
principle score most, immediately followed by maximum length of assignment, the 
 reasons for use and sectoral bans. All in all, it becomes clear that adequate legislation 
is in place that specifically touches on the social protection of the temporary workers.
Table 4.6 Key indicators temporary agency legislation
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Country Licensing/certificate 
requirement
Reasons 
for use 
Maximum length 
of assignment
Sectoral 
bans
Equal 
pay
bg × × ×
ca ×
cl × × × ×
cn × × ×
co × × × × ×
cz × × × ×
dk × ×
ee × ×
fi × × × × ×
fr × × × × ×
de × × ×
gr × × × ×
hu × ×
in × ×
ie × ×
it × × × ×
jp × × ×
lv × ×
lt × ×
lu × × ×
mk
mx × ×
ma
np
nl × × × ×
nz
no
pe × × ×
pl × × × × ×
pt × × × ×
ro × × ×
ru × ×
sg
sk × ×
sl × × ×
za ×
kr
es × × × ×
se × × ×
ch
tr
uk × ×
us × × ×
zm
49 37 17 21 14 30
 
Source: internal analysis by CIETT on the basis of member state data.
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4.4.3 Decent work objectives: fundamental rights
The fundamental rights regarding freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination have been guaranteed through 
Convention 181. Even if they do not ratify the relevant covenants, the ILO member 
states are obliged to respect the workers’ rights entrenched in the convention.
4.4.4 Decent work objectives: social dialogue
In the temporary employment agency sector, social dialogue takes place at various 
levels: at cross-sectoral level, at sectoral level, at temporary employment agency level 
and at user company level. How social dialogue takes place is heavily dependent on 
the (temporary agency) labour relations, as they have evolved in practice.340
Table 4.7a What role for social dialogue in regulating TAW? (Europe)
Countries/ 
Europe
Cross- 
sectoral
AW sector AW company 
(own staff)
User 
 companies
Austria  
Belgium    
Denmark   
Finland   
France   
Germany   
Ireland  
Italy  
Luxembourg  
Macedonia 
Netherlands   
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain  
Sweden    
Switzerland  
United Kingdom1 () 
340 BCG (2011), p. 17.
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Table 4.7b What role for social dialogue in regulating TAW? (Rest of the World)
Countries/ 
Rest of the World
Cross- 
sectoral
AW 
sector
AW 
company
User 
 companies
Argentina 
Australia   
Brazil    
Canada3  – – –
Chile2 – – – –
China 
Colombia3 – – – –
Japan4 ()
New Zealand  
Mexico  
Peru3 –   –
Russia3  – – –
South Africa  – – –
1  In the UK, cross-sectoral level refers to a single agreement between CBI and TUC rather than to collective 
bargaining as such.
2 Collective agreements are not allowed for agency workers (20.123 law, art. 304 & 305).
3 There are no CLAs in these countries.
4  In Japan, AW sector refers to a single agreement between Rengo and JASSA rather than to collective bargain-
ing as such.
4.4.5 Temporary agency work and ILO indicators
In its endeavour to measure decent work, the ILO Office has issued a manual341 con-
taining a list of legal framework indicators that may help answer the question as to 
whether temporary agency work, as discussed by Convention 181, may be considered 
decent. A comparison shows that nearly all indicators are entrenched in Convention 
181 in one way or another.
Table 4.8 List of legal framework indicators
Nr. Indicator Relevant ILO instruments Provisions Con-
vention 181
1 Labour administration Labour Administration Convention 1978 (no. 150) Art.14 lid 2
2 Government 
 commitment to 
full employment
Employment Policy Convention 1964 (no. 122) Pre-ambule
3 Unemployment 
 insurance
Social Security (minimum standards) Convention 
1952 (no. 102) 
Protection Against Unemployment Convention 1988 
(no. 168)
Art. 11e, 12d 
 
Art. 11c, 12b
341 ILO (2012b).
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Nr. Indicator Relevant ILO instruments Provisions Con-
vention 181
4 Statutory minimum 
wage
The Minimum Wage Fixing Convention 1970 
(no. 131)
Art. 11c, 12b
5 Maximum hours of 
work
The Hours of Work (industry) Convention 1919 
(no. 1) 
The Hours of Work (commerce and offices) 
 Convention 1930 (no. 30)
Art. 11d, 12c 
6 Paid annual leave Holiday with Pay Convention (revised) 1970 
(no. 132)
Art. 11d, 12c
7 Maternity leave Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (no. 183) Art. 11j, 12i
8 Parental leave Workers with Family Respondability Convention 
1981 (no. 156)
Art.11j, 12i
9 Child labour The Minimum Age Convention 1973 (no. 138) 
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 
(no. 182)
 
 
Art. 9
10 Forced Labour Convention on Forced Labour 1930 (no. 29) Preambule
11 Termination of em-
ployment
Termination of Employment Convention 1982 
(no. 158) 
Recommendation 166
?
12 Equal opportunity of 
employment
Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 (no. 100) 
Discrimination Employment and Occupation 
 Convention 1958 (no. 111)
Art. 5
13 Equal remuneration of 
men and women for 
work of equal value
idem Art. 5
14 Employment injury 
benefits
Social Security (minimum standards) Convention 
1952 (no. 102) 
Employment Injury Benefits Convention 1964 
(no. 121)
Art. 11h, 12g
15 osh labour inspection Labour Inspection Convention 1947 (no. 81) 
Labour Inspection (agriculture) Convention 1969 
(no. 129)
Art. 14, lid e
16 Pension (public 
private)
Zie ad 14 en 
Applicability part V and Invalidity Old Age and Survi-
vers Benefits Convention 1967 (no. 128)
 
Art. 11e, 12d
17 Incapacity for work 
due to sichness/sick 
leave
Zie ad 14 en 
Part iii and the Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
Convention 1969 (no. 130)
 
Art. 11e, h 
Art. 12d, g
18 Incapacity for work 
due to invalidity
Idem Idem
19 Freedom of 
 association and 
right to organize
Freedom of Association and the Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention 1948 (no.87)
Art. 4
20 Collective bargaining 
rights
Idem Art. 4
21 Tripartite 
 consultations
Tripartite Consultation (International Labour 
 Standards) Convention 1976 (no. 144)
Art. 2, lid 4 
Art. 3, lid 3 
Art. 7, lid 2 
Art. 8, lid 1 
Art.13, lid 1
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The only indicator lacking provisions in Convention 181 relates to termination of em-
ployment. However, it would go too far to look on temporary agency work as  indecent 
merely on the basis of this hiatus.
There is a Termination of Employment Convention from 1982 (no. 158) linked to 
Recommendation no. 166. This Convention 158 states in article 2, par. 2, that member 
states may exclude ‘workers engaged under a contract for a specified period of time 
or a specified task’ from the provisions of the convention.342 Recommendation no. 
166 further develops this article and also includes temporary employment, albeit that 
justified grounds must be provided for the situations in which this is allowed. Art-
icle 3 of Recommendation 166 states:
1. Adequate safeguards should be provided against recourse to contracts of em-
ployment for a specified period of time the aim of which is to avoid the pro-
tection resulting from the Termination of Employment Convention (1982), and 
this Recommendation.
2. To this end, for example, provision may be made for one or more of the following:
a) Limiting recourse to contracts for a specified period of time to cases in 
which, owing either to the nature of the work to be effected or to the circum-
stances under which it is to be effected or to the interests of the worker, the 
employment relationship cannot be of indeterminate duration
b) Deeming contracts for a specified period of time, other than in the cases 
referred to in clause (a) of this subparagraph, to be contracts of employment of 
indeterminate duration
c) Deeming contracts for a specified period of time, when renewed on one 
or more occasions, other than in the cases mentioned in clause (a) of this sub-
paragraph, to be contracts of employment of indeterminate duration.
Thus, temporary employment is allowed, but it is restricted to specific conditions 
relating to the nature of the assignment, the circumstances of the assignment or the 
interests of the worker. If these conditions are not met, an open-ended contract is 
deemed to exist.
Convention 158 has been ratified by 36 member states, and is by now thought 
to be controversial. Employers advocate abrogating it, as it no longer complies with 
current demands.343 They argue that ‘full employment and open labour markets are 
more important for perceived employment security than strict project dismissal 
regu lation’.344 This position fits in with Kennedy remarking in the 1960s that ’a rising 
342 Rayer (2014), p. 320.
343 ILO (2011), p. 26.
344 ILO (2011), p. 23. See also: Lörcher (2011).
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tide lifts all boats’, when he defended plans to cut taxes in order to boost economic 
growth.345 All in all, the position is that job security is served better by more jobs 
rather than by more severe dismissal rules. Meanwhile, it must be admitted that the 
permanent contract is still the mainstay of the world of work.
In some countries, Convention 158 and Recommendation 166 have resulted in 
temporary agency legislation that couples the hiring of temporary workers to  specific 
reasons for use, as the above survey shows for at least seventeen CIETT member states.
All in all, it can be concluded that Convention 181 complies with nearly all the 
decent work indicators. The only exception is the ‘termination indicator’, but as to 
that it can also be established that this is regulated in Convention 158 (and Recom-
mendation 166) for all types of work, including temporary agency work. Therefore, 
there was no strict need to regulate this again in Convention 181.
For that matter, it might have caused astonishment if this conclusion could not 
be drawn. Convention 181 is all about ILO standards, and it would be odd if these 
were indecent. However, the observations are also relevant, as the concept of decent 
work has gained importance since Convention 181 was realised and the unions have 
expressed doubts about various aspects of this Convention (p. 105), which should 
be examined (p. 106).
Moreover, temporary agency work is seen as a form of precarious work – as 
we expounded in chapter 3 – which is after all a concept that can be qualified as the 
opposite of decent work. Furthermore, we saw before that IUF General Secretary 
Ron Oswald, argued that temporary agency work does not create decent work (see 
p.  101, 102). However, the ILO supplies an adequate normative framework for 
regulating decent temporary agency work.
Therefore, from this point of view there is no reason to denote temporary agency 
work as inherently precarious or indecent. There is, however, a need to obtain more 
ratifications of Convention 181 and to promote the principles of Recommendation 
188, so that temporary agency work can continue to develop in accordance with this 
instrument. As long as there are no new instruments to supplant Convention 158 and 
Recommendation 166, they too inspire further legal development.
Otherwise, the main challenge to decent work is – as we saw before – the informal 
economy. This is where the largest decent work deficit exists. Interestingly, a clear 
correlation can be observed between the strict regulation of temporary employment 
agencies and the size of the informal, or undeclared economy. The more flexibly tem-
porary employment agency are regulated, the smaller the undeclared economy.
345 John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, JFK on the Economy and Taxes, http://www.
jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/JFK-on-the-Economy-and-Taxes.aspx.
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Figure 4.7  Relationship between the strictness of regulation of temporary contracts and 
the size of the undeclared economy
Source: Renooy & Williams (2014), p. 35 ff.
Therefore, temporary agency work cannot only be considered as decent work because 
it more than meets the (legal) decent work indicators, but because this type of work 
can also contribute to the transition from informal to formal, more decent work. This 
is also confirmed in the recent ILO recommendation 204 regarding the transition 
from informal to formal work.
Convention 181 can likewise play a role in combating human trafficking. Among 
other things, the ILO has taken action to that end in the Fair Recruitment Initiative, 
which, apart from promoting the fundamental ILO conventions – the Migration for 
Employment Convention (revised) 1949 (no. 97) and the corresponding Recommenda-
tion (no. 86), the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provision) Convention 1975 (no. 
143) and the corresponding Recommendation (no. 151) – also promotes the Employ-
ment Service Convention 1948 (no. 88) and the Private Employment Agencies Con-
vention 1997 (no. 181).346
The United Nations and the EU are likewise engaged in combating human 
trafficking.347 The EU has published348 a ‘practical guide’ and we may assume that 
Convention 181 will play an important role in its realisation. Both CIETT and ITUC 
responded favourably to its application.349
346 ILO (2015b).
347 Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
55/25 of 15 Nov. 2000; Anti-trafficking Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA; EU Strategy towards the Eradication of 
Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016, (COM 2012) 286 final.
348 European Commission (2016).
349 Paraskevopoulou et al. (2016), pp. 19–20.
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Chapter 5
Human rights
In addition to the concept of decent work, another phenomenon has had considerable 
influence on international social law: since the end of the Second World War, interest 
in the concept of human rights has expanded enormously. It has interacted with the 
role multinationals play in the increasing globalisation of labour relations and the 
development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).
Half of the world’s largest enterprises appear to be multinationals. From 1970 
to 2007, the number of multinationals increased from 7,000 to nearly 80,000.350 To-
gether, these enterprises have approximately one million subsidiaries, many of which 
operate in developing countries. These multinationals own 70% of all patents and are 
responsible for 80% of all international trade.
These internationally active enterprises have mainly profited from the universal 
trend in the 1980s of reduction of government involvement, a development inspired 
by the Chicago School and politically applied in tandem by Reagan and Thatcher. 
This meant that markets should not be regulated, but rather facilitated.
As early as 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) set the 
tone in this respect. In 1995, the GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), in which 150 countries participate. This organisation aims at promoting inter-
national trade, resolving commercial disputes and bringing down trade barriers. In 
this, globalisation went hand in hand with liberalisation, and this eventually resulted 
in focusing on protection from market excess, particularly through the tabling of the 
issue of human rights. Van Dam351 characterises this development as follows: ‘Trade 
has been globalised, justice not yet’.
Corporate responses include Corporate Social Responsibility, focusing on human 
rights as the spearhead of the CSR agenda. The concept has by now become more 
350 Van Dam (2008).
351 Van Dam (2008).
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comprehensive, and for numerous enterprises it forms an integrated part of the com-
pany policy.
This chapter will discuss how the human rights have developed and how the 
results of these developments should be valued in comparison to the achievements 
of Convention 181.
5.1 GENERAL
Human rights are rights that ensue from the single fact of being human, regardless 
of sex, skin colour, race, religion, wealth, et cetera. They are not granted; one simply 
has them. Far from bestowing them, the state, and the authorities in that state, must 
respect them.352 Cliteur353 argues that these rights determine the boundaries of legit-
imate state practice. They are fundamental values that must be protected by law and 
that must safeguard human dignity and self-fulfilment. They are part of the highest 
moral order and as such are inviolable.
Human rights are also known as nature rights, natural rights, subjective public 
rights, public freedoms, fundamental rights and individual rights.354
5.1.1 History of human rights 355
It is difficult to establish when the first texts on human rights were produced. We may 
go back as far as the Code of Hammurabi dated 1800 BC, which includes concepts 
relating to human rights. Through the centuries, there have been religious texts that 
refer to what we now call human rights. Moreover, several philosophical movements 
have also had some influence.356
The 1215 Magna Carta is generally seen as the beginning of codification. It in-
cludes clauses such as: ‘To none will we sell, to none deny or delay right or justice’; 
also: ‘No freeman shall be taken or improved or disseized or outlawed, or exited or in 
anyway harmed… save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land’.
These regulations had little to do with the protection of ordinary citizens, but 
rather dealt with ensuring the rights of the powerful nobility in the face of the ex-
cessive demands of the King of England. It should rather be seen as the beginning 
of restricting an absolute and arbitrary monarch. In later times, that amounted to 
protecting the individual from a tyrannical and oppressive state.
352 Henrad (2008).
353 Cliteur (1999), p. 19.
354 Henrad (2008), p. 26.
355 Bates (2010), p. 17.
356 Henrad (2008), p. 42 ff.
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The English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution culminated in the Bill of Rights 
dated 1689. In essence, this law established the sovereignty of parliament in relation 
to the omnipotence of the Stuart kings, who claimed to have ‘divine right’.
The crux of this Bill of Rights was that the absolute power of the monarch was to 
be restricted in the interest of the individual. It was preceded by the abolition of tor-
ture in the English legal system in 1641 and the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679. Advocates 
such as Hobbes and Locke had vast influence on this development.
On the European continent, this development was put in motion by Montesquieu 
(De L’Esprit des Lois, 1748), Rousseau (Du contrat social, 1762), Voltaire (Dictionnaire 
philosophique, 1765) and Kant (On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political 
Right, 1792), all leading figures in what would later be called the Enlightenment. Par-
ticularly Montesquieu’s doctrine of the so-called trias politica was a guiding force in 
this respect. His ideas were also the driving force behind the French Déclaration des 
droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789). This was preceded by the creation in the  United 
States of The Declaration of Independence (1776), which commences as follows:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
This Declaration made accusations against George III and was a successful follow-up 
to the American War of Independence. While it only involved five American states 
in 1776, in 1783 all the states took part in one way or another. The most characteristic 
was the Virginia Declaration of Rights 1776, which formed the basis for the eventual 
Bill of Rights. It states (in art. 1) that:
… all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent 
rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any com-
pact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.
Then, the Virginia Declaration expounds that governing is subject to consent (all 
power is invested in the people, art. 2) and that the legislative and the executive 
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 powers must be separate from the judicative, before naming a number of human 
rights such as basic procedural rights and freedom of expression (art. 3–12).
The French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen stated that ‘l’ignorance, 
l’oubli ou le mépris des droits de l’Homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics 
et de la corruption des Gouvernements’. Article 16 of this French declaration clearly 
connects restriction of state power to protection of the human rights (‘Toute Société 
dans laquelle la garantie des Droits n’est pas assurée, ni la séparation des Pouvoirs 
déterminée, n’a point de Constitution.’). The declaration goes on to state:
La Loi n’a le droit de défendre que les actions nuisibles à la Société. Tout ce qui n’est 
pas défendu par la Loi ne peut être empêché, et nul ne peut être contraint à faire ce 
qu’elle n’ordonne pas.
Compared with this French declaration, the American Declaration of Independence 
was inconsequential. However, in 1791, the first ten amendments to the American 
Constitution came into force. They had been approved by three-quarters of the States 
in 1789, and together constituted the U. S. Bill of Rights. This bill provided that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.
Among other things, these amendments imply the famous right to keep and bear 
arms (amendment II), protection from unreasonable searches, seizures and arrests 
(amendment IV), include various measures against unfair conduct (amendments V 
and VI) and prohibit cruel and unusual punishment (amendment VIII).
During the following decades, the human rights issue continued to occupy the minds. 
This development received extra impetus during the two world wars. The first pro-
posals for establishing an international human rights code date from 1929, when the 
Institut de Droit International (Institute for International Law), then situated in New 
York, published a ‘Declaration of the International Rights of Man’. Initiatives in the 
United Kingdom (such as a publication by H. G. Wells in 1940) and Germany (the 
Weiße Rose resistance group) made further contributions.
In his 1941 State of the Union address, US President Roosevelt spoke about the four 
fundamental freedoms (freedom of speech and expression, freedom of every person to 
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worship God in his own way, freedom from want and freedom from fear).357 Later that 
year, Roosevelt and Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter, which stated that ‘all the 
men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want’. In 1942, 
this was followed up by the Declaration by United Nations and in 1945 by the Char-
ter of the United Nations. In its preamble, the Charter states that the peoples of the 
United Nations had determined:
… to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small…
In 1946, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was established 
and given the mandate to work at an international Bill of Rights. Part of that was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The draft Declaration was realised 
in 1948 and adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations by a vote of 48 
in favour.
History of human rights
1215 Magna Charta
1689 English Bill of Rights
1776 The Declaration of Independence, Verenigde Staten en Virginia Declaration of Rights
1779 Franse Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen
1791 U. S. Bill of Rights
1941 Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech
1942 Declaration by the United Nations
1945 Charter of the United Nations
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1949 Four Geneva Conventions
1966 iccpr and icescr open for signature
1976 Entry into force of iccpr and icescr, new Bill of Rights
5.1.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 358
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was drafted by a specially estab-
lished committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. The idea was to formulate an interna-
tional Bill of Rights, of which the UDHR formed a part. This document was to consist 
357 Schrijver & VerLoren van Themaat (1989), p. 16.
358 Bates (2010), p. 35; for the Declaration text see: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.
shtml.
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of three parts: the Declaration itself, the resulting obligations and implementation 
provisions, i.e. a supervision and control system. As mentioned above, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on 10 December 1948.
Six communist member states (the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
the Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) abstained, as did Saudi Arabia 
and South Africa. The 48 member states in favour endorsed the Declaration as a 
‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’.
Eleanor Roosevelt stated that the Declaration ‘may well become the  international 
Magna Carta of all men everywhere’. It did not imply any obligations and was not 
 legally binding. Roosevelt’s emphasis on its non-binding character may well have 
been the reason why 48 UN member states endorsed it. Since then, the Declaration 
has become legally binding after all.359
Firstly, it is an elaboration of what is provided regarding human rights in the UN 
Charter. Secondly, it has the status of customary international law. There are many 
references, not only in constitutions, of which the two general human rights coven-
ants from 1966 are best-known: the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR,) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).360 These covenants were drafted to develop the 1948 Declaration 
into legally binding provisions.
In 1966, these covenants were opened for signature and by 1976, 35 member 
states had ratified them, which meant they were bound by legally binding regula-
tions. Although these regulations are legally binding as customary law, it must be 
established that there are ‘persistent objectors’, particularly in the Arab world, who do 
not accept all the standards. These standards are still part of general principles of law.
Apart from the treaties mentioned above, the UN has developed several others 
over time to elaborate on the human rights. In 2009, all UN member states had rati-
fied at least one UN human rights treaty and 137 UN member states had even ratified 
six.
Each UN human rights instrument has its own treaty body, a committee that 
monitors the further implementation (table 5.1).
359 Henrad (2008), p. 58.
360 For texts and explanations, see: Monash University (2008).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, abbreviated version 361
1. Right to Equality
2. Freedom from Discrimination
3. Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
4. Freedom from Slavery
5. Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment
6. Right to Recognition as a Person before the Law
7. Right to Equality before the Law
8. Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal
9. Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile
10. Right to Fair Public Hearing
11. Right to be Considered Innocent until Proven Guilty
12. Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence
13. Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country
14. Right to Asylum in other Countries from Persecution
15. Right to a Nationality and the Freedom to Change It
16. Right to Marriage and Family
17. Right to Own Property
18. Freedom of Belief and Religion
19. Freedom of Opinion and Information
20. Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association
21. Right to Participate in Government and in Free Elections
22. Right to Social Security
23. Right to Desirable Work and to Join Trade Unions
24. Right to Rest and Leisure
25. Right to Adequate Living Standard
26. Right to Education
27. Right to Participate in the Cultural Life of Community
28. Right to a Social Order that Articulates this Document
29. Community Duties Essential to Free and Full Development
30. Freedom from State or Personal Interference in the above Rights
361 http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-5/8_udhr-abbr.htm
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Table 5.1 Overview of the UN treaty bodies 362
Instrument Monitoring body Number of 
states parties
International Convention on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (icerd)
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (18 members)
173
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (iccpr)
Human Rights Committee (18 mem-
bers)
165
First Optional Protocol to the iccpr 
( iccpr-op1)
Human Rights Committee 113
Second Optional Protocol to the  iccpr on 
the Abolition of Death Penalty (iccpr-op2)
Human Rights Committee  72
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (icescr)
Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (18 members)
160
Optional Protocol to the icescr 
( icescr-op)
Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights
  0 (not yet 
in force)
Convention against Torture and Other Forms 
of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
(uncat)
Committee against Torture (10 mem-
bers)
146
Optional Protocol to uncat ( uncat- op) Subcommittee on Prevention of 
 Torture (10 members)
 50
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (cedaw)
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (23 
members)
186
Optional Protocol to cedaw ( cedaw- op) Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women
 99
Convention on the Rights of the Child (crc) Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(18 members)
193
Optional Protocol on Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography
Committee on the Rights of the Child 136
Optional Protocol on Children in Armed 
Conflict
Committee on the Rights of the Child 130
International Convention on the Rights of 
Migrant Workers and their Families (icrmw)
Committee on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers (10 members)
 42
Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (crpd)
Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (18 members)
 83
Optional Protocol to the crpd ( crpd- op) Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities
 52
International Convention for the Protection 
of all Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ances
Committee on Enforced Disappear-
ances (10 members)
 18 (not yet 
in force)
The institutional structure of the UN Charter includes several bodies that are involved 
in the UN human rights mandate to a greater or lesser extent (for a survey, see figure 
5.1).
362 Connors & Schmidt (2014), table 18.1.
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Figure 5.1 The United Nations human rights network 363
Under article 7, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter, further subsidiary organs can be 
established according to need. Important to the promotion and protection of the hu-
man rights are the former Human Rights Committee and its Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, the current Human Rights Council and 
363 Smis et al. (2011), p. 136–137. 
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its Advisory Committee, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and his Office, 
and the Commission on the Status of Women.364
The UN human rights treaties have several monitoring mechanisms, including 
supervision of periodical reviews by the monitoring bodies, and complaints proce-
dures.365 However, the enforceability366 of the monitoring mechanisms tends to be 
severely limited. At UN level, no legally binding judgments are possible. On the basis 
of periodical reports, assessments can take place, and Special Rapporteurs can be 
assigned to follow up certain decisions. This way, some pressure can be exerted on 
states to do what is needed.
5.1.3 Regional developments367
The UDHR also has its regional equivalents, i.e. in Europe, Africa and on the Ameri-
can continents. South East Asia and the Arab world are playing their part.
Following the UDHR, Europe realised the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which was drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950.368 This Con-
vention has established a European Court – based in Strasbourg – which can deliver 
binding judgments. When states have ratified the Convention, they must respect this 
court’s judgments and (1) end any violation, (2) offer restitutio in integrum (undo the 
consequences) and (3) ensure that no more violations will take place in future.
The interpretations by the Court may be important to all parties to the Convention. 
The Court does not employ an official doctrine of precedent, but it may be expected 
that the jurisdiction is consistent and coherent. When it deviates from earlier juris-
prudence, it will meticulously justify doing so.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe monitors the execution 
of the ECHR judgments. This committee is a purely political body and thus only has 
political power, but it does engage the Department of Execution of Judgments of 
the ECHR to verify whether the state implements the judgment adequately.369 The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also plays a supervisory role in the 
execution of the ECHR judgments and in respect of that regularly calls the Committee 
of Ministers to account.
364 Smis et al. (2011), p. 136–137.
365 Henrad (2008), p. 191 ff.
366 Henrad (2008), p. 227.
367 Henrad (2008), p. 97.
368 The Convention is dated 4 November 1950, Treaty Series 1951, 154 (rectification Treaty Series. 1961, 
8 and 1979, 150, last amended in May 1994, Treaty Series 1994, 165. See also www.echr.coe.int.
369 Henrad (2008), p. 228–229.
 Chapter 5: Human rights
 185
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
art. 1  Obligation to respect human rights
art. 2 Right to life
art. 3  Prohibition of torture
art. 4  Prohibition of slavery and forced labour
art. 5  Right to liberty and security
art. 6  Right to a fair trial
art. 7  No punishment without law
art. 8  Right to respect for private and family life
art. 9  Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
art. 10 Freedom of expression
art. 11 Freedom of assembly and association
art. 12 Right to marry
art. 13 Right to an effective remedy
art. 14 Prohibition of discrimination
art. 15 Derogation in time of emergency
art. 16 Restrictions of political activities of aliens
art. 17 Prohibition of abuse of rights
art. 18 Limitation on use of restrictions on rights
Various protocols
Beside the ECHR, which mainly relates to civil and political human rights, there is 
also a European Social Charter (ESC) concerning social and economic rights.370 This 
was opened for signature to the member states of the Council of Europe in as early as 
1961. With regard to content, the ESC is comparable to the ICESCR. Rights that have 
been listed include:
 – housing (houses that suit families’ needs, combating homelessness,  universally 
guaranteed access to adequate and affordable housing, equal access to social 
housing for aliens);
 – health (accessible and effective health facilities, disease prevention policies, a 
healthy living environment, exclusion of occupational hazards, health and safety 
ensured and guaranteed by law);
 – education (labour under the age of 15 is prohibited, free primary and secondary 
education, free vocational guidance, free basic and advanced vocational train-
ing, access to university and higher technical education based on individual 
 aptitude);
370 European Social Charter, Turin 18 October 1961, Treaty Series. 1963, 90. Revised Treaty Series. 
2004, 13 and Treaty Series. 2004, 14.
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 – work (full employment, the right to earn a living in an occupation freely entered 
into, fair working conditions in respect of wages and working hours, prevention 
of sexual and psychological harassment, prohibition of forced labour, freedom 
of establishing and joining trade unions, promotion of joint consultation be-
tween workers and employers, collective bargaining, mediation and voluntary 
arbitration, the right to strike);
 – social protection (right to social security, social well-being and social services, 
protection from poverty and social exclusion, family and ageing policy);
 – movement of people (simpler immigration formalities, family reunion, emer-
gency aid to returning aliens, protection in case of extradition);
 – non-discrimination (equal treatment and opportunities for men and women, all 
rights without discrimination).
The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) monitors compliance with the 
commitments by the member states. This committee consists of fifteen independent 
experts and is elected and appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe. Every year, one state draws up a report on whether the Charter has been im-
plemented de facto or de jure. If deficits are apparent, the Committee of Ministers will 
have a recommendation sent to that state, requesting adjustment. Requests cannot be 
enforced, but they are authoritative.371
Since 1995, the ECSR has had a collective right to complain in place for workers’ 
and employers’ organisations (i.e. ETUC, Business Europe and IOE), NGOs that have 
a consultative status with the Council of Europe, workers’ and employers’ organisa-
tions in member states and national NGOs.
There is now also a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,372 
which in 54 articles brings together the fundamental human rights regarding dignity, 
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights and justice. On 12 December 2007, the 
chairs of the European Commission, Council of Europe and European Parliament 
signed the Charter. One day later, all European government leaders signed it simul-
taneously with the Lisbon Reform Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty includes a reference to 
the Charter, which thus constitutes a legally binding appendix to the Treaty. Article 
6, par. 1, of the Treaty on European Union provides: ‘The Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted in Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.’
371 Henrad (2008), p. 114.
372 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm and Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJEC, 18-12-2000 C364/1.
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The Charter is somewhat broader in scope than the ECHR and the ESC. For instance, 
it relates to more social rights of workers, data protection, bio-ethics and the right 
to good administration. The rights in the Charter apply to EU citizens in relation to 
their governments.
On 30 April 1948, some seven months before the realisation of the UDHR, the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS)373, adopted the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man. All 35 states of the American continent that are OAS members en-
dorsed this declaration, although Cuba took a special position. In 1965, the declaration 
was followed by a legally binding American human rights treaty, the Pact of San José.374
Several Caribbean states, the United States and Canada have not ratified the 
treaty. Together with the adoption of the Pact of San José an Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights was established, comparable to the European Court of Human Rights. 
This court hears complaints about states that are party to the Pact of San José and 
have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. These are 22 states, and thus the court’s 
scope is narrower than that of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission that 
was established in 1955 to enforce the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man and that monitors the 35 OAS member states.
This Declaration is broader in scope than the Pact, in the sense that it also in-
cludes social, economic and cultural rights, whereas the Pact focuses on civil and po-
litical rights. Furthermore, this pact includes a protocol regarding social, economic 
and cultural rights, known as the protocol of San Salvador.375 Apart from that, the 
Pact includes duties.
The 1981 African human rights treaty, the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, likewise includes duties.376 Since 1989, Africa has a human rights 
commission and a Court (effective since 2004). All 35 member states of the African 
Union have ratified the Charter. However, Morocco withdrew in 1983.
There is also an Arab Charter on Human Rights.377 In 1968, the League of Arab 
States initiated the establishment of a human rights council and in 1979, it initiated 
373 See Raimondo & Salvioli (2008).
374 American Convention on Human Rights, O. A. S. Treaty Series no. 36, 1144 V. N. T. S. 123; see http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm.
375 Additional Protocol in the American Convention on human rights in the area of economic,  social 
and cultural rights; protocol of San Salvador: see: http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/ 
a-52.html.
376 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981) OAV Doc. CAB/
Lei/67/3.5.21 I. L. M. 58/1982, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm. See also:  Adjovi 
(2012).
377 See http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/loas2005.html
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the drafting of a charter. The charter is in line with the UN treaties, but follows the 
sharia, condemns Zionism, allows for restrictions of the freedom of expression and 
only rules the death penalty to be illegal for political crimes. A revised version of the 
charter came into force in 2008 and likewise shows deficits compared to prevailing 
international law. By the end of 2013, 13 out of the 22 League member states had rat-
ified this charter.
Recently, in 2012, an Asian human rights declaration was adopted at an Asian 
summit meeting in Phnom Penh.378 The declaration is broad in scope, containing 
political, social, economic and cultural rights. It draws attention to development and 
peace, but also leaves room for exceptions.
5.2 HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSLATED TO THE BUSINESS SECTOR
5.2.1 The Ruggie Framework
The relationship between human rights and the business sector has demanded par-
ticular attention. How should the business community, which operates more and 
more internationally, deal with these rights? In 2004, a sub-committee of the UN 
Human Rights Commission developed the ‘Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights’. It was an attempt to impose on the business sector the human rights that the 
UN member states had endorsed, the main difference being that states have  primary 
duties and enterprises have secondary duties. The norms triggered widespread re-
sistance in the business sector. The UN Commission on Human Rights refused to 
endorse the document and asked the UN Secretary-General, then Kofi Annan, to 
appoint a special representative to find a solution to this controversy and also clarify 
the roles and responsibilities of the states, the enterprises and other actors in relation 
to human rights.
In 2005, Kofi Annan appointed Harvard Professor John Ruggie to the role of 
special representative. This appointment was continued when Ban Ki-moon took 
 office as Secretary-General in 2007. Ruggie reported to the UN Commission on 
 Human Rights, later known as the UN Human Rights Council, and to the UN General 
Assembly.379
In April 2008, Ruggie submitted his report to the UN Human Rights Council. 
He had conducted fourteen multi-stakeholder consultations on five continents, com-
missioned extensive research, produced a thousand pages of text, received numerous 
378 Asean Human Rights Declaration 19 Nov. 2012, see: http://asean.org/phnom-penh-statement-on-
the-adoption-of-the-asean-human-rights-declaration-ahrd/. See also Severino (2013).
379 See Ruggie (2011).
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reactions and reported twice to the Commission and later to the Council. In his 2008 
report, he stated:380
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the gov-
ernance gaps created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic 
forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse conse-
quences. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful 
acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How 
to narrow and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our funda-
mental challenge.
The consultations had revealed that all stakeholders, however divergent their posi-
tions, felt a strong need for a joint conceptual and political framework. This frame-
work rested on diverging but nonetheless common responsibilities. It is based on 
three principles: the state duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, 
including enterprises; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the 
need for more effective access to remedies.
Each principle is an essential part of the framework: the state duty to protect, 
since it is at the core of the human rights regime; the corporate responsibility to 
respect, since society expects enterprises to do so, and the access to remedies, since 
the existing legal and non-legal avenues to appeal are limited in number, scope and 
effectiveness. The three principles form a whole in the sense that they support each 
other in sustainable progress.
The State duty to protect has both legal and political aspects. The State has the duty to 
protect against abuse of human rights by third parties, including enterprises, within 
the scope of their jurisdiction. In order to help states deal with this in respect of the 
core human rights treaties, the supervising treaty bodies recommend that states take 
all necessary steps to protect against such abuse, including preventing, examining 
and punishing abuse and offering possibilities for correction.
The framework offers UN member states scope for deciding which measures 
need to be taken, but the treaty bodies indicate that both the regulation and condem-
nation of business activities in relation to human rights are appropriate measures. 
The framework addresses all kinds of activities, national and transnational, large and 
small.
The Corporate responsibility to respect human rights is the second principle. It elab-
orates on the so-called soft law instruments such as the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration 
380 Ruggie (2008), no. 3.
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of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD’s 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The principle is acknowledged by large, 
global enterprises, since they state that enterprises ‘are expected to obey the law, even 
if it is not enforced and to respect the principles of relevant international instruments 
where national law is absent’.381 It also relates to one of the commitments that enter-
prises enter into when they join the Global Compact.
How this respect must be given shape and substance requires further attention. 
It will take a process of due diligence, i.e. a process that not only ensures that national 
laws are complied with, but which also charts where the risk of human rights abuse 
exists in order to prevent it.
Access to remedy is the third principle. Formal remedies are often insufficient, while 
the need for them is greatest. However, the non-formal remedies, such as mediation, 
are underdeveloped, both at corporate and at national and international levels.
In his report, Ruggie makes an attempt to chart the human rights involved. He lists 
labour rights and non-labour rights.
Business impact on human rights
Labour rights
– Freedom of association – Right to equal pay for equal work
–  Right to organize and participate in collect-
ive bargaining
– Right to equality at work
– Right to just and favourable remuneration
– Right to non-discrimination – Right to a safe work environment
– Abolition of slavery and forced labour – Right to rest and leisure
– Abolition of child labour – Right to family life
– Right to work 
Non-labour rights
–  Right to life, liberty and security of the 
person
–  Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment
–  Equal recognition and protection under the 
law
– Right to a fair trial
– Right to self-determination
– Freedom of movement
– Right of peaceful assembly
–  Right to marry and form a family
–  Freedom of thought, conscience and reli-
gion
–  Right to hold opinions, freedom of informa-
tion and expression
– Right to political life
– Right to privacy
–  Right to an adequate standard of living 
(including food, clothing, and housing)
–  Right to physical and mental health; access 
to medical services
– Right to education
–  Right to participate in cultural life, the be-
nefits of scientific progress, and protection 
of authorial interests
– Right to social security
381 IOE/ICC/BIAC (2008).
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Ruggie recommends charting which human rights are at the greatest risk of being 
abused. He advises enterprises to formulate and communicate a human rights policy. 
Moreover, he requests anticipation of possible abuse and the execution of so-called 
impact assessments, i.e. starting a process in which structural attention is paid to pos-
sible abuse and to potential remedy.
In connection to this, it is important that thinking about human rights is com-
pletely embedded in business policy (integration). Lastly, the results of this policy will 
need to be monitored periodically (tracking performance).
5.2.2 Ruggie’s extended mandate: guidelines
The Human Rights Council unanimously welcomed the ‘protect, respect and reme-
dy’ framework in its resolution no. 817, adopted on 18 June 2008. Thus the extended 
mandate of Special Representative John Ruggie had come to an end.
However, the Human Rights Council wanted to extend the mandate once again, 
in order to achieve further operationalisation and promotion of the framework. Rug-
gie was able to fulfil this task in three years. In a progress report dated 9 April 2010,382 
Ruggie stated that he encountered wisdom in the words of Nobel laureate Amartya 
Sen: ‘What moves us,’ Sen wrote, ‘… is not the realization that the world falls short of 
being completely just – which few of us expect – but that there are clearly remediable 
injustices around us which we want to eliminate’. This view resonated with Ruggie’s 
own approach of ‘principled pragmatism’ and raised the question as to how one can 
improve actual lives, rather than achieve ‘perfectly just societies or institutes’, which 
in any case will remain an illusion, and realise a series of practical guidelines through 
which the framework could be implemented.
In March 2011, Ruggie submitted his final report on the guidelines.383 Drafting it 
involved a great deal of work. In November 2010, a first draft was submitted for con-
sultation. It evoked 3576 reactions from 120 countries and 100 submissions (official 
points of view), including many made by governments.
Completing this report marked, as the report states, the end of the beginning: 
‘by establishing a common global platform for action, on which cumulative progress 
can be built, step by step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term de-
velopments’. The ‘Guiding Principles’ were not an attempt to create new legal ob-
ligations, but rather sought to provide an elaboration and to connect this with the 
integrated template of the framework.
382 Ruggie (2010b), p. 23, conclusion ad 121.
383 Ruggie (2011). See also Ruggie J. (2010a).
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The report lists 31 guiding principles. Firstly, the State duty to protect is elaborated. 
States are to enforce the human rights legislation in such a way that it compels the 
business sector to respect them; they must examine whether the rights are adequate 
and take action against any gaps. States must also ensure that other laws and policies 
aimed at enterprises do not detract from the human rights, but rather provide scope 
for respecting them. Moreover, states must provide enterprises with effective guid-
ance on how to give shape to their respect, promote communications and even make 
demands about how they must handle human rights (see principle 3).
The responsibility of enterprises to respect the human rights refers to the interna-
tionally acknowledged human rights, as they are expressed minimally in the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights and in the principles concerning the fundamental rights set out in 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (see principle 12).
The Corporate Responsibility to Respect requires enterprises to avoid causing or con-
tributing to ‘adverse impacts’ on human rights through their own activities and to ad-
dress any abuses as they occur. It also requires preventing and mitigating abuses that 
follow from their operations, products or from services provided by their business 
partners, even if they have not contributed to the abuse themselves (see principle 13).
By business partners are meant the partners in the supply chain and other state 
or non-state entities. This is a complex matter, and what actions can be taken depends 
on the degree of influence the enterprise has on these entities, on how crucial the 
relationship is, how serious the abuse is and on whether ending the relationship will 
ultimately have consequences for the human rights (see principle 19).
The guidelines pay attention to the manner in which the human rights policy 
is to be formulated (principle 16), the due diligence requirement (principle 17), the 
integration in the internal processes (principle 19) and performance tracking (prin-
ciple 20).
Access to Remedy is the third pillar of the framework that was further developed. This 
requires states to guarantee that the people involved in the human rights abuse have 
the opportunity to do something about it; judicially, administratively, by process of 
law, or other possibilities.
‘Remedy’ is also taken to mean apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or 
non-financial compensation, punitive sanctions and guarantees of non-repetition.
The state-based judicial mechanisms (principle 26), state-based non-judicial 
grievance mechanisms (principle 27) and non-state-based grievance mechanisms 
(principle 28) are also elaborated upon. With respect to non-judicial grievance mech-
anisms, effectiveness criteria are legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, objectivity, 
transparency and rights-compatibility, being a source of continuous learning and be-
ing based on engagement and dialogue.
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The UN Human Rights Council has not adopted Ruggie’s Framework and Guiding 
Principles but it has endorsed it, which means that this Council has accepted them. 
With respect to this, Eijsbouts argued:
It is particularly not about adopting. That was not possible, as neither the Frame-
work, nor the Guiding Principles were the result of a formal realisation and decision- 
making process within the Council. Those would undoubtedly have resulted in soft 
law. Thus, while the corporate responsibility to respect human rights may not have 
been adopted, it is unanimously endorsed (a unique event so far) by the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights.
Ruggie characterises the corporate responsibility itself as a global standard of expected 
conduct, i.e. a universal societal standard. In view of the unanimous endorsement by 
the UN Commission on Human Rights it must not be ruled out that national judges 
applying national laws see this standard as soft law. As soft law it can further develop 
into international customary law, i.e. hard law.384
Eijsbouts has worked out the various CSR regulations in concentric ‘circles’. He con-
siders the UN Guidelines to be a ‘global standard of expected conduct’, belonging to 
the core of his concentric circles.
Figure 5.2 The Concentric Circles of CSR Regulation385
384 Eijsbouts (2012), p. 819.
385 Eijsbouts (2011), p. 24.
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The same resolution that contained the endorsement of the Guiding Principles by 
the Human Rights Council also included the decision to establish a working group 
that was to engage in promoting and implementing the Guiding Principles.386 In this 
resolution a broad mandate was formulated for the working group to encourage the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles.
5.3 ‘SOFT RULES OF THE GAME’
The UN Guiding Principles can be seen as a global standard of expected conduct387 
that may possibly develop into some kind of soft law at a national level. Inter-
nationally, soft law applies in any event to three initiatives and instruments that target 
multinational organisations, i.e. the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy of the ILO388; the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises389 and the UN Global Compact.390
5.3.1 The ILO MNE Declaration
The ILO MNE Declaration dates from 1977 and was formulated jointly by govern-
ments, employers’ and workers’ organisations. In 2000 it was also revised and supple-
mented with the ‘Fundamental Rights and Principles’. In 2006, further adjustments 
to other ILO instruments followed.
The ILO Declaration contains a very broad international tripartite agreement 
with respect to appropriate corporate conduct in the fields of work and social  policy. 
The ILO Declaration is aimed at promoting the positive contribution that multi-
nationals make to economic and social progress and to minimising the problems that 
ensue from their actions.
The Declaration provides voluntary guidelines for multinationals, governments 
and employers’ and workers’ organisations for shaping social policies and aims to 
inspire good practices. It reflects the key ILO declarations, including the fundamental 
labour standards. The Declaration thus constitutes the most comprehensive  summary 
of labour rights that are important to multinationals and addresses both governments 
and national and international enterprises. It includes principles regarding general 
386 Human Rights Council, seventeenth session, agenda item 3, A/HRC/RES/17/4, 6 July 2016.
387 United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, Report of the Special Representative 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John 
Ruggie, Human Rights Council, seventeenth session, agenda item 3, A/HRC/17/31 Advance Edited 
Version, p. 13 ad A11.
388 ILO (2006b).
389 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011).
390 United Nations (2000).
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policy, employment, working and living conditions and labour relations. The main 
elements are:
 – general policy: complying with national law and respecting international stand-
ards;
 – employment: promoting employment, respecting the principle of equal treat-
ment and aiming for stable employee numbers;
 – training: attention for vocational training and education;
 – working and living conditions: wages, benefits and conditions of work must not 
be less favourable than those in comparable enterprises in the host country. If 
no benchmarks are available, enterprises should provide the best possible wages, 
benefits and conditions of work in accordance with government policy, aimed 
at the basic needs of employees and their families, respect the minimum age for 
employment, combat the worst forms of child labour, and pay attention to occu-
pational health and safety;
 – labour relations: standards should not be less favourable than those in com-
parable enterprises in the host country; freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, no abuse by threatening transfer, right to information, attention for 
consultation, and access to remedy and examination of grievances.
In 1993, the ILO established a Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises that 
 periodically examines the implementation of the Declaration and expounds its pro-
visions. The Declaration also includes an arrangement for settling disputes.
5.3.2 OECD Guidelines
All OECD member states have adopted the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises, as have a number of non-members (including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, 
Estonia, Israel, Ireland, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia). The guidelines aim to 
provide a balanced and multilaterally supportive code of conduct that reflects the 
shared values of the participating governments. It is about ‘recommendations joint-
ly addressed by governments to multinational enterprises’ offering ‘principles and 
standards of good practice consistent with applicable law’. These guidelines aim to 
enhance the positive contribution to economic, social and environmental progress 
by multinational enterprises.
In essence, they are a series of recommendations in the field of company policy, 
information, human rights, employment and labour relations, environment, fighting 
corruption, bribery and extortion, consumer interests, science and technology, com-
petition and taxes.
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The guidelines are part of a more comprehensive OECD instrument, the Declaration 
on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which was set up to en-
courage direct investments and international economic development and growth.
The recommendations encompass a unique combination of binding and voluntary 
elements. The governments concerned commit themselves to promoting the guide-
lines among multinationals that operate in or from their country. The guidelines also 
imply the commitment to establish a so-called NCP, a National Contact Point, which 
acts as a kind of coordination point in respect of the guidelines. This also comprises 
a unique dispute settlement mechanism that includes arbitration. To date over 360 
cases have been submitted to NCPs.391
The guidelines target both international and national enterprises. SMEs are like-
wise invited to comply with the guidelines (‘to the fullest extent possible’).
In 2011, the Guidelines (drawn up in 1976 and revised in 2000) were updated to align 
with the latest developments in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
chain responsibility, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
 Human Rights. By now, 44 countries have adopted the Guidelines, which are the only 
government-backed framework for international business management that also im-
plies a unique dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, the Guidelines link up closely 
with John Ruggie’s implementation guidelines (see section 5.2), and in chapter IV, 
paragraph 39, they state:
In all cases and irrespective of the country or specific context of enterprises’ opera-
tions, reference should be made at a minimum to the internationally recognised 
human rights expressed in the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the main instruments through which 
it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and to the 
principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 1998 International Labour 
Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
5.3.3 Global Compact
The third initiative aimed at international enterprises is the UN Global Compact. It 
enables enterprises to voluntarily endorse ten principles regarding human rights in 
general, labour standards, environment and anti-corruption. The Global Compact is 
a practical guide derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO 
391  OECD (2016c), p. 12.
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Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and the UN Convention Against Corruption.
The initiative dates from July 2000 and more than 9000 enterprises in 164 coun-
tries have since endorsed the Compact.
There is a direct relation between the UN Global Compact and the UN Guiding 
Principles. The first two principles of the Global Compact regarding human rights 
have been developed in the UN Guiding Principles.392 It states:
As a global standard applicable to all business enterprises, the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples provide further conceptual and operational clarity for the two human rights 
principles championed by the Global Compact. They reinforce the Global Com-
pact and provide an authoritative framework for participants on the policies and 
processes they should implement in order to ensure that they meet their respons-
ibility to respect human rights.
Thus, by subscribing to the Global Compact, enterprises endorse the UN Guiding 
Principles.
In addition to the UN Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines for Multi national 
Enterprises 2011 and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multi-
national Enterprises and Social Policy, which are all considered to be normative 
international frameworks, Eijsbouts views the Global Compact as a managerial inter-
national framework that may help enterprises develop a CSR profile. He also includes 
the ISO 26000 Guidelines on CSR and the GRI Integrated Reporting Initiative in this 
category.393
392 United Nations Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
 Relationship to UN Global Compact Commitments, July 2011, updated June 2014.
393 Eijsbouts (unpublished).
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The Ten Principles
The UN Global Compact’s ten principles in the areas of human rights, labour, the 
environment and anti-corruption enjoy universal consensus and are derived from:
 – The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
 – The International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental  Principles 
and Rights at Work
 – The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
 – The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The UN Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within 
their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour 
standards, the environment and anti-corruption:
Human Rights
 – Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of interna-
tionally proclaimed human rights; and
 – Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labour
 – Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
 – Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
 – Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and
 – Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.
Environment
 – Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environ-
mental challenges;
 – Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental respons-
ibility; and
 – Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies.
Anti-Corruption
 – Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, includ-
ing extortion and bribery.
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Table 5.2  Government and stakeholder involvement in ILO Declaration, OECD Guide-
lines and UN Global Compact394
Global? Government? Treaty derived? Social Partner?
ilo mne 
Declaration
Yes. Yes. The revised Declara-
tion was adopted in 1977, 
and revised in 2000 and 
2006 by the ilo.
Yes. References 
include the Universal 
Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ilo Decla-
ration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights 
of Work, the ilo fun-
damental conventions, 
as well as a number of 
other ilo instruments.
Yes. The ilo is a tri-
partite body, where 
employer and worker 
organisations are formal 
partners.
oecd mne 
Guidelines
Yes. Yes. All 30 oecd member 
countries subscribe to 
the Guidelines. A further 
10 countries have also 
subscribed to them. The 
oecd Guidelines are part 
of a Declaration which 
was adopted at Ministerial 
level and their implemen-
tation by adhering gov-
ernments is governed by 
binding oecd decisions.
Yes. Referenced are: 
The Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights; 
the ilo Declaration of 
Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at 
Work; the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment 
and Development and 
Agenda 21; and the 
Copenhagen Declara-
tion for Social Develop-
ment.
Yes. The business and 
trade union bodies were 
involved in developing 
the Guidelines and 
have formally endorsed 
them as an important 
reference point.
un Global 
Compact
Yes. Yes. Initially an initiative 
of the un Secretary- 
General, the un Global 
Compact has since been 
repeatedly recognised by 
the un General Assembly. 
In the most recent ga 
resolution addressing the 
un Global Compact  
(a/res/62/211), the 
Global Compact Office 
was given a strengthened 
mandate. Every two years 
the Global Compact Office 
prepares the Secretary- 
General’s report to the 
General Assembly on 
global partnerships, which 
also addresses the role of 
the un Global Compact.
Yes. Referenced are: 
The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights; 
The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and 
Development; and the 
un Convention Against 
Corruption.  
The four labour prin-
ciples of the ungc 
come from the ilo 
Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and 
Rights of Work.
Yes. Business, em-
ployee organisation 
and other civil society 
organisations are 
involved in governance 
and advisory roles. 
Overall, the business 
sector represents the 
greatest number of 
participants.
394 OECD (2009), Table 6.2.
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5.3.4 Practical translation
Since the realisation of John Ruggie’s Guiding Principles and their application in 
the OECD Guidelines, much work has been done to translate these guidelines into 
practical terms. The Global Compact Network Netherlands and ten enterprises that 
participate in this Dutch network (AkzoNobel, Essent, Fortis Bank Nederland, KLM, 
Philips, Rabobank, Randstad, Shell, TNT, and Unilever) have collaborated in devel-
oping a guidance tool for companies. This is a practical instruction manual for enter-
prises on how to engage actively in the human rights issue.395
At the initiative of the European Commission, this Network has developed a dedi-
cated guide for the temporary agency sector, to support the implementation of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.396 This guide works out the 
six core elements of the corporate responsibility to respect. It dwells consecutively on 
formulating a policy commitment and implementing it into the corporate culture, 
and on giving shape within the enterprise to the Human Rights Due Diligence, the 
elements of which are:
 – assessing actual and potential human rights impacts;
 – integrating the findings and acting to prevent or mitigate the impacts;
 – tracking how effectively impacts are addressed;
 – communicating how impacts are addressed;
 – remediation: the process through which the company actively engages in the 
remediation of impacts it has caused or contributed to.
395 Business and Human Rights Initiative (2010).
396 Shift & Institute for Human Rights and Business (2013).
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Human Rights Due Diligence: Core Elements and Guidance Points397
3.1 Human Rights Policy ‘Setting the Tone’
1. Involve senior management and seek approval
2. Identify and evaluate existing commitments and policies
3. Consider carrying out a human rights risk mapping
4. Involve internal and external stakeholders in the process
5. Develop statements of policy on human rights
3.2 Assessing Impacts ‘From Reactive to Proactive’
6. Understand impacts on human rights
7. Distinguish various processes of assessing impacts;
8. Conduct a human rights risk mapping
9. Involve the existing risk management function
10. Identify the risks to human rights
11. Prioritize actions to mitigate the risks
12. Feed the assessment results into business operations
3.3 Integration ‘Walking the Talk’
13. Assign responsibility for human rights
14. Organize leadership from the top
15. Include human rights in recruitment and hiring
16. Make human rights an integral part of company culture
17. Train key managers and employees
18. Develop incentives and disincentives
19. Develop capacity to respond to dilemmas and unforeseen circumstances
3.4 Tracking Performance ‘Knowing and Showing’
20. Get started with tracking and reporting performance
21. Develop company-specific key performance indicators
22. Consider different types of indicators
23. Track performance of suppliers and other relationships
24. Verify performance using various instruments
25. Consider how to report on performance
26. Consider updating performance and due diligence
3.5 Grievance Mechanism ‘Early Warning, Effective Solutions’
27. Take full advantage of grievance mechanisms
28. Make a gap analysis of existing grievance mechanisms
29. Bring internal mechanisms in line with the Ruggie principles
30. Consider how to contribute to mechanisms for external stakeholders
31. Integrate grievance mechanism in stakeholder management
32. Improve effectiveness of grievance mechanisms
397 Business and Human Rights Initiative (2010), p. 4.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
202
Multinational employment agencies such as Adecco, Manpower and Randstad398 
participate in the UN Global Compact. They express their human rights policies in 
various communications.
Adecco
Adecco399 endorses the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and issues a dedi-
cated annual report on CSR in which it dwells on the issue and formulates ambitions 
with regard to economic, social and environmental policies. The company has for-
mulated six strategic focus areas related to the inclusive workforce (see figure 5.3), i.e. 
diversity and equal opportunities, integration, business and human rights, team and 
training development, occupational health and safety, and environmental respons-
ibility. Adecco also endorses Ruggie’s Guiding Principles.
The report mentions the fact that most staff have participated in training in the 
fields of compliance and ethics. Moreover a right of complaint has been developed 
and the report dwells on the wide range of issues, the majority of which, incidentally, 
concern employment practices (see figures 5.4 and 5.5).
Figure 5.3 Adecco Group: six strategic focus areas 400
398 Adecco Group (no date, 2015); Randstad (no date, 2016); Manpower Group (2014).
399 Adecco Group (2015).
400 Adecco Group (2015).
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Figure 5.4  Completed online training on Bribery & Corruption prevention (% of all 
employees) 401
Figure 5.5 Adecco Group: ACE Reporting – Allocation of reported issues 2013 (in %) 402
Manpower
Manpower403 likewise issues a CSR report, which also reports on the economic, social 
and environmental policies of the enterprise. Sustainability is the key in those poli-
cies. Manpower formulates a framework of issues that are of increasing importance 
to stakeholders (figure 5.6). The MNE likewise conducted training in the field of their 
Code of Business Conduct (figure 5.7). In 2013, Manpower paid ample attention to 
its performance in relation to the Guiding Principles. The company stated that this 
had enhanced the staff ’s awareness regarding any ethical issues and that the Business 
Ethics Hotline had been improved, also in the sense that it can now be accessed for 
free across the world.
In 2014, Manpower issued another CSR report, stating that 96% of all staff had 
participated in ethics training.
401 Adecco Group (2014).
402 Adecco Group (2014).
403 Manpower Group (2013).
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Figure 5.6 Manpower Group: issues in ascending order of importance to stakeholders 404
Figure 5.7  Manpower Group: 2013 ethics training completion rates (per cent of required 
employees)405
Randstad
Randstad406 does not issue a separate CSR report, but instead integrates the CSR 
elements of its operations in the conventional annual report. This has to do with 
Randstad’s core values in which the aspects of ‘knowing’, ‘serving’, ‘trust’, ‘striving for 
perfection’ and ‘simultaneous promotion of all interests’ set the course (figure 5.8).
404 Manpower Group (2013), p. 8.
405 Manpower Group (2014), p. 12.
406 Randstad (2015).
• Business performance
• Client & candidate success
• Employability
• Ethics & integrity
• Talent development & engagement
• Community investment
• Diversity
• Health, safety & wellness
• Human rights & fair labor
• Environmental management & performance
• Supply chain integrity
• Of concern to select 
   stakeholders
• Managed through standard
   processes and practices
• Of critical strategic interest
   to ManpowerGroup and
   stakeholders
• Actively managed with 
   global goals and local 
   objectives
• Underlying factor in 
   business success
• Managed through standard
   processes and practices
IM
P
O
R
TA
N
C
E 
TO
 S
TA
K
EH
O
LD
ER
S
SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY, RISK OR IMPACT
lo
w
hi
gh
low high
Anti-
corruption/
FCPA
Code of
Conduct
Data Privacy 
& Information
Security
Anti-trust
& Global
Competition
Insider
Trading
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2014
2013
 Chapter 5: Human rights
 205
Randstad has also trained their personnel in the business principles, including Rand-
stad’s policies and its misconduct reporting procedure. Partially as a result of this 
training, awareness is high (table 5.3). Moreover, the annual report dwells extensively 
on the integrity and grievance mechanism.
Figure 5.8 Randstad: core values 407
Table 5.3  Randstad: awareness of misconduct reporting procedure (as % of total number 
of respondents)408
2015 2014
North America 72% 72%
Netherlands 85% 54%
France 56% 88%
Germany 83% 81%
Belgium & Luxembourg 63% 65%
Iberia 66% 65%
United Kingdom 67% 64%
Other European countries 73% 70%
Rest of the world 67% 67%
Corporate 87% 85%
Group 70% 70%
Source: Great People Survey
407 Randstad (2015), p. 10.
408 Randstad (2015).
our core values
to know
We are experts. We know our clients, their companies, 
our candidates and our business. In our business, it is 
often the details that count.
to serve
We succeed through a spirit of excellent service,
exceeding the core requirements of our industry.
to trust
We are respectful. We value our relationships and treat
people well.
striving for perfection
We always seek to improve and innovate. We are here 
to delight our clients and candidates in everything 
we do. This gives us the edge.
simultaneous promotion of all interests
We see the bigger picture, and take our social
responsibility seriously. Our business must always 
benefit society as a whole.
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Table 5.4 Randstad: misconduct reporting409
2015 2014
New complaints 113 136
Of which anonymous  35  52
Concerns referred to other channels/not legitimate  79  91
Proven or partially proven  10  21
Not (yet) proven  20  241
Under investigation   4  –
Total 113 136
1 The complaint reported as ‘Under investigation’ in 2014, appeared to be ‘Not proven’.
It becomes clear that all three multinational employment agencies mentioned above 
are serious about integrating the human rights policy into their operations. They 
appear to have made a start and are making further strides to conform to Ruggie’s 
Guidelines. The rest of the market will need to follow their example.
In their reports, these enterprises go into their corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR). In the following paragraph, this domain will be placed within a broader 
framework.
5.4 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The human rights issue belongs to the domain of what we now call Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). This domain arouses increasing interest. Climate change and 
the credit crunch have given it added impetus. However, the collapse in April 2013 
of the Rana Plaza building near Dhaka in Bangladesh has enhanced the focus on 
CSR among the enterprises involved. Within the Netherlands, earlier cases such as at 
Ahold and more recently at SBM Offshore, Imtech, Ordina and Fugro call for reflec-
tion.410 The actual issue at stake is that enterprises become aware that their behaviour 
can have huge social consequences.
5.4.1 History of corporate social responsibility411
Historically, CSR played a role in the Netherlands in relation to nineteenth-century 
social issues: in 1863, Dutch entrepreneurs addressed their king with the request to 
take action on the social wrongs related to child labour.412 In the twentieth century, 
409 Randstad (2015).
410 Dekker & Van den Outenaar (2014).
411 Bienefelt (2005), p. 8. See also: Kolk (2003), p. 9 ff.
412 Smit (2014), p. 212 ff.
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CSR has been closely linked to the phenomenon of the welfare state, and during the 
last decades to environmental issues. Since then, the credit crunch has added further 
fuel to the phenomenon of CSR.
In the United States, CSR is historically linked to the idea that the rich had to do 
something about poverty, which took the form of philanthropy and which was later 
adopted by enterprises for lack of a social security system.
In Europe, philanthropy is less dominant. Europe does not have institutions 
such as The Rockefeller Foundation or the Ford Foundation, but it has had ‘social 
entrepreneurs’ such as Van Marken, Stork and Le Poole in the Netherlands, who (out 
of enlightened self-interest) took care of housing, education, savings schemes and 
recreation. Meanwhile, however, these entrepreneurs opposed legal social amenities, 
an opposition that, by the way, sprouted the first Dutch employers’ organisation. In 
spite of this, social law did develop in the twentieth century.
CSR has become more comprehensive and deeper in scope. Whereas it started out 
as philanthropy and stewardship by entrepreneurs who had a broader scope than 
profitmaking, various elements have been added through time. Enterprises have an 
economic responsibility (profit objective), a legal responsibility (complying with the 
law and fulfilling obligations) a moral responsibility (doing what society expects) and 
a social responsibility (doing what is desirable).
Thus, apart from making profit, CSR must observe other (legal, ethical and  social) 
interests. It is about simultaneous representation of interests. Profit is no longer an 
objective per se, but is seen as a means to foster continuity.
5.4.2 Elkington: People, Planet, Profit 413
John Elkington’s book Cannibals with Forks (1997) has been of particular importance 
to the development of the CSR framework. In this publication, Elkington introduces 
the concept of the Triple Bottom Line (TBL), i.e. People, Planet and Profit; he takes 
stock of the seven revolutions that 21st-century entrepreneurs will need to take into 
account and of the TBL principle. He argues that, as they gain influence and as lib-
eralisation boosts competition, enterprises can make the difference by underscoring 
sustainability and the TBL criteria.
In Elkington’s view, enterprises must also pay more attention to the so-called soft 
values, which means that quality is more important than quantity. This, too, should 
be communicated to the outside world more, which may also be facilitated by tech-
nological development. Moreover, enterprises should become aware of what the ef-
fect of their products and services can be in a broad sense.
413 Elkington (1997).
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Furthermore, entrepreneurs should create trust together with their stakeholders. 
 Elkington likewise draws attention to both the short and the long term and recom-
mends the use of scenarios. He calls for the integration of the TBL aspects into the 
company policy. By integrating People (the social aspect), Planet (the ecological as-
pect, the environment) and Profit (the economic aspect), entrepreneurs can achieve 
the desired sustainability in their operations.
As regards to the ‘People’ aspect, sustainable entrepreneurship looks at social 
policies. How does the enterprise treat its staff, but also: what is the social signific-
ance of the enterprise? This is pre-eminently where promoting human rights, or the 
‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ comes into play. The ‘Planet’ aspect 
involves everything to do with environment. And of course the ‘Profit’ aspect, the 
economic side of entrepreneurship, cannot be left out.
The Triple Bottom Line has expanded enormously in CSR thinking. The concept has 
also evoked criticisms. For instance, the Dutch Bishop Van Luyn adds to this triad 
the P of the ‘Pneuma’ aspect in order to underscore the importance of the spirit, or 
soul. According to Van Luyn, every enterprise also needs pneuma, inspiration, spirit 
needed to survive.414
5.4.3 Definitions
CSR is a concept on the move:415 there is no unequivocal definition. There is, how-
ever, some agreement about what the concept comprises:
 – CSR is more than philanthropy; it forms an integral part of the core activities of 
an organisation.
 – CSR can be subdivided into social, ecological and economic dimensions. They 
involve the consequences of operational activities for people within and outside 
the organisation, the consequences for the (living) environment and the manu-
facture and the economic effects of products and services respectively.
 – CSR means restricting negative effects and giving room for and enhancing any 
positive effects of the operational activities.
 – Organisations should account for the societal effects of their actions.
 – CSR reaches beyond merely complying with minimal forms of law and regula-
tions. Developing countries and countries in transitions do not always have a 
sufficiently developed legal framework and supervision mechanism, or gaps can 
be observed.
414 Van Luyn (2006).
415 Bienefelt (2005), p. 5 ff.
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 – An international enterprise must comply with international standards. The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which also pay attention to 
 human rights, are an important frame of reference for the behaviour of inter-
national organisations, both SMEs and large enterprises.
On the basis of the many definitions of CSR, Eijsbouts lists the following core char-
acteristics:
 – voluntarism, implying that CSR exclusively covers the domain ‘beyond the law’;
 – internalizing or managing externalities, to account for the total cost of business 
in the market prices for its goods and services;
 – multiple stakeholder orientation to balance fairly all impacts of operation on 
people;
 – alignment of social and economic responsibilities, to balance fairly financial 
and social benefits;
 – practices and values to put the CSR practices in the right value context;
 – beyond philanthropy, to adopt CSR as a core function in business strategy and 
policy rather than as a bolt-on nicety.416
In its report De winst van waarden417 (which translates as The Profit of Values) the 
Dutch Social Economic Council (SER) defines CSR as:
It perceives the company as a profit-driven organisation and as a long-term form 
of cooperation between stakeholders. Companies differ from other organisations 
in their drive for profit. But the social and economic value of companies should 
not be equated with the financial returns to owners/capital providers. Companies 
create value by producing goods and providing services, which contribute to soci-
ety’s prosperity by satisfying people’s needs. The employment that is created in the 
process is an important instrument for earning income and for the social and per-
sonal development of individuals. Consequently, the SER feels that corporate social 
responsibility also encompasses the core business of any company. This is not to 
say that all manifestations of corporate social responsibility should by definition be 
considered part of the core business of the company, but that concern for the social 
effects of the company’s performance is part of it. In other words, the SER’s view is 
that the `social’ activities of a firm are an inseparable element of corporate policy, 
so that the distinction between core business and non-core business is irrelevant.
416 Eijsbouts (2011), p. 10.
417 SER (2000). The English summary can be found on https://www.ser.nl/~/media/files/internet/
talen/engels/2000/2000_11.ashx
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The SER feels there are two key elements that dictate whether one can rightly refer 
to socially responsible business in this day and age:
 – consciously targeting business activities at value creation in three dimensions 
– Profit, People, Planet – and hence at contributing to society’s prosperity in the 
longer term;
 – maintaining with the various stakeholders a relationship that is based on trans-
parency and dialogue and which responds to the legitimate demands of society.
 –
The Dutch knowledge centre duurzaamondernemen.nl argues that in the Nether-
lands, sustainability and corporate social responsibility are often seen as synonymous. 
People take it to mean, the website continues, an entrepreneurial style in which atten-
tion for the environment, the social-ethical aspects and the profits are balanced and 
in line with the expectations of the company stakeholders.418
In his preliminary advice, Eijsbouts419 distinguishes between CSR as a normative 
concept and as an operational concept. As a normative concept CSR is the entre-
preneur’s responsibility to fulfil the justified expectations of society with regard to 
the social consequences of his operations: the economical, social and environmental 
consequences for all stakeholders. CSR as an operational concept, he argues, com-
prises the systematic and structured manner in which the enterprise gives effect to all 
relevant aspects of CSR standards in its day-to-day operational practice, propagates 
them to staff, suppliers and society, guards their effectiveness and accounts for them 
to society.
Furthermore, Eijsbouts notes that the Dutch government distinguishes three 
overlapping dimensions of CSR.420 Firstly, the international dimension that takes 
place at the intersection of international business management and social topics, 
including labour standards, environment and human rights, which may lay down 
conditions for business management. Secondly, the national dimension that mainly 
comprises the creation and use of responsible production and production methods.
Both these dimensions relate to the core business of enterprises. There is then 
a third dimension, in respect of which the Dutch cabinet feels that entrepreneurs 
continue to take further steps, playing an active role in society. The cabinet states 
that an enterprise takes on a visible role in society that goes beyond the core business 
and beyond what legislation obliges it to do, which results in added value to both the 
enterprise and society.
418 Dutch Online Portal for Corporate (Social) Responsibility & Sustainability (‘Kenniscentrum 
Duur zaam Ondernemen’), http://www.duurzaam-ondernemen.nl/english/ 
419 Eijsbouts et al. (2010), p. 28 ff.
420 Eijsbouts et al. (2010), p. 5.
 Chapter 5: Human rights
 211
5.4.4 A comprehensive approach
CSR constitutes a more comprehensive approach to business management. It puts 
paid to the limited vision of business management as Milton Friedman from the 
 famous Chicago School of Economics formulated it in the 1960. He argued:
In a free enterprise private property system, a corporate executive is an employer 
of the owner of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
customs.
Eijsbouts421 demonstrates that the United States has detracted somewhat from this 
strict point of view through the years, to the extent that judges in various states have 
allowed for stakeholders management, although the shareholder primacy principle 
continued to be the dominant creed.
This school of thought was equally popular in the United Kingdom. How ever, 
on the initiative of the British government, a report was issued422 that proposed com-
pelling directors to review the enterprise’s ‘impact on the community and the envi-
ronment’. This led to an ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach that meant that 
directors were also legally obliged to take into account long-term considerations and 
the interests of various shareholders to promote long-term shareholder value, which 
has been included in the Section 172 Companies Act under the title ‘Duty to promote 
the success of the company’. While shareholders were thus granted an opportunity 
to appeal in case of disputes, this did not apply to other stakeholders. After all, ex-
tending the possibility to stakeholders would have unduly eroded the position of the 
shareholders.
According to more recent insights, CSR also yields major economic benefits. On 
closer analysis, Friedman’s mental legacy should not need to be too divergent from 
the CSR train of thought.423
Quite often, accidents or similar occurrences that gain vast publicity are reasons 
for enterprises to occupy themselves with CSR.424 For instance, the collapse of the 
Rana Plaza building near Dhaka in Bangladesh, one of the most serious industrial 
421 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 50.
422 Company Law Review Steering Group (2000).
423 Kolk (2004), p. 117.
424 Kolk (2004), p. 118.
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 accidents in history, was a catalyst for change towards sustainability. CSR has to do 
with ensuring continuity, for which social acceptance, and thus a good reputation, is 
a prerequisite. In essence, it is about what is sometimes called the ‘licence to operate’, 
also known as the social legitimisation of the enterprise.
In Kolk’s view, using CSR as a solution to solve conflicts and crisis situations 
leads to nothing. She advocates a different approach, which she calls sustainable 
management.425
Originally, CSR was thought to be voluntary.426 From various perspectives, it 
has always been seen as something that transcends the law and that should not be 
regulated. It is subject to soft law rather than to hard law. This line of thought recurs 
in relation to the human rights issue, in respect of which the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines can in the first instance be considered 
forms of soft law. In the first instance, for later in this chapter this will be qualified. It 
is worth mentioning that the Earth Charter, an initiative by a number of politicians 
from throughout the world, has also vastly influenced the thinking about CSR.427 This 
also applies to the ICC Guide to Responsible Sourcing, the manual by the International 
Chamber of Commerce on responsibility for so-called supply chain management.428
Since 2008, the national employers’ and employees’ organisations involved in the 
Dutch Social Economic Council (SER) have worked at promoting international CSR, 
or ICSR, and its implementation. ‘Living wages’ was one topic on the agenda for 2014 
and 2015.429
5.4.5 Corporate governance
Where the rules of play with regard to CSR are concerned, the development of cor-
porate governance is equally important, as can be inferred from developments in 
the Netherlands. Initially, Dutch company law was strongly influenced by Friedman’s 
line of thinking. For instance, the recommendations produced by the Dutch Peters 
 Committee in 1997, from which a first code resulted, provided a guideline to the 
shareholder value theory.430
425 Kolk (2004), p. 120.
426 Eijsbouts et al. (2010), p. 25.
427 See Lubbers et al. (2008).
428 SER (2008), p. 53.
429 See www. ser.nl/imvo.
430 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 54.
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In 2004, the Dutch Tabaksblat Committee developed the Corporate Governance 
Code, in which the comply or explain principle gained importance.431 The British 
Cadbury Report432 described Corporate Governance as ‘the system by which compa-
nies are directed and controlled’.433
There are various outlooks on the relationship between CSR and corporate gov-
ernance.434 Firstly, there is the view that both co-exist, which was expressed when 
the Tabaksblat Committee was established. Secondly, there is the view that corporate 
governance is part of CSR:
Corporate governance is an increasingly important issue of CSR. And as they con-
tinue to develop, corporate governance principles will continue to provide the 
more solid foundations on which broader CSR principles – and business ethics – 
can be further enhanced.435
Eijsbouts, who is in favour of a comprehensive approach, defends a third view in 
which CSR is part of corporate governance. Both concepts contribute to value gain 
and comprise elements of risk management. In this view, Eijsbouts is likewise guided 
by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, which have applied since 2004.436
In the Netherlands, this has led to the principle (principle II.1 of the 2001 Corpo-
rate Governance Code) that the management is responsible, among other things, for 
the corporate social dimensions relevant to the enterprise and that it must account 
for them to its supervisory board and the annual general meeting of shareholders.437
Thus, CSR integrates the shareholder interest in the broader stakeholder interest. 
A forthcoming new amendment to the Dutch corporate governance code, which will 
put more focus on long-term and cultural aspects of operational management, will 
underscore this integration even more.438 Through corporate governance, this CSR 
philosophy also provides a greater platform for the importance of protecting human 
rights.
Truth is a multi-faceted jewel that includes a human rights element. The human 
rights issue is characterised by soft law and hard law approaches. This raises the ques-
tion as to how binding the corporate responsibility to respect actually is.
431 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 54.
432 Cadbury (1992), can be downloaded from: www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
433 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 55.
434 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 56.
435 Eijsbouts (unpubl.); Eijsbouts (2010), p. 56.
436 OECD (2004a).
437 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 58.
438 MCCG (2016).
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5.5 HOW BINDING ARE THE HUMAN RIGHTS? 439
In recent years, human rights have gained in importance. John Ruggie’s ‘protect, 
 respect and remedy’ framework and the adjustment of the OECD Guidelines as a 
result of it have given enterprises more clarity and guidance as to how to treat this 
phenomenon. The CSR philosophy and the changes in corporate governance have 
also given rise to an attitude that fits in with the corporate responsibility to respect. 
Still, the question is, how imperative are these aspects?
5.5.1 Voluntariness; soft and hard law
The Dutch way of thinking about CSR is strongly influenced by the voluntary charac-
ter people want to imbue it with.440 The 2008 SER Statement posits that:
… the parties believe that it is primarily up to enterprises themselves to develop 
national and international CSR and the associated supply chain responsibility, in 
dialogue with their social environments. With enterprises operating in such a wide 
range of circumstances, it would be very difficult and, indeed, undesirable to pre-
scribe a precise and uniform set of rules for doing so. Enterprises can be expected 
to display the necessary transparency in this area, however. Transparency enables 
enterprises to win the trust of their stakeholders, build their reputations and com-
mand their employees’ and customers’ loyalty. The social context requires openness 
and transparent communication. That means that the enterprise must respond to 
legitimate questions and demands.441
Subsequently, the Statement refers to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work,442 the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Mul-
tinational Enterprises and Social Policy,443 the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises444 and the ICC’s445 recommendations regarding supply chain respons-
ibility and its Guide to Responsible Sourcing.
All these declarations and recommendations have come up before. They are about 
frameworks that are usually indicated as soft law.446 Even though they  transcend the 
439 Smis et al. (2011), p. 25.
440 Eijsbouts et al. (2010), p. 25.
441 SER (2008), p. 6.
442 ILO (1998).
443 ILO (2006b).
444 OECD (2009).
445 SER (2008)
446 Atleson et al. (2008).
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law, they are certainly not non-committal. They are authoritative guidelines that may 
also refer to hard law, for instance the human rights treaties that have further devel-
oped the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, i.e. the two 1966 UN treaties (ICCPR 
and ICESCR) regarding civil and political, respectively economic, social and cultural 
human rights. This also holds true for the ECHR, the European Convention on  Human 
Rights. Through ratification of these treaties, the instruments become hard law. In the 
Netherlands, they constitute such hard law that they affect the national judicial sys-
tem. Thus, article 93 of the Dutch Constitution provides that: ‘Provisions of treaties 
and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding on all persons 
by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been published.’ Sub-
sequently, article 94 states: ‘Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall 
not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are 
binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institutions’.447
Still, the question arises as to how hard ‘hard law’ is, and how soft ‘soft law’ actu-
ally is. It has been demonstrated before that the formal enforceability of UN conven-
tions is limited, even if these can be characterised as being ‘hard’. Issues often have to 
deal with judgments that may be authoritative and influential,448 but are still difficult 
to enforce legally.
This even holds true for the ECHR, albeit to a far lesser extent. The  European 
Court produces binding judgments, but the Committee of Ministers supervises the 
observance, and although it may exert political pressure to achieve observance, it can-
not impose sanctions. Moreover, so many cases have been introduced to the Court 
that the waiting period may amount to six years. In 2011, 120,000 cases were pending 
at the Court, while it can only give 500 decisions a year. The question is whether all 
this contributes to adequate legal protection. In this way, ‘hard’ law becomes very soft 
in its subsequent implementation.
As an example of soft law on the other hand, the OECD Guidelines demonstrate that a 
judgment by a NCP can hit home hard. Eijsbouts argues that through the NCP mechan-
ism449 a process of ‘naming and shaming’ can arise, which may be characterised as a 
sanction. This applies all the more if obtaining an export subsidy is made conditional 
on compliance with the OECD Guidelines.
Having studied two cases introduced to the UK NCP (Raid versus Das Air – 21 July 
2008 – and Global Witness versus Agrimex – 28 August 2008) Backer  concludes that 
there is a development from a formal non-binding system to a ‘binding governance 
system’.
447 Sybesma-Knol & Van der Heijden (2000), p. 35. See also Schrijver (2014), p. 35.
448 Henrad (2008), p. 227.
449 Smis et al. (2011).
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
216
These cases suggest the parameters within which the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises are beginning to serve as the focal point for the construction of an auto-
nomous transnational governance system that is intended to serve as the touch-
stone for corporate behaviour in multinational economic relationships.450
Eijsbouts also points at the mandatory provision in article 2:291, paragraph 1, of 
the Dutch Civil Code (amended in 2005 on the basis of the EU Modernisation of 
Accounts Directive) compelling enterprises to provide information regarding the 
non-financial performance indicators including environment and staff matters,451 to 
the extent that they are necessary in order to understand the results of the enterprise’s 
position.
Earlier on, the Netherlands had produced the Directive 400452 as a non-binding 
standard for the management report in accordance with the GRI (Global Report-
ing Initiative) and the corresponding Guidance Note on Sustainability Reporting, 
connected to the so-called Guidance Note on Sustainability Reporting. In 2006 the 
Dutch Supreme Court decided that these guidelines could be an important and 
 authoritative line of action for what should be considered acceptable in concrete in-
stances. Directive 400 was amended in 2005 and 2008, in such a way that a reporting 
framework was provided for CSR. Thus, in this case soft law applies that should not 
be considered informal under any circumstances.
Also important in this respect is Directive 2014/95/EU.453 Under this Directive, 
it became mandatory for enterprises with more than 500 staff to also disclose their 
non-financial information as from December 2016. This non-financial statement must 
include ‘information on the due diligence processes implemented by the  undertaking, 
also regarding, where relevant and proportionate, its supply and  subcontracting 
chains, in order to identify, prevent and mitigate existing and potentially adverse 
impacts.’ It may be expected that this form of hard law will enhance CSR thinking.
For that matter, the Directive cannot be seen in isolation from the CSR strategy that the 
EU revised in 2011. In a Communication on this topic, the European  Commission454 
450 Backer (2009).
451 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 63.
452 Dutch Accounting Standard Board (‘Raad voor de jaarverslaggeving’, 2009). See: http://www.
rjnet.nl/Site/English/.
453 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain 
large undertakings and groups.
454 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the  European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, a renewed EU strategy 2011–
2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility. Brussels 25-10-2011 Com (2011) 681 final.
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no longer views CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies integrate social and environ-
mental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis’ but rather as ‘the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society’.
Respect for applicable legislation, and for collective agreements between social 
partners is a prerequisite. In order to meet that responsibility fully, the enterprises 
need to make sure they have a process in place to integrate social, environmental, 
ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations and core 
strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders, with the aim of:
 – creating the maximum added value for their owners/shareholders and for their 
other stakeholders and society in general;
 – identifying, preventing and mitigating any possible adverse impacts.
It will be clear that there is now scarcely any question of freedom from obligation.
5.5.2 Corporate liability law
In his preliminary advice, Eijsbouts dwells extensively on corporate law, which sets 
out mandatory provisions regarding the management board of the enterprise455 (art. 
2:129/235 BW). He refers to principle II.1 of the 2001 Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code, which states:
The management board is liable for managing the company. This includes respons-
ibility for achieving the company’s targets, for its strategic policy and associated 
risk profile, for its financial results and for the relevant corporate social aspects of 
the business.
The greater part of these duties ensues from Dutch national law (art. 2:141, par. 4, 
Dutch Civil Code). Article 2:8 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that the compa-
ny and those who are involved in its organisation pursuant to law and the articles 
of incorporation, including the management board (and its individual members) 
must behave towards each other in accordance with what is required by standards of 
reason ableness and fairness. Article 2:9 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that in the 
accomplishments of its duties the management board must be guided by the interests 
of the company and its affiliated enterprise, with explicit provision in respect of the 
supervisory board in article 2:140/250 of the Dutch Civil Code.
The management board is also responsible for pursuing just policy. In the case 
of well-funded doubts as to what constitutes just policy, an investigation by the 
455 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 66 ff.
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 Enterprise Chamber (‘Ondernemingskamer’) can be requested on the basis of article 
2:345 in conjunction with article 350 of the Dutch Civil Code. Thus, CSR policy can 
also be enforced by means of an investigation. If other stakeholders, such as share-
holders and employees, do not request an investigation, the Advocate-General could 
decide to do so in the public interest.
Article 2:15 of the Dutch Civil Code indicates that stakeholders also have the 
opportunity to correct policy if it has been passed in conflict with the provisions of 
law or the articles of incorporation that regulate the making of resolutions, if it is in 
conflict with the standards of reasonableness and fairness, or if it is in conflict with 
an internal regulation.
Lastly, if the interests of CSR stakeholders are harmed, they can direct a legal 
action on the basis of a tortious act456 (art. 6:162 Dutch Civil Code). Formally, such 
an act is a violation of a right and an act or omission in violation of a duty imposed 
by law or of what according to unwritten law has to be regarded as proper social con-
duct (in so far as there was no justification for this behaviour). Among other things, 
this will result in duties of care, which socially responsible enterprises will have to 
fulfil. In this context, Van Dam457 presents a range of aspects of care that need to be 
observed in this respect, such as the requisite knowledge, the precautions, the role of 
third parties and subsidiaries and the extent to which the lack of care causes damage. 
This can also be related to the tenet of being a good employer and the so-called prin-
ciples of being an adequate employer, which in Dutch labour law take shape through 
being a reasonable and fair employer under article 7:611 of the Dutch Civil Code and 
the general standards of reasonableness and fairness (art. 6.2 and art. 6:248 of the 
Dutch Civil Code).458
It is in this vein that Ruggie advocates setting up programmes to give substance 
to the duty of care in relation to his ‘corporate responsibility to respect’, ‘impact 
assess ment’ and ‘due diligence’. For that matter, Van Dam argues that many liability 
cases are filed on the basis of the American Alien Tort Claims Act. This old (1789) act 
grants a foreigner the right to have an American judge make a decision on ‘any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law of nations’. Many 
of these cases are settled out of court.459
456 Eijsbouts (2010), p. 82.
457 Van Dam (2008), p. 55.
458 Heerma van Voss (1999), p. 40 ff.
459 Van Dam (2008), p. 36.
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5.5.3 Criminal law
Apart from international, corporate and liability law, criminal law also provides op-
portunities to enforce CSR standards. For instance, enterprises can be accessories to 
offences such as murder, manslaughter or abuse. Moreover, they can be complicit in 
international offences such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or tor-
ture. In such cases, international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Court 
in The Hague, can also try suspects. This court cannot try legal persons, but it can try 
individuals such as directors. However, the barrier to prosecution remains high and 
the enterprise runs little risk.
The furnishing of proof of wilful acts and of the facts in general is problematic. 
In this context, however, Kristen speaks of a ‘growing tendency’, although he refers to 
criminal law as an ultimum remedium to tackle injustice, as Dutch Cabinet Minister 
Modderman advocated in 1886.460
The role that jurists play in all this is likewise important to the focus on human 
rights in the corporate sector. In his oration of September 2015, Van Dam referred to 
the various legal orientation stages that are crucial in this respect. He distinguishes an 
inactive stage, a reactive stage, an active stage and a proactive stage, the last of which 
ultimately provides the best guarantee for a fully-fledged human rights policy.461
5.5.4 Developing countries
The discussion above has made clear that soft law may be less soft that it would ap-
pear to be on the surface. However, this discussion was largely based on how the 
legal system works in the Netherlands. How enforceable, then, are human rights in 
developing countries? A case in point is the collapse of the Rana Plaza building near 
Dhaka in Bangladesh in April 2013.462
Following the incident, this country has become the ‘policy laboratory’ for how 
to deal with observance of labour rights. Van der Heijden & Zandvliet (2014) present 
a so-called network approach, by means of which the lacunae relating to observance 
of labour rights can be filled. The characteristic feature of this is the wide range of 
initiatives by various stakeholders to tackle this issue.
Van der Heijden & Zandvliet advocate that enterprises join the example of the 
Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety rather than individually establishing 
their commitment by contract. The ILO must ask itself whether a comprehensive 
instrument on occupational health and safety is in order; and furthermore, the ILO 
460 Kristen (2010), p. 182. See also: Van Dam (2008), p. 26.
461 Van Dam (2015), p.6.
462 Van der Heijden & Zandvliet (2014).
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must consult more directly with enterprises and use its authoritative role to reinforce 
negotiations about supply chain management. The governments must establish an 
international factory inspectorate, which can act more decisively than is now the case 
with the ILO missions. Moreover, foreign policies and trade and development co-
operation should focus more on observance of international labour rights.
Figure 5.9 RMG Industry Mechanisms and Stakeholders 463
5.5.5 Enhancing the binding character?
Equally remarkable in this context is the intense debate that is taking place in the 
UN Human Rights Council on the question as to whether it is not time to introduce 
a binding human rights treaty for the corporate sector. On 30 June 2014 it adopted 
a resolution to establish an intergovernmental working group that was to compile a 
binding draft-human rights treaty aimed at the activities of ‘Transnational Corpora-
tions and other Business Enterprises’. Voting in the Human Rights Council was much 
divided (20 in favour, 14 against and 13 abstentions). Notably, Ecuador had taken the 
initiative, with the support of Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa and Venezuela. At the time 
of the vote, African countries were the main supporters. The US and the EU were 
against and China was provisionally in favour.
463 Adaptation van Van der Heijden & Zandvliet (2014), figure 1.
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John Ruggie has openly rejected the initiative. On the basis of his knowledge and 
experience, he considers the realisation of a new binding agreement to be unfeasible. 
In his view, priority should be given to the further implementation of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights that were established in 2011.464
Nobel Prize winner Stiglitz465 has also called for more powerful human rights 
instruments. He disapproves of enterprises respecting human rights out of sheer 
self-interest. Stiglitz has sounded a warning that this self-interest is liable to change: it 
is also a misconception in the sense that this narrow self-interest does not come close 
to the broad self-interest that Adam Smith once propagated in his book The Wealth 
of Nations. Stiglitz advocates stricter standards, more clarity about what is allowed 
and what is not, and stricter law and regulations in order to make those who do not 
comply accountable for their actions.
5.6 CONVENTION 181 COMPARED
If we compare Convention 181 to the Bill of Rights (the Universal Declaration of 
 Human Rights, the affiliated 1966 UN conventions regarding civil political rights, re-
spectively the economic, social and cultural rights), the OECD Guidelines and the ILO 
Declaration concerning multinationals, it becomes clear that they both overlap and 
complement each other.
They particularly overlap in respect of fundamental labour rights such as 
‘non-discrimination’, ‘freedom of association and collective bargaining’, ‘forced 
 labour’ and ‘child labour’. The overlap makes clear that these are essential labour 
rights. The duplication has a synergetic effect. The various elements regarding worker 
protection in these instruments also overlap, albeit that their descriptions in the Bill 
of Rights are more comprehensive than those in Convention 181.
Articles 11 and 12 of this Convention list employee rights, the protection of which 
the member states need to guarantee, meaning that the member states will also need 
to indicate the responsibilities of the temporary employment agency and the com-
missioning client.
The employee rights relate to the ‘freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing’, ‘minimum wages’, ‘working time and other working conditions’, social security 
benefits’, ‘access to training’, ‘safety and health’, ‘compensation of occupational acci-
dents and diseases’, ‘claims from workers in case of insolvency’, ‘maternity and par-
ental protection and benefits’.
464 Ruggie (2014).
465 Stiglitz (2013).
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The articles 23, 24 and 25 of the UDHR are broader in scope. They provide that every-
body is entitled to work, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection 
against unemployment. Everyone also has the right to ‘equal pay for equal work’ and 
to ‘just and favourable pay that ensures for him and his family an existence worthy of 
dignity’; if necessary, this must be supplemented ‘by other means of social protection’. 
Moreover, everybody is entitled to ‘form and join trade unions’. Furthermore, every-
body is entitled to ‘rest and leisure, to a reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay’.
Article 25 provides that everybody is entitled to a standard of living adequate for 
himself and his family, to ‘security in the event of unemployment, illness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control’.
The articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the ICESCR develop this further.
Article 6 provides that the member states recognise and safeguard the right to 
work, which ‘includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by 
work which he freely chooses or accepts’. This also includes ‘technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady eco-
nomic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment under 
conditions safeguarding fundamental political and economic freedoms to the indi-
vidual’.
Article 7 develops the right to ‘just and favourable conditions’ and entitles every-
body to minimum remuneration providing ‘fair wages and equal remuneration for 
work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guar-
anteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for 
equal work’. It also entitles everyone to a ‘decent living’, ‘safe and healthy conditions’, 
‘equal opportunity by promotion’, ‘rest, leisure’, and ‘reasonable limitation of working 
hours, and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays’.
Article 8 provides that everybody is entitled to form and join trade unions; the 
right to strike is also provided.
Article 9 gives the right to social security.
Article 10 gives the right to paid maternity leave and generally focuses on the 
family as the basic unity of society.
Article 11 recognises the right to an adequate standard of living: adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
Apart from elements aimed at protecting workers, Convention 181 also includes spe-
cific provisions regarding the requirements for the temporary employment agency, 
data protection, no fee to worker, migrants, cooperation between public employment 
services and temporary employment agencies and access to remedy.
 Chapter 5: Human rights
 223
These dimensions also overlap to some extent, albeit not as much as the dimensions 
above. Article 13 of the UDHR gives the right to migrate to another country, and 
 Article 8 of the UDHR gives the right to an effective remedy. The articles 12, 14 and 17 
of the ICCPR give the right to migration, a fair trial and privacy respectively.
The OECD Guidelines particularly fit in with the above-mentioned Bill of Rights 
and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights (IV.39), and therefore, the above 
explanation also applies to the comparison with Convention 181.
The ILO Declaration is far more comprehensive and deals with ‘non-discrim-
ination’ (art. 22, 23), ‘freedom of association and collective bargaining’ (art. 42–57), 
‘child labour’ (art. 36), ‘wages, benefits and conditions of work’ (art. 33, 34), ‘safety 
and health’ (art. 37–40), ‘training’ (art. 25–32), ‘remedy’ (art. 58, 59) and ‘security of 
employment’ (art. 24–28).
Thus, the fundamental labour rights included in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, as well as in the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, are also firmly 
entrenched in Convention 181. The preamble and the articles 4, 5 and 9 pay ample 
attention to these rights. Convention 181 also pays attention to the workers’ rights, 
although this attention is more specific and more restricted in scope than it is in the 
Bill of Rights, the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration.
The specific provisions in Convention 181 regarding requirements for the tem-
porary employment agency, data protection, no fee to worker, migrants, cooperation 
between public employment services and temporary employment agencies and ac-
cess to remedy overlap to a far lesser extent with provisions in the Bill of Rights, the 
OECD Guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration.
Article 14 of Convention 181 contains a specific enforcement provision. It pre-
scribes that the provisions of the Convention ‘shall be applied by means of laws or 
regulations or by any other means consistent with national practice, such as court de-
cisions, arbitration awards or collective agreements’. ‘The labour inspection service or 
other competent public authorities’ are to ensure supervision of the implementation. 
Moreover, other remedies will need to be developed, including penalties that may be 
‘applied in case of violations’.
Does this human rights approach give specific attention to the bottlenecks pointed 
out in chapter 4, such as job insecurity, inequality of remuneration, weaker union 
movement and excessive use of temporary agency work? In regard to job security it 
can be noted that the ILO Declaration pays attention to ‘security of employment’ in 
the articles 24–28. Article 25 provides that:
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Multinational enterprises equally with national enterprises, through active man-
power planning, should endeavour to provide stable employment for their em-
ployees and should observe freely negotiated obligations concerning employment 
stability and social security. In view of the flexibility which multinational enter-
prises may have, they should strive to assume a leading role in promoting security 
of employment, particularly in countries where the discontinuation of operations 
is likely to accentuate long-term unemployment.
Thus, it is a call for making particular efforts to create permanent jobs, while under-
standing the need for flexibility.
In regard of unequal pay, it can be noted that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal 
work’ is included in the Bill of Rights and that the ILO Declaration refers to ‘wages, 
benefits and conditions of work’ that ‘should not be less favourable to the workers 
than those offered by comparable employers’. But as noted before, it is not clear to 
whom such a worker is to be compared, with someone else working at the temporary 
employment agency, or with someone working directly for the employer (see para-
graph 3.4.1).
As far as the weakness of the trade union movement is concerned, all these human 
rights arrangements refer to the fundamental right to ‘freedom of association and 
collective bargaining’. Article 12 of Convention 181 was referred to above, which com-
pels member states to expound responsibilities regarding this right.
There are no explicit references to excessive use of temporary agency work; 
through Ruggie’s Guidelines, however the OECD Guidelines now draw attention to 
efforts:
… to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact where they have not contributed to 
that impact, when the impact is nevertheless directly linked to their operations, 
 products or services by a business relationship. This is not intended to shift respons-
ibility from the entity causing an adverse impact to the enterprise with which it has 
a business relationship.466
The requirement of paying close attention to what might (possibly) go wrong in the 
supply chain fits in with the idea of ‘responsible sourcing’, as advocated in the ICC 
Guide to Responsible Sourcing. CSR thinking has resulted in the obligation for com-
mission clients to investigate whether temporary employment agencies give sufficient 
substance to the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’.
466   OECD (2009), no.12
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What is equally significant in this context is that, in its report to the 2016 ILC on 
‘Decent work in global supply chains’, the ILO establishes that there is a relationship 
between the supply chain and non-standard forms of employment, which also in-
clude temporary agency work. The ILO points at the need for both quantitative and 
qualitative functional flexibility and pay flexibility, to help the organisation deal with 
seasonal demand or with fluctuations in production cycles. The report states that, 
particularly at the lower end of the supply chain, abuses may occur through the use 
of ‘unethical labour contractors with links to human traffickers, providing one of the 
channels for “modern-day slavery” in the global economy’.467
All in all, it is evident that Convention 181 observes the many human and labour 
rights that can also be found in the human rights treaties. In these agreements they 
are broader in scope. Still, a ratified agreement such as Convention 181 will entail 
more, and more specific, obligations relating to temporary agency work, for instance 
in respect of the regulation concerning the temporary employment agency’s status 
and to the ‘no fee to worker’ principle.
The ‘human right-ification’ of the labour relationships also touches on Conven-
tion 181 and the question must be raised as to whether this development has consid-
erably weakened the impact of Convention 181. One might wonder what further use 
Convention 181 has, if enterprises need to observe the human rights treaties more and 
more closely. The answer is that Convention 181 is more specific, brings obligations 
upon ratification and also observes fundamental labour rights; thus, it has retained 
its value next to the human rights treaties. While there is a considerable overlap, the 
more individual instruments set course for a certain direction, the more effective 
they will be.
Thus, it can be established that, from a human rights perspective, Convention 
181 has value and that it is substantively adequate.
467 ILC (2016), p. 22–23.
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5.6.1 Addenda
Table 5.5  C181 and Bill of Rights, OECD Guidelines, Tripartite ILO Declaration MNE and 
Social Policy
C 181 UDHR ICCPR ICESCR OECD 
 guidelines
ILO-Decl. 
MNE
I Core-issues
a. non-discrimination art. 5 art. 1,2,7 art. 26 art. 3 iv.39,  
V.1e
art. 21, 
22, 23
b. freedom of association 
and collective bargain-
ing
art. 4, 
11a,b, 12a
art. 20,
art. 23, lid 4
art. 21, 22 art. 8 iv.39, 
V.1a,b, 
2a,b, 
3,6,7,8
art. 42 
t/m 57
c. forced labour Pre ambule art. 4 art. 8 iv.39, 
V.1d
d. child labour art. 9 art. 24 iv.39, 
V.1c
art. 36
II Worker Protection issues
a. right to work art. 23 art. 10 art. 6 iv.39
b. free choice of employ-
ment
art. 23 art. 6 iv.39
c. working time (rest and 
leasure, limitation 
hours, and periodic 
holidays)
art. 11d, 
12c
art. 24 art. 7 iv.39
d. conditions of work (just 
and favourable con-
ditions)
art. 11d, 
12c
art. 23, lid 1 art. 7 iv.39
e. (minimum-(wages) and 
(equal) pay (for equal 
work) (favourable remu-
neration)
art. 11c, 
12b
art. 23, lid 2 art. 7 iv.39 
V.4a,b
art. 33, 34
f. adequate standard of 
living
art. 3, lid 3, 
art. 25
art. 11 iv.39
g. social security/protec-
tion (occ. accidents, 
diseases, maternity, 
parental protection, 
benefits, protection 
against unemployment 
sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age)
art. 11e, 
12d
art. 22, 
art. 23,  lid 3, 
art. 25, 
leden 1,2
art. 9 iv.39
h. health and safety art. 11g, 
12f
art. 7, 
12
iv.39, 
V.4c
art. 37 
t/m 40
i. training art. 11f, 
12e
art. 26, lid 1 V.5 art. 29 
t/m 32
j. insolvency art. 11i, 
12h
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C 181 UDHR ICCPR ICESCR OECD 
 guidelines
ILO-Decl. 
MNE
III Specific issues 181
a. legal status art. 3 leden 
1,2
b. privacy and protection 
personal information
art. 6 art. 17 iv.39
c. no fee to worker art. 7
d. migrant workers art. 8 art. 13, lid 2 art. 12 iv.39
e. cooperation public/
private agencies
art. 13, lid 1
f. access to remedy art. 14, lid 3 art. 8 art. 14 iv.39 art. 58. 59
IV Other specific issues
a. stability of work art. 24 
t/m 28
b. unequal pay
c. weakened position 
trade union
d. excessive use of agency 
work
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Chapter 6
Global Social Dialogue: 
IFAs as a new trend?
Following an analysis of the ‘human right-ification’ of labour relationships and its 
effects on temporary agency work under Convention 181, the search for the value and 
adequacy of Convention 181 is continued by means of a study of the meaning of the 
IFA instrument for the formation of social law in general and for temporary agency 
legislation in particular.
Globalisation has prompted the global unions to make more and more arrange-
ments with international enterprises regarding the labour standards that need to be 
observed.
In these arrangements, the IFA (International Framework Agreement) is placed 
in the framework of the sources of labour law, the nature of labour law and social 
dialogue. In this chapter, a review is given of the origins of the international trade 
movement, the reason why the global unions conclude IFAs, what IFAs actually are, 
the reasons why international social partners conclude IFAs and in what number, and 
the potential binding power they have.
IFAs will particularly be viewed in relation to temporary agency work. An  answer 
will be provided to the question as to how IFAs relate to ILO convention 181 and 
whether they can be seen as substitutes for and/or supplements to the convention.
6.1 SOURCES OF LABOUR LAW
6.1.1 Sources
Modern labour law has various sources. Bronstein468 distinguishes five, i.e. the con-
stitution, the law in a formal sense (statutory regulations), employment contract law, 
international law and case law.
468 Bronstein (2009), p. 4. See also Heerma van Voss & Barentsen (2015), p. 4.
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Bronstein argues that in 1917, Mexico was the first country to bring into its constitu-
tion both political and social rights. Besides political and individual rights, such as 
the right to own property and the right to transact business, the Mexican constitution 
includes social rights such as the freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
the right to strike, the right to equal remuneration and equality of treatment for men 
and women, the right to non-discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, social 
origin, religion and political opinion, together with bans on child labour and forced 
labour.
Many constitutions entrenched these rights. Some also included provisions re-
garding fair dismissal and reasonable working hours. However, this does not apply to 
all constitutions and it should be noted that countries such as the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand and Israel do not have a constitution at all.
The second source is the law in a formal sense, on the basis of which various other 
regulations can be passed. This is the most common form of labour law. There are 
exceptions, for instance in Belgium and Denmark where labour law flows from em-
ployment contract law, and in Australia and New Zealand where arbitration awards 
define the social playing field. In the United States, 15% of the labour force comes 
under employment contract law and 85% under statutory regulations.
The third source is employment contract law (collective agreement). In essence, these 
agreements have a civil law character, however they deviate from civil agreements, 
both in terms of form and effect. In certain judicial systems, the national government 
can make them legally binding, as a result of which the provisions also apply to the 
so-called ‘outsiders’.
Collective agreements can be concluded per enterprise, branch and business sector, 
per region or nationally, depending on the system of labour relationships that has 
developed in a particular country.
The fourth source is international law, such as the ILO conventions and European 
law that applies to the 28 member states. ILO conventions are legally binding for 
countries that have ratified them. Whether a convention has direct effect depends 
on the judicial system of the country in question. In so-called one-tier systems (for 
instance, France, Spain and most Latin America countries), ratified ILO conventions 
have direct effect in the case of individual disputes, but in so-called two-tier systems 
(such as Australia, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and the 
United States), they need to be transposed into national law. European law creates 
obligations for the member states as soon as it is accepted at European level; it does 
not require ratification.
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The fifth source of labour law has to do with case law that has been created by national 
and international judges. This can have vast influence. In Japan for instance, dis-
missals were initially decided by case law, and have been codified by now. In Germany, 
Spain and the Netherlands, essential parts of labour law, such as the right to strike, 
likewise depend on case law. For the Netherlands, the ESC will also take precedence.
Furthermore, there are countries where labour law is dependent on so-called arbitra-
tion awards (binding decisions made by an arbitration board). These have so far  taken 
place in Australia and New Zealand.
6.1.2 Heteronomous and autonomous
Besides the variety as to sources, there is also variety as to the nature of labour law. 
Labour law can have both a public and a private basis. Historically, labour law be-
longs in the public domain, but through the years, the private component has become 
increasingly stronger.
In labour-related affairs, the question invariably rises as to whether the statutory 
approach should be preferred, as against the private law approach. As early as the 
1960s, Van Esveld469 argued that an all-embracing government that aims to serve 
the public interest or the special interest of a particular group from the perspective 
of social justice also has its drawbacks. He finds that making adequate directions is 
no sinecure. Apart from that, the government needs machinery that tends to expand 
more quickly than expected, and in turn, this results in dirigisme and alienation, due 
to stakeholders no longer feeling involved.
That is why in the 1930s, Molenaar470 preferred what he called autonomous law, 
‘law sprung entirely from society itself ’. He preferred it to heteronomous law, ‘labour 
law that has essentially been provided by government’. He argues:471
Practical differences aside, it must be acknowledged that the ethical value of auto-
nomous law towers above that of governmental law […] external law is eminently 
suitable for banishing abuses when private initiative fails. In imposing an ethical 
minimum, the legislator then performs an outstanding job, for it may be assumed 
that the social organisation was not healthy. However, if the legislator goes on to 
prosecute autonomous law with the scourge of uniformity and the lasso of coercion 
wherever it crops up, then current labour law will eventually only be able to derive 
value from the coercive power of a penalty clause. In our view, this would be lam-
entable, for as soon as the structuring of the various communities with our society 
469 Van Esveld (1968).
470 Molenaar (1953), p. 375.
471 Molenaar (1953), p. 377.
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no longer flows from the feeling among those concerned that this is unequivocally 
how it should be, the reasonable basis threatens to be lost as a result of our many 
actions. It would mean that we will only look at the law to tell us what is allowed 
and what is not. Our behaviour will have lost reasonable value.
Furthermore, Molenaar argues:472
The idea that Dr Kuyper473 defended with such talent, taking inspiration from 
his political example Groen van Prinsterer, and which he characterised as ‘sover-
eignty within one’s own circle’, has increasingly gained ground. This idea was also 
expressed by the 1931 Quadragesimo Anno encyclical, in which the Pope expounds 
to the faithful the meaning of the principle of subsidiarity, which requires that the 
State does not take on regulations that can be brought about equally well (or better) 
by smaller circles and groups of stakeholders.
This idea really fits in with the liberal principle of self-efficacy; the ‘independent 
power’ which Thorbecke has stressed unremittingly.
At the time, Molenaar’s opinions met with criticism. People still remembered the 
Dutch government’s efforts to combat social misery. And possibly, the contradistinc-
tion was a trifle absolute. Van Esveld argues that jurisprudence takes place along 
heteronomous and autonomous poles. While it is commendable to distinguish them, 
they still are the traits of one character.474
Interestingly by the way, is that by the turn of the century Van der Heijden475 
called for a new legal order for labour, in which private law must play a larger role 
than public law.
6.1.3 ‘Hard’ and ‘soft law’
Another distinction that can be made is the one between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. In 
chapter 4, it became clear that much legislation in the field of human rights was ‘soft 
law’. With regard to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal476 make 
three distinctions. They argue that ‘hard law’ implies a legal obligation, while ‘soft 
law’ implies a weaker obligation or no obligation. Furthermore, there is a difference 
as to accuracy. ‘Hard law’ is more accurate, while ‘soft law’ tends to use more vague, 
472 Molenaar (1953), p. 396.
473 Abraham Kuyper was a Dutch journalist and a politician [ed.].
474 Van Esveld (1968), p. 306
475 Van der Heijden (1999a), p. 19.
476 Abbott & Snidal (z.j.). See also Shaffer & Pollack (2010), p. 714.
 Chapter 6: Global Social Dialogue: IFAs as a new trend?
 233
general and abstract wording. Thirdly, there is a difference as to effectiveness. ‘Hard 
law’ often outsources the interpretation and enforcement to an independent third 
party (such as a court of law), while ‘soft law’ keeps interpretation and enforcement 
within its own circle, thus creating more political room for manoeuvre.
With respect to hard and soft law, the American literature477 distinguishes three 
trends, i.e. the ‘legal positivists’, the ‘rationalists’ and the ‘constructivists’. All three 
movements see hard and soft law as alternatives that may complement each other, but 
their basic assumptions diverge. The ‘legal positivists’ consider hard and soft law to 
be opposites. Hard law is about formal legal obligations, while soft law does not im-
ply formal obligations. On the other hand, ‘rationalists’ argue that hard and soft law 
both make contributions, to which governments may appeal in various situations. 
‘Constructivists’ do not state a preference, but they do see that soft law has advant-
ages in the creation of new standards; they consider it to be a potential model for the 
transition to hard law.
Table 6.1 Theories of hard and soft law and their interaction478
Strengths and weaknesses of hard 
and soft law as alternatives
Interaction of hard and soft law as 
complements
Legal positivism Hard law preferable; soft law either 
problematic or used as stepping 
stone to hard law
Soft law, at most, can contribute to 
development or elaboration of hard 
law.
Rational choice 
institutionalism
Hard and soft law have different 
strenghts and weaknesses; choice 
governed by fators such as certainty 
of state interest, transaction costs of 
bargaining, indication of credibility 
of state commitment, and desire for 
flexibility.
Abbott and Snidal’s three pathways:
(i) binding framework agreement 
leads to greater substantive 
development over time;
(ii) Plurilateral agreement, member-
ship grows over time;
(iii) Nonbinding tools evolve into 
hard law.
Constructivism Neither hard nor soft law inherently 
preferable, but soft law can be par-
ticularly helpful in elaborating new 
and transformative norms.
Soft law can contribute to socializa-
tion and normative convergence, 
paving the way for hard law.
The benefits of hard law that Shaffer and Pollack479 mention are its credibility, the 
more direct effect (‘self-executing’), more handholds for interpreting and elaborating, 
better enforcement, partly as a result of dispute settlement by courts of law.  Benefits 
477 Shaffer & Pollack (2010), p. 707.
478 After Shaffer & Pollack (2010), p. 723.
479 Shaffer & Pollack (2010), p. 717.
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of soft law480 relate to its usability and lower initial costs, implementation costs, its 
enhanced flexibility and learning potential, its enhanced scope for ambition and di-
versity, and its availability to parties outside government.
6.1.4 Source matrix
In conclusion, labour-related jurisprudence takes place along heteronomous and 
auto nomous poles. They can be contrasted, but not absolutely. They are the flip sides 
of a coin. This applies in equal measure to the contrast between soft and hard law. 
These contrasts, both that of heteronomous versus autonomous and that of soft ver-
sus hard, have individual, national and international dimensions.
Table 6.2 Source matrix
Hard Soft
National Supranational National Supranational
Heteronomous • Legislation • Conventions
• Directives (eu)
• Regulations (eu)
• Declarations
• Guidelines
• Recommendations
Autonomous •  Collective 
agreements
•  Codes of 
conduct
• Codes of conduct
• ifas
6.1.5 Social dialogue
The ILO also uses the concept of social dialogue, stating:481
Where the interest of different segments of society do not coincide, it is generally 
accepted that people affected by decisions should be able to express their needs, 
participate in decision-making processes and influence the final decisions so that 
a proper balance of interests is struck by governments and other decision-makers. 
This basic principle applies both to the broad political institutions of democracy 
and to the world of work.
It goes on to state:
480 Shaffer & Pollack (2010), p. 719.
481 ILC (2013), p. 5
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Social dialogue is the term that describes the involvement of workers, employers 
and governments in decision-making on employment and workplace issues. It in-
cludes all types of negotiation, consultation and exchange of information among 
representatives of these groups on common interests in economic, labour and so-
cial policy. Social dialogue is both a means to achieve social and economic progress 
and an objective in itself, as it gives people a voice and stake in their societies and 
workplaces.
Social dialogue can be bipartite, between employees and employers (as social part-
ners) or tripartite, if the government is also involved. Bipartite social dialogue takes 
place in collective bargaining or other types of negotiations, cooperation and dispute 
settlement. Tripartite dialogue takes place when employees, employers and govern-
ment jointly discuss government policies, legislation and other matters that concern 
employees and employers alike. Collective bargaining plays a role in many countries. 
It takes place at various levels, i.e. at national (intersectoral), sectoral and at company 
level.482
Table 6.3 Collective bargaining on wages
Intersectoral level Sectoral level Firm level
Australia – xxx x
Austria – xxx x
Belgium xxx x x
Brazil – xxx x
Bulgaria – xxx x
Canada – – xxx
Chile – – xxx
China – x xxx
Cyprus – xxx x
Czech Republic – xxx x
Denmark xx xx x
Estonia – – xxx
Finland xx xx x
France x x xxx
Germany – xxx x
Greece x xxx x
Hungary – xxx x
India – xx xxx
Indonesia – – xxx
Ireland xxx x x
Israel – xxx x
Italy – xxx x
482 ILC (2013), p. 21
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Intersectoral level Sectoral level Firm level
Japan – – xxx
Republic of Korea – x xxx
Latvia – – xxx
Lithuania – – xxx
Luxembourg – xx xx
Malaysia – – xxx
Malta – – xxx
Mexico xx xx xxx
Netherlands – xxx x
New Zealand – – xxx
Norway xx xx x
Philippines – – xxx
Poland – – xxx
Portugal – xxx x
Romania – xxx x
Russian Federation x xx x
Singapore – – xxx
Slovakia – – xxx
Slovenia x xxx –
South Africa – xxx x
Spain – xxx x
Sweden – xxx x
Switzerland – xxx x
Turkey – – xxx
United Kingdom – x xxx
United States – – xxx
X = existing level of wage bargaining; XX = important, but not dominant level of wage bargaining; XXX = dominant 
level of wage bargaining.  Source: Cazes et al. (2012).
Collective bargaining relates to fewer than 20% of the workers in paid employment 
in approximately 60% of the ILO member states. Over the last decade, the proportion 
of collective bargaining has remained stable in some European countries (Austria, 
Belgium and France), while increasing in some Latin American countries (Argentina 
and Uruguay). Moreover, it is increasing in some Asian countries (Cambodia, China 
and Indonesia). Elsewhere, however, decreases have occurred as the result of deregu-
lation measures, decentralisation of bargaining structures and decreasing support for 
this type of social dialogue.483
During the last two to three decades, a new type of social dialogue has  arisen, 
which has a transnational character and takes place between global unions and multi-
national enterprises.484 The ILO sees this as another form of social governance, which 
483 ILC (2013), p. 22.
484 ILC (2013), p. 55. See also Stevis (2010).
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might remedy possible shortcomings in the supply chain.485 It is important to analyse 
this development further, partly in relation to international regulations concerning 
temporary agency work.
6.2 GLOBAL UNIONS
6.2.1 Global business
Across the world, it is estimated that more than 100,000 multinational enterprises 
are operating that own approximately 900,000 subsidiaries.486 These enterprises are 
the driving forces in the flows of foreign investments that have been effected in de-
veloping countries. They determine the changing picture of production and labour, 
and their effect can be felt in every aspect of worldwide trade, industry and services.
In 2004, the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization re-
ported that lack of worldwide regulation was cause for growing concern that ‘compe-
tition between countries is inducing them to reduce regulations, taxes, environmental 
protection and labour standards in a “race to the bottom” ’.487
According to Croucher and Cotton,488 the current wave of globalisation is char-
acterised by the financial institutions that discourage the developing countries’ pro-
tectionism. They argue that the financial aspects of globalisation have vast impact, 
not just for national law and regulations, but also for the enterprises and for the way 
they are using labour. The opening-up of economies to trade clearly also has negative 
consequences for the trade union movement. Furthermore, they point out that glo-
balisation encompasses more than the increase of the flow of capital and goods be-
tween countries. It has a vast political dimension, in the sense that it has been caused 
by the liberal economic theories stating that enhancing liberalisation promotes pros-
perity and boosts development.
Since the end of the 1970s, enterprises have been looking for new production 
locations, where they can cut costs and market their products. The financial institu-
tions created scope for this by concluding bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. 
Many countries switched to a ‘free market system’ and the effects for both employ-
ment and the trade unions were considerable.
Croucher and Cotton argue that the current globalisation trend is also charac-
terised by a dramatic increase in the global labour supply. Enterprises can now deploy 
large numbers of cheap workers, particularly in the former Soviet Union, China and 
485 ILC (2016), p. 52 ff.
486 De Felice (2015), p. 518.
487 ILC (2013), p. 55
488 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 13
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India. This is not only due to the decline of communism, but also to the opening-up 
of national economies to the global capital market and the increased participation of 
women in wagepaid work.
Furthermore, there is a mobile brigade of 86 million migrant workers who by 
and large have few labour rights. According to Croucher and Cotton, a global pro-
tection system that compensates for the weakening of the national systems and the 
power shift to employers has failed to arise. Although there are OECD Guidelines and 
ILO core conventions, they are ‘weak and largely tokenistic’.489
From the 1970s onwards, the economic activities of the multinational enterprises 
have expanded enormously. In the early 1990s, their economic size was estimated to 
be a third of global GNP.490
Multinational enterprises employ more people than they actually have on their 
own payroll. The capital markets force them to cut costs and resort to cheaper forms 
of labour, even ‘informal’ labour.491 The pressure is further increased by private  equity 
demanding better returns.
The term ‘externalisation’ is used to indicate that outside of companies’ oper-
ations, the use of external labour is increasing. Central management is asking local 
management to outsource labour to an increasing extent. Croucher and Cotton view 
the expanding role of temporary agency work as the visible tip of the iceberg, which 
comprises a wide range of labour suppliers.492
Globalisation has major consequences for the trade union movement. Old cer-
tainties and the support for the union movement that was at one time a matter of 
course are falling. Due to neoliberal theories, the trade unions have also lost political 
influence. Multinational enterprises have a greater influence on governments, while 
the increase of informal labour hampers union membership, and the unions’ eco-
nomic power is waning. The union movement’s opportunities to solve problems at 
national level are diminishing, which is why there is a move towards the international 
level.493
The multinational enterprises take various initiatives to comply with labour 
standards, both on the part of their various subsidiaries and by their suppliers:494
489 Hyman (2002).
490 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 17.
491 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 18.
492 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 19.
493 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 22.
494 ILC (2013), p. 56.
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Voluntary initiatives involving MNEs
Initiatives generally fall within the following broad categories:
(a) management-driven corporate codes of conduct and statements on business 
ethics;
(b) industry-driven standardization, such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition or the Global Social Compliance Programme;
(c) multi-stakeholder initiatives that may involve companies, trade unions, NGOs 
and other CSOs such as the UN Global Compact and the Ethical Trading Initia-
tive;
(d) commercial standards, such as the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) standard on social responsibility (ISO 26000);
(e) public-private initiatives such as the Better Work Programme; and
(f) negotiated labour-management agreements with cross-border coverage, known 
as TCAs, including IFAs and European framework agreements (EFAs), and 
sometimes regional company-based framework agreements.
6.2.2 Global trade unions
The international trade union movement consists of Global Union Federations 
(GUFs) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).495
This international movement originated in 1864, when the International Work-
men’s Association/IWMA was established. The International Transport Workers Fed-
eration, established in 1897, is one of the oldest GUFs.
The International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) can be seen as precursors to the 
GUFs. In 2006 the ITUC was formed, a merger between WCL, World Conference of 
Labour (formerly IFCTU, International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, estab-
lished in 1920) and the ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, es-
tablished in 1949, as counterpart to the WFTU, the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
which was established in 1945.
GUFs are organised per industry sector and have affiliated national sectoral un-
ions in more than 120 countries. GUFs account for 80% of all international union ef-
forts. The sectors range from education, representing teachers, to transport, in which 
the ITF takes an active part.
495 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 6.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
240
Table 6.4 The origins of the international trade union movement
1864 International Workmen’s Association (iwma) is established
1871 iwma is dissolved
1889 First International Trade Secretariats of cobblers, printers, hat makers and tobacco 
workers start
1897 International Transport Workers Federation is established 
1901 International Secretariat of National Trade Union Centers (isntuc) is established in 
1913. It is called the International Federation of Trade Unions (iftu)
1919–1921 29 International Trade Secretariats are established; many are merged
1919 International Federation of Trade Unions (iftu is re-established
1920 International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (ifctu) is established (later 
called World Conference of Labour)
1920 Red International of Labour Unions (rilu) is established
1937 rilu is dissolved
1945 World Federation of Trade Unions (wftu) is established
1949 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (icftu) is established
1973 European Trade Union Confederation (etuc) is established
2006 wcl is dissolved, merges with icftu, forming International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ituc)
Source: Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 25
The GUFs have a wide variety of set-ups. There are three categories. The first is char-
acterised by memberships in the private sector and by an industrial and bargaining 
focus (BWI, ICEM, IMF, IUF and UNI). The second category (IFJ and ITGLWF) also 
have private sector members, but focus less on bargaining and have a weak member-
ship base. The third category represents public sector workers (EI and PSI). In 2012, 
IMF, ICEM and ITGLWF merged into IndustriAll. The GUFs see it as their duty to 
defend their margin of negotiation for members, to create more scope for them and 
to develop training activities. The GUFs are flanked by the ITUC that represents the 
national union umbrella organisations. Together, GUFs and ITUC form the ‘Interna-
tionals’. GUFs denote the global sectoral unions without the ITUC.
Figure 6.1 National and international levels of trade unionism
Source: Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 6
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Table 6.5 List of global unions, 2008
Global 
union
Main sectors 
covered
Estima-
ted total 
membership 
(millions)
Total 
number of 
affiliates
Number of 
countries 
covered
Estimated 
number of 
developing 
country 
affilliates
Estimated 
percentage 
of developing 
country 
 affilliates
ituc Umbrella body 168 311 155 190 61
ei Education 30 394 171 189 48
Industrial:
• imf
• icem
• itglwf
Metalworking
Chemicals, 
energy,  mining, 
paper
Textiles, 
 garments, 
leather goods
25
20
9
200
379
238
100
117
122
unknown
182
163
unknown
48
68
psi Public services 20 650 160 323 50
uni Telecoms, 
graphics, 
media, retail, 
services
15.5 900 140 unknown unknown
bwi Construction 
and materials
12 318 130 unknown unknown
itf Transport 4.5 654 148 63 10
iuf Food, agricul-
ture, catering, 
tourism
2.6 375 127 206 55
ifj Journalism 0.6 117 100 43 37
Source: Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 7
How important are the trade unions nowadays? This is deduced from their member-
ship. OECD figures show that the overall trade union density in the OECD countries 
has decreased from 18.1% in 2006 to 16.9% in 2013. In 28 out of the 34 countries con-
cerned there was a decrease, while in the remaining 6 countries (Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, France, Italy and Spain) trade union density increased.
Table 6.6 Trade union density
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Australia 18.6 19.3 18.4 18.5 18.2 17.0
Austria 29.1 28.7 28.4 27.9 27.4 27.4
Belgium 54.4 54.9 53.8 55.1 55.0 –
Canada 27.1 27.3 27.4 27.1 27.5 27.2
Chile 15.0 15.8 15.0 14.9 15.3 –
Czech Republic 17.7 17.0 15.5 13.9 13.4 –
Denmark 66.3 67.7 67.0 66.4 67.2 66.8
Estonia  7.1  7.7  7.6  6.8  6.4 –
Finland 69.6 69.9 69.1 68.4 68.6 –
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France  7,6  7,7  7,7  7,7  7,7 –
Germany 19,1 18,9 18,6 18,0 17,9 17,7
Greece 24,0 23,2 22,5 22,6 21,3 –
Hungary 14,4 12,8 12,5 11,4 10,6 –
Iceland 79,3 83,7 84,4 84,0 82,6 –
Ireland 31,9 33,1 32,7 32,6 31,2 29,6
Israel – – – – – –
Italy 33,4 34,7 35,5 35,7 36,3 36,9
Japan 18,2 18,5 18,4 19,0 18,0 17,8
Korea 10,3 10,0  9,7  9,9 – –
Luxembourg 36,5 36,0 35,1 33,9 32,8 –
Mexico 15,7 15,3 14,4 14,5 13,6 13,6
Netherlands 18,8 19,1 18,6 18,2 17,7 17,6
New Zealand 20,6 21,4 20,8 20,8 20,5 19,4
Norway 52,6 53,6 53,7 53,5 53,3 53,5
Poland 15,1 15,1 14,6 13,5 12,5 –
Portugal 20,5 20,1 19,3 19,5 20,5 –
Slovak Republic 17,2 17,0 16,9 17,0 16,8 –
Slovenia 28,1 – 25,0 23,1 – –
Spain 17,4 17,8 17,6 17,2 17,5 –
Sweden 68,3 68,4 68,2 67,5 67,5 67,7
Switzerland 17,5 17,3 17,1 16,7 16,2 –
Turkey  5,8  5,9  5,9  5,4  4,5 –
United Kingdom 27,1 27,1 26,4 25,6 25,8 25,4
United States 11,9 11,8 11,4 11,3 11,1 10,8
oecd countries 17,9 18,0 17,6 17,5 17,1 16,9
Source: http://stats.oecd.org
However, the importance of the trade union movement is not deduced from mem-
bership numbers alone, but also from the unions’ collective bargaining cover rates. 
According to the ILO, these are close to 20% at a global level, but can be much higher 
in developed countries such as France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Finland and Den-
mark, where it exceeds 90%.
Furthermore, the trade union movement’s position is influenced by the way it is 
entrenched in the national system of labour relationships. In Belgium, for instance, 
the trade union movement plays a prominent role in the implementation of social 
security, which boosts union membership. The scope of the collective agreement is 
partly determined by the system of extension of collective labour agreements that 
exists, for example, in the Netherlands.
Interestingly, in spite of the fall in membership, the collective bargaining instru-
ment continues to be popular. For instance, a recent poll among Dutch salaried em-
ployees showed that 79% sets great to considerable store by collective agreements.496
496 Opinion panel dated 26 February 2015, See: http://www.eenvandaag.nl/uploads/doc/Rap-
port%20vakbonden_1.pdf, p. 7.
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Figure 6.2  Trade union density and collective bargaining covering rates. Selected coun-
tries, most recent years Source: Hayter & Stoevska (2011)
For that matter, there are also signs that if one were to analyse the trade unions and 
their membership worldwide, no decline would be apparent. Moreover, it is still dif-
ficult to attain reliable global figures, since there is quite a wide range of definitions. 
Should the unemployed, pensioners and students be included? And does one count 
paying members only or should sympathisers also be included? The ILO does not 
have up-to-date figures either. Nevertheless, estimates show that between 2000 and 
2007 48% of all union federations had grown, 35% had decreased and 17% had re-
mained fairly stable. This observation is based on 444 federations that are said to 
represent the bulk of global trade unions.
Figure 6.3 Change in union federation Source: Hall-Jones (2008).
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Article 20 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights497 states that ‘Everyone 
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be com-
pelled to belong to an association.’ Article 23, paragraph 4, of the Declaration states 
that ‘Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests’.
These provisions are further developed in article 22 of the ICCPR and article 8 of 
the ICESCR. Importantly, the provisions in article 22, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR and 
article 8, paragraph 4, of the ICESCR refer explicitly to ILO convention 87 concerning 
freedom of association and protection of the right to organise.
Since it was created in 1948, ILO convention 87 has been ratified by 153 countries. This 
is an impressive number, but the number of non-ratifying countries is equally con-
siderable: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei, China, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Marshall  Islands, 
Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Thai-
land, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, the United States, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
Most conspicuous are Brazil, China, India and the US, whose inhabitants add up to 3 
billion, and quite a few countries in the Middle East, all in all representing more than 
half the world population.
The other important convention regarding the freedom of association and bar-
gaining, i.e. Convention 98 (1949), has been ratified by 164 countries and again the 
non-ratifying countries include: Canada, China, India, Mexico and the US, jointly 
representing nearly half the world population.498
In respect of freedom of association, there are also ILO conventions 151 (1978) 
and 154 (1981) regulating respectively the public sector and the promotion of collec-
tive bargaining. Respectively 52 and 46 ILO member states have ratified these con-
ventions.
Most national constitutions safeguard the freedom of association. Exceptions 
are possible, for instance in connection with the armed forces. In 142 constitutions, 
the freedom of association is explicitly acknowledged. A constitutionally recognised 
right to strike is in place in 93 countries. The freedom of association is not restricted 
to trade unions, but also holds for employers’ organisations. It is a fundamental right 
that is at the heart of our democracy.499
We saw above that GUFs and ITUC represent the trade unions on the global 
social playing field. Opposite ITUC as employees’ representative, the IOE represents 
497 Blanpain (2012). 
498 Blanpain (2012), p. 24.
499 Blanpain (2012), p. 15.
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employers. The IOE500, the International Organization of Employers, was established 
in 1920 and its membership consists of 150 employers’ and corporate federations from 
143 countries. The IOE particularly looks after the interests of institutions such as 
the United Nations, the World Bank and the ILO. The IOE represents nearly all em-
ployers’ federations, i.e. 43 from Africa, 33 from the Americas, 29 from Asia and 43 
from Europe. Among other spearheads, the IOE promotes corporate social responsi-
bility and human rights policies in business, but it does not engage in social dialogue 
or collective bargaining with trade union organisations.
The ITUC501 represents nearly 170 million workers from 155 countries and en-
compasses more than 300 affiliated member organisations. They include national, 
democratic and representative trade union organisations that endorse the constitu-
tion of the Confederation, which states among other things: ‘The Confederation is 
inspired by the profound conviction that organisation in democratic and independ-
ent trade unions and collective bargaining are crucial to achieving the well-being of 
working people and their families and to security, social progress and sustainable 
development for all’. The bargaining activities are in fact left to the GUFs.
At the sectoral level, hardly any employers’ organisations can be found that 
are specialised in negotiating with GUFs. Employers’ organisations include the In-
ternational Association of Public Transport, the International Union of Railways, 
the Federation of the employers’ associations in the metal and electrical industries, 
the Chemical Employers’ Labour Relations Committee, the International Hotel and 
Restaurant Association, the World Federation of Building Service Contractors, the 
International Road Transport Union, the World Federation of the Sporting Goods 
Industry, the International Council of Mining and Metals, the International Con-
federation of Private Employment Services (CIETT) and the International Chamber 
of Shipping. However, all these organisations hardly engage in meaningful forms of 
social dialogue with employees’ organisations. The only exception is the maritime 
sector, where ICS/IMEC (International Chamber of Shipping/International Maritime 
Employers Committee) and ITF play important roles,502 partly due to concluding a 
full, global collective agreement.503 Possibly, this less pronounced role of  international 
employers’ organisations is the main reason why the GUFs have made overtures to an 
increasing number of multinational enterprises in order to gain some grip on the 
increasing globalisation.
500 Ojeda-Avilés (2014), p. 234.
501 Ojeda-Avilés (2014), p. 233.
502 Lillie (2008), p. 191.
503 Papadakis (2008), p. 3.
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But there are other reasons. Croncher and Cotton list five: 504
 – The multinational enterprises ‘drive’ globalisation by the role they play in invest-
ment, trade, technology and finance.
 – Quite often, one of the subsidiaries of these multinational enterprises already 
has contacts within the trade union movement.
 – Multinational enterprises often need the knowledge and experience of the trade 
union movement, partly on account of their risk management.
 – Often, strong links between the trade unionists and corporate management are 
already in place.
 – The dialogue between global employees’ organisations and the central manage-
ment of such a multinational enterprise is invaluable for the trade unions they 
represent.505
Therefore, the GUFs enter into social dialogue with an increasing number of multi-
national enterprises. They conclude International Framework Agreements (IFAs) 
and thus set a new trend, although it remains to be seen if it will continue. What is 
the meaning of this development in general and what does it imply for the regulation 
of labour? These questions will be answered below.
6.3 IFAs
6.3.1 What is an IFA?
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) are an attempt by the Global Union 
Federations (GUFs) to respond to globalisation. These IFAs are the result of consulta-
tion at a global level between multinational enterprises and the GUFs in their capac-
ity of sectorally organised global unions. They constitute the global development of 
social dialogue.
Another concept that is being used is TCA, Transnational Company Agreements, 
which as part of Transnational Collective Labour Relations in turn results from TCB, 
Transnational Collective Bargaining.506
Transnational Collective Labour Relations are characterised by both public and 
private initiatives.507 The public initiatives include the OECD Guidelines for Multi-
national Corporations, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multi national Enterprises and Social Policy, the UN Global Compact and the Ruggie 
504 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 16.
505 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 16.
506 Blanpain & Marassi (2015), p. 5 ff.
507 Blanpain & Marassi (2015), p. 11.
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Guidelines containing the ‘UN Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework (see chapter 
4). The private initiatives include Corporate Codes of Conduct and Transnational 
Collective Agreements. These agreements are concluded both at a global and at a 
Euro pean level. By now, over 160 enterprises have co-signed more than 250 agreements 
in that sense.508 An IFA is in order if a global agreement with a GUF was concluded.
6.3.2 Why should Global Union Federations want IFAs?
The literature509 lists four important reasons for GUFs to conclude such agreements.
Firstly they are about promoting employees’ rights and bringing these together for 
the benefit of the entire labour community of the multinational enterprise (some-
times they even include the entire supply chain) by introducing rules that apply for 
all subsidiaries. This often fits in with the eight core conventions that belong to the 
1998 ILO Declaration. The International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF), now part of 
IndustriAll Global Union, formulated it as follows:
[IFAs are] a global instrument with the purpose of ensuring workers’ rights in all of 
the target company’s locations. […] Through IFAs the ILO’s Core Labour Standards 
can be guaranteed in all facilities of a transnational company, which is especially 
helpful in transition and developing countries, where legislation is sometimes in-
sufficient, poorly enforced or anti-worker.510
Secondly, these agreements reinforce social dialogue. Local unions can also benefit 
from this. They are often co-signatories to the agreement. As a result of this reinforced 
social dialogue, the IFA is a valuable instrument for achieving a situation that is ‘free 
of conflict’ and constitutes stable relationships between management and workers. 
Thirdly, the IFAs enhance the international solidarity. And fourthly, the GUFs can use 
IFAs to reinforce their organisation by means of expanding their networks, enabling 
them to look after the employees’ interests better.
For multinational enterprises too, various aspects play a role in concluding an IFA.511 
If the corporate brand is widely known, there is a clear relationship with the enter-
prise’s need to maintain its reputation. Furthermore, there is a connection with the 
EU Directive with regard to the European Works Council. This has been a consider-
able boost to achieving supranational agreements, which may even extend beyond 
508 Blanpain & Marassi (2015), p. 27.
509 Drouin (2010), p. 599 ff.; Telljohann et al. (2009a), p. 513 ff.
510 International Metalworkers’ Federation (no date).
511 Blanpain & Marassi (2015), p. 34 ff.
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Europe. The International Finance Corporation as part of the World Bank has like-
wise had a driving role, since the social conditions for the granting of loans could be 
established in an IFA.
Besides these external factors, there are the internal ones, such as the need for 
stable relationships between management and workers, and for a positive corporate 
image. Lastly, specific social groups, for instance environmental groups, can exert 
due pressure. Thus, multinational enterprises can find valid arguments to justify con-
cluding an IFA.
However, there are also counter-arguments; particularly legal questions that 
may be raised by the agreement and that may deter enterprises. In this context, the 
IOE512 is concerned about the fact that IFAs usually refer to ILO instruments that are 
actually meant and written for governments. That is why it doubts their added value, 
pointing out their obscure legal status, which may entail considerable liability ex-
posure at a national level.
Boonstra is positive about IFAs, but moderately so, for employees hardly dare 
make use of the private liability law, as they fear possible intimidation, repercussions 
and victimisation.513
6.3.3 The rise of IFAs
As early as the 1960s, attempts were made to realise what we now call IFAs.514 Par-
ticularly the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs), as precursors of the GUFs, in the 
metal industry, chemistry and food industry were confronted with globalisation and 
wanted to take steps. Charles Levinson – consecutively Assistant Secretary General 
and General-Secretary of the IMF (1956–1964) and General Secretary of the ICEM 
(1964–1985) – was a key figure in these attempts. He aimed for international collective 
negotiations at the level of large multinational enterprises.
He distinguished three stages. Firstly, he wanted to organise international solid-
arity together with a union that took part in a local conflict involving a  multinational 
enterprise. Then, he wanted to conduct negotiations simultaneously in separate sub-
sidiaries of an enterprise spread across various countries. In the third stage, he pur-
sued integrated negotiations with the multinational enterprise’s management board 
on the basis of a wish list jointly compiled by the various national unions.
The ITSs are also in favour of establishing world councils in order to coordinate 
union activities and encourage the exchange of information. The idea arose as early 
as the 1950s, but the first world councils came into being at the end of the 1960s: 
512 IOE (2005), p. 11.
513 Boonstra (2014), p. 7.
514 Telljohann (2009b), p. 15 ff. See also: Gallin (2008), p. 15 and Da Costa & Rehfeldt (2011).
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one at Ford, one at GM, a joint council at both Chrysler-Simca-Rootes and Volks-
wagen-Daimler-Benz. Eventually, sixty councils were started, but their influence was 
restricted, partly due to limited coordination on the part of the trade unions.
Thus, Levinson’s third stage, involving integrated negotiations, was never at-
tained. The first stage, seeking to organise solidarity in case of local conflicts, was dif-
ficult enough as it was. For stage two, involving simultaneous negotiations,  Levinson 
refers to four examples, three of which are French, i.e. Saint-Gobin, Michelin, 
Rhône-Poulenc, the fourth one being Royal Dutch Shell.
There are various reasons why Levinson’s strategy failed. One reason was that 
the multinational enterprises were uncooperative, while refusing to acknowledge the 
ITSs as negotiating partners. Then, due to the economic crisis, the trade unions be-
came more defensive, could not muster solidarity and found it difficult to realise an 
international approach.
Eventually, this attitude changed due to the europeanisation of labour relation-
ships, particularly as a result of the acceptance and implementation of the European 
directive on European works councils. This was preceded in 1980 by Vredeling’s515 
draft guideline that aimed at regulating participation in multinationals in the case 
of complete or partial closure of a subsidiary of such an enterprise. Even though this 
draft was adjusted at a later date, the employers continued to oppose it, with the sup-
port of Margaret Thatcher’s British government.
In 1994, a directive was drawn up that was acceptable to the European Council, 
partly as a result of changes to the decision making process in Europe (qualified ma-
jority voting, implemented along with the Maastricht Treaty).
In order to encourage regulations by the European Works Council, the  European 
Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) asked various multinational enterprises to form 
permanent committees of information and advice. In 1985 this proved successful with 
regard to the French multinational enterprise Thomson Grand Public.
A second agreement at international level was entered into in 1986, involving the 
French enterprise Danone and the IUF, the GUF in the Food, Agricultural, Hotel, 
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Association. It was this agreement 
that paved the way to the signing in 1988 of what history considers to be the first IFA.
BSN (Danone) and IUF formulated the following common viewpoint:516
1. A policy for training for skills in order to anticipate the consequences of the 
introduction of new technologies or industrial restructurering. To achieve this 
515 Henk Vredeling was a Dutch member of parliament and a European Commission member [ed.].
516 Gallin (2008), p. 26
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objective, the social partners will seek to integrate this aspect into present and 
future plans for training.
2. A policy to achieve the same level and the same quality of information, both 
in the economic and the social fields in all locations of BSN-subsidiaries. To 
achieve this objective, the social partners concerned, will seek both through 
national legislation as well as collective agreement, to reduce the differences 
observed in terms of the information between one country and another or be-
tween one location and another.
3. A development of conditions to assure real quality between men and women at 
work developing jobs and work processes have led to distortions between the 
situation of men and women; the social partners will therefore evaluate loca-
tion by location, the nature of the different initiatives to be adopted to improve 
the situation.
4. The implementation of trade union rights as defined in ILO conventions. 87, 
98 and 135. The social partners concerned will identify where progress can be 
made in improving trade union right and access to trade union education.
In the meantime, 115 IFAs have been concluded with GUFs. IndustriALL (43) is mar-
ket leader in this respect, closely followed by UNI (38). IUF, BWI, PSI and IFJ have 7, 
22, 3 and 2 respectively. For a survey of all these IFAs, please peruse the survey below.
Table 6.7 Survey of IFAs517
Company Employees Country Sector GUF Year
1 Danone 104,600 France Food iuf 08/1988
2 Accor 160,000 France Hotels iuf 06/1995
3 ikea 139,000 Sweden Furniture bwi 05/1998 
(2001 Iway)
4 Statoil 23,000 Norway Oil Industry icem 07/1998
5 Faber-Castell 6,500 Germany Office Material bwi 03/2000
6 Hochtief 80,900 Germany Construction bwi 03/2000
7 Freudenberg 33,300 Germany Chemical Industry icem 06/2000
8 Skanska 57,100 Sweden Construction bwi 02/2001
9 Telefónica 120,000 Spain Telecommunication uni 04/2001 
(03/2011)
10 Carrefour 365,000 France Retail uni 05/2001
11 Chiquita 20,000 usa Agriculture iuf 06/2001
12 ote Telekom 27,000 Greece Telecommunication uni 06/2001
13 Indesit (Merloni) 16,000 Italy Domestic Appliances imf 12/2001
14 Endesa 22,900 Spain Energy icem 01/2002
517 Thanks are due to Gijs van Wezenbeek who, in consultation with the author, used various sources 
to compile an IFA file, on the basis of which the various analyses have been carried out.
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Company Employees Country Sector GUF Year
15 Ballast Nedam 3,100 Netherlands Construction bwi 03/2002
16 Fonterra 16,000 New Zealand Dairy Products iuf 04/2002
17 Volkswagen 572,800 Germany Automobile imf 06/2002 
+ Charter taw 
11/2012
18 Norske Skog 3,000 Norway Paper icem 06/2002 
(12/2013)
19 Daimler 275,000 Germany Automobile imf 09/2002
20 AngloGold 66,500 South Africa Mining icem 09/2002 
(05/2009)
21 Eni 82,200 Italy Energy icem 12/2002
22 Leoni 62,000 Germany Cables/Automotive imf 04/2003
23 gea 18,000 Germany Engineering imf 04/2003
24 iss 533,500 Denmark Cleaning/Mainten-
ance
uni 05/2003 
(06/2008)
25 rag (Evonik) 33,000 Germany Mining icem 08/2003
26 Rheinmetall 9,200 Germany Metal/Automotive imf 10/2003
27 skf 44,000 Sweden Ball-bearing/Seals imf 11/2003
28 Prym 3,500 Germany Metal Manufacturing imf 11/2003
29 H&M 116,000 Sweden Retail uni 01/2004
30 Bosch 281,000 Germany Engineering imf 03/2004
31 sca 36,000 Sweden Paper icem 04/2004
32 Club Méditerranée 20,000 France Hotels/Leisure iuf 04/2004
33 Lukoil 150,000 Russia Energy/Oil icem 05/2004
34 Renault 121,000 France Automobile imf 10/2004 
(07/2013)
35 Impregilo 34,400 Italy Construction bwi 11/2004
36 Röchling 7,500 Germany Automotive industry/
plastics
imf 11/2005
37 Electricité de 
France
160,000 France Energy icem +  
psi
01/2005 
(01/2009)
38 Rhodia 14,000 France Chemical Industry icem 01/2005 
(03/2008)
39 Veidekke 6,300 Norway Construction bwi 03/2005
40 Falck 32,000 Denmark Healthcare, Assist-
ance, Safety Services 
and Emergency
uni 03/2005
41 bmw 110,000 Germany Automobile imf 04/2005
42 eads 143,300 Netherlands Aviation imf 07/2005
43 Schwan-Stabilo 4,390 Germany Writing Material bwi 09/2005
44 Lafarge 64,000 France Construction Material bwi + 
icem
09/2005
45 Arcelor 232,500 Luxembourg Steel imf 09/2005 
(06/2008)
46 Portugal Telekom 13,000 Portugal Telecommunication uni 01/2006
47 psa Peugeot 
Citroën
207,000 France Automobile imf 03/2006 
(05/2010)
48 Securitas 310,000 Sweden Security Services uni 03/2006
49 Royal bam Group 23,000 Netherlands Construction bwi 04/2006
50 Nampak 1,300 South Africa Packaging uni 05/2006
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Company Employees Country Sector GUF Year
51 Euradius Bankrupt Netherlands Printing uni 08/2006
52 Staedtler 2,000 Germany Writing Material bwi 11/2006
53 nag 40,000 Australia Banking uni 12/2006
54 France Télecom 
(Orange)
161,000 France Telecommunication uni 12/2006
55 VolkerWessels 14,500 Netherlands Construction bwi 01/2007
56 Brunel 11,000 Netherlands Recruitment imf 04/2007
57 Quebecor (Quad 
Graphics)
43,000 Canada Printing uni 05/2007
58 waz 16,000 Germany Media ifj 07/2007
59 Umicore 14,300 Belgium Metal/Chemicals icem + imf 09/2007
60 Inditex 128,000 Spain Textiles/Clothing itglwf + 
uni
10/2007 
(10/2009) 
(05/2012)
61 Vallourec 24,000 France Steel architecture/
Automotive
imf 04/2008
62 Italcementi 18,300 Italy Building bwi 06/2008
63 Danske Bank 21,500 Denmark Banking uni 09/2008
64 icomon 80,000 Brazil Telecommunication uni 10/2008
65 Ability 150,000 Brazil Telecommunication uni 10/2008
66 Aker 28,000 Norway Offshore Fishing, 
Constructing and 
Engineering
imf 10/2008
67 Takashimaya ??? Japan Retail uni 11/2008
68 ciett (Randstad, 
usg, Olympia, 
Manpower, Kelly, 
Adecco)
??? Belgium Temporary Work uni 11/2008
69 G4S 618,000 United Kingdom Cleaning/Mainten-
ance
uni 12/2008
70 Elanders 8,300 Sweden Printing uni 01/2009
71 Wilkhahn 600 Germany Furniture bwi 02/2009
72 Telecommuniçoes 
Ltda
25,000 Brazil Telecommunication uni 03/2009
73 Shoprite 100 South Africa Retail industry uni 02/2010
74 Media Prima 
Malaysia
1,920 Malaysia Media uni 03/2010
75 Antara 66,400 Indonesia Agriculture uni 03/2010
76 Norsk Hydro 22,000 Norway Energy ifm + icem 03/2010
77 Telkom Indonesia 25,600 Indonesia Telecommunication uni 09/2010
78 Electrolux 55,000 Sweden Metal imf 10/2010
79 Pfleiderer 5,300 Germany Building Materials bwi 10/2010
80 gdf Suez 147,400 France Energy bwi + 
icem + psi
11/2010
81 Banco Do Brasil 111,500 Brazil Banking uni 06/2011
82 Mann-Hummel 15,200 Germany Automobiles imf 06/2011
83 zf 72,600 Germany Engineering imf 10/2011
84 Petrobas 86,100 Brazil Oil icem 11/2011
85 Mizuno 5,400 Japan Textile itglwf 11/2011
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Company Employees Country Sector GUF Year
86 Sodexo 420,000 France Food and Facility 
Management
iuf 12/2011
87 fcc Building 63,000 Spain Building and 
Develop ing
bwi 02/2012
88 man se 53,500 Germany Automobile imf 03/2012
89 Ford 224,000 United States Automobile imf 04/2012
90 Ferrovial 70,000 Spain Constructing and 
Infrastructure
bwi 06/2012
91 Saab 14,000 Sweden Automobile imf 06/2012
92 Siemens 343,000 Germany Engineering IndustriAll 07/2012
93 ohl 22,000 Spain Building and 
 Engineering
bwi 09/2012
94 Eurosport (groupe 
tf 1)
4,000 France Media uni 12/2012
95 Telenor 4,200 Norway Telecom uni 01/2013
96 Codere 13,800 Spain  uni 03/2013
97 enel 71,000 Italy Energy IndustriAll 
+ psi
06/2013
98 Melia 38,000 Spain Hotels iuf 12/2013
99 Solvay 29,400 Belgium Chemical and Plas-
tics
IndustriAll 12/2013
100 Loomis 20,000 Sweden Banking Manage-
ment
uni 12/2013
101 Metro  Germany Distribution uni 12/2013 
(9/1999)
102 itau Unibanco sa 
Brazil
96,000 Brazil Banking uni 03/2014
103 Dragados (Grupo 
acs)
130,000 Spain Construction bwi 10/2014
104 Acciona 34,000 Spain Construction bwi 10/2014
105 Sacyr (Grupo syv) 21,000 Spain Construction bwi 10/2014
106 aeon 360,000 Japan Retail uni 10/2014
107 Felaban  Brazil Banking uni 06/2014
108 Indosat  Indonesia Telecommunicatie uni 09/2014
109 Total France Energy IndustriAll 1/2015
110 Gamesa Spain Engineering IndustriAll 2/2015
111 Thyssen Krupp Germany Metal Manufacturing IndustriAll 3/2015
112 Sociéte Géneral France Banking uni 6/2015
113 abn-amro Netherlands Banking uni 9/2015
114 Hennis & Mauritz Sweden Retail uni 11/2015
115 Media Network Qatar Media ifj 12/2015
6.3.4 IFAs through time
Following the Danone contract, a period of quiet lasted until 1995, when Accor and 
IUF entered into a global agreement. Post-millennium, the number of IFAs grew 
steadily, culminating in 10 IFAs being signed in 2005. Until then, IFAs had largely 
been the territory of European multinational enterprises. From 2006, the  importance 
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
254
of non-European multinational enterprises has increased considerably. Out of all 
IFAs signed since then, one third are from outside Europe. In 2010, the proportion of 
Europe/non-Europe was fifty-fifty, and in 2011 non-European IFAs were in the major-
ity. The year 2010 yielded 10 IFAs, but that annual number has been waning since. 
The last three years have averaged 7 to 8. It remains to been seen whether this trend 
will endure.
Figure 6.4 IFAs through time With thanks to Gijs van Wezenbeek.
Upon further analysis of the substance of the IFAs it becomes clear that they en-
trench the ILO core conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
non-discrimination and child labour. These topics are included in nearly all IFAs. 
Much attention is likewise paid to employee protection. The IFAs regulate that wages 
must be living wages, and that they must be ‘decent, adequate, reasonable and fair’. 
Also, the working hours must be reasonable. The directions regarding occupational 
health and safety must be observed. Moreover, appropriate living and working con-
ditions must be created. Furthermore, training and education is awarded attention. 
A number of IFAs regulate that the permanent employment relationship is the start-
ing point for (labour and employment conditions) policies.
Equally important are the provisions regarding the supply chain, through which the 
IFA regulations are extended to include suppliers and subcontractors. The  approaches 
range from supplying information and encouragement to imposing obligations  under 
penalty of breaking the commercial relationship if the supplier fails to comply with 
the IFA provisions.
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Figure 6.5 IFAs, substance With thanks to Gijs van Wezenbeek.
I. CORE CONVENTIONS
Freedom of association and collective bargaining
No forced labour
Non-discrimination
No child labour
II. WORKER PROTECTION
Living, decent, adequate, reasonable, fair wages
No excessive work hours
Health and safety
Decent living and working conditions
Skills and training
Regular employment is leading
III. SUPPLY CHAIN
Extension to subcontractors and suppliers
IV. OTHER TOPICS
Environment
Anti-corruption
Restructuring
Social dialogue
Diversity
Representation
Corporate social responsibility
Agency work
V. PROCEDURE
Implementation
Conflict resolution
Duration
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A Eurofound518 study shows that on the basis of the consulted IFAs nearly half the 
enterprises commit to informing their suppliers; 23% takes a step further by com-
mitting to taking measures (14%) or taking responsibility for the entire supply chain 
(9%). Nearly one third of the enterprises studied did not mention suppliers and sub-
contractors at all.
Figure 6.6 Inclusion of suppliers and subcontractors in the scope of application
Source: Telljohann et al. (2009b), p. 32.
The analysis mentioned earlier shows that special subjects can also be included in the 
IFA, for instance the environment, anti-corruption, restructuring, social dialogue, 
corporate social responsibility, and also temporary agency work.
In many IFAs, the implementation is further developed. This is often left to bi-
partite committees that meet periodically to discuss the course of events from the 
perspective of the IFA. Moreover, many IFAs include provisions on how to deal with 
differences of opinion on certain matters. Furthermore, the duration of the agree-
ment comes up for discussion. Tacit renewal is quite usual, unless one of the parties 
involved cancels the agreement.
It becomes clear from an earlier analysis based on 80 IFAs519 that many of them 
do not only refer to the ILO core conventions, but also to numerous other ILO instru-
ments.
518 Telljohann et al. (2009b), p. 32.
519 Papadakis (2011), p. 249 ff.
9% of the subcontractors assume responsibility
for the whole supply chain
31% of the IFAs do not
mention suppliers and
subcontractors at all
14% take measures to assure
that suppliers do
comply with the IFA
46% of the IFAs inform their suppliers and encourage them to adhere to the IFA
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Figure 6.7 IFA references to ILO instruments
With thanks to Gijs van Wezenbeek, based on Papadakis (2011).
R.198 Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006
R.190 Worst Forms of Child Labour Recommendation, 1999
R.188 Private Employment Agencies Recommendation, 1997
R.143 Workers Representatives Recommendation, 1971
R.116 Reduction of Hours of Work Recommendation, 1962
C.182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999
C.181 Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997
C.167 Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 1989
C.162 Asbests Convention, 1986
C.161 Occupational Health Services Convention, 1985
C.156 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981
C.155 Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981
C.138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973
C.135 Workers’ Representatives Convention, 1971
C.131 Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970
C.116 Final Articles Convention, 1961
C.111 Plantation Convention, 1958
C.105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
C.102 Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952
C.100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
C.097 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949
C.095 Protection of Wages Convention, 1949
C.094 Labour Clauses (Public Convention) Convention, 1949
C.047 Forty Hour Week Convention, 1935
C.029 Forced Labour Convention, 1930
C.007 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1919
C.001 Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919
Other references
General references
C.159 Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment
(Disabled Persons) Convention, 1983
C.087 Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Rights to Organise Convention, 1948
ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, 1998
C.098 Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949
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6.3.5 How binding are IFAs?
Blanpain and Marassi520 argue that IFAs (and also EFAs, European Framework 
Agreements) usually cannot be characterised as national collective agreements. Even 
the involvement of national trade unions as co-signatories does not automatically 
mean that such an agreement is binding at a national level. According to Blanpain, 
IFAs clearly relate to soft law: they are not enforceable in national courts. Neverthe-
less, through their implementation, the agreements result in periodic consultations. 
Although they are not legally binding, they can actually have practical consequences.
Blanpain and Marassi only perceive a legal effect if the IFA takes the form of a 
national collective agreement. Their examples include implementation provisions in 
the IFAs of Arcelor Mittal (2008), Danone (2007) and EDF (2005–2009), which refer 
to local practices and legislation. They also see a legal effect if the parties commit 
to the IFAs. As a striking example they point out the IFA of Arcelor Mittal, which 
refers to the Luxembourg judge in respect of the CSR commitments that have been 
included.
Van Wezenbeek521 argues that multinational enterprises generally do not want to 
 carry any legal responsibility for an IFA. Although IFAs are often called ‘agreements’, 
any real ‘contract’ is out of the question. Some IFAs also explicitly preclude any collat-
eral effect, as a result of which their employees cannot derive rights from it.
On the other hand, IFAs that have been signed by the employees’ and employers’ 
representatives do have an air of an ‘agreement’ about them, entailing rights and ob-
ligations. Three out of four IFAs actually use the term ‘agreement’, which does imply 
some form of binding character. This applies particularly to the dispute settlement 
regulations that are included in the IFAs. Moreover, the collateral effect turns out to 
be excluded in only very few cases.
Van Wezenbeek goes on to argue that ‘since even an unilateral initiative such 
as a code of conduct, potentially creates a sort of contract, a signed commitment 
like an IFA, between two authoritative parties, can indeed have a binding effect for 
the signatories’. In the event, he looks on an IFA as soft law with potentially binding 
(moral) effects.
The International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF)522 points out enforcement 
problems that may occur due to a lack of any ‘global industrial relations regulatory 
framework’.
520 Blanpain & Marassi, (2015), p. 189 ff.
521 Van Wezenbeek (2009), p. 81 ff.
522 IMF (2006), p. 13
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The IMF argues that implementation is labour-intensive and cannot always count on 
the support of the enterprises. It does, however, create the opportunity for organisa-
tion and network extension. What is striking in this context is the conclusion drawn 
from an analysis of the IFA effects in Brazil and the United States to the effect that:
… we could show, while Kansas is still very much a reality, it is not altogether im-
mune to the impact of globalization. Indeed the existence of a global policy tool 
such as an IFA, made use of proactively by informed actors at the local level, can 
have a dynamic and constructive influence on labour relations across a variety of 
instrumental and legal settings.523
Interesting in this context is also the Unilever case, where the IUF proved to be able, 
even without an IFA, to start a corporate campaign against the ‘casualisation’ of la-
bour (turning permanent jobs into temporary ones), to be acknowledged in its global 
role by the United Kingdom thanks to a complaint lodged by the NCP (the OECD’s 
National Contact Point), and to achieve the creation of permanent jobs at a Unilever 
subsidiary in Pakistan.524
All in all, IFAs are a new form of social dialogue that may be added to the manage-
ment toolbox of our labour relationships. It only applies to small numbers (merely 108), 
which have limited reach in terms of workers. Still, they send a positive signal, creating:
… an additional channel for the communication, implementation and monitoring 
of social human rights whilst at the same time helping to get preconditions for 
their impacts by promoting the international networking of trade unions and the 
transnationalisation of labour relations at the corporate level.525
6.4 IFAs AND TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK
6.4.1 The IFA for temporary agency work
One IFA applies specifically to temporary agency work. This IFA was co-signed by 
UNI Global Union and the Corporate Members of CIETT, i.e. Adecco, Kelly Services, 
Manpower Group, Olympic Flexgroup, Randstad and USG People.526
523 Fichter & Helfen (2011), p. 110.
524 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 69 ff.
525 Platzer & Rüb (2014), p. 17
526 Memorandum of Understanding between Adecco, Kelly Services, Manpower Group, Olympia Flex-
group, Randstad and USG People, CIETT corporate members, and Uni Global on temporary agency 
work. http://www.enidea.gr/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/MoU-UNI-CiettCMC-Final-EN.pdf.
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This IFA constitutes a Memorandum of Understanding. The parties acknowledge that 
Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 provide a regulatory framework for tem-
porary agency work; they commit to the core conventions that safeguard decent tem-
porary agency work. Moreover, they state that temporary agency work contributes 
to the improved functioning of the labour market, fulfils the specific needs of both 
enterprises and jobseekers, and in that sense complements other forms of employ-
ment. They also acknowledge that further topics will need to come up for discussion.
Furthermore, the partners acknowledge that temporary agency work can contribute 
to:
 – evening out fluctuations in the labour market;
 – implementing active labour market policies by helping jobseekers re-enter the 
labour market, helping disadvantaged people enter into the labour market and 
providing more work opportunities for more people;
 – facilitating transitions on the labour market for students and young workers 
(helping them find their first job and gain work experience);
 – organising vocational training and education between assignments;
 – promoting the transition of temporary agency work to fixed-term and open- 
ended contracts;
 – improving life work balance by enabling part-time work and flexible working 
hours;
 – combating undeclared work.
The partners advocate an adequate regulatory framework that:
 – guarantees that temporary agency work does not infringe on employees’ rights;
 – clarifies the role of the temporary employment agency as the employer;
 – provides adequate protection for temporary workers, by means of decent work-
ing and employment conditions, and offers proper conditions for temporary 
employment agencies in a well functioning labour market;
 – ensures that the regulations regarding the use of temporary agency work are 
proportionate, non-discriminatory and objective and prevent such potential 
abuses as can be caused by undermining employment and working conditions;
 – promotes quality standards in the temporary employment sector, fights unfair 
competition by fraudulent temporary employment agencies and commission-
ing clients, also combats abuses and illegal practices, and takes action against 
 human trafficking.
According to the partners, a regulatory framework should include and promote:
 – the principles as guaranteed by Convention 181 and Recommendation 188, with 
a particular focus on the no fee to workers rule;
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 – fair treatment of temporary agency workers with regard to their basic working 
and employment conditions, based on the principle of non-discrimination (for 
instance, equitable, objective and transparent principles for the calculation of 
wages and benefits, in accordance with national legislation and practices);
 – respect for the freedom of association and bargaining as guaranteed by ILO con-
ventions 87 and 98;
 – social dialogue at national, sectoral or corporate level, using collective bargain-
ing as an adequate means;
 – banning the replacement of striking workers without prejudice to national leg-
islation and practices;
 – attention to and clarity of benefits (salary, social insurance, pension, vocational 
training).
At a national level, the partners want to spearhead the following actions:
 – identifying and removing obstacles to the performance of temporary employ-
ment agencies and if possible, cooperating with national governments to elimi-
nate these obstacles;
 – reviewing licensing and inspection systems and, where relevant, introducing 
them in collaboration with national governments (including possible financial 
guarantees), to contribute to good industry standards, provided they are pro-
portionate, non-discriminatory, objective and do not aim at hindering the de-
velopment of temporary employment agencies;
 – cooperating with national governments to provide adequate and lasting social 
protection for temporary agency workers, which includes providing subsistence 
payments in the case of unemployment;
 – promoting social dialogue as a means to further develop working conditions of 
temporary agency workers and the conditions of use of temporary agency work.
At a global level:
 – cooperating with the ILO to promote ratification of Convention 181 and Recom-
mendation 188;
 – cooperating with the ILO to promote the international instruments that fight 
human trafficking;
 – continuously conducting research and exploring opinions and conditions in 
the interests of both workers and employers (regarding job creation, precarious 
work et cetera);
 – promoting a global platform for social dialogue.
The partners commit to communicate this memorandum through their own chan-
nels. UNI and the Corporate Members agree to meet twice a year.
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The Memorandum has evoked considerable criticism, particularly from the other 
GUFs. This has also resulted in the stalemate described in paragraph 3.3.6.
Cotton527 argues that such a memorandum should never have involved just one 
GUF. Temporary agency work does not restrict itself to the work area of one GUF and 
therefore it cannot profess to represent all GUFs. She advocates a form of  transnational 
private labour regulation and lists three possible developments:
 – the route through an IFA involving a number of, if not all, GUFs;
 – a real collective agreement with its own certification and inspection system, 
based on the model in the maritime sector;
 – a social dialogue between CIETT and the Council of Global Unions (the coop-
eration of the GUFs).
Besides the Memorandum, CIETT has a Code of Conduct528. These rules of conduct 
call for respect for laws and regulations, for ethical and professional conduct, for the 
no fee to worker principle, transparent terms of engagement, for health and safety at 
work, non-discrimination, workers’ rights, confidentiality, quality of service and fair 
competition, and (new) access to remedy.
A Quality Standards and Compliance Officer (a CIETT board member who safe-
guards the quality and observance of the rules) will coordinate any compliance issues 
regarding the Code of Conduct.
Apart from the comprehensive IFA concluded with the CIETT Corporate Members 
another IFA has been co-signed by the International Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF, 
since then merged into IndustriAll) and Brunel. Through this IFA, Brunel commits 
to the fundamental human rights. The agreement incorporates the core conven-
tions and includes anti-corruption provisions. Furthermore, Brunel directs attention 
to vocational training, remuneration, working hours, and occupational safety and 
health. With regard to remuneration, Brunel states that ‘is committed to ensuring 
that remuneration is better than, or at least equal to the conditions set forth in the 
national legislation or collective bargaining agreements’.
6.4.2 IFAs and temporary agency work
Do other IFAs pay attention to temporary agency work, or do they contain elements 
that touch on temporary agency work as regulated in Convention 181? It can be estab-
lished that the IFAs pay ample attention to the core conventions regarding freedom 
527 Cotton (2015).
528 CIETT Code of Conduct, now the WEC Code of Conduct, on http://www.wecglobal.org/filead-
min/templates/ciett/docs/CIETT_Code_Conduct.pdf
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of association and bargaining, forced labour, child labour and non-discrimination. 
To that extent, there is a clear overlap with Convention 181. Moreover, many IFAs 
include provisions in the area of wages, working hours and occupational safety and 
health, which also constitute overlaps. But that is as far as the IFAs will go.
However, this does not mean that the IFAs are irrelevant to temporary agency 
work. Through their supply chain provisions, these IFAs can clearly influence the op-
erations of temporary employment agencies. Moreover, IFAs turn out to have labour 
market provisions that are relevant to temporary agency work.
6.4.3 Supply chain
It has been established above that nearly all IFAs contain provisions encouraging 
suppliers and (sub)contractors of these multinational enterprises to comply with all 
provisions of the IFA. As we saw, these IFAs have different variants. For instance, one 
can read with regard to the automotive sector:
(Company) supports and encourages its suppliers to introduce and implement 
equivalent principles in their own companies. (Company) expects its suppliers to 
incorporate these principles in their own business policies as a basis for relations 
with (Company).
In the Statoil IFA, it says:
This agreement covers all activities where Statoil has direct control. Where Statoil 
does not have direct control, it will exercise its best efforts in order to secure com-
pliance with the standards in this agreement. Statoil will notify its subcontractors 
and licensees of this agreement and encourage compliance with the standards.
The Ballast Nedam IFA states:
Ballast Nedam acknowledges that it not only bears responsibility for the conditions 
under which its own employees work, but also shares responsibility for the condi-
tions under which the employees of its contractual partners do their work.
Ballast Nedam therefore requires that its contractual partners shall support this 
agreement and shall also ensure that it is adhered to by any of their contractual 
partners who are in any way active in connection with the business activities of 
Ballast Nedam.
The Staedler IFA includes the following statement:
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The respect of employees’ rights is an integral part of Staedler’s continuing develop-
ment, and Staedler will therefore aim to collaborate only with those contract part-
ners, subcontractors and suppliers who recognise and also implement the criteria 
mentioned in the agreement. In this respect, Staedler will inform its contract part-
ners about the agreement it has entered into. When entering into contracts with 
suppliers, Staedler will take up the appropriate clauses in the contract and will re-
quire suppliers to fill in a questionnaire regarding their own compliance with the 
clauses to the agreement.
Telefonica states in its IFA:
As Telefonica considers respect for workers’ rights mentioned in this agreement as 
an element of progress in industrial relations, the company will tell the companies 
that would like to provide contracts and services of the need to adhere to these 
principles.
Thus all IFAs, some more obligatorily than others, request the suppliers and (sub)
contractors to join the IFA. These provisions also touch on temporary employment 
agencies. The question is, however, how this agreement develops in practice. What 
penalties can be applied? Ending the relationship with the supplier/contractor should 
be seen as a last resort and will evoke continuity questions. Still, pressure can be ex-
erted.
The trade union movement’s role can also be influential. In the Unilever case529 
above, we saw that trade unions’ corporate campaigns can actually yield results. Trade 
unions continue to develop successful strategies.530
Remarkably, it looks as if the supply chain provisions completely pass over the rights 
that third parties may have. Temporary employment agencies as third party service 
providers are employers too, and as such have free negotiating rights that flow from 
the ILO conventions 87 and 98. Article 12 of Convention 181 contains the solution 
that national governments allocate the responsibilities of temporary agency work. 
Still, the question arises how conflicting interests must be dealt with if this provision 
is not applied.
529 Croucher & Cotton (2011), p. 65.
530 IndustriAll (2014). See also Ebisui (2012).
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6.4.4 Labour market provisions
Various IFAs have provisions with regard to the permanent or temporary character 
of the employment or assignment.
In the Veidekke IFA we can read:
Employment shall, as a main rule, be based on permanent employment. Tempor-
ary and part-time employees should as a main rule receive the same relative terms 
and conditions as fulltime permanent employees.
The Wilkhahn IFA states:
Wilkhahn shall endeavour to keep temporary employment (jobs via third parties) 
to a minimum.
The UNITEL Telecom IFA declares:
National employment legislation and agreement shall be respected in an attempt to 
create stable employment wherever possible.
The Norsk Hydro IFA includes the following provision:
Hydro recognizes that permanent employment is preferable and will not use hired-
in personnel, part-time and temporary employment to undermine wages and 
working conditions. Both parties acknowledge that hired-in, part-time and tem-
porary workers are occasionally necessary, and that effective use of such allows 
Hydro to quickly adapt to changing conditions, thereby increasing job security and 
predictability and permanent employment.
Temporary and part-time employees should receive the same training, follow-up 
and necessary equipment to carry out their functions in a safe manner.
The Vallourec IFA notes:
Vallourec bases its development on (among others) a qualified permanent staff 
adjusted to the sustainable level of activity of the company. Through the use of 
appropriate short-time working management tools (use of time accounts, hiring of 
personnel from other Group units, short-term contracts), the Group aims to avoid 
large-scale staff lay-offs due to market fluctuations. This approach allows recourse 
to large-scale staff lay-offs to be limited to cases of structural changes.
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GDF Suez IFA states:
GDF SUEZ recognizes the importance of secure employment for both the indi-
vidual and for society through a preference for permanent, open-ended and direct 
employment. GDF SUEZ and all subcontractors shall take full responsibility for all 
work being performed under the appropriate legal framework and, in particular, 
shall not seek to avoid obligations of the employer to dependent workers by dis-
guising what would otherwise be an employment relationship or through the ex-
cessive use of temporary or agency labour. GDF SUEZ and all subcontractors shall 
respect legal and contractual obligations to all workers under labour and social 
security laws, regulations, and collective bargaining agreements arising from the 
regular employment relationship (Social Security Minimum Standards Conven-
tion C.102). GDF SUEZ and all subcontractors shall pay social security and pension 
contributions for their workers where such provisions exist. Companies will ensure 
that workers are not classified as self-employed when working under conditions 
of direct employment (bogus self-employment). GDF SUEZ expects its partners to 
apply comparable principles and regards this to be an important basis for a lasting 
business relationship.
The Telecom Group Portugal IFA puts forward:
The parties hereto shall engage jointly in finding solutions that will enable to main-
tain permanent and stable employment.
The Sodexo IFA declares:
IUF underlines its special concerns regarding (among others):
 – The use of casual rather than regular employees. Sodexo HR leadership and 
the IUF Secretariat will work cooperatively in order to examine the conditions 
under which they may progressively address these concerns, wilhout creating a 
competitive disadvantage which could hinder Sodexo’s business growth or have 
negative consequences on employment.
The Inditex IFA states:
External manufacturers, suppliers and their subcontractors undertake that all the 
employment formulas they use are part of the ordinary labour practice and applic-
able local laws. External manufacturers, suppliers and their subcontractors shall 
not impair the rights of workers acknowledged under the labour and social security 
laws and regulations by using schemes of: subcontracting, homeworking, training 
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and apprenticeship contracts or any other like formula which prevents promotion 
of regular employment in the framework or regular employment relationships.
The Enel IFA observes:
Enel, recognizing the importance of permanent and secure employment, adopts 
and promotes the ILO definition of ‘Decent Work’ as work that is productive and 
delivers a fair income, provides security in the workplace and social protection for 
workers and their families, and gives people the freedom to express their concerns 
to organize and to participate in decisions that affect their lives.
The Solvay IFA states:
Solvay favors the direct employment of people under open-ended work contracts. 
Solvay undertakes to apply a fair wage policy comparable with good standards in 
the profession for the country concerned.
The MELIA IFA includes the following provision:
IUF-UITA emphasises its major concerns as: the working and social conditions of 
employees, direct employment of workers rather than through subsidiary or ex-
ternal companies.
The management of MELIA and the IUF-UITA International Secretariat will co-
operate in order to define how to improve conditions regarding the concerns of 
IUF-UITA, without creating a competitive disadvantage, which could hinder busi-
ness growth at MELIA or have negative consequences on employment.
Hennis & Mauritz reports:
Obligations to employees, under labour or social security laws and regulations aris-
ing from the regular employment relationship, shall not be avoided through the use 
of labour-only contracting or through apprenticeship schemes where there is no 
real intent to impart skills or provide regular employment.
The employers should strive for permanent employment and take steps beyond 
those required by law to limit the use of fixed-term contracts of employment.
These provisions give an interesting overall picture of the agreements that multi-
national enterprises and the GUFs have entered into with regard to employment. 
There is a striking preference for permanent employment, although outsourcing 
 labour has not been declared as completely taboo. Moreover the implementation of 
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existing  regulation is requested. Furthermore the partners appear to aim for a prop-
er balance between maintaining permanent staff and the need to adjust to change 
( Norske  Hydro), to prevent future dismissals (Vallourec) and adequate competition 
relationships (Sodexo, Melia). Furthermore, there is a desire for focusing on solutions 
(Telecom Group Portugal). Here too, the trade union movement can rely on successful 
strategies.531 The most important attainment in this respect is the Volkswagen charter.
6.4.5 Charter on Temporary work for the Volkswagen Group
In 2012, Volkswagen and IndustriALL entered into the Charter on Temporary Work 
for the Volkswagen Group. It included important arrangements about deploying 
temporary agency workers. The partners agreed on:
 – reasonable use of temporary employment or temporary agency work as a key 
tool to attain flexibility within the Volkswagen group;
 – phasing in the ‘equal pay’ principle; the remuneration of temporary agency 
workers keeps pace with their increasing experience and qualifications in the 
same way as it does for permanent workers;
 – there always being a connection with the range of vocational training facilities;
 – the fact that, besides the use of interns and employing young graduates, tempor-
ary employment or temporary agency work is a third route to hiring permanent 
staff.
Temporary employment/temporary agency work gives an individual a chance to find 
permanent employment if his or her qualifications are adequate and if the opportun-
ity presents itself. At the same time, temporary employment/temporary agency work 
is a means for Volkswagen to even out fluctuations and carry out special tasks. It is 
complementary to the permanent staff, which constitutes good HR policy, provided 
the principles that have been agreed on are being observed.
The agreement covers limiting the number of temporary agency workers, equal 
pay, limiting the duration of the assignment, right to permanent employment and 
selecting temporary employment agencies: these must endorse the Charter.
The number of temporary agency workers must be reasonably proportionate 
to the permanent workforce. For the proportion per subsidiary, a 5% benchmark is 
adhered to. The partner may agree to vary. If the proportion of temporary employ-
ment/temporary agency work increases, consultations are in order, in accordance 
with the arrangement in the Charter of Labour Relations that regulates consultation. 
The management must inform the European and Global Works Councils about the 
numbers.
531 Benassi (2016).
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In respect of remuneration, it has been agreed that after a nine-month period, tempor-
ary agency workers are to receive the same wages as permanent employees working at 
the same level. After two years, a temporary agency worker is likewise entitled to the 
variable remuneration, which is comparable to what the permanent employee would 
be paid by that time. Working hours for temporary agency workers are the same as 
those in the employee’s plant. The temporary agency worker is entitled to the same 
working conditions as the permanent employee has, in the sense that he or she has 
equal occupational and health rights, together with, as a rule, access to the common 
facilities, services and other provisions.
The protection of a temporary agency worker covers a maximum of three con-
tracts with a 36-month limit. If a temporary agency worker has reached this limit, the 
possibility of permanent employment is looked into. There is also a minimum assign-
ment of 6 months. As a rule, each extension should cover 6 months. After 18 months, 
a temporary agency worker is entitled to be eligible for permanent employment at 
Volkswagen, provided he or she meets the qualification requirements.
Only temporary employment agencies that endorse the ‘Volkswagen Group re-
quirements regarding sustainability in its relationships with business partners’ can be 
accepted as service providers.
In case of differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of the Charter, the 
president and general secretary of the European and/or Global Works Council must 
seek a solution together with the international HR director.
All in all, the Volkswagen package is the most far-reaching IFA in this field. It 
makes clear what global social dialogue can achieve.
The charter also raises the question as to how to deal with the negotiating rights of 
temporary agency workers, which have been safeguarded for them by ILO conven-
tions 87 and 98. In 2013, new collective agreements were concluded in Germany532 
between the temporary employment federations iGZ (Interessenverband Zeitarbeit) 
and Bundesarbeitgeberverband der Personaldienstleister (BAP) on the one hand and 
a number of Deutscher Gewerkschafts Bund (DGB) unions on the other. The agree-
ments included salary supplements that may rise from 15% after 6 weeks’ work to 50% 
after 9 months.533 It may be clear that conflicting interests can play a role. Who is the 
employer, Volkswagen or the temporary employment agency? At any rate, the pos-
sibility of conflicting regulations requires room for consultation between the parties 
involved, including opportunities for synchronising the regulations.
532 Tarifverträge Zeitarbeit, BAP/DGB-Tarifgemeinschaft, vom 22-7-2003, geändert durch Änderungs-
tarifverträge vom 22-12-2004, 30-5-2006, 9-3-2010, 17-9-2013, ergänzt durch Ergänzungstarif-
verträge über Branchenzuschläge www.tuja.de, p. 29.
533 Sperman (2013).
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Table 6.8  Example of collective agreement provision re time-based salary 
 supplements534
Branchenzuschläge ME West ab 01.01.2014
Entgelt-
gruppe
DGB-Tarif-
vertrag
nach 
6 Wochen
nach 
3 Monaten
nach 
5 Monaten
nach 
7 Monaten
nach 
9 Monaten
Zuschlag 15% 20% 30% 45% 50%
E1  8,50  9,78 10,20 11,05 12,33 12,75
E2  9,07 10,43 10,88 11,79 13,15 13,61
E3 10,61 12,20 12,73 13,79 15,38 15,92
E4 11,22 12,90 13,46 14,59 16,27 16,83
E5 12,67 14,57 15,20 16,47 18,37 19,01
E6 14,25 16,39 17,10 18,53 20,66 21,38
E7 16,64 19,14 19,97 21,63 24,13 24,96
E8 17,90 20,59 21,48 23,27 25,96 26,85
E9 18,89 21,72 22,67 24,56 27,39 28,34
Branchenzuschläge ME Ost ab 01.01.2014
Entgelt-
gruppe
DGB-Tarif-
vertrag
nach 
6 Wochen
nach 
3 Monaten
nach 
5 Monaten
nach 
7 Monaten
nach 
9 Monaten
Zuschlag 15% 20% 30% 45% 50%
E1  7,86  9,04  9,43 10,22 11,40 11,79
E2  8,01  9,21  9,61 10,41 11,61 12,02
E3  9,36 10,76 11,23 12,17 13,57 14,04
E4  9,90 11,39 11,88 12,87 14,36 14,85
E5 11,19 12,87 13,43 14,55 16,23 16,79
E6 12,58 14,47 15,10 16,35 18,24 18,87
E7 14,68 16,88 17,62 19,08 21,29 22,02
E8 15,79 18,16 18,95 20,53 22,90 23,69
E9 16,67 19,17 20,00 21,67 24,17 25,01
It becomes clear that the formation of social law takes place through various chan-
nels. The IFA can be seen as a new instrument that may be added to the toolbox 
containing instruments to give form and substance to this jurisprudence. What also 
becomes clear is that the IFA instrument cannot replace Convention 181. While cor-
porate  CIETT members refer to the convention and the corresponding Recommenda-
tion 188, inclusion of these can hardly supplant the convention. It is supportive and 
supplementary.
534 Tarifverträge Zeitarbeit, BAP/DGB-Tarifgemeinschaft, vom 22-7-2003, geändert durch Änderungs-
tarifverträge vom 22-12-2004, 30-5-2006, 9-3-2010, 17-9-2013, ergänzt durch Ergänzungstarif-
verträge über Branchenzuschläge www.tuja.de, p. 29.
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This also applies to the supply chain and employment provisions. The IFAs can play 
a flanking role tackling bottlenecks with regard to temporary agency work, such as 
employment insecurity, unequal pay, weak trade union positions and excessive use of 
temporary agency work. The supply chain provisions can direct attention to decent 
wages and other labour and employment conditions.
Labour market provisions can prioritise permanent employment and encourage 
reasoned choices in decisions on the use of temporary agency work. Moreover, stand-
ards can be set in instances where excessive use is made of temporary agency work.
IFAs grant trade unions a prominent position in the ongoing globalisation. The 
Volkswagen Charter may be seen as a promising prospect towards mature temporary 
agency relationships.
Nevertheless, serving the justified interests of temporary agency employers con-
tinues to be important. Scope for consultation between all parties involved in tempo-
rary agency work and opportunities for further synchronisation must be guaranteed.
All in all, the IFAs do not replace Convention 181; they are supplementary, pro-
viding scope for additional measures. Convention 181 continues to be an adequate 
instrument in its own right.
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Chapter 7
The European approach to temporary 
agency work
This last section of part II examines the developments that have by now come up in 
Europe with respect to temporary agency work. Firstly, a picture will be drawn of 
what Europe now signifies from a social perspective. This social picture is important 
to be able to understand why the EU has eventually embraced the topic of temporary 
agency work. It will become clear why the EU, which was established as the EEC, i.e. 
the European Economic Community, has increasingly taken up social issues.
The first treaties were mainly about safeguarding the so-called four freedoms, 
i.e. the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. We shall see, how-
ever, that to an increasing extent the social dimension – both in a procedural and a 
substantive sense – also demands attention and is entrenched in EU regulations. The 
jurisprudence by the European Court likewise puts in efforts. More and more, these 
pivot around the question as to how the freedom of movement of persons and ser-
vices relate to the social aspect.
The social dimension culminated in the Treaties of Maastricht (1992), where 
a social protocol was drawn up, which was eventually entrenched in the Treaty of 
 Amsterdam (1997). Lisbon, and its Charter of Fundamental Rights, should likewise 
be mentioned in this context.
Freedom of movement of persons and services also involves temporary agency 
work, and it is in this specific field where people are employed and services are provid-
ed. As such, regulations on temporary agency work are rooted in the core of European 
economic and social regulations. Hence the significance of examining the EU’s social 
dimension first. Largely parallel to this social law development at EU level, temporary 
agency regulations have developed, and these will be discussed extensively below.
Particular attention warrants the Posting of Workers Directive, the Enforcement 
Directive and the social dialogue on temporary agency work. After the latter failed, a 
protracted discussion ensued on a directive regarding temporary agency work, which 
was eventually realised in 2008. It will also become clear that Europe attaches great 
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importance to the concept of flexicurity and that the social partners in the temporary 
agency sector are committed to positioning temporary agency work as a flexicurity 
concept.
Lastly, elements in Convention 181 will be compared to the European regulatory 
framework on temporary employment agencies. The pivotal question in all this is 
how adequate Convention 181 (still) is. Has the development of European temporary 
agency regulations overtaken Convention 181 and is it is now partly superfluous from 
a European perspective, or does this convention still have added value for Europe?
7.1 SOCIAL EUROPE
7.1.1 How it started: Treaty of Paris
The history of the European union started in the 1950s. France and Germany drove 
the development towards the Treaty of Paris, on which occasion the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded, and towards the two treaties signed in 
Rome, establishing Euratom and the European Economic Community.535
The dream of a United States of Europe had existed for much longer. During the 
Franco-German war (1870–1871) Victor Hugo addressed the Assemblée Nationale on 
1 March 1871, declaiming: ‘No more frontiers! The Rhine for everyone! Let us be the 
same Republic, let us be the United States of Europe, let us be the continental federa-
tion, let us be European liberty, let us be universal peace’.536
The war of 1870–1871 and the First and Second World Wars engendered barbar-
ities that focused attention on the desire to have ‘no more war, ever’. It pushed the 
perpetual strife and rivalry between Germany and France to the background.
On 19 September 1946, Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 
1940 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1955, delivered a speech in Zurich, in which he stated:
I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe. This noble continent (...) 
is the fountain of Christian faith and Christian ethics. It is the origin of most of the 
culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times (...) Yet it 
is from Europe that have sprung that series of frightful nationalistic quarrels, orig-
inated by the Teutonic nations, which we have seen even in this twentieth century 
and in our own lifetime, wreck the peace and mar the prospects of all mankind (...) 
Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously 
adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few 
years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland 
535 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 73.
536 Gardner (2016), p. 247.
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is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European Family, or 
as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in 
peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.537
The Schuman Declaration, dated 9 May 1950,538 stated that ‘the contribution which 
an organized and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the main-
tenance of peaceful relations’; and that ‘Europe will not be made at once, or according 
to a single plan’.
By signing the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg pledged themselves to the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which served as the model for the later European Union. They 
transferred part of their sovereignty to a supranational power that was to govern the 
coal and steel market as the so-called High Authority.539
The social dimension had not been explicitly included in the Paris Treaty. How-
ever, the common market for coal and steel was to have positive effects. Article 2 of 
the treaty provides that the common market is to contribute to economic expansion, 
the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of living.540
7.1.2 Wat came next: Treaty of Rome
In the years following the Treaty of Paris, attempts were made to realise a European 
political community and a European defence community.541 The latter plan was even-
tually thwarted owing to French resistance. Thus, the idea of a comprehensive federa-
tion was let go.542 A so-called Benelux memorandum constituted a joint proposal by 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Beyen (the Netherlands), Spaak (Belgium) and Bech 
(Luxembourg). The proposal can be seen as a concerted re-launch to achieve more 
European cooperation.543 On 25 March 1957, in Rome, the Benelux countries – Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg –, together with Germany, France and Italy 
signed the treaties for the European Economic Community and Euratom.544
Euratom was tasked with encouraging the peaceful application of nuclear energy, 
which was intended to become an alternative for traditional sources of energy.
537 The full text of the speech can be found on www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html.
538 Hendrickx (2011), p. 9.
539 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 76.
540 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 83.
541 Verhofstadt (2015), p. 24.
542 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 81.
543 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 87.
544 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 87.
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The EEC treaty implied agreements with respect to the establishment of a customs 
union, agreements in the field of transport and competition, and agreements regard-
ing the development of a joint agricultural policy.545
Economic collaboration was both an aim and a means to realise closer relations 
between the states united in the Community (art. 2) and guarantees for peace and 
security (preamble).546
The social dimension plays a minor role in the treaty. Only two articles are dedic-
ated to social measures: article 3 c) eliminates obstacles to the freedom of  movement 
of persons, services and capital, and article  3 i) relates to the establishment of the 
 European Social Fund (ESF) in order to improve employment opportunities for work-
ers and to contribute to raising their standard of living.547 In the further devel opment 
of the free movement of workers, articles 48–51 provide that the special Council of 
Ministers can take measures unanimously in the field of social security in order to 
prevent migrants losing their social security rights when moving to another member 
state.548
Part III, title III of the treaty, titled ‘Social Policy’, contains the further elabora-
tion of the EEC’s social agenda.549
Article 117 formulates the justification for social measures, stating:
Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working conditions and 
an improved standard of living for workers, to make possible their harmonisation 
while the improvement is being maintained. They believe that such a development 
will ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, which will favour 
the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in 
this Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation 
or administrative action.550
Article  100 authorises the Commission to make proposals to the Special Council 
of Ministers to issue directives for the closer harmonisation of such provisions laid 
down by law, regulations or administrative action in member states as directly affect 
the establishment or functioning of the common market.551
545 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 88.
546 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 88.
547 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 102.
548 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 102.
549 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 103.
550 The full text of the Treaty of Rome can be found on https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/ 
1999/1/1/cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e/publishable_en.pdf.
551 https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e/ 
publishable_en.pdf, p. 37.
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The articles make clear that social development is a by-product of economic develop-
ment.552 Article 118 elaborates on article 117, providing that the member states need 
to work more closely together in matters relating to occupational and continuance 
training, employment, industrial hygiene, labour legislation and working conditions, 
protection against occupational accidents and diseases, the law as to trade unions and 
collective bargaining between employers and workers.553
The largest social impact has been attributed to article  119 of the EEC Treaty. 
It deals with equal pay for equal work and has shaped equal treatment through the 
juris prudence of the European Court, for instance in the Defrenne judgments.554
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the European Court regarding the human rights con-
stitutes an important contribution to the creation of social law by respecting hu-
man rights duties as ‘general principles of law’. In 1975, the Court first referred to the 
ECHR, the European Charter of Human Rights, and in 1978, it also referred to the 
ESC, the European Social Charter.555
7.1.3 The 1970s and 1980s
On 8 April 1965, the treaties of Rome were integrated in a single treaty that became 
effective on 1 July 1967.556
By the end of the 1960s, people worried about the poorly functioning economy, 
which caused exchange rate turbulence. Eventually it resulted in the establishment of 
the European Monetary System (EMS), in which the member states were obligated 
to limit currency fluctuations.557 The goal laid down in the Single European Act was 
an economic and monetary union. At the 1972 Paris Summit, the government leaders 
argued that this could not be achieved without social policy. More coordination in 
the field of employment opportunities and conditions of employment was needed. 
In 1974 this resulted in the first Social Action Programme, which was to mobilise 
the Community in the field of full and better employment opportunities, the im-
provement of working and living conditions and the enhancement of social partners’ 
involvement in the economic policy process.558
552 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 104.
553 https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-6b0b3252696e/ 
publishable_en.pdf, p. 43.
554 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 105.
555 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 109.
556 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 111.
557 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 112.
558 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 113.
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Whereas the Treaty of Rome still referred to promoting employment, this programme 
was all about concrete objectives. Although many proposals were submitted, only a 
few were agreed upon, for instance: the directives for equal treatment of men and 
women and the directives regarding the protection of workers’ rights upon the trans-
fer of an enterprise and in case of mass redundancy.559
This action was based on article 119, which had already been included in the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957. While this article had been formulated for economic reasons, it was 
now being used to fulfil social and emancipatory objectives.560
A plan by the Dutch European Commissioner Vredeling, tasked with social af-
fairs and employment, to create a form of pan-European employee participation fell 
through, mostly as a result of British resistance.561 Based on the amendments to the 
Treaty of Maastricht, a less far-reaching form was eventually adopted. Thus, it could 
no longer be torpedoed by the United Kingdom.562
In the slipstream of the Social Action Programmes, non-binding programmes 
were set up, such as plans to give specific target groups, including young and poor 
people, better opportunities in the labour market. The Social Action Programme 
(1974–1976) can be seen ‘as part of the pursuit of a more interventionist social policy 
than had been foreseen by the EEC Treaty, a pursuit that was thrown overboard in the 
early 1980s’.563
At that time, a political wind of deregulation and flexibility got up in response to 
the protracted economic crisis. There was no more agreement on directives, except 
in the field of occupational safety. Guidelines were drawn up for protection against 
excessive noise, against the hazards of being exposed to chemical, physical and bio-
logical agents at work, and against asbestosis. Reaching unanimous agreement was 
not a problem in this field, not even for the British, who already had relevant regula-
tions of their own.564
The French President Mitterand was dissatisfied with this halting attitude to-
wards shaping social policy. In 1981, he opted for an ‘espace social’. He enlisted the 
support of his fellow-countryman Jacques Delors, who became the chairman of the 
European Commission in 1985.565 However, Delors did not manage to have the social 
dimension evolve in line with the economic one. That same year, his commission 
published the white paper Completing the internal market comprising three hundred 
559 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 114.
560 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 115.
561 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 116.
562 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 116.
563 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 116.
564 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 117.
565 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 117.
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largely economically driven measures.566 Still, Delors was convinced that something 
had to happen in the social domain:
The creation of a vast economic area, based on the market and business co operation 
is inconceivable – I would say unattainable – without some harmonisation of social 
legislation. Our ultimate aim must be the creation of a European social area.567
The white paper led to the 1986 Single European Act for which treaties were signed 
on 27 and 28 February in Luxembourg and The Hague respectively.568 These were 
not merely agreements on the internal market, but also included amendments to 
the texts of treaties, new objectives and codification of jurisprudence. The preamble 
refers to the ECHR and the ESC, stating that the member states wish to express the 
determination to:
... work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights re-
cognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European 
Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.569
Besides this preamble, a number of new treaty articles reinforced the social di-
mension. Occupational health and safety were designated as social objectives, and 
article 118 of the EEC Treaty, which tasks the Commission with promoting ‘close co-
operation in the social field’ was supplemented with article 118A stating: ‘the Member 
States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the 
working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall set as 
their objective the harmonization of conditions in this area’570
Delors also wanted member states to converge more. He aimed at organising 
 coherence between rich and poor regions.571 By way of cushioning the differences, he 
set out to shape an ‘espace social’. It was necessary to prevent rich countries from bene-
fitting from the internal market more than the poorer ones. To that end, art icle 130 
was adopted, stating: ‘In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the 
Community shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the  strengthening of 
566 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 118.
567 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 118.
568 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 119.
569 The full text of the Single European Act can be found on http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html 
?uri=cellar:a519205f-924a-4978-96a2-b9af8a598b85.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
570 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 120.
571 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 118.
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its economic and social cohesion’.572 This resulted in Community support to less- 
favoured areas, but not to binding social policies.
Moreover, the Single European Act resulted in article 100A, which gave the Council the 
opportunity to act by a qualified majority rather than by the unanimity that had ap-
plied until then.573 This concerned measures that had as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market. Moreover, the veto right was abolished in fields 
related to the internal market, for instance measures concerning the free movement of 
workers (article 49), the freedom of establishment (art. 54 and 56), the recognition of 
qualifications (art. 57) and with regard to the ban on discrimination (art. 7).574
This vested the European Parliament with more power. Cooperation was the 
name of the game. If the European Commission endorses an amendment adopted by 
the European Parliament, the Council can only torpedo it by unanimity.575 Further-
more, it can act by qualified majority to lay down directives aimed at improving the 
environment.576
Delors also wanted to create more scope for social partners at European level. 
Some form of social dialogue already existed, but by means of the Single European 
Act, Delors gave it new impetus in article 118B: ‘The Commission shall endeavour 
to develop the dialogue between management and labour at European level, which 
could, if the two sides consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement’. This 
dialogue has resulted in several collective binding agreements in the fields of parental 
leave, part-time work, fixed-term contracts, teleworking and stress.577
By the end of the 1980s, the pressure to enhance European cooperation from a social 
perspective increased. A poor economic situation and the entry of Greece (1981), 
Spain and Portugal (1986) underscored the differences in living standards. At the 1988 
Euro Summit in Rhodes, the government leaders stated that the ‘completion of the 
internal market must be accompanied by progress in implementing its provisions on 
social policy, and by the strengthening of economic and social cohesion’.578 By that 
time, listing workers’ fundamental rights was considered. An alternative proposal 
meant signing the European Social Charter, but in the end, a working group for the 
Commission decided to draft a catalogue of fundamental social rights. This Com-
munity Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers was adopted without 
572 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 120.
573 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 121.
574 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 121.
575 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 121.
576 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 122.
577 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 122.
578 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 123.
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the support of the British. The preamble provides that the same importance must be 
attached to the Community’s social aspects as to its economic aspects. The Commun-
ity Charter is not legally binding, and constitutes no more than a solemn statement, 
although the Court does refer to it in its jurisprudence.579
7.1.4 From Maastricht to Amsterdam
On 7 February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was realised, the Treaty on European 
 Union (TEU). Following ratification by all national parliaments, it became effective 
on 1 November 1993.580
In 1989, the Berlin Wall had come down. There was fear of a strong unified Ger-
many, and Kohl, then Chancellor of Germany, was willing to enter into a monetary 
union.581 ‘Maastricht’ meant a common currency, focus on a form of citizenship in a 
European context, agreements regarding justice and internal affairs, and a common 
foreign and security policy. In the social domain, the so-called social protocol was 
realised, in which the eleven member states of the Union, without the British, com-
mitted to agreements that would apply to them only.582 This protocol was linked to 
the social agreement in which the new provisions for the eleven countries in question 
were laid down.
Together with the Maastricht Treaty, a so-called co-decision procedure was im-
plemented, which made the European Parliament and the European Council equal 
partners, who had to agree through negotiations before adopting a directive.583
This procedure usually requires attaining a full or qualified majority in both 
institutions. A proposal is rejected if one of them does not agree. It is one of the four 
main forms of decision-making where the European Parliament does not have the 
last word. The other three forms are the consultation procedure, the assent procedure 
and the cooperation procedure of the Single European Act.584 Through the negoti-
ation procedure, the Commission has the authority to introduce amendments that the 
Council can adopt by qualified majority, or by unanimity if it wants to impose changes.
Whereas human rights were included in the 1986 Single European Act through 
reference in the preamble to the ECHR, the European Charter of Human Rights, 
and the ESC, the European Social Charter, in ‘Maastricht’ the reference to the ESC 
579 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 123.
580 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 128.
581 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 128.
582 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 130.
583 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 131.
584 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 133.
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 disappeared and the reference to the ECHR was enhanced.585 Apart from a reference 
in the preamble, the introductory article  F, par.  2 stated: ‘The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) and as they result from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the member states, as general principles of Community 
law’.586 For that matter, the Union can only apply this respect in the areas where the 
EU is competent.
Although the British steered clear of the aforementioned protocol, they did 
commit to article 2 of the new Treaty on European Union that states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an 
economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or ac-
tivities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of convergence 
of economic performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, the 
raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohe-
sion and solidarity among Member States.587
All in all, it meant an enhancement of the social objectives. Furthermore, it meant a 
broadening of scope as the by now well-known articles 117–222 were supplemented 
with topics such as education (art. 126), vocational training (art. 127) and youth.588
The social agreement linked to the social protocol that was concluded by the eleven 
member states posits in article 1:
The Community and the Member States shall have as their objectives the promo-
tion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social pro-
tection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human 
resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion. 
To this end the Community and the Member States shall implement measures 
which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, particularly in the 
field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the 
Community economy.589
585 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 133.
586 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 134.
587 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 137.
588 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 138 and 139.
589 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 142.
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Figure 7.1 The Legislative Process Barnard (2012)/COM(93) 600, 43 with updates
According to article 2, the EC will support and complement the activities of the mem-
ber states in the fields of occupational health and safety, labour and employment 
conditions, equality between men and women with regard to labour market oppor-
tunities and treatment at work, the information and consultation of workers, and the 
integration of persons who have been excluded from the labour market.590
590 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 142.
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Directives can be drawn up, containing minimum requirements in line with the co-
operation procedure, i.e. without veto rights, except for amendments by the Euro-
pean Parliament that are endorsed by the Commission.591
According to article 2, par. 3, social security and the social protection of workers, 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, co-determina-
tion and financial contributions for the promotion of employment and job creation 
are exempted from majority voting.592
Article 2, par. 4, provides that, at the request of the social partners, the member 
states can task them with the implementation of the directives.593
Article 2, par. 6, measures in respect of the right of association, the right to strike 
or the employers’ right to impose lock-out are completely exempted.594
Article 3 obligates the Commission to consult with social partners on the ‘pos-
sible direction’ of Community action. The social partners can choose to develop an 
agreement of their own, and in principle, the duration of this procedure must not 
exceed nine months.
Article 4 enables the conversion of such an agreement into a Council decision. 
It has been arranged that agreements by social partners are not legally binding in the 
member states without a Council decision.
In 1993, in the Green Paper European Social Policy,595 the European Commission 
cautioned about the danger of social dumping. It also drew attention to the question 
as to how labour law could be reconciled with the economic objectives. The Green 
Paper stated that ‘this process will be taking place at a moment when the attention of 
the community is focused on the whole issue of how to reconcile economic and social 
objectives in the face of rising unemployment and growing concern about Europe’s 
ability to remain competitive into the 21st century’.
It discussed ‘labour market adaptability’,596 anticipating the concept of flexi-
curity, which will be expounded below. The discussion was also related ‘to the prob-
lems which all Member States are having in funding the growing demand on social 
protection systems and the search for greater efficiency in the operations of these as 
one means of making savings’.597
591 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 143.
592 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 143.
593 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 143.
594 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 143.
595 EC Commission (1993).
596 Hendrickx (2011), p. 24 and 25.
597 Hendrickx (2011), p. 25.
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It was proposed to introduce minimum standards, but the eventual White Paper, 
titled Growth, competitiveness, employment598 did not contain any. Instead, social 
dumping was to be prevented through co-optation, coordination and convergence.599 
The White Paper on European Social Policy600 did not develop the discussion. At the 
Essen Summit (December 1994), member states agreed to make arrangements for im-
proving employment through ‘increasing the employment-intensiveness of growth, 
in particular by more flexible organisation of work in a way which fulfils both the 
wishes of employees and the requirements of competition’.601
In this context, the Commission took the initiative to make arrangements under 
the ‘Maastricht’ protocol in the field of fixed-term contracts,602 part-time work and 
temporary agency work.
Moreover the Essen Summit saw the formulation of concrete objectives, 
which the member states were to translate into multi-annual programming. Non- 
compliance with these objectives was not subject to sanctions.603
On 2 October 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty was signed, and following ratifications 
by the member states it reached completion on 1 May 1999.604 The most important 
aspect of the Amsterdam Treaty has been its inclusion of the social agreement. In the 
United Kingdom, Tony Blair had become prime minister, and he was willing to put 
an end to the social schism that had arisen as a result of Maastricht. The old articles 
117–120 of the EC Treaty were replaced by articles 136–143. Article  136 (ex art.  117) 
formulates the objective and integrates article 1 of the social protocol. It states:
The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such 
as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 
and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 
shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and 
working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improve-
ment is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management 
and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high em-
ployment and the combating of exclusion.
598 European Commission (1994).
599 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 145.
600 Commission of the European Communities (1994).
601 Hendrickx (2011), p. 27.
602 Hendrickx (2011), p. 27.
603 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 146.
604 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 147.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
286
To this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which take 
account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contrac-
tual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union economy.
They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning 
of the internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but 
also from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and from the approximation of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.605
This article is seen as a major milestone, under which all EC member states commit-
ted to a broadly formulated social policy.606
Moreover, ‘Amsterdam’ constitutes the basis for a European employment poli-
cy. The treaty speaks of ‘a high level of employment and social protection’ as part of 
the EU’s new task (art. 12). This entails the task of developing a coordinated strategy 
for employment (art.  3).607 On 24 January 2000, the Council decided to establish 
an Employment Committee.608 The Council noted that the Amsterdam Treaty only 
lays down the procedures, ‘by which Member States and the Community shall work 
towards developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for pro-
moting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to 
economic change’.609
And thus, the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was born, a  method 
whereby member states make efforts to develop their employment policy according 
to guidelines set by the Commission.610 The added value lies in the inherent peer 
pressure.611
7.1.5 From Lisbon and back again via Nice
In 2000 (six months prior to the Nice Summit), when optimism soared due to the 
favourable economic development by the turn of the century, the European Council 
took the initiative to the creation of the so-called Lisbon Strategy. Its aim was to be-
come ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion.612
605 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 156.
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Later on, ‘sustainable development’ was added, so that the Lisbon Strategy had three 
objectives, i.e. economic policy, social policy and environmental policy.613 The Euro-
pean Council appointed itself coordinator.
According to the objectives, member states should aim for an average economic 
growth increase by 3 per cent, rising employment rates from 61 to approximately 70 
per cent and increasing the participation of female workers from 51 per cent to over 
60 per cent. In this context, the European Council stated: ‘Human capital is Europe’s 
most important asset and should be at the heart of EU policy.614 Rather than for legis-
lation to realise the objectives, the Council opted for the above-mentioned OMC, the 
Open Method of Coordination. Through this type of ‘gentle’ pressure it attempted to 
realise policy coordination, accompanied by a learning process among member states 
through reports and exchanges of best practices.615 Some years after the Lisbon Strat-
egy was launched, it reached an impasse and the focus shifted back to the primacy of 
economic growth. A High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok advised that realising 
economic growth and reinforcing Europe’s competitiveness are core requirements 
for the success of the Lisbon Strategy and that, thus, the social and environmental 
dimensions are once again dependent factors. This way of thinking is also at the core 
of the 2020 Strategy, adopted in March 2010, which prioritised growth, although it 
had to be ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive’. The EU set five headline targets for 2020:
1. Employment: 75 per cent of the 20–64 year-olds to be employed.
2. Research, development and innovation: 3 per cent of the EU’s GDP to be invested 
in research & development and innovation.
3. Sustainability: greenhouse gas emissions to be 20 per cent lower than in 1990, 20 
per cent of the energy from renewables, and energy efficiency must be increased 
by 20 per cent.
4. Education: at least 40 per cent of the 30–34 year-olds must have completed the 
third level of education and the school drop-out rates must be reduced to below 
10 per cent
5. Poverty and social exclusion: at least 20 million fewer people are in or at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion.616
Reports follow a set pattern containing integrated guidelines. By now, the 2020 strat-
egy has become inseparably interwoven with the EU budget cycle, which has been 
tightened due to the economic crisis.617
613 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 174.
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Following the Lisbon Summit, the Nice Treaty was concluded by the end of 2000. The 
treaty was marked by the entry of ten new member states. Earlier on, a committee 
of wise men, consisting of Von Weizsäcker, Dehaene and Lord Simon, had indicated 
that it was necessary to make the EU regulations and treaties more citizen-friendly.618
In the final act of the Nice Treaty, the government leaders called for a deeper and 
wider debate about the future of the European Union.619 It formed the overture to 
designing a European Constitution. The Nice Treaty did contain several amendments 
to the chapter of ‘social provisions’, in title XI ‘social policy, education, vocational 
training and youth’.
In particular, decision-making in the various fields of activity was simplified. The 
Council can promote the social objectives both by encouraging cooperation between 
the member states, for example through the exchange of knowledge or the evaluation 
of experiences, and by establishing minimum guidelines. This applies to (a) the im-
provement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ health and 
safety; (b) the labour and employment conditions; (c) social security and social protec-
tion of workers; (d) the protection of workers upon termination of their employment 
contract; (e) the information and consultation of workers; (f) representation and col-
lective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination; 
(g) the conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Com-
munity territory; (h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market; and 
(i) the equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities 
and treatment at work. It does not, however, apply to (j) combating social exclusion.
In principle, the co-decision procedure (including qualified majority and Parlia-
mentary involvement) holds, unless the areas c, d, e, f, and g are concerned, about 
which Parliamentary consultation takes place and for which Council unanimity is 
requisite. In case of unanimity, decisions for the areas d, f and g can still be made by 
qualified majority voting, but this does not apply to c, social security.
A new field of competence is the modernisation of the social security systems 
(n). Just like combating social exclusion (j), this field of competence makes use of the 
OMC (the Open Method of Coordination).620
Moreover, the Nice Treaty enables incentive measures to combat discrimination 
by qualified majority of the Council and co-decision by Parliament. Unanimity con-
tinues to be mandatory for directives.621
At a later date, these amendments, particularly article 137 EC, were to prove ex-
tremely relevant to regulating temporary agency work at EU level. The Treaty of Nice 
618 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 166.
619 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 166 and 167.
620 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 172. See also: Ter Haar (2012).
621 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 172.
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also came to include a supplement to article 7 EU Treaty of Amsterdam, which author ises 
the European Council to take measures in case of a serious and persistent breach of the 
Union principles by a member state. This concerns a prevention mechanism stating that:
On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Par-
liament or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four 
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may 
determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the val-
ues referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the Council shall 
hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting 
in accordance with the same procedure.622
In Nice, the chairpersons of the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
European Commission also had the opportunity to sign the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Although no agreement on the Charter’s status could 
be reached at the time, a debate was arranged on the future of the European Union. 
According to the Laeken Declaration dated 14 and 15 December 2001, a new treaty 
should address:
 – a better division and definition of competence in the European Union;
 – simplification of the Union’s instruments;
 – more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the European Union;
 – the legitimacy of a Constitution for European citizens.623
Jacques Chirac had earlier uttered the word ‘constitution’, and this fitted in with ideas 
of, for instance Spinelli in 1984624 and Herman625 in 1994. A new Constitution would 
be both a definitive acknowledgement of the member states’ partial loss of sovereign-
ty and a definitive instrument for preconditions and guarantees for the transfer of 
sovereignty. A so-called convention led by the former French head of state Valérie 
Giscard d’Estaing was tasked with its development, and on 29 October 2004 the draft 
Constitution was signed by the Council and the Ministers of Foreign  Affairs.626 The 
realisation of the draft Constitution involved discussion on the social aspect, which 
would not need to be featured, but was eventually included through proposals by 
622 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 169.
623 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 180.
624 Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986) was the driving force behind the draft of a first European Constitution; 
see https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/altiero_spinelli_en.pdf
625 In 1993 Fernand Herman conducted a study on the feasibility of a European Constitution, result-
ing in a draft-Constitution in 1994; See http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vgzlnoiotgpk/herman_
grondwet_van_1994. See also: Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 165 and 166.
626 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 182.
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the ‘Social Europe’ working group. In the Constitution text this resulted in qualified 
majority voting both for social policy aspects relating to the freedoms of the in ternal 
market, such as the mutual recognition of diplomas and rights of third- country 
nationals, and for decisions regarding the social security of migrant workers and 
self-employed persons.
Qualified majority voting was not extended to social protection that was to 
guarantee adequate living conditions in case of old age, disability, maternity, unem-
ployment or dependency, and with regard to social assistance and housing. It was 
provided, however, that: ‘in defining and implementing the policies and actions re-
ferred to in this Part, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protec-
tion, the combating of social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of public health’ (art. 111–117).627
Be this as it may, a declaration was furnished (declaration 18, ad art.  III-213) 
providing that areas of social policy essentially fall under the competence of member 
states, and that the Union can only take complementary or supporting action.628
In any event, the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, 
which is declared binding in article 1–9 can be called an achievement.
However appealing the project appeared to be, the draft-Constitution was finally re-
jected by France and the Netherlands. This put a stop to the Constitution project, 
and the Treaty of Lisbon, dated 13 December 2007, took over its position. This reform 
treaty consists of two parts, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Many elements of the draft-Constitution were included in this treaty. Article 2 
TEU, adopted from the Constitution, states that:
… the EU is a Community of values. The Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimina-
tion, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.629
Article 3 TEU aims, firstly, to promote peace, its values and the well-being of the Euro-
pean peoples; secondly, to offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice 
627 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 188.
628 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 188.
629 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 203. The TEU can be downloaded on en.euabc.com/upload/rfConstitu-
tion_en.pdf.
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without internal frontiers and, thirdly, the realisation of an internal market with a 
social dimension, aiming at full employment and social progress: the Union ‘shall 
combat social exclusion and discrimination and shall promote social justice and 
 protection (…)’.630
Article 8 TFEU states that, in all its activities, the Union shall aim to promote 
equality between men and women.631 Article  9 TFEU provides that, in defining 
and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account re-
quirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee 
of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health’.632
Article 10 provides that, in defining and implementing its policies and activities, 
the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.633
In the articles 151–161, the TFEU (title X, Social policy) has adopted the former art-
icles 136–145 from the TEC. Article 152 is new, however, as it establishes the tripartite 
‘ Social Summit for Growth and Employment’.634 Article 156 provides that the Com-
mission can propose studies, guidelines and indicators, including periodic monitor-
ing and evaluation, and that it can also promote and coordinate them through the 
OMC, the Open Method of Coordination.635
European social policy does not merely involve legislation and guidelines, but also 
juris diction. In this respect two judgements are significant: Viking and Laval, in 
which the Court assessed how the right to take collective action relates to the free-
dom of establishment (art. 49 TFEU, ex art. 43 TEC) and the freedom to provide ser-
vices within the Union (art. 56 TFEU, ex art. 49 TEC).
The Viking judgment636 concerned the Finnish ferry company ‘Viking Line’ that 
ran ferry services between Estonia and Finland. The vessel in question, the ‘Roselle’, 
sailed under Finnish colours and was obliged to apply the Finnish terms of employ-
ment. The company wanted to change this by reflagging the vessel to Estonia and 
by concluding a ‘more profitable’ collective bargaining agreement with an Estonian 
trade union. The Finnish union FSU announced a strike and the ITF, the  International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, called for an expression of solidarity and a boycott of 
630 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 204.
631 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 205.
632 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 205. 
633 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 205 and 206.
634 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 206.
635 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 206.
636 Viking, judgment of the Court of 11 December 2007, case C-438/05.
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negotiations with Viking. Viking stated that all this was contrary to the freedom of 
establishment. The European Court decided that the right to strike is a fundamental 
right and as such forms an integral part of Community law, and that this may con-
stitute a justified interference with the freedom of establishment, which put the trade 
unions in the right. However, the Court also argued that such an interference was 
only tenable if there were overriding reasons of public interest and if the interference 
were necessary and proportionate, which would apply only if jobs and terms of em-
ployment were really at risk or in serious danger. Furthermore, the national court 
was to examine whether the actions had been proportionate, which amounted to 
examining possible alternatives.
The Laval judgment637 was about the clash between the right to strike and the 
freedom of providing services. Baltic, a Swedish trading partnership owned by Laval, 
a Latvian company, was licensed to build a school in Sweden. The Swedish con-
struction union demanded that the Swedish collective construction agreement be 
 applied to the posted workers. Baltic concluded a collective agreement with a Latvian 
 union, arranging lower wages. The Swedish union organised blockades and solidarity 
strikes, which resulted in Baltic going bankrupt. The Swedish court asked the Euro-
pean Court of Justice whether these actions were in line with the freedom of provid-
ing services. The Court judged that interferences are allowed, but that actions must 
be aimed at complying with the hard core of labour law, as provided by the Posting 
of Workers Directive. This did not apply in the case in question, as the actions were 
directed at the more favourable conditions of the Swedish collective construction 
agreement.
Again, the Court ruled that it was up to the national court to test whether the 
restriction of that freedom is guaranteed by ‘a legitimate objective compatible with 
the Treaty’, whether it is justified by overriding requirements in the general interest, 
and whether it is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective they pursue, 
and do not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.638
Also relevant in this context are the Rüffert and the Commission vs. Luxembourg 
judgments from 2008.
The Rüffert judgment639 was about a public contract awarded to a German con-
struction company that was carried out by a Polish subcontractor. The Polish workers 
earned considerably less than required by the local collective agreement, whereupon 
the government of Niedersachsen withdrew the contract and demanded compensa-
tion. The case was brought before the European Court of Justice, which argued that 
637 Laval, judgment of the Court of 18 December 2007, case C-341/05.
638 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 207 ff. Hendrickx (2011), p. 31.
639 Rüffert, judgment of the Court of 3 April 2008, case C-346/06.
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article 49 of the Treaty prohibits the demand to pay wages ‘that are at least at the level 
of the wages that are foreseen on the basis of the collective agreement that applies to 
the place where the work is done’, because these are higher than the mandatory min-
imum wage that would otherwise be applicable, and more generally this kind of pub-
lic procurement obligation would prevent foreign service providers from competing 
on the basis of lower wages.
The Court stated that the rate of pay laid down by the law of Niedersachsen 
cannot be seen as a minimum rate of pay ensuing from the 2006 Posting Directive, 
which will be discussed below. Following the line of reasoning in the Laval judgment, 
this Directive was considered a maximum Directive rather than a minimum Direct-
ive from which member states may deviate in a positive sense.
The Commission vs. Luxembourg judgment640 revolved around the interpreta-
tion of article 3.10 of the Posting Directive, enabling member states, by way of deroga-
tion from article 3.1, which lays down minimum rates, to guarantee workers other 
terms and conditions of employment, whether laid down in universally applicable 
collective agreements or arbitration awards or not, on the grounds of public interest. 
The Court was negative about a series of arrangements that Luxembourg had adopted 
upon the implementation of the Posting Directive. The Court judged that the deroga-
tion option in article 3.8 impinges upon the freedom to provide services, and as such 
must therefore be interpreted strictly.
Requirements such as a written contract, automatic wage indexation, prevalence 
of Luxembourg collective agreements, minimum rest periods, information require-
ments and demands regarding national representation all constituted hindrances to 
the freedom to provide services, as entrenched in the EU regulations.
These judgments evoked resistance on the part of the trade unions, whereupon 
the Commission issued a regulation, the so-called Monti-II regulation, which how-
ever achieved the opposite of what it set out to do, namely that the right to strike 
should not hinder the freedom to provide services. The regulation in turn evoked 
much resistance, after which the Commission revoked it.641
We saw before that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be 
considered an important achievement, which has since been entrenched in the Treaty 
of Lisbon, not as a separate part, as in the draft-Constitution, but as an important 
annex.
Socially tinted topics have been included under Chapter IV, Solidarity, contain-
ing twelve articles, of which the articles 27–33 cover the ‘labour rights’.
640 Commission v. Luxembourg, judgment of the Court of 19 June 2008, case C-319/06.
641 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 214.
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Article  27 grants the right to be guaranteed information at the appropriate levels. 
Article 28 grants the right of collective bargaining and collective action. Article 29 
acknowledges the right of access to free placement services. Article 30 is about pro-
tection in the case of unjustified dismissal, followed by article 31 that grants the right 
to fair and just working and employment conditions.
Article 32 provides an explicit ban on child labour and grants young workers 
the right to be protected against economic exploitation and against any work  likely 
to harm their health, safety or development, or to interfere with their education. 
 According to article 33, the family is the mainstay of society, and in order to com-
bine work and family there are the rights to protection from dismissal for a reason 
connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave 
following the birth or adoption of a child.
Article 34 expresses the right to social security benefits and social services.642
For all that, the Dutch Council of State put the value of the Charter into perspective, 
stating that:
The Charter provides a powerful and inspiring phrasing of common values and 
basic principles, but the very attractively robust straightforwardness and decisive-
ness, which constitutes the power of a declaration of principles, renders the texts 
less suitable to be integrated into the regulations of the European Union in a legally 
binding way at this point in time.643
7.1.6 Conclusion
Meanwhile, the economic crisis has resulted in tightening up the 1997 Stability and 
Growth Pact and in improving coordination within the Eurozone, called the Euro-
pean Semester. This improved coordination of the member states’ budgetary and eco-
nomic policy was further enhanced in 2010 by means of six economic governance 
measures, the so-called Sixpack,644 followed by the Euro Plus Pact645 and the Two-
Pack.646
In early December 2011, in Brussels, this in turn resulted in the new Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, 
which the seventeen euro countries and those who voluntarily joined it signed on 
642 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 222.
643 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 229.
644 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 241.
645 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 243.
646 Buitenweg et al. (2014), p. 245.
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2 March 2012. On 1 January 2013, this treaty came into force. Thus, budgetary discip-
line has easily gained the highest priority, which has evoked criticism. The Treaty of 
Lisbon provided a solid entrenchment of social policy in Europe, but the political and 
economic course that the EU has been forced to steer shortly after Lisbon has pushed 
the social dimension further and further into the background.
Meanwhile, the EU will need to find its way between a Brexit discussion, which 
may well result in damage to the social dimension because of introducing migrant 
discrimination, and the ideal of the United States of Europe, as Verhofstadt647 has 
voiced it. A clear-cut outcome is not yet in sight.
7.2 EUROPE AND TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK
We saw earlier how the social domain has developed in the European Union since the 
1950s. While initially the aim for a common market drove the social face of Europe, 
in the course of time more and more individual social elements have been added to 
the European repertoire. ‘Maastricht’, ‘Amsterdam’ and ‘Lisbon’ were highlights in 
this respect. Against these backgrounds, we shall now discuss how temporary agency 
work has been given attention on the European agenda.
7.2.1 Social security
Temporary agency work first received attention due to a question about the applica-
tion of the rules coordinating social security. They provided that only one social 
 security system applies to migration, the single state rule, and that this was to be the 
country of employment (lex laboris). At first, an exemption obtained (art. 14 Regula-
tion 1408/71), providing that in the case of cross-border employment, the social se-
curity of the country of residence applied for a certain period (at first, one year, later 
two years).648 The question was whether this also applied to temporary agency work.
In 1970, in Manpower vs. Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie Strasbourg,649 
the European Court of Justice ruled that this was the case. The Court decided:
Although under the contract each temporary worker is required to comply with 
the working conditions and discipline laid down by the internal rules of the estab-
lishment to which he is sent, it appears from an examination of the file that this fact 
does not affect the maintenance of the worker’s relationship with the undertaking 
647 Verhofstadt (2015), p. 202 and 255.
648 Regulation 1408/71/EC art. 14; amended by no. 883/2004/EC.
649 Manpower v. Caisse Primaire d’Assurance Maladie Strasbourg, judgment of the Court of Decem-
ber 17th 1970, case 35/70.
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which has engaged him. It is thus the latter undertaking which is at the centre of 
different legal relationships, because it is at the same time a party to the contract 
with the worker and to the contract with the hiring undertaking.
According to the Court, ‘the object of the undertaking is not to do work but to engage 
workers to put them for a consideration at the disposal of other undertakings’. In the 
Manpower case:
The undertaking which has engaged the worker remains their sole employer. The 
maintenance of the worker’s relationship with such an employer for the entire 
dura tion of employment arises in particular from the fact that it is the employer 
who pays the salary and can dismiss him for any misconduct by him in the per-
formance of his work with the hiring undertaking. Further, the hiring undertaking 
is indebted not to the worker but only to his employer.
Thus, this decision recognised the temporary agency business model. Moreover, the 
Court decided in the Webb case650 that ‘the activity of contracting out workers con-
stitutes a provision of services within the meaning of the Treaty’. However, the Court 
stated:
(…) it must be noted in this respect that the provision of manpower is a particu-
larly sensitive matter from the occupational and social point of view. Owing to the 
special nature of the employment relationships inherent in that kind of activity, 
pursuit of such a business directly affects both relations on the labour market and 
the lawful interests of the workplace concerned. That is evident, moreover, in the 
legislation of some of the Member States in this matter, which is designed first to 
eliminate possible abuse and secondly to restrict the scope of such activities or even 
prohibit them altogether.
The Court has also studied the question as to whether in the case of cross-border 
temporary agency work, the so-called countries of employment are justified in im-
posing restrictive provisions on the temporary employment agencies operating from 
abroad. At issue here is the application of article 49 EC, which regulates the freedom 
to provide services. This freedom can be restricted if the public interest is at issue and 
to the extent that the country of origin of the temporary employment agency offers 
no guarantees of its own.
650 Webb, judgment of the Court of 17 December 1981, case 279/80.
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In the Commission versus Italian Republic case,651 Italy’s requirements that tem-
porary employment agencies have a branch office on its territory and meet certain 
financial conditions were rejected as it had failed to verify whether protective meas-
ures were in place in the country of origin.
In the 1990s, the Court also took decisions regarding the tenability of the state 
monopoly in the field of work placement. A strong lobby had been launched to lib-
eralise the temporary employment sector in Europe, and in 1992, CIETT, the inter-
national umbrella organisation of temporary employment agencies, filed complaints 
with the Commission against Germany, Spain and Italy.652 Moreover it started a trial 
action regarding the situation in Italy.
A first judgment regarding the state monopoly in the field of work placement 
was given in the Höfner versus Macrotron case, which revolved around the admiss-
ibility of ‘headhunting’.653
The second presented itself in the Job Centre case654, which dealt with both 
the admissibility of private work placement and outsourcing. Both judgments came 
down to the following.
 – Placing workers is an economic activity, even if it is entrusted to public place-
ment offices.
 – Public placement offices can be designated as enterprises in the sense of the 
Euro pean Community’s competition rules.
 – In principle, public placement offices remain subject to the competition regula-
tions.
 – Article 86 of the EC Treaty applies in case of activities that clearly cannot be car-
ried out by public placement offices.
 – According to article 86(b) of the EC Treaty, abuse may apply upon restriction of 
the services.
 – According to the Commission, the work placement market is broad and very 
diverse. Supply and demand aim at both unskilled and highly trained workers.
 – In such a market, which is subject to enormous socio-economic changes, public 
placement offices may not be able to satisfy all the demands.
 – Prohibitions entailing penal and administrative sanctions for private parties cre-
ate a situation as referred to in article 86(b) EC Treaty, if the public placement 
offices are incapable of satisfying all the market demands.
 – One possible effect of abuse suffices and is particularly relevant if work place-
ment is also aimed at nationals in the territories of other member states.
651 Commission v. Italian Republic, judgment of 7 February 2002, case C-279/00.
652 Randstad (1995), p. 19.
653 Höfner v. Macrotron, case 41/90.
654 Job Centre, case 55/96.
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The Court’s judgment is clear. A labour market monopoly violates the European 
competition law:
 – if the public placement offices fails to satisfy all the market demands;
 – if private work placement is rendered impossible by prohibitions, on pain of 
penal and administrative sanctions;
 – if the relevant work placement activities may also extend to the nationals or to 
the territory of other member states.
The judgments, and particularly the Job Centre case, resulted in a  de-monopolisation 
process in all countries concerned. In Italy, Act no. 264 from 1949 was gradually re-
placed.655 In 1994, Germany discontinued the state monopoly of the so-called Fed-
erale Arbeitsamt, which had been in place since 1922, as a result of this judgment.656 
And in 1993–1994, in Spain, the INEM lost its monopoly and reforms were imple-
mented.657
7.2.2 Resolutions of the European Council and Parliament, first draft directive
In anticipation of these developments, the issue of regulating temporary agency work 
had received some attention. In the discussion on the adaptation of working time, 
the Council had drawn up a resolution dated 18 December 1979, asking for ‘specific 
communications… regarding part-time work and temporary employment’ (page 3 
Final Provisions). The Council stated that these forms of labour had become a reality 
in the labour market and that it was appropriate to take action ‘to ensure that tem-
porary work is supervised and that temporary workers receive social protection’. On 
17 September 1981, the European Parliament likewise requested regulation through a 
resolution658 and in 1982, a draft directive was first presented.659
Item 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum acknowledges that temporary employ-
ment is not always to the detriment of the workers (in the sense that it meets the 
needs of certain categories of workers, such as young, female and older workers), but 
that this type of labour was increasingly forced upon a number of workers looking for 
permanent employment. They were said to fall victim to various forms of discrimina-
tion and above all to suffer due to the insecurity of their jobs when compared with 
permanent employees.
655 Colucci (2004), pag 146.
656 Weiss (1999). Zie ook Weiss (2004).
657 Duran Lopez & Martinez Rodriques (1999).
658 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 156.
659 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 157.
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According to the Commission, two systems to regulate temporary work would be 
feasible:660
1. systems to protect permanent employees by limiting the cases in which tem-
porary work was used and the duration of temporary work, which meant that 
temporary workers would not be given equal rights;
2. systems allowing employers to hire temporary workers, provided they were to 
have the same social advantages as permanent employees according to labour 
law, collective contracts or customary practices in labour relationships.
Due to resistance on the part of the employers, certain groups within the European 
Parliament and above all a veto by the British government, the draft did not make it 
through.
7.2.3 A new attempt in 1990
In 1990, a new attempt was made to address temporary work. As we have seen before, 
the Community Charter had been published, and it was time to take action in order 
to improve the living and working conditions with regard to ‘forms of employment 
other than open-ended contracts, such as fixed-term contracts, part-time work, tem-
porary work and seasonal work’.
On the basis of various legal principles, three directives were proposed.661 The 
directive on occupational safety and health on the basis of article  118 A of the EC 
Treaty was the only one to eventually make it through. The other two were related 
to working conditions, proposed on the basis of article 100 of the EC Treaty and to 
‘distortion of competition’, which attempted to create a level playing-field in terms of 
costs in the case of atypical work on the basis of article 100A EC Treaty. Underlying 
the proposals was the desire to further restrict non-standard forms of employment.
As mentioned above, only one directive was realised: Directive 91/383/EEC662 
dated 25 June 1991, which addressed both workers with fixed-term contracts and tem-
porary agency workers.
The reason for issuing the directive was that workers with temporary contracts 
were more subject to occupational accidents and diseases. By implementing the prin-
ciple of equal treatment, the temporary workers should be granted a level of occupa-
tional safety and health equal to that of others working at the user enterprise. There 
was no justification for allowing differences in treatment. The directive also requires 
the temporary agency employer (or commissioning client) to provide temporary 
660 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 158.
661 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 159.
662 Directive 91/383/EEC; see also: Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 161.
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workers with information and training with regard to occupational risks before they 
start their assignment.
The temporary agency employer must provide information on the nature of the 
assignment and the required qualifications, according to particulars supplied by the 
commissioning client.
7.2.4 Posting of Workers Directive and Services Directive
In the context of the freedom to provide services, it proved to be equally necessary to 
regulate the posting of workers from one member state to another. This resulted in 
the Posting of Workers Directive.663 Paragraph 7.3 will discuss this further.
Besides this directive, the Services Directive likewise turned out to exercise the 
minds in the mid-1990s. Proposed by European Commissioner Bolkestein in early 
2004, it opted for a purely economic approach to creating a common market for 
services. The country of origin principle was introduced, intending that the service 
providers could operate throughout the EU using the conditions that applied in their 
country. This fired up a fierce debate in which the danger of social dumping was 
pointed out, i.e. a situation in which the countries with the fewest and the least ex-
pensive regulations would profit most. Opposite this country of origin principle was 
the equal treatment principle, providing a level playing field across the EU for both 
domestic and foreign service providers.
The resistance of the trade union movement and the European Parliament in 
particular was considerable. The providers of temporary employment services should 
be particularly exempted from this Services Directive, especially since so far no en-
abling regulations for temporary employment agencies existed in Europe.664
Bolkestein did not prevail and in due course, a much watered-down Services 
Directive ensued,665 which provided in article 2 e that the Services Directive did not 
apply to temporary employment agencies. Also, it provided in article 1, par. 6:
This Directive does not affect labour law, that is any legal or contractual provision 
concerning employment conditions, working conditions, including health and 
safety at work and the relationship between employers and workers, which Mem-
ber States apply in accordance with national law which respects Community law. 
Equally, this Directive does not affect the social security legislation of the Member 
States.
663 Directive 96/71/EG.
664 Kowalski (2006).
665 Directive 2006/123/EC.
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In par. 7, it subsequently provided:
This Directive does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in 
the Member States and by Community law. Nor does it affect the right to negotiate, 
conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take industrial action in accord-
ance with national law and practices which respect Community law.
The Services Directive has fallen short of the impact that it was initially intended to 
have. In 2010, only seven member states turned out to have implemented what was 
left of the Directive.
7.2.5 Continuous demand for regulation of temporary agency work
The trade union movement, however, considered it a major victory to have changed 
the Services Directive so drastically in collaboration with the European Parliament. 
As indicated above, temporary agency work was still exempted, and the demand for 
EU regulations on temporary agency work continued to be discussed. As mentioned 
above, ‘Maastricht’ made it possible to make another attempt. A social dialogue on 
temporary agency work ensued. This dialogue failed and resulted in a new Commis-
sion proposal. After discussing the Posting of Workers Directive in paragraph 7.3, this 
temporary agency dialogue and the draft-Directive, together with what they resulted 
in, will be expounded on.
7.3 POSTING OF WORKERS DIRECTIVE AND ENFORCEMENT 
DIRECTIVES 666
7.3.1 Posting of Workers Directive
The posting of workers issue was already part of Jacques Delors’ action programme 
for perfecting the Single Market as planned in his White Paper.667 On 1 August 1991, 
the Commission presented a proposal regarding the posting of workers (having work 
carried out on a temporary basis in a EU member state different from where the 
worker is based), in the context of the freedom to provide services. The proposal 
was amended by input from the European Parliament and by the stance taken by the 
 Economic and Social Committee. On 16 December 1996, it was adopted by a quali-
fied majority, Portugal abstaining and the United Kingdom dissenting.668
666 Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU.
667 Commission of the European Communities (1985).
668 Slachter (2014), p. 166 and 167.
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The then article 57, par. 2, in conjunction with article 66 (now art. 53, par. 1, in con-
junction with art. 62 TFEU) was chosen as the legal basis for authorising through an 
‘ordinary’ co-decision procedure by qualified majority the establishment of guide-
lines regarding the ‘coordination of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the taking-up and pursuit of 
 activities as self-employed persons’.
The preamble recites the objective laid down in the Directive to eliminate bar-
riers to the freedom of movement of services and persons. Moreover, it argues that 
the internal market increasingly evidences cross-border service provision. Besides 
promoting this dynamic, it is also necessary to regulate employee rights and com-
petition. Internationalisation raises questions and requires legal certainty.669
In actual fact, three objectives present themselves, i.e.: the protection of the 
employees concerned, fair competition and creating legal certainty. Statutory inter-
national private law arrangements are referred to, provided that Community law may 
deviate from them. In this context, coordination of national and labour law arrange-
ments is opted for, in the sense that a ‘hard core’ of mandatory provisions is laid 
down for the minimal protection of (posted) workers in the country of employment. 
Employers from a member state other than the country of employment must likewise 
comply with them.
This does not change the arrangements that are in place in the field of social 
security coordination (Regulation 1408/71). Nor does it obstruct the existing provi-
sions with regard to third countries. Moreover, there is no obligation to acknowledge 
the existence of temporary employment agencies. Furthermore, it does not affect the 
applicability of national legislation to cross-border temporary employment service 
providers. Lastly, it does not affect the workers’ right of collective action to promote 
interests.
The hard core of minimal protection may be deviated from in a positive sense. 
Also, no distinction must be made between EU employers and non-EU employers.
The preamble consists of 25 recitals, and the Directive itself amounts to 9 articles. 
Article 3, the core of the Directive, states that the member states shall ensure that 
workers posted in their territory are guaranteed the terms and conditions of employ-
ment that have been laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision and/or 
by collective agreements or arbitration awards that are universally applicable within 
the meaning of article 8, insofar as they concern the activities included in the annex:
a. maximum work periods and minimum rest periods;
b. minimum paid annual holidays;
669 Houwerzijl (2004), p. 115.
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c. the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates (this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes);
d. the conditions of hiring-out workers, in particular the supply of workers by tem-
porary employment agencies;
e. health, safety and hygiene at work;
f. protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of 
pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of 
young people;
g. equality of treatment between men and women, and other provisions on 
non-discrimination.
For the purposes of this Directive, the concept of minimum rates of pay referred to 
under c is defined by the national law and/or practice of the member state where the 
worker is posted.
Graham670 concludes from this article that the core provisions do not apply to tem-
porary agency workers, for whom a separate provision (d) is in place, relating to ‘the 
conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular by temporary employment agen-
cies’. He also concludes this from article 3, par. 9, since it provides that member states 
may arrange that foreign temporary employment agencies must guarantee their 
workers the same terms and conditions as apply to domestic agencies. The question 
arises as to whether article 3, par. d, automatically commits temporary employment 
agencies to provisions regarding ‘equal pay for equal work’ or whether the member 
states must explicitly provide this through article 3, par. 9. Thus, is ‘equal pay for equal 
work’ a duty or a right on the basis of the Posting of Workers Directive?671
For the other forms of posting, i.e. for contracting work (art. 1, par. 3a) and intra- 
corporate transfers (art. 1, par. 3b) the legal and administrative provisions and/or the 
collective agreements of arbitration awards that have been declared universally applic-
able in the country of employment apply. For that matter, the annex to this Directive 
effectively limits this to the construction sector. According to article 3, par. 8, in the 
absence of a system for declaring agreements or awards to be universally applicable, 
member states can also take other decisions that have a similar effect, provided that 
they make no distinction between domestic and foreign enterprises.
The core provisions of article 3, par. 1, are valid from the first working day. There 
is no waiting period, as had been suggested in an earlier proposal. With the  exception 
of the construction sector, the core provisions with regard to the paid annual holi-
days (art. 3, par. 1, under b) and ‘minimum rates of pay’ (art. 3, par. 1, under c) do 
670 Blanpain and Graham, 2004, p. 282
671 See also: ETUC (2010), p. 14.
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not apply in the case of initial assembly and/or the first installation of goods, where 
this is an integral part of a contract for the supply of goods, necessary for taking the 
goods supplied into use and carried out by qualified and/or specialist workers of the 
supplying enterprise.
In the case of contracting and intra-corporate transfers, the member states can 
choose not to apply the provisions regarding minimum rates of pay if an assignment 
takes less than one month. Also, they can disregard the provisions regarding mini-
mum rates of pay and paid annual holidays in case of very small assignments. The 
provision on compliance is significant. The member states are to designate so-called 
‘liaison offices’ and must ensure cooperation on supervision. Such cooperation must 
also respond to requests for information in order to draw attention to and combat 
abuses and unlawful use. Thus, the member states are to take measures to make the 
‘core provisions’ generally available (art. 4). Moreover, adequate provisions must be 
made available to workers and/or their representatives for the enforcement of the 
obligations (art. 5).
However well-intentioned the Posting Directive was, its implementation did not 
resolve the issue of the vulnerable position of cross-border workers. The media con-
tinue to publish articles on the infringement of workers’ rights.672
7.3.2 Evaluation
In 2003, the Commission evaluated the Directive.673 In its report it mentions the 
various deficiencies and issues concerning inappropriate implementation and/or 
application of the Directive. In 2006, guidelines were established in order to make 
clear how control measures under prevailing EU law, in line with the case law of the 
Court could be justified and proportionate. In 2007, it pointed at the deficient mon-
itoring, the poor administrative cooperation and the inadequate access to informa-
tion. It has been discussed above that the Court’s Viking674 and Laval675 judgments 
raised the question as to the proper balance between the freedoms of establishment 
and providing services, as entrenched in the TFEU, and fundamental social rights, 
such as the right to strike. Added were the judgments in the Rüffert676 and Com-
mission vs. Luxem bourg677 cases, which allowed the principle of the free movement 
of  services to prevail over various national social regulations. There was also debate 
on the concept of public order, which could justify the infringement of fundamental 
672 Govaers & Van Beers (2013). See also: Witteman (2016).
673 See European Commission (2012), p. 4.
674 Viking, judgment of the Court of 11 December 2007, case C-438/05.
675 Laval, judgment of the Court of 18 December 2007, case C-341/05.
676 Rüffert, judgment of the Court of 3 April 2008, case C-346/06.
677 Commission v. Luxembourg, judgement of the Court of 19 June 2008, case C-319/06.
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social rights, the material scope of the core provisions in the Directive, and the nature 
of the mandatory minimum rates of pay.
All in all, great concern had been aroused, and both Barroso, as President of 
the European Commission, and Monti, as former European Commissioner internal 
market and competition, wanted to take action. The Commission had already called 
for enhanced cooperation between the national administrations, improved exchange 
of information between member states and better access to information.678
The European unions and certain parties in the European Parliament vented 
strong criticism on the Court’s judgments, which they designated as ‘licences for 
 social dumping’. They put forward two key demands:
 – revision of the Posting Directive, including the principle of equal pay for equal 
work and the opportunity for the country of employment to apply more favour-
able terms of employment than the core conditions provided by article 3, par. 1, 
of the Directive;
 – inclusion in the Directive of a protocol regarding social progress.679
The European employers, united in Business Europe, and most member states, were 
happy with the jurisdiction. In 2010, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee issued an advice, which included enhancing the implementation of the Posting 
 Directive and partially revising it, so that the legal obligations of national govern-
ments, enterprises and workers were made clearer.680
In its 2010 communication ‘Towards a Single Market Act’,681 the Commission 
stated that it would ensure that an effective enforcement of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights would consider the right to strike, and that it would submit a legislative 
proposal with an eye to improved enforcement of the Posting Directive. Subsequent-
ly, on 13 April 2011, the ‘Single Market Act’682 set out twelve levers to boost growth 
and encourage confidence, and it also contained a legislative initiative for improving 
and enhancing the conversion, the application and the practical compliance with the 
Posting Directive.
This legislation will also comprise measures to prevent and punish any abuse 
or circumvention of the applicable law and will be accompanied by regulations to 
make clear the relation between the pursuit of the freedom of establishment and of 
the freedom to provide services on the one hand and the fundamental social rights 
on the other.
678 European Commission (2008a), p. 1.
679 SWD (2012) 63 final, SWD (2012) 64 final, p. 7.
680 Advice 2011/C44/15.
681 COM (2011) 608, final/2 dated 11.11.2010.
682 COM (2011) 206, final.
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7.3.3 Enforcement Directive
The above eventually resulted in a proposal for the so-called ‘Enforcement Directive’ 
aimed at enhancing the protection of the rights of posted workers, improving the 
climate of fair competition and facilitating cross-border provision of services.683
Article 53, par. 1, in conjunction with article 62, TFEU constituted its legislative 
basis. Among other things, the preamble recited that:
 – abuse must be prevented by improved implementation and monitoring;
 – adequate and effective enforcement plays a key role;
 – an electronic information exchange system will facilitate administrative co-
operation;
 – relevant information must be supplied to service providers and workers;
 – the member states may conditionally implement control procedures or admin-
istrative formalities;
 – effective and adequate inspections will be carried out;
 – cooperation and information exchange on the application of the regulations 
shall take place;
 – effective complaints mechanisms must be in place;
 – a form of sequential liability must be introduced;
 – there must be rules shaping the cross-border enforcement of penalties and sanc-
tions;
 – the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be observed.
Important articles are:
 – article 4, prevention of abuse and circumvention, which provides that compet-
ent authorities shall pay more attention to the factual elements characterising 
the activities;
 – article 5, arranging improved access to the information;
 – article 6, arranging mutual assistance;
 – article 11, aimed at the defence of rights, the facilitation of complaints and the 
back payments;
 – article 12, dealing with subcontracting liability;
 – article 13 including provisions about mutual assistance and mutual recognition.
By now, the Directives still prove to fall short of practical needs. There appears to be 
a need for modernising the Posting Directive. A new discussion has been started at 
European level, led by the Dutch minister of Social Affairs and Employment, advoc-
ating ‘equal pay for equal work in the same place’. Apparently, the Posting Directive 
683 SWD (2012) 63 final, SWD (2012) 64 final, p. 11.
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and the social security legislation provided too much scope for allowing posting on 
competitive terms of employment. A so-called ‘targeted review’ is advocated. In the 
meantime, the Dutch minister Asscher has enlisted the backing of seven member 
states (the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Aus-
tria). To be continued.684
However, one month after the letter from the seven, there was a letter from the 
nine, i.e., Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia, who spoke out against a revision. They pointed out the risk 
that such an amendment would harm some of the fundamental principles of the EU, 
including the freedom to provide services. A principle such as ‘equal pay for equal 
work in the same workplace’ is misleading and derogates the common market prin-
ciple that a sustainable economic development benefits from efficient, innovative and 
competitive enterprises and from robust legislation. Such a revision goes against the 
European Commission’s aim to enhance the common services market, these member 
states argued.685 For now, it looks as if the European Commission opts for Asscher’s 
approach.686
For one thing, a proposal was made to amend the Posting of Workers Direc-
tive, changing the reference to ‘minimum rates of pay’ to ‘remuneration’. Moreover, 
member states may involve supply chains in imposing obligations, while the principle 
of equal pay for equal work in the Temporary Agency Work Directive, as  included 
 under article 5, also applies to cross-border temporary agency work, so that any doubt 
on this matter will be resolved. Furthermore, the duration of a posting is limited to 
24 months, after which the labour law of the host member state will  apply.687
The Eastern European resistance has not yet abated, although according to Euro 
Commissioner Thyssen there are no opposed blocks (Eastern Europe against West-
ern Europe). On that subject, she stated:
684 Letter of the Dutch minister of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 18 June 2015. See also: Schout 
et al. (2015).
685 Letter to Marianne Thyssen, European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and 
Labour Mobility, dated 7 July 2015 about Revision of the Posting of Workers Directive. See also: 
Schout et al. (2015).
686 ‘Commission presents reform of the Posting of Workers Directive – towards a deeper and fairer 
European labour market’, press release European Commission, 8 March 2016.
687 Proposal for a directive of het European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/
EC of het European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services, Strasbourg, 8.3.2016 Com (2016) 128 final, 
2016/0070(COD).
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Various countries want to study the proposal seriously and have not yet defined 
their position. We shall listen to each other and if that means we must revise parts 
of the proposal, we shall do so, but it must be fairer and more balanced.688
Since then, ten member states, i.e. the nine that are opposed to revision of the direc-
tive, backed by Denmark, have shown the yellow card. National parliaments have 
this option, if they fear erosion of national sovereignty. However, on 20 July 2016, the 
European Commission announced that it considers the revision proposal not to be in 
breach of the so-called subsidiarity principle. Again, to be continued.689
7.4 SOCIAL DIALOGUE ON TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK
We saw earlier that in the 1980s, two attempts were made at European level to regu-
late temporary agency work by means of a directive. Eventually regulations were lim-
ited to occupational health and safety. Lack of unanimity, and later even lack of a 
qualified majority meant that the realisation of a Temporary Agency Work Directive 
has been a long, drawn-out process.
At first, ‘Maastricht’ and ‘Amsterdam’ appeared to change this. The social pro-
tocol enabled achieving agreement by means of a social dialogue. And surprisingly, 
this worked out well for topics such as parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term 
contracts. The fact that the Council could by now decide on these proposals by quali-
fied majority voting obviously contributed to the positive outcome.
In the preamble of the framework agreement pertaining to the social dialogue 
on fixed-term contracts, the parties indicated that they intended to consider the need 
for a similar agreement relating to temporary agency work.690 They were not certain, 
but they were willing to think about it. In any case, temporary agency work was ex-
cluded from the framework agreement on fixed-term work that was concluded on 18 
March 1999.
7.4.1 Viewpoints of the social partners
In general, the European trade union movement was in favour of negotiations 
through social dialogue. In these circles, there was some hesitation regarding tem-
porary agency work. Trade unions preferred to wait until the directive on fixed-term 
688 Cats (2016b).
689 ‘Detachering van werknemers: Commissie bespreekt bezorgdheden van nationale parlementen’ 
(‘Posting of Workers: Commission discusses national parliaments’ concerns’), europa-nu.nl, 20 
May 2016 (Dutch only).
690 Ahlberg et al. (1999), p. 71. See also: Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 196.
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work had been implemented. UNICE, representing the employers, appeared to hes-
itate even more. Whereas ETUC decided on 2 December 1999 to enter into the social 
dialogue on temporary agency work, it took until 3 May 2000 before UNICE reached 
a positive decision. It can be established that this has definitely been influenced by 
the stance CIETT had taken as the international temporary agency employers’ rep-
resentative, together with Euro-FIET (renamed Uni-Europa as of 1 January 2000) as 
the European services workers’ union. They had entered into a sectoral dialogue in 
1999 and were determined to achieve a sectorial solution in the event that UNICE and 
ETUC would not enter into a ‘cross-sectoral’ dialogue on temporary agency work.691 
A draft-directive had already been drawn up.692
To ETUC this was unacceptable, because Euro-FIET/Uni-Europa could not con-
duct negotiations on behalf of all sectors and according to the employers, CIETT 
could not represent the interests of their commissioning employers.
Both sides – UNICE, CEEP, UEAPME and CIETT representing employers on 
the one hand, featuring CIETT as observer, and ETUC representing employees on 
the  other – set up negotiating teams containing approximately thirty people. The 
chief negotiator for the employers was Wilfried Bernaert and his counterpart for the 
employees was Jean Lapeyre, who had also conducted the earlier negotiations. Jean 
Degimbe, who had also presided the social dialogue on fixed-term contracts, was 
appointed chairperson.693
The trade union movement held the view that the quality of temporary agency 
work must be improved on the basis of two principles: laying down the conditions 
under which temporary agency work can be deployed and ensuring equal treatment 
for the workers concerned.
A European regulation had to reach farther than ILO convention 181. There were 
three key criteria that an agreement would have to meet:
 – it should promote structured collective bargaining;
 – it should dovetail with the Posting Directive;
 – the subsidiarity principle should be applied, in the sense that the agreement 
should be converted into collective agreements at the national level.694
It was important to the employers that a balance should be achieved between flex-
ibility and security for the workers. The positive contribution that temporary agency 
work makes to employment and the lifting of restrictions were key starting points.695
691 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 196
692 CIETT (2000a).
693 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 198 and 199
694 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 200
695 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 200
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7.4.2 Viewpoints CIETT and Uni-Europa
Op 3 May 2000, CIETT and Uni-Europa issued a joint declaration in the context of 
the sectoral social dialogue they had started before. They stated:
Both organisations are hopeful and confident that the sectoral Social Dialogue 
will have positive effects on this important industry which will benefit all parties 
involved in Europe – employees, the agencies and user enterprises. […] On the 
basis that agency work may play a positive role in the labour market, the sectoral 
social dialogue should work towards improving the quality and the operation of 
the European labour market, the employment and working conditions of agency- 
supplied workers as well as the further professionalisation of the sector.
They declared that they supported ongoing negotiations between UNICE/CEEP and 
ETUC and aimed at playing an active role in their progress.696
In the trade union movement, the role played by Euro-FIET (Uni-Europa) 
evoked criticism. Subsequently, a number of meetings took place in the framework 
of the social dialogue on temporary agency work, and in the third round, on 11 and 12 
October 2000, draft texts were exchanged.
7.4.3 Developing viewpoints
With regard to the principle of non-discrimination ETUC stated:
1. Temporary agency workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner 
than comparable workers, unless different treatment is justified on objective 
grounds.
2. With regard to the following employment conditions the comparable worker 
is considered to be the worker in the user enterprise unless explicitly regulated 
otherwise by collective agreement at the national or sectoral level:
– remuneration;
– working conditions, including working time and rest periods;
– health and safety, taking into account the Directive 91/383 EEC.
3. In regard to the other employment conditions, Member States, after consulta-
tion with the social partners and/or the social partners at national or sectoral 
level, shall define in which cases the comparable worker is that of the user en-
terprise and in which cases that of the temporary work agency.
696 Joint declaration of Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa on the sectoral social dialogue on Agency Work, 
July 2000.
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4. The arrangements for the application of this clause shall be defined by the 
Member States after consultation with the social partners and/or the social 
partners having regard to Community law, national law, collective agreements 
and practice.697
The employers stated:
1. In respect of employment conditions, temporary agency workers assigned to 
work for and under the control of an undertaking or establishment shall not 
be treated in a less favourable manner than a comparable worker, defined in 
accordance with point 4, unless different treatment is justified on objective 
grounds, and without prejudice to length of service or seniority criteria relating 
to particular benefits.
2. Where appropriate, the principle pro rata temporis shall apply.
3. The modalities of application of this clause shall be defined by the Member 
States and/or social partners having regard to national law, collective agree-
ments or practice.
4. The responsibility to define the term comparable worker is incumbent upon 
Member States and/or social partners.
5. Temporary employment agencies established in one Member State assigning a 
worker to work for and under the control of an undertaking/establishment in 
another Member State shall respect the provisions of Directive 96/71.698
The various statements represented huge differences in opinion. The trade union 
movement wanted equal pay, i.e. a remuneration as would be applicable in the user 
company, unless other arrangements would be made, for instance through collective 
bargaining. For terms of employment other than wages and occupational health and 
safety, regulations could be left to the member states, following consultation with the 
social partners. The trade unions’ point of view was not acceptable to the employers. 
They wanted the member states and/or social partners to decide who should be the 
comparable worker whose wages should be leading in determining the  remuneration. 
Nor did the employers condone any reference to wages, since this would be in breach 
of article 137, par. 6, EC.699
During the fourth and fifth negotiation rounds in November and December, ETUC 
proved willing to a degree of compromise. They were set on achieving a result  regarding 
697 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 202.
698 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 202.
699 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 203.
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equal pay. The employers were willing to accept the ‘comparable worker’ in the user 
company where maximum working hours, minimum hours of rest and occupational 
health and safety were concerned, but wanted to continue to leave the other terms of 
employment, including pay, to the member states and/or the social partners.
On 18 December, a drafting group met up and the trade union movement 
presented a new draft version. Proposals were made to clarify the legal position of 
temporary agency workers and to attach conditions of use to the deployment of tem-
porary agency work. They dovetailed with provisions regarding objective reasons 
for contract renewal, maximum, duration or the maximum number of renewals of 
such contracts or relationships assignment that had been included in the framework 
agreement on fixed-term work.
Moreover, there should be supervision by means of licensing or certification, 
protection of migrant workers, a ban on temporary agency work in case of strikes, no 
fee to workers, a ban on hindering the entering of direct contracts with the commis-
sioning employer and opportunities for sectoral or categorial bans as provided for in 
Convention 181.700
Temporary agency workers should also count with regard to quantitative 
 requirements for establishing works councils, both at the temporary employment 
agency and with the commissioning client.
In the sixth negotiation round, the employers responded. They recognised that the 
permanent employment contract was to remain the basic principle. Temporary 
 agency workers should be informed of any new vacancies in the user enterprise in 
the same way as the enterprise’s permanent employees. Temporary employment 
 agencies must comply with the no fee to worker principle. Moreover, there should 
be no  impediments to concluding a direct contract of employment. The temporary 
agency workers were to count with regard to co-determination, and representative 
bodies should be supplied with information about the temporary agency workers 
deployed and should be able to consult about them.
While the employers would not accept a compromise regarding the non- 
discrimination regulations, they did concede that member states and social partners 
should evaluate the provisions in respect of temporary agency work and abolish them 
wherever possible. Employers held on to restricting the agreement to temporary 
agency workers with a temporary contract.701
The ETUC declared that it would be flexible regarding the so-called ‘conditions of 
use’, if the employers were to accept the non-discrimination provision, sectoral or cat-
egorial bans, and bans on replacing striking workers with temporary agency workers.
700 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 205.
701 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 206.
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The employers were willing to accept the user enterprise’s standards for deter mining 
the maximum working hours, minimum resting periods and occupational health 
and safety, however, for other terms of employment, including pay they did not want 
to do so. The determination of those other terms had to be left to the member states 
and/or social partners.
The Commission’s Legal Service advised that strikes not be mentioned in a 
framework agreement, but perhaps to include this in the preamble. Moreover, the 
Legal Service argued that employment conditions also imply pay but that it would 
be unwise to include the word ‘pay’ in the text.702 Furthermore, it argued that if the 
rates of pay were determined with reference to the ‘comparable worker’s’ wages at the 
user enterprise, this would indirectly determine the sectoral wage level, which would 
definitely be in breach of article 137, par. 6.703
This resulted in major confusion, not only on the part of the trade union move-
ment. In the eighth negotiation round, another attempt was made to reach a solution. 
The employers were willing to move on the topics of occupational training and strik-
ing, but not on non-discrimination provision. ETUC wanted a reference to the user 
company for basic employment conditions and a clear indication by the employers 
that pay was included in these conditions. The latter was given by the employers. 
Also, ETUC proposed a new text in respect of non-discrimination: ‘For basic employ-
ment conditions, the comparable worker would be a worker in the user company un-
less explicitly regulated otherwise by a collective agreement concluded by the social 
partners at the national or sectoral level assuring the principle of non-discrimination’.
For countries that have no sectoral or national collective bargaining systems, a 
paragraph 2 was provided, suggesting the possibility of achieving equivalent solu-
tions in another manner.704
7.4.4 No compromise
On 14 March 2001, the chairperson of the negotiations reported that a compromise 
did not seem possible. Eventually, ETUC addressed two questions to UNICE: can em-
ployers accept the user pay reference, and is it possible to agree on provisions that 
aim to combat abuse?
Employers argued that the user company reference was acceptable in respect 
of occupational health and safety, maximum working hours and minimum rest-
ing hours. However, they did not find it acceptable as a reference for other terms of 
employment. Employers were willing to allow bans on temporary agency work in 
702 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 209. See also: Schömann & Gueda (2012), p. 15.
703 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 209.
704 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 210 and 211.
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 certain sectors or for certain activities on the basis of specific reasons, provided that 
these restrictions would be regularly evaluated in order to establish whether the bans 
were still justified.
On the basis of these responses, ETUC considered the negotiations to be over. 
On 6 April 2001, European Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou initiated another 
consultation between the parties at the request of European Commission chairman 
Romano Prodi. Diamantopoulou asked them to make another attempt. Thereupon, 
the employer’s chairperson Bernaert informally proposed that the user pay reference 
might be acceptable, if restricted to temporary agency workers with temporary con-
tracts, but ETUC would not accept this proposal.
Shortly afterwards, Diamantopoulou made yet another attempt, proposing that 
the user pay reference could be deviated from if this were justified by an objective 
reason, such as an alternative adequate level of protection. ETUC rejected this pro-
posal, as did the employers who wanted an exception for workers with open-ended 
contracts.
Thus, the social dialogue on temporary agency work had utterly failed. The ini-
tiative was now fully with the Commission.705
7.5 TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK DIRECTIVE
7.5.1 Joint declaration 2002
After the social dialogue had failed – in May 2001 – it took until March 2002 be-
fore the Commission presented a draft for a Temporary Agency Work Directive. In 
the meantime, Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa presented a joint declaration regarding 
elements that should be taken into account in a new proposal. Both parties aimed 
at achieving a good balance between protecting the temporary agency workers and 
underscoring the positive role that temporary agency work can play.
The Declaration706 proposes the following essential elements:
 – The basic principle is that non-agency employment and permanent contracts are 
the most common types of labour, while it is recognised and acknowledged that 
temporary agency work can contribute to the economic and employment targets 
of the European Union.
 – The quality of temporary agency work opportunities and relations must be im-
proved, considering the interests of workers, commissioning clients and tempor-
ary employment agencies with regard to flexibility and security.
705 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 212.
706 Euro-Ciett/Uni-Europa joint declaration, Objectives of the European Directive on Private Agency 
Work, October 2001.
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 – Temporary agency work must be acknowledged as a way to help disadvantaged 
workers integrate in the labour market, for instance through vocational training 
and educational activities.
 – The quality of temporary agency work is underscored by taking into account 
the equal treatment obligations that flow from both the temporary employment 
agency’s relationship with its workers and the temporary agency worker’s rela-
tionship with the commissioning client and its staff.
 – Following consultation with social partners, member states will need to be asked 
to remove any impediments to the proper functioning of the temporary employ-
ment agency, provided that legislation may be needed to combat any abuse, such 
as the possible undermining of labour and employment conditions in the user 
enterprise and otherwise.
 – It must be guaranteed that EU and national law and regulations in the field of 
non-discrimination are respected, provided that the tripartite relationships 
pertaining to temporary agency work require a specific approach; furthermore 
that temporary employment agencies do not replace striking workers by agency 
workers, and that temporary agency workers may exercise collective bargaining 
and union rights.
 – Temporary agency workers are employed by the temporary employment agency, 
as a result of which the agency has obligations as an employer and the workers 
are protected by the applicable labour law.
 – It must be guaranteed that temporary agency workers have access to adequate 
occupational training and education opportunities at the temporary employ-
ment agency and in the user enterprise, and that – neither directly nor indirect-
ly – fees are charged to the temporary agency worker for the services provided.
 – It must be encouraged that social partners implement the above principles, 
which must be included in the directive.
 – It must be recognised that updating of benefit systems is necessary in order to ad-
just them to current circumstances and especially to facilitate continuity of rights.
7.5.2 Commission proposal
The purpose of the Directive is (art. 2):
1. to improve the quality of temporary agency work by ensuring that the principle 
of non-discrimination is applied to temporary agency workers;
2. to establish a suitable framework for the use of temporary agency work.707
707 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 221.
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In the recitals, one can read, among other things, that ‘temporary agency work meets 
not only undertakings’ needs for flexibility but also the need of employees to reconcile 
their working and private lives. It thus contributes to job creation and to participa tion 
and integration in the labour market’ (recital 11).
The recitals also state that ‘with respect to basic working and employment con-
ditions, temporary workers should not be treated any less favourably than a “compar-
able worker”, i.e. a worker in the user undertaking in an identical or similar job, 
taking into account seniority, qualifications and skills’ (recital 15).
It states that deviations are possible for workers with a permanent contract (re-
cital 17). Moreover, social partners may deviate from the ‘equal pay for equal work’ rule 
laid down in recital 15 (recital 18). Furthermore the principle of  non-discrimination 
should be applied flexibly for assignments that do not exceed six weeks.
The protective provisions of the Directive enable ‘that any restrictions or pro-
hibitions which may have been imposed on temporary work to be reviewed and, 
if necessary, lifted if they are no longer justified on grounds of the general interest 
regarding in particular the protection of workers’ (recital 20).
Article 1, par. 1, provides that: ‘This directive applies to the contract of employment 
or employment relationship between a temporary agency, which is the employer, and 
the worker, who is posted to a user undertaking to work under its supervision’.
In total, the directive has seventeen provisions. The most important ones are the 
articles 4 and 5 regulating respectively ‘review of restriction or prohibitions’ and ‘the 
principle of non-discrimination’, as stated in recitals 15 and 20.
Article 4 specifically states that after consulting the social partners, the member states 
must regularly and at least every five years review ‘any restrictions or prohibitions on 
temporary work’ and ‘verify whether the specific conditions underlying them still ob-
tain’. If they do not, the member states should lift the restrictions or prohibitions. The 
result of the review must be reported to the Commission, who must also be informed 
as to why maintaining certain restriction or prohibitions is justified.
Article 5, par. 1, states: ‘Temporary workers during their posting shall receive at least 
as favourable treatment, in terms of basic working and employment conditions, in-
cluding seniority in the job, as a comparable worker in the user enterprise, unless the 
difference in treatment is justified by objective reasons. Where appropriate, the pro 
rata temporis principle applies’.
Thus, exemptions can be made when temporary workers who have a permanent 
contract of employment with a temporary employment agency continue to be paid in 
the time between postings. (‘German exemption’) (par. 2).
 Chapter 7: The European approach to temporary agency work
 317
Also, a collective agreement may be concluded that derogates from the principle of 
equal treatment, on the condition that an adequate level of protection is provided for 
temporary workers (Swedish exemption’) (par. 3).
Moreover, member states may provide that assignments taking up six weeks at 
most will be exempted from this principle. Furthermore, it is stated that if no compar-
able worker exists, reference will be made to the collective agreement applicable in 
the user enterprise; if no such collective agreement exists, reference will be made to 
the collective agreement applicable to the temporary employment agency. And if that 
does not exist either, the treatment of temporary agency workers must be regulated 
by national legislation and practices.
Article 6 gives temporary workers the right to be informed of any vacancies in the 
user enterprise in a similar way as other employees of this user enterprise (par. 1). 
Any clauses banning or preventing the conclusion of a permanent contract are null 
and void (par. 2). Moreover, the no fee to workers principle applies and furthermore, 
in principle, temporary workers have a right to access to the social services of the user 
enterprise (par. 3 and par. 4).
Lastly, measures are required, or must be promoted through social dialogue, to im-
prove temporary workers’ (access to) occupational training and to enhance their em-
ployability.
Article 7 provides that temporary workers count for the purposes of calculating 
the threshold above which representative bodies must be formed at the temporary 
employment agency, and in principle also in the user enterprise.
Article 8 gives the representative bodies the right to information on the use of 
temporary agency work as part of the information provided by the user enterprise on 
the employment situation in that enterprise.
The articles 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 constitute the final provisions. Article 9 states that 
member states may apply provisions that are more favourable. Article 11 provides a 
period of two years for further implementation and article 12 regulates a review after 
five years.
The Commission assessed the effectiveness of the Directive, putting the cost in-
creases that result from it into perspective. It also referred to a CIETT study that un-
derscores the importance of applying all new provisions and conditions in respect of 
temporary agency work – especially in the field of wages and job security – by means 
of adequate labour legislation. All these measures will benefit the sectoral image and 
enhance social acceptance of temporary agency work. This is vital if the temporary 
employment agency industry is to develop further.708
708 CIETT (2000b), p. 40.
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7.5.3 Reactions
The member states responded diversely, focusing particularly on article 4 and art-
icle  5. In view of the revision provision, many member states wondered what this 
would mean for regulating temporary agency work in the individual countries; with 
regard to article 5, there was criticism about the ‘six-week period’ that would consti-
tute the exemption on the principle of non-discrimination. There were both member 
states that did not want any exemptions and those who wanted to considerably ex-
tend this period.
Apart from the discussion on articles 4 and 5, there was the question as to 
whether the freedom to use temporary agency work as a labour market instrument 
was at issue. The British voiced doubts about whether the Directive could be based on 
article 137 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, now that article 137, 
par. 5, ruled out the possibility to discuss pay at European level.
Debate likewise arose on the comparable worker, which would not serve as a 
suitable concept for comparison. Also, the non-discrimination principle as such and 
the exemptions from it came up for debate. The British felt that such a principle would 
be unjustified, since a jobseeker who starts his career as a temporary agency worker 
can hardly be compared with a permanent worker. The Germans, whose legis lation 
on temporary agency work included a 12-month period after which user-pay was 
mandatory, also had problems with the way this principle was to be regulated in the 
Directive.
Moreover, the British stated that they have no tradition of collective bargaining 
and that it would be difficult to find a ‘comparable worker’’ in the user enterprise in 
order to be able to determine the rate of pay. This earned the British the support of 
the Irish and the Portuguese. Opposite them were the Belgians, the French, the Span-
iards and the Greeks.
Eight countries (Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) were opposed to the six-week exemption. Germany,  Ireland 
and the United Kingdom were in favour, although they actually wanted a longer ex-
emption period.709
On 23 October 2002, the European Parliament gave its judgment. The Parliament 
proposed more than 50 amendments. According to the rapporteur, existing legisla-
tion, such as ILO convention 181 and ILO recommendation 188 had not been taken 
sufficiently into account. There were also many technical questions. In the course of 
the deliberations, the Legal Service issued a point of view on the potential breach 
with article 137, par. 5, that ruled out pay from the European competences. The Legal 
709 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 222 ff.
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Service stated that the provision in article 5 aimed to regulate non-discrimination 
and was not intended to regulate the pay level. The latter continued to be at the dis-
cretion of the member states.
The Commission also presented an amendment to article 5 stating: ‘The basic 
working and employment conditions applicable to temporary agency workers should 
be at least those which would apply to such workers if they were recruited by the user 
undertaking to occupy the same job.’ Thus, the ‘comparable worker’ had made room 
for the ‘hypothetical comparable worker’.
The majority of the member states appeared to react positively to this amend-
ment, although Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden continued to 
have reservations.
The European Parliament proposed amendments, among others with regard to 
article 4, which was brought more into line with the prohibition options of ILO con-
vention 181, and with regard to article 5, where the ‘German exemption’ would only 
apply to ‘pay and specific pay elements’ and where payment must be adequate and 
continuous whether they are on an assignment or not.
The ‘Swedish exemption’ was amended by deleting ‘as long as an adequate level 
of protection is provided’. The six-week exemption was fully deleted, as it would keep 
a large number of temporary agency workers outside the scope of the Directive.710
7.5.4 Amended proposal
On 28 November 2003, the Commission presented an amended proposal. Out of the 
58 amendments by the European Parliament, 31 were accepted.
Article 2 was supplemented with the following purpose: to ensure the protection 
of temporary workers, recognising temporary employment agencies as em ployers 
and the use of temporary agency work to contribute to creating jobs. According to 
the amended article  3, the definition of ‘pay’ should be left to the member states. 
 Article 4 on the prohibitions or restrictions was adjusted in total accordance with the 
European Parliament’s amendments. The prohibitions or restrictions were justified 
‘on grounds of general interest relating in particular to the protection of temporary 
workers, the requirements of health and safety at work and the need to ensure that 
the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented’. The review obliga-
tion was less strict, and the obligation to review periodically and within a five-year 
period was deleted.
Article 5 aligned with the amendment presented earlier during the deliberations, 
i.e. the so-called ‘if clause’.
710 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 229 ff.
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The ‘German exemption’ was now only to apply to pay. Deleting the phrase ‘ad equate 
level of protection’ in the context of the Swedish exemption was not adopted by the 
Commission. The six-week period exemption would now only apply to pay, but not 
to any other basic working and employment conditions.711
7.5.5 Further reactions
The subsequent deliberations showed some progress, but at least three items con-
tinued to be undecided. The Members of the European Parliament agreed om the 
purpose of the Directive, i.e. elements such as ‘protection of temporary workers’, 
‘ recognising temporary agencies as employers’ and ‘use of temporary agency work to 
contribute to creating jobs’ remained intact, and Sweden was satisfied with the pro-
vision regarding the ‘Swedish exemption’ that social partners could derogate without 
derogations being subject to a legal opinion.
There continued to be discussion on article 3, the scope, on article 4 with regard 
to the prohibitions or restrictions and on article 5 with regard to the six-week period 
as exception to the rule on user pay. Article 3 concerned the question as to how an 
exception could be made for the integration of jobseekers in the labour market.
During the Greek presidency, compromises were proposed. In article 4, the ob-
ligation to lift the prohibitions or restrictions – the obligation to discontinue – was 
deleted, as it was said to be a superfluous provision. In article 5, the six-week  period 
was amended, in the sense that a transitional arrangement would apply, in line with 
proposals by the European Parliament that amounted to member states having the 
option during five years following the Directive’s implementation to waive the user 
pay obligation for assignments the duration of which is to be determined by the 
member states. Following the evaluation of the Directive, the five-year period could 
be further extended.
During the Dutch presidency, four items were deliberated on:
 – The transitional arrangement: should it be five years, eight years or for an in-
definite period?
 – In that case, how long should the derogation period in article 5, par. 4, now es-
tablished at six weeks, be?
 – Should the derogation apply to pay only, or be extended to essential terms of 
employment?
 – What was needed with regard to article 4; should a review be held ‘once and for 
all’ through the implementation, or will deleting the requirement in the prohibi-
tions and restrictions of temporary agency work be sufficient?712
711 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 237 ff.
712 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 248.
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During the subsequent deliberations, solutions hardly proved feasible. The discus-
sion on article 4 in particular made no progress.
7.5.6 Fundamental criticism
Scientists mainly criticised article 5 concerning the principle of ‘equal pay for equal 
work’. Grapperhaus was critical, arguing that the application of the principle of equal 
pay raises questions on the issues of equal treatment, freedom of contract/individual 
autonomy and the right to collective bargaining.713
Grapperhaus argued that the (amended) draft directive ‘does not deal correctly 
with the right of temporary agency workers to be treated equally to their comparable 
workers’.714 According to him the wording of the amended article 5 par. 1 – The basic 
working and employment conditions of temporary workers shall be, for the duration 
of their posting at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply if they had been 
recruited directly by that enterprise to occupy the same job – does not:
… sufficiently meet the requirements of the principle of equal treatment for equal 
work as set out in various international treaties, and as elaborated further in de-
cisions of the Court. To achieve unrestricted equal treatment, it would be neces-
sary to at least take into account that there is a certain sliding scale of comparison 
that requires temporary agencies to achieve that temporary agency workers receive 
treatment equal to either their colleague temporary agency workers or the compar-
able user enterprise employee, depending on the relevant work related circum-
stances.715
But what is a comparable user enterprise employee? The temporary agency worker 
starting his or her assignment can hardly be compared with a permanent worker, 
since the temporary agency worker lacks the work experience, lacks experience with 
the user enterprise, has not yet been integrated within the user enterprise’s  company, 
is free to go any day or any week, in contrast to the user enterprise’s permanent 
 worker and has a closer bond with the temporary employment agency than with the 
user company.
Grapperhaus argues that, in the course of time, the temporary agency worker 
is increasingly integrated within the user enterprise’s company. He becomes familiar 
with the work, gains experience, becomes more socially integrated and more inter-
ested in the user enterprise’s company, and he will find it more difficult to cut short 
713 Grapperhaus (2003), p. 12.
714 Grapperhaus (2003), p. 57.
715  Grapperhaus (2003), p. 57.
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the assignment. There is a gliding scale, as it were. In the beginning, the ‘comparable 
worker’ cannot be said to be the permanent employee at the user enterprise; this is 
only relevant following a process of integration.
Referring to jurisprudence by the European Court,716 Grapperhaus holds the 
view that to determine who the ‘comparable worker’ is, it is necessary to take into 
account all the aspects of each individual case, for instance the nature of the assign-
ment, the training requirements and the working conditions:
As equal treatment demands equal circumstances, it is always necessary to judge all 
circumstances before one can truly establish a comparable worker. Since circum-
stances at work change over a period of time, it is inevitable that both the employer 
in question as well as the comparable worker will go through changes during that 
time.
Ultimately, Grapperhaus proposes to let the member states decide how the ‘compar-
able worker’ is to be defined. He suggests facilitating this after a twelve-month period. 
Although the criticism was fundamental in nature and certainly made sense, it played 
no great role in the ensuing discussion.
The presidencies of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (2006) stated that they 
would do anything to achieve an agreement on the Temporary Agency Work Direct-
ive. The subsequent presidencies of Germany and Portugal (2007) did not manage to 
make any progress either.717 This only changed during Slovenia’s presidency in the 
spring of 2008.
A breakthrough in this discussion was achieved through a deal that was con-
cluded by the national employers’ and workers’ organisations and the government 
of the United Kingdom. It was agreed to introduce a twelve-week ‘period of grace’ 
before the user pay obligation becomes effective. This agreement paved the way for a 
new proposal by the Commission.718
716 Grapperhaus (2003), p. 15–17.
717 Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 251
718 Government agrees fair deal on Agency Work, News Release Department for Business, Enter-
prise and Regulatory Reform, reference 2008/199, 20 May 2008, http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/
wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/161038. See also: More rights for agency workers: what does the political deal 
announced today means for users and suppliers of temps and contractors. Blake Lapthorn, Tailo 
Lyons, 2008, joint declaration by the Government; CBI and TUC, 21 May 2008
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7.5.7 Joint declaration 2008
Approximately at the same time, Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa issued a joint declara-
tion719 that attempted to indicate the contours of a new directive. This declaration 
included the following ‘guiding principals’:
 – An EU regulatory framework must be in the interest of both the business and 
the workers.
 – An EU regulatory framework must be drawn up for the entire EU, i.e. for all the 
member states.
 – The draft directive will need to be judged on its own merits.
 – The proposed regulations need to combine adequate protection for temporary 
agency workers with the role that temporary employment agencies can play in a 
properly functioning labour market, need to supply measures that prevent un-
fair competition by fraudulent temporary employment agencies and/or com-
missioning clients, and need to combat abuse and illegal practices.
 – The principle of equal treatment with regard to basic working and employment 
conditions must be applied.
 – A proper regulatory framework promotes social dialogue, collective bargaining 
and a functioning system of labour relationships in the sector.
 – Any impediments to the adequate functioning of temporary employment agen-
cies must be identified and eliminated. Certain restrictions are necessary to 
combat potential abuse and the potential undermining of labour and employ-
ment conditions.
 – Licensing, certification, inspection and registration systems can contribute to a 
healthy development of the sector, provided the regulations are proportionate, 
non-discriminatory and objective.
 – ILO convention 181 and ILO recommendation 188 must be taken into account, 
as must respect for organisational freedom and freedom of negotiation, as laid 
down in the ILO conventions 87 and 98.
 – National legislation on replacing striking workers by temporary agency workers 
must be observed.
 – It is recognised that, under the right conditions, temporary agency work can 
play a positive role in the labour market.
 – Temporary employment agencies may not compete on labour and employment 
conditions.
 – The principle of non-discrimination applies from the first day onward, unless 
social partners or tripartite bodies have agreed on a qualifying period at a na-
tional level.
719 Euro-Ciett/Uni-Europa (2008).
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 – For the duration of the assignment, the basic working and employment condi-
tions must be equal to those of a comparable worker at the user enterprise, or 
to what would be applicable if the worker in question had been hired directly.
 – A collective agreement may derogate from the principle of non-discrimination.
 – Other solutions, including transitional regimes, qualifying periods to be agreed 
on by social partners and/or tripartite bodies are feasible.
 – Permanent contracts with the temporary employment agency may derogate 
from the principle of non-discrimination, if the worker continues to be paid 
between assignments.
 – In accordance with Directive 91/383/EEC with regard to occupational health and 
safety, temporary agency workers must be fully protected in the same way as 
other workers at the user enterprise.
Remarkably, in this declaration CIETT relinquished the stance that there are obliga-
tions with regard to equal treatment both at the user enterprise’s level and at the 
temporary employment agency’s level. Equally remarkably, Uni-Europa accepted 
the derogation option for permanent employees. Earlier on, both items had been 
non-negotiable for these parties.
7.5.8 A new directive720
Eventually, the Slovenian presidency managed to formulate a proposal that would 
be acceptable to all parties. A number of amendments/supplements were made to 
the 2002 proposal. The recitals refer to the Lisbon strategy and the aim for flexibility, 
 security, and decrease of segmentation. Moreover, they refer the Council’s opinion 
that new forms of organisation and a wider range of employment contracts, leading to 
a better combination of flexibility and security, contributes to adjustability. Further-
more, they drew attention to the by now accepted concept of flexicurity (recital 9).
The Directive establishes a protective framework that is non-discriminatory, trans-
parent and proportionate, while respecting the diversity of the labour markets and 
industrial relations (recital 12: joint declaration 4). Permanent contracts are the gen-
eral form of employment relationship (recital 15).
The member states may in a flexible manner take into account the diversity 
of the labour markets and industrial relations and define the working and employ-
ment conditions, provided that the overall level of protection for temporary agency 
 workers is respected (recital 16). Furthermore, member states may derogate from the 
principle of the non-discrimination as long as an adequate level of protection is in 
place (recital 17).
720 Directive no. 2008/104/EC. See also Monika Schlachter, p. 249 ff.
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A review of the restrictions or prohibitions must take place, however, without any 
explicit obligation to eliminate them if they fail to comply with the requirements 
(recital 18). The Directive does not affect the autonomy of social partners (recital 19). 
Administrative and judicial procedures should be provided for to safeguard the rights 
of temporary agency workers, combined with effective dissuasive and proportionate 
penalties for breaches of the obligations (recital 21).
The Directive comprises 13 articles. Article 4, on the review of restrictions or 
prohibitions, and article 5, the principle of equal treatment, continued to be import-
ant. The essence of article 4 is par. 2, stating:
By 5 December 2011, Member States shall, after consulting the social partners in ac-
cordance with national legislation, collective agreements and practices, review any 
restrictions or prohibitions on the use of temporary agency work in order to verify 
whether they are justified on the grounds mentioned in paragraph 1.
The grounds mentioned in paragraph 1 are grounds of general interest relating to the 
protection of temporary agency workers, the requirements of health and safety at 
work or the need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are 
prevented. If the provisions have been laid down in collective agreements, the review 
may be carried out by the social partners.
Apart from the ‘German exemption’ in par. 2 and the ‘Swedish exemption’ in par. 3, 
article 5, the article that regulates non-discrimination, now also has a ‘British exemp-
tion’ in par. 4, stating:
Provided that an adequate level of protection is provided for temporary agency 
workers, Member States in which there is either no system in law for declaring 
collective agreements universally applicable or no such system in law or practice 
for extending their provisions to all similar undertakings in a certain sector or 
geographical area, may, after consulting the social partners at national level and on 
the basis of an agreement concluded by them, establish arrangements concerning 
the basic working and employment conditions which derogate from the principle 
established in paragraph 1. Such arrangements may include a qualifying period for 
equal treatment.
Also important is a new paragraph 5, stating:
Member States shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with national law and/
or practice, with a view to preventing misuse in the application of this Article and, 
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in particular, to preventing successive assignments designed to circumvent the pro-
visions of this Directive. They shall inform the Commission about such measures.
Another amendment concerns the purpose article, article 2, which provides:
The purpose of this Directive is to ensure the protection of temporary agency 
workers and to improve the quality of temporary agency work by ensuring that the 
principle of equal treatment, as set out in Article 5, is applied to temporary agency 
workers, and by recognising temporary work agencies as employers, while taking 
into account the need to establish a suitable framework for the use of temporary 
agency work with a view to contributing effectively to the creation of jobs and to 
the development of flexible forms of working.
Furthermore, the Directive includes, as did the 2002 proposal, article 6 regulating 
 access to employment, collective facilities and vocational training. Article  7 deals 
with the representation of the temporary workers, article 8 regulates the information 
of workers’ representatives, and the final provisions in articles 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 on 
respectively minimum requirements, penalties, implementation, review, and entry 
into force.
Article 10 in particular has undergone considerable changes since the 2002 pro-
posal. In order to combat non-compliance, member states must provide appropriate 
administrative and judicial measures. These penalties must be effective, proportion-
ate and dissuasive, and workers and/or their representatives must have adequate 
means of enforcing them.
7.5.9 Effects
The question is what has by now been the effect of the Temporary Agency Work 
Directive. The Commission issued a report on its application in March 2014.721 The 
report shows that all the member states have implemented the directive, although 
in a number of cases transposition occurred late and only after the Commission 
had launched infringement proceedings. What is interesting is the extent to which 
member states have made use of the derogation options provided for in article  5. 
Five member states made use of the so-called ‘German exemption’: Hungary, Ire-
land, Malta, Sweden and the United Kingdom;722 ten member states made use of the 
‘Swedish exemption’:723 Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
721 European Commission (2008b).
722 European Commission (2008b), p. 6
723 European Commission (2008b), p. 7
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Figure 7.2  Evolution of national regulation on TAW; 2012–2015: Changes after the AWD
implementation phase CIETT, internal communications
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden; the United Kingdom and Malta made use 
of the ‘British exemption’724.
With regard to the review of the restrictions and prohibitions, 24 member states 
provided reports. Four member states - Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the United 
Kingdom - stated that no restrictions or prohibitions were in place. The justifications 
of the restrictions and prohibitions were very general, referring to the protection of 
temporary agency workers, the requirements of health and safety at work, the proper 
function of the labour market and prevention of abuse.
The Commission reports that Romania, Sweden and Belgium have removed 
restrictions and prohibitions.725 Romania has added ‘the execution of specific tem-
porary tasks’ as a reason for using temporary agency work. Sweden has lifted the 
six-month waiting period before a new assignment at the same user enterprise may 
be accepted. In Belgium, integration purposes, i.e. with a view to possible direct 
724 European Commission (2008b), p. 8
725 European Commission (2008b), p. 12
Conditions and
Restrictions added
Restrictions lifted
France: Easing of regulation on assignment renewals (from 1 to 2) + 
easing of regulation on max. length of assignments + removal of 
waiting period between assignments for open-ended contracts 
(2015); lower financial guarantee; types of contract offered (2013)
Greece: Reasons for use (2014); Restrictions on sectoral bans lifted 
+ restrictions on hiring after dismissals eased + shorter waiting 
period for TAW contracts renewals after max. length of assignments 
reached (2014); exclusivity of purpose of TWAs (2012); lower sum 
as financial guarantee + requirement on minimum staff working in 
TWA lifted (2012)
Italy: Use of TAW eased for vulnerable workers & young people, reasons 
for use and extension of maximum length of assignments (2014)
Romania: Sectoral bans lifted + extension maximum length assign-
ment, more balanced licensing system (2013)
Spain: Permanent recruitment + cooperation with PES (2012) + 
Legal bans in public and construction sector lifted (2012); specific 
training and learning contracts for agency workers (2013); 
apprenticeship contracts (2013)
Luxembourg: No need of authorization for job-training contracts in 
periods between assignments (2014)
Portugal: Lower sum as financial guarantee (2014)
Czech Republic: Restriction on hiring of disabled people lifted (2014)
Latvia: Maximum length of assignments (but with longer waiting 
period) (2014)
Estonia: Licensing system removed
Germany: Stricter regulation 
on Equal Pay (2013) based
on sectoral/branch pay 
supplements
Spain: Higher sum as 
financial guarantee + stricter 
reporting obligations on 
operations (2015)
Slovakia: Maximum length 
of assignments + limitation 
to assignment renewals + 
restrictions on use of TAW 
(2015)
Slovenia: Need of financial 
guarantee + stricter reporting 
obligations on operations + 
quota on nr. of agency 
workers in a firm (2013)
Estonia: Limitation to assign-
ments
France: Potential ban on the 
use of agency work in public 
services, with the exception 
of the health sector/
hospitals (2016)
+ –
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
328
 recruitment of the worker by the user enterprise, have been added as a reason for 
using temporary agency work. The Commission states that few restrictions or prohi-
bitions have been removed, although the review was still work in progress in several 
member states. For that matter, a CIETT report shows that between 2012 and 2015, ten 
countries had removed restrictions and prohibitions, while six countries had added 
or re-implemented restrictions and prohibitions, or intended to do so.
The social partners were mostly involved in the review of article 4 and/or the imple-
mentation of the directive.726
The cost increases appeared to be limited or could hardly be traced.727 Most 
member states thought that the directive had achieved its socio-political aims. The 
employers – both Business-Europe and Euro-Ciett – were of the opinion that the 
aims had not been fully achieved. The results of the review of the restrictions and 
prohibitions were disappointing, and some member states had even recently intro-
duced restrictions and prohibitions. There are still too many examples of sectoral 
prohibitions, excessively restricted maximum durations of temporary assignments, 
excessively limited reasons for using temporary agency work and restrictions to the 
maximum number of temporary agency workers. Another source shows that par-
ticularly such quota rules can distort competition.728
A clear majority of the member states did not consider clarifying of amending 
the directive, or parts of it, to be necessary.729 Only Finland responded that article 4 
was unclear. Business-Europe asked the Commission to provide an interpretative 
communication on this article. Euro-Ciett stated that it would request a revision of 
article 4 if substantial progress in its implementation proved unfeasible. ETUC re-
sponded that it was yet too early to judge, although it found the derogation options 
to article 5 very problematic, particularly the ‘German exemption’. The Commission 
concluded that the provisions of the directive have been correctly implemented and 
applied,730 although its twofold objective – equal treatment and reviewing the restric-
tions and prohibitions of temporary agency work – has not yet been fully achieved.
The wide range of derogation options provided for in article 5 has led to a situ-
ation where the application of the Directive has no real effect on the improvement of 
the protection of temporary agency workers. On the other hand, the review of restric-
tions and prohibitions on the use of temporary employment agencies has served, in 
the majority of cases, to legitimate the status quo, instead of giving an impetus to the 
726 European Commission (2008b), p. 13
727 European Commission (2008b), p. 15
728 Lundvall & Strand (2014). 
729 European Commission (2008b), p. 18
730 European Commission (2008b), p. 19.
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rethinking of the role of temporary agency work in modern, flexible labour markets. 
The fact that according to the CIETT report ten countries have by now amended their 
temporary agency legislation in a positive way does not alter this conclusion.
7.5.10 The Finnish case
Meanwhile, a case in Finland involved asking the European judges to clarify article 4 
of the directive. The Finnish transport workers’ union (Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työnteki-
jäliitto AKT ry) requested the Finnish labour court (Työtuomioistuin) to condemn 
Shell Aviation Finland oy and its employers’ organisation (Öljytuote ry) for infringing 
on a provision on temporary agency work in the collective agreement. As a result, 
the Finnish judge wondered whether restricting the use of temporary agency work is 
actually in line with article 4, par. 1, of the directive and requested a ruling from the 
European Court of Justice. In his conclusions, the Advocate General dealt with the 
case in detail.731 The provision in the Finnish collective agreement is as follows:
Undertakings shall restrict the use of temporary agency workers to dealing with 
peaks of work or to the performance of other tasks of limited duration or of a spe-
cific nature which, for reasons of urgency or because of their limited duration or 
skill requirements or the use of special tools or other similar reasons, they cannot 
have performed by their own staff [...] The use of temporary workers is an unfair 
practice if the temporary agency workers employed by undertakings using external 
workers carry out the undertaking’s usual work alongside the undertaking’s per-
manent workers under the same management and for a long period of time.
AKT argued that Shell and Öliytuole were infringing this provision by regularly em-
ploying temporary staff. The question was whether this provision was in line with 
article 4, par. 1, which only considers restrictions and prohibitions acceptable if they 
serve the general interest, particularly relating to the protection of the temporary 
agency workers, the requirements of health and safety at work, a proper functioning 
of the labour market and the prevention of abuse.
Among other things, the Advocate General M. Szpunar stated that article 4 clear-
ly provides that unjustified restrictions are prohibited. The article does not concern 
a procedural requirement, but rather a substantive rule. He deduced this from both 
the literal text and the origins of the provision. He also rejected the contention that 
the legal basis of article 137, par. 1 and par. 2, EC would be insufficient for prohibiting 
restrictions on the use of temporary agency work, since such a prohibition would 
731 Conclusion by Advocate General M. Szpunar delivered on 20 November 2014 (1), case C-533/13 
Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT ry v. Öljytuote ry and Shell Aviation Finland oy. 
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be an acceptable by-product of the objective of equal treatment. The A  G  argued 
furthermore that the right of collective bargaining is enshrined in article 28 of the 
Charter, but that this right is not absolute and may be restricted by Community law 
such as article 4 of the directive. The A G went on to argue that European law resists 
the interpretation that article 4 comprises a purely procedural obligation, and that the 
national court and the European Court of Justice perform essential functions for the 
nature of Union law. He argued:
The interpretation advocated by certain Member States in this case, according to 
which the Member States must review restrictions on the use of temporary agency 
work but are under no obligation as regards the outcome of that review, seems to 
me to be irreconcilable with that principle.
Furthermore, he concluded that article 4, par. 1, reflects article 56 TFEU and specifies 
the compelling reasons that may justify the restriction. Therefore, he advised that 
article 4, par. 1, be considered as a prohibition of unjustified restrictions on the use 
of temporary agency work rather than as a purely procedural requirement. He also 
argued that the wording of the so-called peak/sick leave clause in the collective agree-
ment tends to suggest that it is justified. He stated:
To my mind, a Member State may, without overstepping the bounds of that dis-
cretion, provide that the use of temporary agency work is permitted in circum-
stances which are consistent with the temporary nature of that form of work, albeit 
that temporary work must not have a detrimental effect on direct employment. 
[…] I consider that Article 4(1) of Directive 2008/104 does not preclude national 
rules which, first, restrict the use of temporary agency work to the performance of 
tasks that are temporary and which, for objective reasons, cannot be carried out 
by workers employed directly by the user undertaking and, secondly, prohibit the 
employment of temporary agency workers alongside workers employed directly 
by the user undertaking to carry out tasks identical to those carried out by its own 
workers for a long period of time.
All in all, the A G argued that article 4, par. 1, really provides a prohibition of unjusti-
fied restrictions on temporary agency work rather than merely a procedural require-
ment, and that a so-called peak/sick leave clause is not unjustified.
The Court’s judgment732 did not act on the A G’s advice. It did however estab-
lish that the member states are obliged to review any restrictions or prohibitions on 
732 Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT ry versus Öljytuote ry and Shell Aviation Finland Oy, 
judgement of the Court of March 17, case-533/13.
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the use of temporary agency work: ‘in order to verify whether they are justified on 
grounds mentioned in article 4 (1)’, that the member states must inform the Commis-
sion of the results of this obligation and that the obligation is imposed on the com-
petent authorities of the member states rather than on the national court. Depending 
on the results of this review the member states could have been obligated to amend 
their national legislation on temporary agency work. The Court did not enlarge on 
how this was to take place. It did, however, establish that a legislative framework is 
not obligatory. Consequently, the Court established that article 4 is addressed only to 
the competent authorities of the member states and does not impose an obligation 
on the national courts.
Grapperhaus733 holds the view that:
This means that on the basis of article 4 (1) of the Directive, Member States can be 
required to remove or adapt any unjustified prohibition or restriction in national 
law, but they can not be required to adopt national legislation. […] In addition on 
the basis of article 4 (2) and (3) of the Directive, Member States can be required to 
conduct a review of any restrictions or prohibitions on the use of temporary agency 
work in national legislation or – if it concerns collective agreements – ensure that 
a review is conducted by the social partners, in order to verify whether they are 
justified if such review has – factually – not yet taken place, such review should be 
conducted by the Member States or – if it concerns collective agreements – by the 
social partners.
Moreover, Grapperhaus holds the view that reviews of unjustified restrictions or pro-
hibitions on temporary agency work can be achieved through the directive’s limited 
direct applicability. Through this so-called ‘vertical effect’ private parties can address 
member states. Also, an appeal can be made to the European Commission, which 
will be able to take the necessary action.
And thus it appears to have become clear that article 4, which at the start of the 
discussion was essentially a valuable element of the directive, has ultimately turned 
out to be a cumbersome procedure that does not facilitate a reasonable review. 
Therefore, acceptance of the principle of non-discrimination turns out to be scantily 
rewarded by a much-weakened article with which to review the restrictions or pro-
hibitions on temporary agency work on the basis of the positive role that temporary 
agency work is by now playing. The question is whether article 2 of the directive is 
respected, since it now states:
733 Grapperhaus (2015).
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The purpose of this Directive is to ensure the protection of temporary agency 
workers and to improve the quality of temporary agency work by ensuring that the 
principle of equal treatment, as set out in Article 5, is applied to temporary agency 
workers, and by recognising temporary work agencies as employers, while taking 
into account the need to establish a suitable framework for the use of temporary 
agency work with a view to contributing effectively to the creation of jobs and to 
the development of flexible forms of working.
7.6 FLEXICURITY
7.6.1 Definition and origins
We shall now examine the concept of flexicurity. What is it? What position does it 
hold in the European employment policy? What principles does Europe now follow 
with regard to this concept? And how does temporary agency work relate to this cur-
rently accepted labour market concept?
Wilthagen and Tros734 define flexicurity as ‘a policy strategy that attempts, syn-
chronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work 
organizations and labour relations on the one hand and to enhance security employ-
ment – security and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the 
labour market on the other hand.’
In later versions, Wilthagen has left out the reference to weaker groups in the 
labour market. The definition pays attention both to the process of flexicurity and to 
its substance. Both are considered to be relevant. The concept originated at national 
level,735 in the Netherlands, as a result of the implementation of the Dutch Flex Act 
(the Flexibility and Security Act) in 1999. The terminology was first coined by the 
Dutch sociologist Hans Adriaansens, who used it in the context of this new Flex Act. 
In 1996, a study was published by the WRR (Netherlands scientific council for gov-
ernment policy) under the supervision of Adriaansens, in which the term was used 
again:
It is a requirement of justice, rightfulness and efficacy that a community that needs 
flexible labour ensures that the social security system likewise invests flexible em-
ployment relationships with adequate security. However, such forms of ‘flexicurity’ 
call for particular alertness to improper use by employee or employer.
734 Bekker (2011), p. 27.
735 Bekker (2011), p. 104.
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In Denmark, too, the concept was discussed in national politics. In the autumn of 
2005, the Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen emphasised the satisfactory results of 
the flexible Danish labour market in combination with strong social security. The 
Danish model of flexicurity showed good economic results, high labour mobility, 
strong social security and a happy population.
Following the turn of the century, the concept drew more and more attention 
among academics and policy makers. In 2004, the concept was well established, and 
by that time Rasmussen advocated this system at European level:
… equipping people to adapt to – inevitable – change: to go from jobs of the past 
to the new and better jobs of the future […] Flexicurity is about flexibility and 
security. Security is about shortening the distance between the old and the new 
jobs while socially and economically securing people between jobs. And it’s about 
making social partners in the labour market co-responsible for development.736
At the time, the EU Commissioner for Social Affairs Špidla termed it as: ‘this month’s 
special offer in the supermarket of ideas’ and said it fitted in with the European em-
ployment strategy.737 Departing from the Danish model, it boiled down to a system 
of easy hiring and firing, high unemployment benefits and a proactive labour market 
policy. The policy concept had the potential to solve many of the unemployment 
problems in Europe.
But how was the concept interrelated with European employment policy? To 
understand that, it is necessary to list the developments chronologically.
7.6.2 Flexicurity as a concept of European employment policy
In paragraph 7.1 it was seen that the Treaty of Amsterdam had laid the foundations 
for a European employment policy. This was preceded by the White Paper, titled 
Growth, competitiveness, employment referred to above,738 which focused on the com-
bination of a deregulation agenda with active labour market measures. This, in turn, 
aligned with the 1994 Essen Summit, resulting in the so-called European employment 
 strategy, comprising a wide range of priorities that were later to become employment 
guidelines. Hendrickx argues that, on hindsight, the abovementioned white paper al-
ready contained the ingredients of what was later to become the flexicurity concept.739
736 Bekker (2011), p. 106.
737 Bekker (2011), p. 106.
738 European Commission (1994).
739 Hendrickx (2011), p. 26.
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This is connected to topics such as: training, the insider-outsider theory, active labour 
market policy and the adjustment of income guarantee mechanisms. In the European 
employment strategy, these and similar topics were tabled through OMC, the Open 
Method of Coordination. Article 145 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ex art icle 125 EC) 
provides:740
Member States and the Union shall, in accordance with this Title, work towards 
developing a coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting 
a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to eco-
nomic change with a view to achieving the objectives defined in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on European Union.
Article 146 (ex art. 126 EC) makes clear that the ball is in the member states’ court. 
They are requested to promote their employment policies in accordance with the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. The Council and Commission are to issue  annual 
employment reports. Conclusions shall be drawn during a Council meeting. On a 
proposal from the commission, the Council will subsequently, and by means of a 
qualified majority vote, establish guidelines that the member states are to take into 
account. Together with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, these guidelines 
constitute a package that the member states must comply with. In this context, the 
employment committee advises the Commission. The member states are to draw 
up NAPs (National Action Programmes), later called NRPs (National Reform Pro-
grammes), in which they are to respond to the guidelines. The Council may, by quali-
fied majority vote, make recommendations to the member states if they fail to comply 
with guidelines. However, no sanctions are imposed in case of breaches of the guide-
lines, as opposed to non-compliance with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, in 
which case penalties are applicable.
This process of establishing employment guidelines is sometimes called the so-
called Luxembourg process because such guidelines were first established during a Lux-
embourg summit in 1998. At the time, these guidelines focused on four main points, i.e.:
 – employability,
 – entrepreneurship,
 – adaptability,
 – equal opportunities.
740 Barnard (2012), p. 90 ff.
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Table 7.1 The Luxembourg process: employment guidelines 1998
Pillars Guidelines Examples of activities and targets
I Improving 
 employability
Tackling youth 
 unemployment
Within a period not exceeding five years:
• every unemployed young person is offered 
a new start before reaching six months of 
unemployment (e.g. training, retraining, work 
practice
• unemployed adults to be offered ‘fresh start’ 
before reaching 12 months of unemployment
Transition from 
passive measures to 
active measures
To increase the numbers of unemployed who are 
offered training, each ms will fix a target of the 
average of the three most successful states and at 
least 20%
Encouraging a partner-
ship approach
Social Partners to conclude agreements to in-
crease the possibilities of training, work experi-
ence, traineeships and equivalent
ms and Social Partners to develop possibilities for 
lifelong training
Easing the transition 
from school to work
ms to improve the quality of school to reduce sub-
stantially the number of young people with greater 
ability to adapt to technological and economic 
changes
II Developing 
 entrepreneurship
Making it easier to 
start up and run busi-
nesses
Reduce significantly the overhead costs and 
administrative burdens for businesses, especially 
sme’s, particularly in hiring workers
Encourage the development of self-employment by 
removing obstacles (e.g. tax and social security) 
to setting up as self-employed or running small 
businesses
Exploiting the op-
portunities for job 
creation
ms must investigate measures to exploit fully the 
possibilities for job creation at local level, espe-
cially concerning new activities not yet satisfied by 
the market
Making the taxation 
system more employ-
ment friendly and re-
versing the long-term 
trend towards higher 
taxes and charges on 
labour1
ms to set a target for gradually reducing the overall 
tax burden and for reducing the fiscal pressure on 
labour and non-wage labour costs
ms to examine the advisability of reducing the rate 
of vat on labour intensive services not exposed to 
cross-border competition2
III Encouraging 
adaptability in 
businesses and 
their employees
Modernizing work 
organization
Social Partners to negotiate agreements to modern-
ize work, including flexible working arrangements 
(e.g. annualized hours, reduction of working hours, 
reduction of working time, development of part-
time work, lifelong training and career breaks)
striking a balance between flexibility and security
ms to look at the possibility of incorporating in its 
law more adaptable types of contracts
Support adaptability 
in enterprises
Examine obstacles, especially tax obstacles, to 
investment in human resources
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Pillars Guidelines Examples of activities and targets
IV Strengthening 
policies for equal 
opportunities
Tackling gender gaps ms to reduce the gap in unemployment rate 
between women and men by actively supporting 
the increased employment of women and acting 
to reverse the under-representation of women in 
certain economic sectors and over-representation 
in others
Reconciling work and 
family life
ms to implement the Directives on Parental Leave 
and Part-time Work
ms to raise levels of access to care services where 
some needs are not met
Facilitating return to 
work
ms to examine the means of gradually eliniating 
the obstacles to return to work for women and men
Promoting the 
integration of people 
with disabilities into 
working life
ms to give special attention to the problems peo-
ple with disabilities may encounter in participating 
in working life
MS = Member State
1 These increased from 35% in 1980 to more than 42% in 1995.
2 This has now become a permanent Directive: Council Dir. 2009/47/EC (OJ [2009] L116/18).
Barnard (2012), p. 97–98
At the time, these employment guidelines still used the term ‘adaptability’ and not 
yet ‘flexicurity’. This only changed when the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and 
Jobs 2005–2008 were established, in which Guideline 21 stated in so many words: 
‘Promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market 
segmentation, having due regard to the role of the social partners’.
Table 7.2  Integrated guidelines for growth and jobs 2005–2008, Annex II, Brussels Euro-
pean Council Presidency Conclusions, 16–17 June 2005
17. Implement employment policies aimed at achieving full employment, improving quality 
and productivity at work, and strengthening social and territorial cohesion
18. Promote a lifecycle approach to work
19. Ensure inclusive labour markets, enhance work attractiveness, and make work pay for job 
seekers, including disadvantaged people and the inactive
20. Improve matching of labour market needs
21. Promote flexibility combined with employment security and reduce labour market seg-
mentation, having due regard to the role of Social Partners
22. Ensure employment-friendly labour cost developments and wage-setting mechanisms
23. Expand and improve investment in human capital
24. Adapt education abd training systems in response to new skill requirements
Barnard (2012), p. 103
In 2008, these eight integrated guidelines, established in 2005 (see above), were fur-
ther developed. The objectives continued to be what had been determined in 2003, 
but three priority actions were to be implemented, i.e.:
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1. Attracting and retaining more people in employment, increasing labour supply 
and modernising social protection systems (18–20);
2. Improving the adaptability of workers and enterprises (21–22);
3. Increasing investment in human capital through better education and skills.
Eight objectives were added, including a coherent approach to unemployment, a tar-
geted approach to long-term unemployment, the basic principle that all jobseekers 
can look up the vacancies in their own country, increasing the retirement age, im-
proving childcare, reducing the number of drop-outs, improving the level of educa-
tion, and more efforts towards lifelong learning.
This package continued to apply in 2009 and 2010, although a review had taken 
place in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. This review resulted in the Europe 2020 
guidelines, six of which focused on the economy and four on employment, such as:
1. Increasing labour market participation of women and men, reducing structural 
unemployment and promoting job quality;
2. Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs and pro-
moting lifelong learning;
3. Improving the quality and performance of education and training systems at all 
levels and increasing participation in tertiary or equivalent education;
4. Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty.
In a fifteen-year period the guidelines were renewed time and again, decreasing in 
number rather than increasing. In essence, however, they were all about more active 
labour market policies, modernisation of the social models, combating labour seg-
mentation and increasing flexicurity. By means of the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties 
and the Luxembourg process an attempt was made to create a so-called third way be-
tween the Anglo-Saxon model of deregulation, low unemployment and fewer social 
facilities on the one hand and the European continent model of employee protection, 
high unemployment and a generous package of social facilities. This third way focuses 
on flexibility for enterprises combined with security for employees, i.e. flexicurity.
7.6.3 Flexicurity principles
The main policy contribution in this respect has been the communication of Euro-
pean Commission, titled: Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity.741 According to 
the Commission, flexicurity742 promotes a combination of flexible labour markets 
741 European Commission (2007).
742 Barnard (2012), p. 163
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and adequate security. This relates to deregulation, the freedom that entrepreneurs 
have to shift their responsibility to the employee, entailing less security. Flexicurity is 
about taking people to adequate jobs and developing their talents. The Commission 
stated:
Flexibility, on the one hand, is about successful moves (‘transitions’) during one’s 
life course: from school to work, from one job to another, between unemployment 
or inactivity and work, and from work to retirement. It is not limited to more free-
dom for companies to recruit or dismiss, and it does not imply that open- ended 
contracts are obsolete. It is about progress of workers into better jobs, ‘upward 
mobil ity’ and optimal development of talent. Flexibility is also about flexible work 
organisations, capable of quickly and effectively mastering new productive needs 
and skills, and about facilitating the combination of work and private responsibil-
ities. Security, on the other hand, is more than just the security to maintain one’s 
job: it is about equipping people with the skills that enable them to progress in their 
working lives and helping them find new employment [i.e. from job security to 
employment security]. It is also about adequate unemployment benefits to  facilitate 
transitions. Finally, it encompasses training opportunities for all workers, espe-
cially the low skilled and older workers.
The Commission recognised that four policy aspects were on the agenda:
 – flexible and reliable contractual arrangements,
 – comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL),
 – Effective Labour Market Policies (ELMP),
 – modern social security systems.
In an earlier Green Paper Modernising Labour Law to meet the challenge of the 21st 
century,743 the Commission recognised that changes in production methods result in 
the business sector’s need for both permanent employees and workers employed on 
the basis of various other contracts.
The Commission also made recommendations and suggestions, and so-called ‘path-
ways’, i.e. approaches that the various member states could make use of depending 
on their specific employment situation. The first pathway dealt with labour market 
segmentation; the second discussed how flexicurity could be shaped at enterprise 
level, offering ‘transition security’. The third pathway related to tackling skills and 
opportunity gaps among the workforce and the fourth focused on improving oppor-
tunities for benefit recipients and informally employed workers.
743 Commission of the European Communities (2006).
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Employers tended to be satisfied with these principles, but the trade unions proved 
more critical. The Commission ‘was mainly focusing on reducing key workers’ rights, 
such as the right to stable jobs and secure contracts’. In the trade unions’ view, the 
Commission’s vision would result in ‘precarious’ work. The Commission would not 
provide a credible and sufficient political agenda to promote job security.
This led to the adoption by the European Council of a renewed set of flexicurity 
principles. This was preceded by a great many deliberations. The European Parlia-
ment adopted a resolution by 496 to 92, with 49 abstentions, in which it stated:
The rationale for an integrated flexicurity approach is the need to achieve the ob-
jectives of the renewed Lisbon Strategy, in particular more and better jobs, and at 
the same time to modernize the European social models. This requires policies that 
address simultaneously the flexibility of labour markets, work organization and 
labour relations, and security – employment security and social security.
The joint analysis by the European social partners has been equally remarkable. They 
jointly proposed flexicurity measures that were to comprise – in a balanced and 
 holistic way – elements agreed at the appropriate level. These elements were:
 – labour law and contractual arrangements;
 – effective and high quality labour market policies;
 – lifelong learning policies;
 – efficient and sustainable social protection systems;
 – a social dialogue.
On 12 December 2007, the European Council issued its version of the flexicurity prin-
ciples. The concept was introduced as a useful method, while the value of the stand-
ard full-time open-ended contract was emphasised as the mainstay of employment 
relationships.
The following eight principles were approved:744
The Common Principles of Flexicurity
Principle 1 Flexicurity is a means to reinforce the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy, create more and better jobs, modernise labour markets, and promote 
good work through new forms of flexibility and security to increase adaptability, 
employment and social cohesion.
Principle 2 Flexicurity involves the deliberate combination of flexible and  reliable 
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective 
744 Bekker (2011), p. 254 and 255.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
340
 active labour market policies, and modern, adequate and sustainable social pro-
tection systems.
Principle 3 Flexicurity approaches are not about one single labour market or work-
ing life model, nor about a single policy strategy: they should be tailored to the 
specific circumstances of each Member State. Flexicurity implies a balance between 
rights and responsibilities of all concerned. Based on the common principles, each 
Member State should develop its own flexicurity arrangements. Progress should be 
effectively monitored.
Principle 4 Flexicurity should promote more open, responsive and inclusive  labour 
markets overcoming segmentation. It concerns both those in work and those out 
of work. The inactive, the unemployed, those in undeclared work, in unstable em-
ployment, or at the margins of the labour market need to be provided with better 
opportunities, economic incentives and supportive measures for easier access to 
work or stepping-stones to assist progress into stable and legally secure employ-
ment. Support should be available to all those in employment to remain employ-
able, progress and manage transitions both in work and between jobs.
Principle 5 Internal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are  equally 
important and should be promoted. Sufficient contractual flexibility must be ac-
companied by secure transitions from job to job. Upward mobility needs to be 
facilitated, as well as between unemployment or inactivity and work. High-quality 
and productive workplaces, good organisation of work, and continuous upgrading 
of skills are also essential. Social protection should provide incentives and support 
for job transitions and for access to new employment.
Principle 6 Flexicurity should support gender equality, by promoting equal access 
to quality employment for women and men and offering measures to reconcile 
work, family and private life.
Principle 7 Flexicurity requires a climate of trust and broadly-based dialogue 
among all stakeholders, where all are prepared to take the responsibility for change 
with a view to socially balanced policies. While public authorities retain an overall 
responsibility, the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation 
of flexicurity policies through social dialogue and collective bargaining is of crucial 
importance.
Principle 8 Flexicurity requires a cost effective allocation of resources and should 
remain fully compatible with sound and financially sustainable public budgets. It 
should also aim at a fair distribution of costs and benefits, especially between busi-
nesses, public authorities and individuals, with particular attention to the specific 
situation of SMEs.
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The principles had been altered considerably. For one thing, they no longer referred 
to sufficient flexibility in recruitment and dismissal, but rather to sufficient contrac-
tual flexibility. Earlier on, Commissioner Špidla had pointed out that:
Flexicurity should not be misconceived as giving employers freedom to dissolve 
their responsibilities towards the employee and to give them little security. Flexicu-
rity does not mean ‘hire and fire’; nor does it imply that open-ended work contracts 
are a thing of the past. Flexicurity is about bringing people into good jobs and de-
veloping their talents. Employers have to improve their work organisation to offer 
jobs with future. They need to invest in their workers’ skills. This is part of ‘internal 
flexicurity’. However keeping the same job is not always possible. Sometimes it is 
better to focus on finding a new job rather than reserving the job one has at the 
moment. ‘External flexicurity’ attempts to offer safe moves for workers from one 
job into another, and good benefits to cover the time span, if needed.745
The emphasis on employment security made way for ‘staying in employment, within 
the same enterprise or into a new enterprise’.
7.6.4 Temporary agency work as a flexicurity concept driven by social 
temporary agency partners
Just before the turn of the century, Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa had started a social 
dialogue at a European sectoral level. Already in 2001, following the failure of the 
cross-sectoral dialogue on temporary agency work, the sectoral social partners had 
declared themselves in favour of finding the right balance between protection of tem-
porary agency workers and the need for flexibility as shaped by the temporary agency 
sector. In line with this earlier declaration, the social partners wanted to issue another 
joint declaration on the ongoing flexicurity debate in early 2007. They acknowledged 
that adequate legislation was essential to preventing any abuses and undermining 
of the working and employment conditions at the user enterprise, while at the same 
time being necessary to abolish redundant regulations. Its implementation into the 
2008 Temporary Agency Work Directive has been discussed above.
In the context of the flexicurity debate particular attention was drawn to the trans-
itional role that temporary agency work can play in the labour market. For instance, 
temporary agency work can be a pathway from being unemployed to being hired. It 
can also facilitate the transition from education to work. More generally, temporary 
agency work can ease the transition into the labour market. It can also can contribute 
745 Bekker (2011), p. 258.
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to the conversion of the various contract forms, from a temporary agency contract to 
a fixed-term or an open-ended contract. Furthermore, temporary agency work can 
contribute to improving the personal work-life balance.
Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa drew attention to a number of issues in order to 
find the right balance between protecting temporary agency workers and the possible 
role that temporary agency work can play in the labour market, in other words, flex-
icurity. They drew attention to, among other things, equal treatment, no temporary 
agency work to replace striking workers, clarifying the role of the temporary employ-
ment agency as an employer, transparency of the employment benefits, also between 
assignments, vocational education, cooperation between public and private employ-
ment agencies, promotion of Convention 181, monitoring systems such as licensing, 
certification and registration, in combination with sectoral social dialogue at national 
level, engaging in contractual relationships with private employment agencies on a 
voluntary basis, revision and abolishment of redundant regulations, creating a level 
playing field in respect of other forms of flexible labour, implementing issues, and 
further research.
Assuming that temporary agency work can play a positive role in the labour 
market, ‘the sectoral social dialogue committee will continue to work towards im-
proving the employment and working conditions of agency-supplied workers’.746
In a separate leaflet, Euro-Ciett indicated the following:
Executive summary 747
Private employment agencies provide an essential form of embodiment of flex-
icurity, by striking a balance between flexibility and work security in the labour 
market.
As well-regulated flexible labour service providers, private employment agencies 
contribute to work security in the labour market:
– Private employment agencies re present a well regulated response to  flexible 
 labour needs.
– Private employment agencies offer an essential stepping-stone function to the 
labour market.
– Private employment agencies create job opportunities that would not exist other-
wise.
– Private employment agencies help ‘outsiders’ to re-enter the labour market.
– Agency workers benefit from a  social status that other flexible workers do not 
have access to.
746 Euro-Ciett/Uni-Europa (2007).
747 Euro-Ciett (2007).
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– Private employment agencies provide flexible working conditions, which a 
growing number of workers are looking for.
– Private employment agencies help to increase work mobility while protecting 
working conditions of workers.
Private employment agencies provide a statutory answer to the flexibility require-
ments companies are facing:
– Private employment agencies are essential intermediaries that improve the flu-
idity and efficiency of the labour market.
– Private employment agencies provide an efficient external solution for com-
panies to manage their need of workforce flexibility.
– Private employment agencies make companies more competitive by enabling 
quick personnel adjustments in client firms..
In the sectoral social dialogue on temporary agency work, Euro-Ciett and Uni- 
Europa have constantly worked towards tabling evidence that might shed light on 
the role that temporary agency work plays in the labour market and in the necessary 
measures. From the employers’ side, this sectoral social dialogue is maintained by 
what is considered their key representative, Euro-Ciett. The main workers’ represent-
ative is Uni-Europa, flanked by further relevant workers’ representatives, such as In-
dustriALL and ETUC.748 Various studies have been conducted with the support of the 
European Commission,. Prominent projects in this context were the European Ob-
servatory on cross-border activities (2009),749 which provided input for improving 
cross-border temporary agency work, The role of temporary agency work and labour 
market transitions in Europe (2013) including interesting data on the transitional role 
of temporary agency work750 and the study How temporary agency work compares 
with other forms of employment (2015),751 benchmarking temporary agency work 
with fixed term contracts and self-employed activity.
The 2013 transition study shows clearly that temporary agency work promotes the 
transition from unemployment to work. In Germany, 60% of the workers had been 
unemployed previous to the temporary agency work period, and in countries such 
as France and Italy that proportion had exceeded 40%. For the Netherlands and 
Belgium, previous unemployment figures amounted to 30%. Moreover, it became 
748 Voss (2016), p. 33.
749 European Observatory on cross-border activities within the temporary agency work sector; Euro- 
Ciett 2009. See also: Rodriquez et al. (no date).
750 Voss et al. (2013), executive summary.
751 IDEA Consult (2015).
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clear that temporary agency workers continued in employment. For instance, it was 
demonstrated that French unemployment previous to and one year after the period 
of temporary agency work had decreased from 55% to 21%. Furthermore, temporary 
agency work results in permanent contracts. A Dutch study of 2009 showed that 56% 
of the temporary agency workers were looking for permanent employment, and that 
29% actually found it. In 2010, 16% of the French temporary agency workers found 
permanent employment within one year. The same held for 66.5% of Italian tempo-
rary agency workers in the period 1998–1999. Although these figures paint a positive 
picture, it must also be concluded that many temporary agency workers, particu-
larly those belonging to so-called target groups, are solely dependent on temporary 
 agency work.
Temporary agency work also plays a role in the transition from education to 
work. Many young people find a job along this pathway.
In Germany 49.5% of all temporary agency workers are under the age of 35; in 
Italy 44% are under 30 and in the Netherlands 46% are under 25. In France 85% of the 
temporary agency workers under 25 turned out not to have worked prior to the tem-
porary agency work period, because they had attended college or been unemployed. 
Following one year of temporary agency work, 62% appeared to be working.
Social partners can play a key role in improving the quality of the transitions by 
means of supplementary arrangements and other initiatives, such as the establish-
ment of education and pension funds.
The transitional role of temporary agency work was also underscored in the study 
How temporary agency work compares with other forms of work.752 In France, relative-
ly more temporary agency workers (54%) turned out to be employed again one year 
later than fixed-term contract workers (43%).
The results of the 2010 EWCS (European Working Conditions Survey) showed 
the existence of an increased perception of unemployment risk and a decreased 
re-employment probability. Other studies show that temporary agency work con-
stitutes an efficient pathway towards permanent employment compared with other 
forms of temporary work. Temporary agency work increases the employment level. 
The more temporary agency work, the higher the employment level. Moreover, it 
decreases the proportion of workers over the age of 45 in the labour market.
Another study result is that temporary agency work proves to be regulated more 
restrictively than fixed-term employment. In respect of social facilities temporary 
agency work turns out to have similar conditions compared with permanent employ-
ment. This applies to facilities in respect of unemployment, illness, maternity leave, 
medical expenses and pensions. There is a problem for workers on very short-term 
752 IDEA Consult (2015).
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contracts who cannot reach the threshold to qualify for these facilities. However, so-
cial partners in the temporary agency sector can take measures to remedy this.
The study shows that permanent employment generally yields better working 
and employment conditions. With regard to working hours, workers with perman-
ent contracts and self-employed workers appear to score better than workers with 
fixed-term contracts and temporary agency workers. According to the EWCS (2010) 
temporary agency workers feel slightly safer (79%) in their working environments 
than workers with permanent contracts (76%), fixed-term contracts (76%) and self- 
employed workers (72%). According to this survey, many temporary agency workers 
had undertaken training during the past twelve months (77%). This proportion was 
higher for workers with permanent contracts (82%) and fixed-term contracts (78%) 
but for self-employed persons this was much lower (55%). Furthermore, the study 
shows that, in contrast with other types of flexible work, such as fixed-term contract 
and self-employment, the temporary agency sector is capable of taking supplement-
ary measures that result in enhancing the social protection of temporary agency 
workers.
These are the observations that Euro-Ciett and Uni-Europa make in their sectoral 
social dialogue on temporary agency work. They regularly result in joint declara-
tions that are to give further substance to the acceptability of temporary agency work. 
Moreover, social dialogue sessions have been set up in countries such as Bulgaria 
(2009), Turkey (2010), Croatia (2013) and Serbia (2014) in order to promote the qual-
ity of temporary agency work. During those sessions, efforts are made to give further 
shape and substance to temporary agency work as a concept of flexicurity.
7.7 CONVENTION 181 COMPARED TO EU LAW
If we compare Convention 181 with the laws and regulations on temporary  agency 
work that have by now been realised at EU level, it becomes clear that EU laws and 
regulations are in place for nearly all provisions in Convention  181. In the field of 
non-discrimination (article  5 c Convention  181) Europe has distinguished itself by 
means of a series of directives regarding equal treatment. Thus, we have Direct-
ive  75/117/EEC in respect of equal pay for male and female workers in which the 
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, as entrenched in article 157 TFEU, has been 
elaborated. We also have Directive 76/207/EEC, regulating access to work,  vocational 
training, promotion and working and employment conditions, aimed at banning all 
forms of direct and indirect discrimination in the world of work. This directive was 
amended by Directive  2002/73. Moreover, there is Directive  79/7/EEC, regulating 
equal treatment in respect of social security.
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In the 1980s, Directive 86/378/EC was added, which was amended to Directive 96/97/
EC as a result of the Barber judgment providing that pension should also be consid-
ered as wages. Directive 86/613/EEC was issued for self-employed persons.
In the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was 
effected in 2007 on the occasion of the Treaty of Lisbon, considerable attention was 
paid to equal treatment. Article 20 provides that ‘everyone is equal before the law’. 
Article 21 provides: ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, col-
our, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or 
any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age 
or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.’ Moreover, in paragraph 2 ‘any discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality’ is prohibited.
Article 23 provides that ‘equality between women and men must be ensured in 
all areas, including employment, work and pay’, except that positive discrimination is 
allowed in favour of the under-represented sex (par. 2).
Besides non-discrimination, Convention  181 also pays attention to fundamental 
 labour rights such as the freedom of association and collective bargaining (art.  4, 
art. 11 a, b and art. 12 a), forced labour (recital 10) and child labour (art. 9). By now, all 
these fundamental labour rights figure in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in articles 12 and 28, article 5 and article 32 respectively.
Article 12 provides the freedom of assembly and association and article 28 regu-
lates the right of collective bargaining and action. Article 5 provides the prohibition 
of slavery and forced labour, and article 32 regulates the prohibition of child labour 
and the protection of young people at work.
With regard to working hours (art. 11 d and 12 c Convention 181) there is a compre-
hensive European equivalent in article 31, par. 2 of the Charter, providing that ‘every 
worker has the right to limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly 
rest periods and to an annual period of paid leave’, and in the EU Working Time 
 Directive (2003/88/EC).
For other working conditions (art. 11 d, 12 c) mention should be made of the Posting 
of Workers Directive and the Temporary Agency Work Directive (Directives 96/71/
EC and 2008/104/EC).
Both Directives include provisions on wages. In article  3, par.  1c, the Posting 
Directive imposes the obligation to adopt minimum wages, including overtime rates, 
on member states that have workers posted on their territory. The Agency Directive 
takes it one step further and makes equal pay for equal work obligatory as part of the 
basic working and employment conditions.
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ILO Convention 181 demands that the member states take the necessary measures in 
relation to, among other things, minimum wages (art. 11 c). Moreover, the member 
states must allocate the respective responsibilities in the tripartite temporary agency 
relationships (art. 12 b). One may argue that for the EU this allocation of responsibil-
ities has taken place through these two directives.
Through Convention 181 (art. 11 e, art. 12 d) social security is another topic that needs 
to be regulated. Under the conditions imposed by Union law and national legisla-
tions, the Charter recognises and respects the right of access to social security bene-
fits and social services that offer protection under circumstances such as maternity, 
illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, or following loss of employment.
In principle, the European Union has nothing to do with social security, as it is 
the responsibility of the individual member states. Coordinating regulations were, 
however, laid down long ago (Regulation EC 1408/71 and Regulation EC 883/2004). 
Also, there are rules with regard to pregnant workers (Directive  92/85/EEC) and 
 parental leave (Directive  2010/18/EU) that can be considered as comprehensive 
equivalents of the provisions in Convention 181 (art. 11 j, art. 12 i).
At EU level, the occupational health and safety provisions, laid down in article 11 g and 
article 12 f of Convention 181, have a comprehensive foundation in Directive 91/303/
EEC. Moreover, the Charter states in article 31, par. 1, that ‘every worker has the right 
to working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity’.
Convention 181 provides in articles 11 f and 12 e that member states must guarantee 
access to training and must allocate responsibility in that respect. In EU law, we find 
a provision in article 6 of the Agency Directive, which obliges the member states to 
instigate the necessary measures or promotes social dialogue to improve temporary 
agency workers’ access to training. In this respect, article 14 in the Charter provides 
that ‘everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and con-
tinuing training’.
Insolvency is also an area of concern provided for in Convention 181 (art. 11 i, art. 12 
h). By now, this issue has been regulated in the EU through Directive 2008/94/EC.
Article 3 of Convention 181 concerns the status of the temporary employment agency, 
stating, among other things, that it shall be determined in accordance with national 
law and practice, and after consulting with social partners, by the member states ‘in 
accordance with a system of licencing or certification, except where they are other-
wise regulated or determined by appropriate national law and practice’. EU law is less 
far-reaching on this point, as the Agency Directive only provides in article 4, on the 
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review of restrictions or prohibitions, that national requirements in respect of regis-
tration, licensing, certification, financial guarantees or the monitoring of temporary 
employment agencies must be respected.
Article 6 of Convention 181 safeguards the workers’ privacy. In the EU, this topic is 
regulated through Directive 95/46/EC. The Charter provides in article 8 that ‘every-
one has the right to the protection of their personal data’.
The ‘no fee to worker’ principle, as laid down in article 7 of Convention 181, now has its 
equivalent in article 6, par. 3, of the Agency Directive.
The status of the migrant worker,753 as provided in article  8 of Convention  181, is 
comprehensively reflected in European law in the Posting of Workers Directives 
( Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EC).
The cooperation between public and private parties (art. 13 Convention 181) is not re-
flected in EU law, in contrast to access to remedy, (art.  14, par. 3, Convention 181), 
which is regulated at EU level in article 47.
Among the bottlenecks discussed earlier on in this study (paragraph 5.4) the topic 
of remuneration has been included in European law, i.e. in article 5 of the Agency 
Directive, which considers the user company standard regarding the basic working 
and employment conditions to be the guiding factor. Furthermore, it is provided in 
article 30 of the Charter that ‘every worker has the right to protection against unjus-
tified dismissal, in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices’, 
which enhances the stability of work.
The weakened position of trade unions is discussed generically in articles 12 and 28 of 
the EU Charter.
EU law has nothing to say about excessive use of agency work.
In some respects, European law takes matters further than Convention 181. For in-
stance, article  6 of the Agency Directive contains provisions on information on 
vacan cies at the user enterprise, access to collective facilities at the user enterprise and 
occupational training. Moreover, the representation of temporary agency workers in 
753 See also Rodriquez et al. (no date), provided that it distinguishes between treatment in the Posting 
of Workers Directive and that in the Temporary Agency Work Directive.
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representative bodies (art. 7), and the obligation to provide information to these repres-
entative bodies on the use of temporary agency work (art. 8) have been regulated.
The right to introduce more favourable provisions as laid down in article 15 of Conven-
tion 181 is also found in the Agency Directive (art. 9). Likewise, the sanctions (art. 14, 
par. 3, Convention 181) have been regulated in article 10 of the Agency Directive.
It can be concluded that European law has adopted regulations in nearly all the fields 
covered by Convention 181. Some of them are less far-reaching, for instance the status 
provisions on licensing and certification requirements, some of them reach farther, 
for example on the principle of equal pay for equal work instance in the Agency 
Directive, and the key provisions on the working and employment conditions in the 
Posting Directive.
The existence of more comprehensive regulations at EU level raises the question 
as to whether Convention 181 is still adequate. As can be seen in the table below, the 
EU has regulated 28 topics relating to temporary agency work to a greater or lesser 
extent, while ILO convention 181 regulates 22 topics. One might contend that this ILO 
convention regulates matters less extensively, but as a result has more focus. In that 
sense, it is adequate for the EU, albeit as a minimum regime.
On balance, it looks as if Convention  181 did actually serve as an agenda for 
 Europe, even though it was not intended as one beforehand. When the Agency Direct-
ive was realised, the European Parliament did plead for a better alignment with the 
Convention. However, the Commission appeared to be against this and embarked on 
its own course.754
But, the question also arises as to whether Convention 181 still has any added value 
for the member states. If everything has been comprehensively, and even more ex-
tensively regulated at EU level, what is the purpose of an ILO convention  that largely 
regulates the same topics?
In this context, a number of aspects are worthy of attention. We mentioned the 
focus of the Convention, promoting overview and clarity. Being an international 
covenant, Convention 181 also provides guarantees for adequate temporary agency 
worker protection and a proper functioning of temporary employment agencies. 
National governments that have ratified Convention 181 are to develop regulations 
in accordance with the conditions laid down in the convention, including the fun-
damental labour rights. Through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU law also 
provides guarantees for those fundamental rights, but only to the extent that they 
flow from EU regulations. This conditional binding force does not apply to a ratified 
754 K. Ahlberg et al. (2008), p. 231. See also: Herzfeld Olssen (2011), p. 50.
Part II International social law developments and Convention 181 
350
covenant such as Convention 181. Upon ratification, the ILO provisions thus appear 
to be stronger than the relevant EU provisions.
EU law also comprises contrasts and interpretation issues. We saw earlier that 
there is no unequivocal answer to the question as to which remuneration regulations 
should be observed on the basis of the Posting Directive. Furthermore, an ILO con-
vention offers a better guarantee for continuity, since it can only be denounced once 
in every ten years.
And lastly, ILO Convention 181 provides a guarantee against the prohibition of 
temporary agency services. It has been discussed before that prior to Convention 181 
there have been conventions aiming to ban private placement, which also included 
temporary agency services. The essential merit of Convention 181 is also that it con-
ditionally allows service provision by temporary employment agencies. That does 
not tally with measures that render temporary agency services unfeasible, although 
specific prohibition may apply.
What is also interesting in this context is that in its 2002 recommendations on 
the proposal for a directive, the Economic and Social Committee advised the EU 
member states to ratify Convention 181.755
All in all, Convention  181 offers more focus, clarity and guarantees for respecting 
fundamental labour rights and continuity of the temporary agency services, also for 
the EU member states.
Table 7.3 Convention 181 compared with EU law
C181 EU Law
I Core Issues
a. Non-discrimination Art. 5 Directives 75/117/eec, 76/207/eec; 
202/73/eec, 79/17/eec, 86/378/eec
Charter 20, 21, 23; art. 19, 157 tfeu
Directive 86/613/eec
b. Freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining
Art. 4
Art. 11 a, b
Art. 12 a
eu-Charter art. 12, 28
c. Forced labour Preambule eu-Charter art. 5
d. Child labour Art. 9 eu-Charter art. 32
II Worker Protection Issues
a. Right to work eu-Charter art. 15
b. Free choice of employment eu-Charter art. 15
c. Working time (rest and leisure, lim-
itation hours and periodic holidays)
Art. 11 d
Art. 12 c
eu-Charter art. 31 lid 2
Directive 2003/88/ec
d. Conditions of work (just and 
 favourable conditions)
Art. 11 d
Art. 12 c
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 5. Directive 
96/71/ec art. 3
755 Herzfeld Olssen (2011), p. 50.
 Chapter 7: The European approach to temporary agency work
 351
C181 EU Law
e. Minimum (wages) and equal pay 
for equal work (favourable remu-
neration)
Art. 11 c
Art. 12 b
Directive 2008/104/ec. Art.5
Directive 96/71/ec art. 3
f. Adequate standard of living
g. Social security protection (occasion-
al accidents, diseases, maternity, 
parental protection, benefits, pro-
tection against unemployment, sick-
ness, disability, widowhood, old age 
Art. 11 e
Art. 12 d
eu-Charter art. 34
Regulation(ec) 1408/71 art. 14, (ec) 
883/2004
Directive 2010/18/eu
Directive 92/85/eec
h. Health and safety Art. 11 g
Art. 12 f
eu-Charter art. 31 lid 1
Directive 91/383/eec
i. Training Art. 11 f
Art. 12 e
eu-Charter art. 14
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 6 par.5
j. Insolvency Art. 11 i
Art. 12 h
Directive 2008/94/ec
C181 European Law
III Specific Issues
a. Legal status Art. 3 par. 1, 2 Directive 2008/104/ec art. 4
b. Privacy and protection personal 
information
Art. 6 eu-Charter art. 8
Directive 95/46/ec
c. No fee to worker Art. 7 Directive 2008/104/ec art. 6 par. 3
d. Migrant workers Art. 8 Directive 96/71/ec
Directive 2014/67/ec
e. Cooperation public/private agencies Art. 13
f. Access to remedy Art. 14, par. 3 eu-Charter art. 47
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 10
IV Other Specific Issues
a. Stability of work eu-Charter art. 30
b. Unequal pay Directive 2008/104/ec art. 5
c. Weakened position trade unions
d. Excessive use of agency work
V Other European Issues
a. Access to employment, collective 
facilities, vocational training
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 6
b. Representation of temporary 
 agency workers
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 7
c. Information of workers represent-
atives
Directive 2008/104/ec art. 8
d. Favourable provisions Art. 15 Directive 2008/104/ec art. 9
e. Penalties Art. 14, par. 3 Directive 2008/104/ec art. 10
f. Implementation and review Art. 18 Directive 2008/104/ec art. 11 en 12
g. Free placement ilo conv. 88 eu-Charter art. 29
If we survey the number of ratifications by EU countries, it becomes clear that thir-
teen member states have ratified Convention 181 while fifteen have not. The question 
is why the majority of the EU chooses not to link up with Convention 181, in spite of 
the Commission’s call to do so.756
756 Commission of the European Communities (2008), p. 32.
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Among the fifteen countries that have not ratified the Convention are three so-called 
prospects, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Sweden. Conspicuous in the list of countries that 
have not ratified is Luxembourg, which has still ratified Convention 96 part II.
When the ILO took stock of potential interest in, among other things, ratify-
ing Convention 181 among its member states in 2010, some countries turned out to 
have objections to the Convention, as it was thought to also regulate outsourcing 
and does not prohibit the replacement of striking workers (Austria), demands spe-
cific requirements such as permits, licenses or otherwise and prohibits charging the 
temporary agency worker with a fee (Germany) and, even though many elements 
of Convention 181 are complied with, priority must first be given to implementation 
of the Agency Directive (Sweden). Norway feels that the Convention is too wide in 
scope by regulating not just temporary employment; nor does this country have pro-
visions for minimum rates of pay, as required by the Convention. This objection also 
holds for Switzerland, which likewise objects to the no fee to worker principle, as do 
Romania, Denmark and the United Kingdom.
In view of all these objections, the question is whether the opportunities (and 
shortcomings) of the Convention are fully appreciated. For instance, the no fee to 
worker principle can be deviated from in consultation with the social partners, and 
permits and licenses can make way for other specific national legislation.
At EU level, interests are best served by ratifying Convention 181, but various 
member states voice objections that can be traced back to other applicable regula-
tions, and possibly to lack of understanding. Time will tell whether these objections 
can be overcome.
In any case, the partners in the social dialogue on temporary agency work show 
wisdom in directing their actions at the Commission in order to encourage member 
states to ratify the Convention.
Ratifications of C181 by EU Member States757
EU countries that have ratified Convention No. 181 (12):
 – Belgium – Lithuania
 – Bulgaria – Netherlands
 – Czech Republic – Poland
 – Finland – Portugal
 – France – Slovakia
 – Hungary – Spain
 – Italy
757 CIETT & Euro-Ciett (2015), p. 16.
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EU countries that have not yet ratified Convention No. 181 (16):
 – Austria – Latvia
 – Croatia – Luxembourg
 – Cyprus – Malta
 – Denmark – Romania
 – Estonia – Slovenia
 – Germany – Sweden
 – Greece – United Kingdom
 – Ireland

Part III  
A national legal framework 
on temporary agency work: 
the Dutch context
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Before 1930 Private and public placement coexisted, but were not regulated.
1930 The Dutch Placement Act (Arbeidsbemiddelingswet) potentially creates a mono-
poly for public employment services; private placement on a not-for-profit basis is 
allowed on condition of licensing; private for-profit placement is prohibited.
1940 Centralisation of the public employment services under German occupation.
1960–1970 Temporary agency work increases and posting workers causes unrest in employ-
ment relationships. The Manpower Provision Act (Wet op het ter beschikking stel-
len van arbeidskrachten) is adopted in 1965 and becomes operational by decree 
in 1970. Work placement and posting workers are restricted by licences.
1990 A new Employment Services Act (Arbeidsvoorzieningswet) subjects all employ-
ment services, including manpower provision, to a tripartite board, on the under-
standing that private for-profit placement and manpower provision are allowed on 
condition of licensing.
1997–1998 In 1997, ilo convention 181 is adopted. The Netherlands are quick to ratify this 
convention, with the tacit approval of the Lower and Upper Houses.
1998 Legislation on flexibility and security is implemented, including the secondment 
agreement into the bw (Dutch Civil Code) as a special employment contract. The 
Dutch Posting of Workers by intermediaries Act (Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten 
door intermediairs, Waadi Act) is also implemented, abolishing the licensing 
system for temporary employment agencies and maintaining it for all private work 
placement.
1999 The European Posting of Workers Directive is adopted, which is implemented as 
the Dutch Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Work) Act (Wet arbeidsvoorwaarden 
grensoverschrijdende arbeid, waga Act).
2003 The Waadi Act is amended, in the sense that the licensing requirement for private 
work placement is abolished.
2004–2006 There are signs that manpower provision is affected by fraud, abuses and illegali-
ty. The Dutch government considers reintroducing a licensing requirement. A moti-
on by Dutch mp Bruls reverses this consideration and results in the establishment 
of the Dutch ‘Labour Standards Register’ that introduces a certification system.
2008–2012 A European Temporary Agency Work Directive and the need for a comprehensive 
strategy result in an amendment of the Waadi Act, implementing the Tempo-
rary Agency Work Directive and incorporating the ‘Registration requirement for 
intermediaries providing manpower act’. Earlier on, the hiring liability regarding 
minimum rates of pay and minimum holiday allowance is introduced in the bw.
2012 The private members’ bill by Hamer and Ulenbelt on the so-called excessive flexi-
ble labour is before Dutch Parliament.
2014 This bill is largely incorporated into the Work and Security Act (Wet werk en zeker-
heid, Wwz), which is implemented in 2014 and 2015.
2015 The Act on Combating Sham Arrangements (Wet aanpak schijnconstructies) intro-
duces total sequential liability to fight sham arrangements.
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Chapter 8
Development
Following ‘decent-isation’, ‘human right-ification’, ‘IFA-isation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the labour relationships and international social law, this section will discuss the 
Dutch context. We saw before that Guy Ryder, Director-General of the ILO, sees the 
Netherlands as the forerunner of the flex changes that are to take place in European 
labour relationships. He also looks upon this country as a testing ground. This is 
 reason enough to discuss specifically how temporary agency legislation has devel-
oped in the Netherlands.
This discussion goes back to how work placement was originally regulated in a 
strict sense, in order to arrive at the broader concept of labour services, which included 
the notion of manpower provision. It will then be made clear how the so-called ‘flex-
akkoord’ (‘flexibility agreement’) further regulated temporary agency work through 
the flexibility and security legislation of the late 1990s. Almost  simultaneously, the 
Netherlands ratified Convention 181, an account of which will follow below.
Moreover, this chapter will discuss the effects on Dutch law and regulations 
on the Posting of Workers, Enforcement and Temporary Agency Work Directives, 
which were examined in the context of the European approach in chapter 7.
The Netherlands is further characterised by a unique form of public-private 
 arrangement, including a certification system that is still under development. Mean-
while, collective labour agreements (CLAs) for temporary agency work regularly come 
into effect. This chapter will look at certification and CLAs, after which chapter 9 will 
discuss complications regarding the development of temporary agency legislation in 
the Netherlands.
8.1 WORK PLACEMENT
At an early stage in the social history of the Netherlands, forms of matching supply 
of and demand for labour can be recognised. In the Middle Ages, a precursor of the 
labour exchange existed. Moreover, regulations were adopted early on. Van  Drongelen 
& Fase tell us that on 26 March 1527, the Amsterdam court ruled that nobody is allowed 
Part III A national legal framework on temporary agency work: the Dutch context 
358
to be ‘idle’; ‘Anyone who is idle, must find himself at the old Bridge in the morning, 
so that the people who want work done, will be able to find him, to hire him and put 
him to work.’758
When guilds were banned, the need for intermediaries arose, and by 1850 prim-
itive labour exchanges were set up, for instance in The Hague in 1846 and in Maas-
tricht in 1852. They were locally oriented and had a marked philanthropic slant.
The need for work placement was closely intertwined with the need for poor 
relief and for tackling the so-called ‘Sociale Quaestie’ (social issue), which pivoted on 
the problems of the 19th-century working classes.
Work placement was practised by small enterprises in inns and public houses, but not 
always in an acceptable manner. These practices evoked criticism, and attempts were 
made to professionalise this activity. In this context, Van Drongelen & Fase mention 
the initiatives of the Maatschappij van de Werkende Stand (‘working class society’) 
in Amsterdam in 1886; the Christelijke Volksbond (‘Christian people’s association’) 
in The Hague in 1850 and the Centrale Arbeidsvereniging ‘Samenwerking’ (‘central 
labour union “Cooperation” ’) in Arnhem in 1897.
The poor relief engendered relief for the unemployed, at the specific request 
of the municipalities, which granted subsidies. Thus, the first municipal labour ex-
change was launched in Schiedam in 1902, followed by Haarlem (1905), The Hague, 
Hilversum, Leiden and Venlo (1906), and Arnhem and Groningen (1907).759 In 1918, 
a federation of Dutch labour exchanges was established, which can be seen as an im-
portant trailblazer of work placement in the Netherlands.
During the First World War, however, this federation could not manage the rising un-
employment, so that national work placement came under government super vision.
The 1930 Placement Act legislated what had more or less developed in practice. 
A national system for public work placement services was distinguished from types 
of special work placement that were subject to licensing. Although the for-profit 
types could be licensed, this system was due to be discontinued. This aligned with the 
ILO’s ideas, described in chapter 2.
During the Second World War, a state-run employment office was established in the 
occupied Netherlands, which was fully dedicated to German warfare. This meant that 
many thousands of Dutch people were put to work in the German war industry.760
758 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 13.
759 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 16.
760 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 25.
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After the Second World War, the field of activity extended to ‘employment services’, 
which encompassed not only work placement, but also help with vocational orienta-
tion and vocational (re)training, re-education and resettlement. As a result of this ex-
tended set of duties, it was fitting not to refer to ‘work placement services’ any longer, 
but rather to ‘employment services’.761
8.2 PROVIDING MANPOWER
Apart from employment-finding, the 1960s Dutch labour market became acquainted 
with the phenomenon of manpower provision, which was taken to mean assigning 
temporary agency workers and posting workers.762 While these activities are closely 
related, at the time they were quite different in nature. Temporary agency work was 
mainly about workers informally assigned by a temporary employment agency to do 
office work. Married women in particular were attracted to this type of labour.
The posted workers were usually male breadwinners working in industrial sec-
tors such as shipbuilding and construction. Particularly in construction, problems 
were rife. It was well-known that labour subcontractors forcibly recruited the con-
struction workers they posted illicitly. They had to be stopped.
The Dutch Secretary of State for Social Affairs at the time, Dr. A. A. van Rhijn 
LLM, asked the SER (‘social and economic council of the Netherlands’) for advice on 
how to put an end to illegal labour subcontracting. This resulted in a non-unanimous 
recommendation. While the majority recommended regulations prohibiting these 
practices coupled with licensing, the minority opted for binding wage regulation, 
coupled with an obligation to report on the part of the user enterprise, which would 
facilitate monitoring.
In the first instance, the ministry opted for binding wage regulation. When this 
proved ineffective, the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Dr. G. M. J. Veldkamp, put 
forward a bill for the  Manpower Provision Act, containing a new concept: manpower 
provision. Distinctions between assigning and posting workers were thus neglected. 
The one concept was to encompass both phenomena.
The Act aimed to ‘protect the interests of good labour market relations and the 
interests of a socially strong position of the workers involved’.
The Minister clearly distinguished the concept of manpower provision from the 
concept of work placement as defined in the 1930 Placement Act. In his explanatory 
memorandum to the bill he stated as follows:
761 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 26.
762 Van Haasteren & Overeem (1976), p. 19.
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Firstly, be it remarked that the state of affairs aimed at by the bill differs  significantly 
from providing work placement services in the sense of the 1930 Placement Act. 
The bill deals with providing a third party with manpower; work placement, how-
ever, is all about helping another party find workers or jobs. These are two essen-
tially different notions. The term ‘manpower provision’ suggests that the ‘posted’ 
worker is working in the enterprise where he has been made available on the basis 
of a legal relationship between himself and the ‘poster’. This state of affairs does not 
apply in the case of work placement. Also from the perspective of the party that is 
employing the workers, the two states of affairs are clearly different: in the case of 
manpower provision, the work is done without any labour relationship arising be-
tween the worker and the hirer; on the other hand, in the case of work placement, 
effecting a labour relationship between the worker and the party for whom he will 
carry out the assignment will be the object of the intervention, upon completion 
of which the work placement officer will step back. Thus, in the view of the under-
signed, both distinguishable areas of activity have been satisfactorily delineated.763
The Dutch Manpower Provision Act remained a dead letter until 1970, when labour 
riots took place in the Waterweg area, as a result of which Minister Roolvink – upon 
the recommendation from the Dutch Labour Foundation – felt obliged to act. He 
implemented a licensing system, subject to a dozen of conditions that, for the sake of 
brevity, boiled down to the following:764
1. One must keep appropriate accounting records.
2. Changes in the company’s management and changes of address must be imme-
diately reported to the Minister of Social Affairs.
3. One must not pay higher wages than those earned by a comparable worker in 
the same position at the user enterprise.
4. One must not pay bonuses on top of the workers’ hourly wages to compensate 
for regular remittances to workers with permanent contracts.
5. The expenses refunded to workers must not exceed what permanent workers at 
the user enterprise are entitled to.
6. A worker must not be hindered in accepting a permanent contract.
7. Workers who are under the age of 18 years may not be assigned, except during 
holidays.
8. Providing manpower abroad is not allowed.
9. Intra corporate provision of manpower is not allowed.
763 Explanatory memorandum to the Act of 31 May 1965, regarding regulations on providing man-
power (Stb. 379), ‘Nederlandse Staatswetten’ in the Schuurmans & Jordens edition no. 40 edited by 
Mr. A. B. Raven, pag. 151; see also Van Haasteren & van Overeem (1976) p. 24
764 Van Haasteren & Overeem (1976), p. 32
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10. At the request of the user enterprise, copies of the pay sheets of the workers as-
signed to the user enterprise must be supplied.
11. In 1971, the amount of manpower provided, expressed in working hours, must 
not exceed the number of hours worked in 1970.
12. Specific data must be periodically supplied to the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Later on, condition 11 was amended in the sense that assignments exceeding three 
months were to be reported and that assignments exceeding six months were subject 
to approval by the Ministry of Social Affairs. This measure was meant to strictly limit 
the employment agency and posting activities to temporary assignments.
In 1973, it was also determined that manpower provision was prohibited in the 
construction sector across the Netherlands and in the steel sector in the Rijnmond 
area. Moreover, contacts were made with the trade union movement in the early 1970s, 
which resulted in the first temporary agency worker CLA in 1971.765 By then, social 
security legislation had been extended to apply to temporary agency  workers.766
The 1960s and 1970s were characterised by a difficult relationship between the tem-
porary agency sector and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. This only 
changed in 1982 after the swearing in of the first Lubbers cabinet, which in its first 
government declaration advocated a generous policy on temporary agency work.767
The fact that manpower provision, including the posting of workers and tempor-
ary agency work, were legally classed under the new 1990 Employment Services Act, 
marked a major mind shift. These forms of employment were presented as  phenomena 
that could make a positive contribution to the labour market, rather than as forms of 
employment that must be combated in view of the risks they presented in the fields 
of illegal labour subcontracting, abuse, fraud and illegality.
8.3 EMPLOYMENT SERVICES768
Through the years, the employment services organisation has evolved increasingly 
from being a work placement institution into becoming a body that focuses on la-
bour market policy as a whole. This also included a coordinating role with regard 
to policies in the fields of economy, education labour relations and social facilities. 
Alongside this, individual services continued to be provided in the fields of work 
placement, granting permits to terminate employment and involvement in the field 
765 Van Haasteren & Overeem (1976), p. 35.
766 Van Haasteren & Overeem (1976), p. 25.
767 Goldschmeding (1998), p. 6.
768 Sol (2000).
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of vocational (re)training, re-education, vocational orientation and intermediation 
of disabled persons.
In the 1990 Employment Services Act, the board of the employment services 
organisation was rendered tripartite, i.e. placed under central control – the ‘central 
employment services authority’ (CBA) – consisting of employers, workers and gov-
ernment representatives. Its field of activity included:769
 – registration of jobseekers and vacancies,
 – vocational orientation,
 – work placement,
 – processing applications for work placement licences,
 – processing applications for manpower provision licences,
 – training and education,
 – subsidising third parties.
The Employment Services Act replaced the 1930 Placement Act and the 1970 Man-
power Provision Act. The new act allowed for private placement, conditional to a 
licence, which was to be granted by the CBA. Private for-profit work placement was 
also allowed, contrary to what had been provided for by the Placement Act, which 
had prohibited this. This policy change did require the Netherlands, which had rati-
fied Convention 96, to switch from the convention’s strict prohibition regime II to the 
more lenient regime III.
In terms of its definition of providing manpower, the Employment Services Act is 
fully consistent with the definition of the Manpower Provision Act. This definition 
reads as follows:770
Providing paid manpower to a third party to perform customary work in that 
 party’s enterprise, under that party’s supervision or management, other than by 
virtue of an agreement concluded with that party.
Exceptions to the above definition include a) provision of manpower by way of as-
sistance and without profit motive, b) provision of manpower for a limited period in 
connection to an item delivered or a job completed and c) provision of manpower 
without profit motive by a joint venture of entrepreneurs.
The provision of manpower is prohibited without a licence granted by the CBA. 
Exemptions are possible for certain categories of workers. A licence may be condi-
769 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 30.
770 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 32.
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tional to regulations, and it can be modified or revoked in the case of well-founded 
fear that the objective stated by the law is harmed.
In respect of providing manpower, the law has a number of further specific pro-
visions, such as the so-called ‘ban on obstructions’, the ban on hindering workers 
from entering into employment relationships with third parties, and the so-called 
‘scab ban’, the ban on providing manpower to an enterprise in the case of an ongoing 
labour dispute, a strike, a lock-out or a sit-in.
Another condition is that the manpower can only be temporarily provided. 
Further regulations stipulate that manpower provision must not exceed six months. 
Moreover, it has been provided that the worker that has been assigned to a user en-
terprise should, in principle, be paid the wages that are customary for that enterprise.
Providing manpower without a licence, infringing on the licensing conditions 
and not observing the ban on conditions and the scab ban are regarded as criminal 
offences and constitute economic crimes.
As early as 1996, it became clear that the Employment Services Act fell short of ex-
pectations. The tripartite management of labour market policy turned out to have 
 hardly any added value compared with government-directed labour market policy. 
As a  result, the Employment Services Act was revoked. For the time being, how-
ever, the regulations on work placement and manpower provision remained in force 
through the 1996 Implementation Act of the Employment Services Act. This proved 
to be a temporary measure, since a review of the usefulness and necessity of these 
labour market regulations had by then already been commenced upon. The memor-
andum titled Heroverweging vergunningstelsel arbeidsbemiddeling en ter beschikking 
stelling van arbeidskrachten (‘review of licensing system work placement and man-
power provision’) concluded that the regulations no longer had any value and proved 
to be more and more outmoded.771
The government sought advice from the SER and the CBA. It also sought advice 
from the Netherlands social insurance council SVr regarding an alternative regula-
tion on fighting tax and premium fraud in relation to manpower provision.
In the view of the SER, a licence was required for private work placement under 
Convention 96, but this should be implemented soberly and flexibly. Regarding man-
power provision, the views were less unanimous. The worker representatives wanted 
the licensing system to remain in place, and if it should be revoked, they were in fa-
vour of at least some legal behavioural standards, i.e. a ban on obstructions and a pay 
equivalence rule. Abolishing the legal assignment period should have consequences 
for the legal status of the workers.
The employers opted for abolishing the licensing requirement and for a scab ban.
771 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 34.
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In its recommendation, the SVr developed various modalities for exemption from 
the liability to pay tax and premiums, and what it considered to be the corresponding 
pros and cons.772
8.4 FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY
In 1994, the CBA announced that it would no longer reinforce the six-month  period 
and would tolerate twelve months. Minister De Vries had already communicated 
his intention to abolish the licensing system for manpower provision. Subsequently 
Minister Melkert introduced his ‘flexibility and security’ memorandum in 1994,773 
which contained the contours of new policy. He adopted the SER recommendation, 
expressed his appreciation for the many variants in the field of manpower provision, 
such as temporary employment agencies, pools of labour and secondment  services. 
He also pointed out their downsides, such as supplanting direct employment by 
less adequately regulated labour in tripartite relationships. This entailed that, while 
the  licensing system could be abolished, legal standards should be introduced, for 
 instance:
 – maintaining the pay equivalence rule, the scab ban and the ban on obstructions;
 – improving the legal position of the temporary agency worker;
 – facilitating a blocked account (G-account) system.774
Under strong pressure from the temporary agency sector, the ‘flexibility and security’ 
memorandum was presented to the Dutch Labour Foundation for advice. This was 
interesting, since the so-called ‘purple government’775 had announced upon taking 
office that it wanted to govern on its own authority, without reserving a role for ‘the 
polder’ (i.e. consensus-based policy-making).
The resistance of the temporary agency sector was particularly directed at the 
memorandum’s aspects relating to the legal position of workers. It was meant to qual-
ify the temporary agency relationship as an employment contract, with all the obliga-
tions this entailed. In practice, the temporary employment relationship had acquired 
a non-binding status, which contributed considerably to the labour market’s flexibil-
ity. This was particularly about the provision ‘end of assignment equals end of con-
tract’, which in the ensuing discussion became known as the so-called agency clause.
772 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 34 ff.
773 ‘Flexibility and security’ memorandum (Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid), Proceedings of the Nether-
lands Lower House 1995/96, 24543.
774 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 35.
775 In Dutch politics a coalition government consisting of liberals and social democrats (symbolized 
by the colors blue and red, respectively).
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In April 1996, the Dutch Labour Foundation (StvdA, formerly STAR) presented a 
largely unanimous recommendation.776 It was in favour of the temporary agency 
relationship being henceforth qualified as an employment relationship. It would, 
however, be a special kind of employment relationship, because of the option of the 
so-called agency clause, which gave the commissioning client the authority to end 
it. Moreover, it became possible to conclude three fixed-term employment contracts 
in a three-year period. These new regulations were to have the character of statutory 
provisions enabling derogations by CLA. Therefore, the Foundation recommended 
establishing a special ‘dismissal guideline’ for the temporary agency sector. It was also 
in favour of maintaining the pay equivalence rule and the scab ban. It could, however, 
do without the ban on obstructions.
The so-called temporary agency covenant was included as an annex to the Founda-
tion’s recommendation. This covenant was concluded between the representatives for 
temporary employment agencies, the ABU and the NBBU, on the one hand and trade 
unions FNV, CNV, Unie BLHP and LBV on the other. It included a special four-phase 
regime of ‘the longer the work period, the more rights for the worker’. During the first 
two phases, the temporary agency relationship legally ended at the end of the assign-
ment; the third phase was characterised by a limited number (eight) of fixed-term 
employment contracts that could be concluded in a two-year period. The fourth phase 
constituted open-ended contracts. Apart from this ‘growth contract’ the temporary 
agency covenant included agreements relating to pensions and vocational training.
The question is how this annexed temporary agency covenant annexed to the 
Foundation’s recommendation must be interpreted legally. In my opinion, we are 
dealing with a CLA, albeit a special one.
Minister Melkert’s ‘flexibility and security’ memorandum, the temporary agency 
covenant and the STAR agreement comprised the fundamental elements of the new 
legislation relating to flexibility and security, which have been further developed in 
the Netherlands Posting of Workers by Intermediaries Act (Waadi Act) and the BW 
(Dutch Civil Code).
8.5 WAADI ACT
The non-public i.e. private work placement and manpower provision were regulated 
by the 1998 Netherlands Posting of Workers by Intermediaries Act (Waadi Act). The 
public employment services were regulated in the 1996 Employment Services Act, 
which was repealed through the Work and Income (Implementation Structure) Im-
plementation Act (SUWI).
776 STAR Nota Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid, publicatie no. 2/96 (‘STAR-akkoord’).
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Private work placement is subject to a licence that implies obligations, such as the 
scab ban and that is, in turn, subject to further regulations. The licence can be refused 
or revoked in case of a well-founded fear that the licensee does not comply with the 
obligations imposed on it, or that the policy of good labour market relationships or 
the workers’ interests will be otherwise harmed.
As soon as the Netherlands was to ratify ILO convention 181, this licensing re-
quirement would lapse. In that case, various behavioural standards were to remain in 
force, including the no fee to worker principle and the scab ban. It must also  remain 
possible to establish special regulations for specific categories of jobseekers and 
 employers.
By the time the Waadi Act was implemented, the licensing requirement for man-
power provision had been abolished. Fraud prevention and the protection of the in-
terests of good labour market relationships continued to be objectives that required 
specific regulations. They were included in the Waadi Act, specifically:
 – article 8, the pay equivalence rule;
 – article 9, no fee to worker;
 – article 10, the scab ban;
 – article 11, information on occupational safety;
 – article 12, sector-specific provisions;
 – articles 16 and 17, hirer liability and exemption.777
The maximum assignment period, which had still been included in the 1996 Em-
ployment Services Act, and the ban on obstructions were no longer included in the 
Waadi Act.
8.6 SECONDMENT AGREEMENT IN THE DUTCH CIVIL CODE
Among academics and in jurisdiction in the Netherlands, the nature of the tempor-
ary agency relationship has evoked much discussion. As early as 1962, Koopmans ar-
gued in his doctoral thesis that manpower provision – ‘hiring relationship’ – can thus 
be considered as a temporary delegation of employer authority to the third  party/
commissioning client by the (contracting) employer.778 Koopmans acknowledged 
the phenomenon that the ‘contracting’ employer’s business model is providing man-
power to others, i.e., assigning temporary agency workers.779 He argued that this may 
both be a question of an employment relationship between temporary employment 
777 Van Drongelen & Fase (2005), p. 37
778 Koopmans (1962), p. 296.
779 Koopmans (1962), p. 296.
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agency and temporary agency worker, and of an assignment agreement between 
these parties. In that case, and depending on the actual circumstances, it would need 
to be established whether an employment relationship applied.780
To Zwemmer, the judgments of the Dutch Supreme Council of 1977, 1980 and 
1988 confirmed the existence of an employment relationship, since there was an ob-
ligation to do work at the commissioning client’s enterprise under his direction. 
However, Zwemmer observed that the Supreme Court did not formulate a rule of 
thumb on the basis of which an employment relationship would apply. Each and 
every time, the actual circumstances decided the outcome. Zwemmer particularly 
found confirmation for his hypothesis in Stein.781
Heerma van Voss782 argued that the temporary employment agencies have long 
 allowed the legal status of the temporary agency worker to be ambiguous. They were 
said to be worried about the consequences of an obligation to pay wages  between 
assign ments and about the consequences of the application of redundancy rules. 
Even though the realisation of the CLA for temporary workers brought some relief, 
ambiguity continued unabated. In jurisdiction and literature, Heerma van Voss re-
cognises the assumption that an employment relationship did apply, in any case for 
the duration of the assignment at the user enterprise. He quoted Advocate Gen eral 
Koopmans, who endorsed a conclusion that this was the prevailing doctrine.783 
 According to Koopmans, the absence of obligations, which is essential to the tem-
porary agency relationship, would have no practical value,.
The temporary agency practice has always looked upon this discussion as being 
largely academic. The CLA for temporary workers and its increasingly extensive im-
plementation supplied solutions; furthermore, the temporary agency practice could 
live with this ambiguity for some time. Eventually, a compromise was found in the 
Flex agreement, entailing that the secondment agreement was included in the BW as 
a special employment contract.
In article 7:690 BW the secondment agreement was defined as follows:
A secondment agreement (or temporary employment agency agreement) is an em-
ployment agreement under which the employer, within the framework of his busi-
ness or professional practice, places the employee at the disposal of a third party 
in order to perform work under the supervision and direction of that third party 
780 Zwemmer (2012), p. 79.
781 Dutch Supreme Court 23 May 1980, NJ 1980, 633 with note on Stein.
782 Heerma van Voss (1996), p. 20.
783 Dutch Supreme Court 7 April 1996 (conclusion by A.-G. Koopmans), JAR 1996/168.
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by virtue of an agreement for the provision of services between the third party and 
the employer.
Legal academics have wondered whether article 7:610 is still applicable to the ques-
tion regarding the requirements for the existence of an employment contract. In 
other words, should this article be considered first, to establish that the constitutive 
requirements of this article are present, i.e. subordinate work (employer-employee 
relationship) and the obligation of continued payment of wages, following which art-
icle 7:690 can be looked at; or does the latter article apply directly through dedicated 
legal provision?
Verhulp,784 Asscher-Vonk785 and Christe786 appeared to be in favour of the legal 
provision theory. Grapperhaus787 holds the view that both articles must be taken into 
consideration. For that matter, jurisprudence has moved away from the legal provi-
sion theory.
The definition of the secondment agreement is comprehensive, and the Minister’s 
argument in the explanatory memorandum is significant:
The proposed regulation for the secondment agreement does not merely relate to 
the temporary agency relationship that is currently found in practice, but also en-
compasses all other tripartite relationships in which the employer’s business model 
constitutes making the employee available to carry out work under the direction 
and supervision of a third party. Such manpower provision may also comprise 
posting workers, provided that such posting activity complies with the elements of 
the definition. If that is the case, the special regime of the secondment agreement, 
as set out in art. 691 book 7 BW applies to this tripartite relationship.
Thus, the proposed regulation for the secondment agreement provides a uniform 
 legal regulation for the many forms of manpower provision occurring under a  variety 
of names, including: temporary agency work, hiring out, posting or em ploy ing in 
the framework of a labour pool.
In practice, it thus relates to temporary employment agencies, labour pools and 
other organisations that professionally provide manpower on a temporary basis, 
however they describe it.788
784 Verhulp (2001). Zie ook www.sprengersadvocaten.nl/publicaties/kort-van-memorie-de-onterechte
 -degradatie-van-een-arbeidsovereenkomst-tot-een-uitzendovereenkomst/.
785 Asscher-Vonk (1997).
786 Christe (2001), p. 171.
787 Grapperhaus & Jansen (1999), p. 39.
788 Dutch Parliamentary papers TK 1996/1997, 25263 no.3, p. 9–11 (Explanatory Memorandum), Parl. 
Gesch. Flexwet (‘parliamentary history of flexibility legislation’), p. 936. See also Verburg (2013), p. 910.
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Article 7:691 provides the special rules for the secondment agreement:
 – par. 1 provides the delayed effect of the chain provision included in article 7:668a, 
to commence after 26 weeks;
 – par. 2 provides that parties to the secondment agreement may stipulate in writ-
ing that, by law the agreement will end when the situation in which this em-
ployee is placed at his disposal for the performance of work is ended. This is the 
so-called agency clause;
 – par. 3 provides for the duration of the legal validity of the clause, i.e. 26 weeks;
 – par. 4 concerns the interval regulations;
 – par. 5 concerns revolving door cases;
 – par. 6 precludes intra corporate transfers;
 – par. 7 concerns a collectively agreed derogation of the periods in the paragraphs 
1, 3, 4 and of the revolving door cases in par. 5.
Article  7:668a provides that several fixed-term contracts can be concluded over a 
period of three years; derogations by CLA are possible.
8.7 RATIFICATION OF ILO CONVENTION 181
In 2003, the licensing requirement for work placement lapsed. This became possible 
once the Netherlands had ratified Convention 181. In chapter 2, the previous history 
of Convention 181 and the fundamental changes it initiated in international social law 
were discussed at length.
In the summer of 1999, after hearing the Council of State, the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs presented the convention to the Upper and Lower Houses of Dutch 
Parliament for tacit approval.789 In his explanatory memorandum, the Minister stat-
ed that:
… it is desirable to raise or maintain as few obstructions as possible for (re)integ-
rating jobseekers in employment. Private temporary employment or work place-
ment agencies fulfil a useful intermediary function in this respect.
The Minister indicated that, as chair of the European Union during the ILO negoti-
ations, the Netherlands had been tasked with coordinating the points of view of the 
then fifteen member states and had managed to reach a consensus on many  topics. 
The Netherlands had always held the view that Convention  96 was not aimed at 
789 Letter from the Minister, session 1998–1999 no. 2, 26601 Private Employment Agencies Conven-
tion (Convention. 181, adopted by the International Labour Conference, having met in its eighty-
fifth session), Geneva, 19 June 1997, p. 2. See also: Jacobs & Blanpain (1999), p. 299 ff.
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 manpower provision. The new Convention 181 applied unequivocally to both work 
placement and manpower provision. Furthermore, the Minister stated in his ex-
planatory memorandum that Dutch law already complied with the provisions in the 
 convention.
The convention relates to agencies that match offers of and applications for em-
ployment without becoming a party to the employment relationship (placement) 
(art.  1, par.  1, part a), and to agencies that employ workers with a view to making 
them available to a third party, to carry out work under his supervision (manpower 
provision) (art. 1, par. 1, part b of the convention). As a third category, the conven-
tion lists other services relating to jobseeking, determined by the competent author-
ity  after consulting the most representative employers’ and workers’ organisations. 
Where definitions of placement and manpower provision are concerned, the Waadi 
Act  tallies with the provisions in the convention.
Article 2 precludes the recruitment and placement of seafarers from Conven-
tion 181 and also provides the opportunity to prohibit operations under specific cir-
cumstances. Article 12 Waadi Act aligns with this.
Article 3 provides that the legal status of private temporary employment agen-
cies shall be determined in accordance with national law and practice after consult-
ing with social partners; par. 2 provides that member states must choose between a 
licensing system, certification or another regulation. Therefore, a licensing system 
is not obligatory, and the Minister stated that the Dutch government’s proposals for 
flexibility and security likewise aimed to steer this course, i.e. no licensing require-
ment for either work placement or manpower provision.
Article 4 safeguards the freedom of bargaining, and the Minister stated that this 
was ruled by the general regulations of Dutch associations law. According to Book 2 
BW, people in the Netherlands are free to establish a trade union without prior con-
sent of the government. The 1927 Act on Collective Agreements further developed 
these collective bargaining rights, and CLAs are taken into account in the Waadi Act. 
Thus, the pay equivalence rule of article 8 Waadi Act that the so-called user enter-
prise standard is decisive for fixing the remuneration, unless a CLA applies to the 
temporary employment agency (par. 2) or to the user enterprise, which provides that 
this user enterprise must ensure that workers are remunerated in conformity with 
that CLA. According to the Minister, the Netherlands complies with the convention’s 
obligations through these regulations.
Article 5 includes provisions regarding equal treatment and non-discrimination, 
listing the following grounds: race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction, social origin, or any other form of discrimination covered by national law, 
such as age or disability; par. 2 provides that positive discrimination is allowed. The 
Minister refers to article 3, par. 3, Waadi Act, which acts as a safeguard against dis-
crimination, to the Equal Treatment Act (AWGB), to article 1 of the Dutch Constitu-
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tion, and to the Disability (Reintegration) Act (REA Act), and feels he may justifiably 
conclude that the Netherlands complies with article 5 of the convention.
Article 6 provides that the privacy protection and processing of personal data 
must be accurate and in accordance with national law and practice. This related first 
to the Act on Registration of Personal Data that was in force at the time and the sub-
sequent Personal Data Protection Act, which implemented EU Directive 95/46/EC.
Article 7 concerns the no fee to worker principle. Article 3, par. 1, Waadi Act regul-
ates that workers may not be charged a fee for work placement services. In respect of 
manpower provision, this has been regulated in article 9 Waadi Act.
Article  8 protects migrant workers. ILO member states must protect migrant 
workers from abuses. Crucial in this respect is article 48, par. 2, EC Treaty (a provi-
sion with direct effect), implementing the freedom of movement for workers, which 
entails the abolition of any nationality-based discrimination between workers of the 
member states as regards employment, remuneration and other labour and employ-
ment conditions. In 1968, this prohibition of discrimination was developed in EC 
Regulation 1612/68, on freedom of movement for workers within the Community. 
‘Any national of a Member State, shall, irrespective of his place of residence, have the 
right to take up an activity as an employed person, and to pursue such activity, within 
the territory of another Member State’ (art. 1 EC Regulation 1612/68). Furthermore, 
Council Directive 68/360/EEC provides (in art. 1) that restrictions on the movement 
and residence of nationals must be abolished.
Article  3 of the Posting of Workers Directive imposes on member states the 
ob ligation to guarantee workers so-called ‘core employment conditions’. Under art-
icle 28 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area, freedom of movement for 
workers is secured for EC member states and EFTA states, which entails the abolition 
of nationality-based discrimination and with respect to employment, remuneration 
and other labour and employment conditions.
In the Netherlands, restrictions for nationals from outside EFTA states are laid 
down in the 1994 Labour Act for Aliens (WAV), which requires work permits. One 
ground for refusing permits is the presence of prioritised supply. If the work and 
employment conditions comprise restrictions with respect to filling the vacancy by 
means of prioritised supply (art. 9, under b, WAV) a work permit can be refused.
The Minister states that these regulations regarding migrant workers provide 
sufficient protection, as required by article 8 of Convention 181.
Article 9 of Convention 181 prohibits child labour. The ban on child labour is laid 
down in in article 3:1 of the Netherlands Working Hours Act. Article 1:2 of this act 
provides that any person under the age of 16 is considered to be a child. Article 3:2 of 
the Working Hours Act provides exceptions, including light, non-industrial work by 
13-year-olds and morning paper rounds by 15-year-olds. Furthermore, derogations 
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are possible, to be decided by the Dutch Labour Inspectorate (art. 3:3 of the Nether-
lands Working Hours Act).
Article 10 of Convention 181 requires a complaints procedure. Under article 13 
Waadi Act the Dutch Labour Inspectorate is designated as supervisor. The Minis-
ter has also designated it as complaints institute. Article 15 Waadi Act provides that 
non-compliance of the Waadi Act provisions can be reported to the employer and 
worker in question, the works council and the relevant employers’ and workers’ or-
ganisations.
The articles 11 and 12 of the convention relate to the protection of the workers 
 employed by private employment agencies. Article  11 provides that member states 
must ensure adequate legal protection in relation to freedom of association (art. 11, a), 
collective bargaining (art. 11, b), minimum wages (art. 11, c), working times (art. 11, d), 
social security benefits (art. 11, e), access to training (art. 11, f), occupational safety 
and health (art.  11, g), compensation in case of occupational accidents or diseases 
and compensation in case of insolvency and protection of workers’ claims (art. 11, h 
and i), maternity protection and benefits, and parental protection and bene fits (art. 11, 
i). Article 12 provides that member states must divide the respective respons ibilities 
between the temporary employment agencies and the user enterprises, in accordance 
with national law and practice.
The protection of the freedom of association and collective bargaining were discussed 
earlier, under article 4. Minimum rates of pay are guaranteed in the Netherlands by 
the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (WML).
The Netherlands Working Hours Act guarantees the legal protection of workers 
in relation to working hours. In the Netherlands, temporary agency workers are also 
insured under the social security scheme, as they are employees, or are considered to 
be equivalent to employees.
Agreements on training and education have been made in the two existing CLAs 
on temporary agency work.
Article 7:658 BW monitors occupational health and safety; par. 2 also provides 
 liability in this respect; par. 4 has extended this liability to the person who in the 
course of his professional practice or business enables a worker, with whom he has not 
concluded an employment agreement, to carry out work. Furthermore, the Nether-
lands Law on Working Conditions regulates various subjects in the field of occupa-
tional safety and health and the well-being of the worker.
The Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WW) regulates claims in the case of 
employer insolvency, relating to back pay, the wages for the notice period and holiday 
allowances.
The Dutch Sickness Benefits Act regulates maternity allowances and childbirth 
benefits.
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With respect to the allocation of responsibilities, as provided in article 12 of the con-
vention, the Dutch Working Conditions Act and the Netherlands Working Hours 
Act include regulations that take into account the tripartite employment relationship 
inherent in temporary agency work. Moreover, article 8 Waadi Act includes a pay 
equivalence rule that takes this into consideration.
As a contribution to occupational safety and health, article 11 Waadi Act oblig-
ates the provision of information on specific characteristics of the workplace and 
of the assignment. Article 4, par. 5, of the Dutch Working Conditions Act obligates 
the user enterprise to make this information available to the temporary employment 
agency, who in turn has to pass this information on to the temporary agency worker 
under article 11 Waadi Act.
Article  34 of the Dutch Collection of State Taxes Act  provides that joint and 
several liability exists for the payment of premiums and taxes in the case of the tem-
porary employment agency’s insolvency.
Article 13 of Convention 181 promotes the cooperation between private temporary 
employment agencies and public employment services. In chapter 2 (p. 44), it was 
noted that meantime this public-private cooperation has come about in various ways.
Article 14 of the convention requires supervision. According to article 13 Waadi 
Act, by an order of the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, this rests with the 
officials working at the Dutch Labour Inspectorate. The payment of premiums and 
taxes on the basis of social security legislation is supervised by the wage inspectors of 
the executive bodies and by the Dutch Tax Authority.
Article 15 Waadi Act also makes clear that non-compliance with the Waadi Act 
provisions in the field of manpower provision may be investigated. The results of this 
investigation may be reported to the worker, employer, works council and relevant 
employers’ and workers’ organisations.
Likewise, when article 11 Waadi Act is not observed, the worker in question can 
bring a civil action. Any violation of the Dutch Working Conditions Act is punish-
able as an economic offence. The Labour Inspectorate, too, can take measures, such 
as instructions or an order to suspend work. Violations of the Dutch Working Hours 
Act or the Dutch Labour Act for Aliens are also punishable as economic offences.
Breaching prohibitions of discrimination is punishable by law. The worker can 
also go to (civil) court if legal provisions and obligations in respect of, for example, 
wages, holiday allowance and dismissal that arise out of CLAs are not observed.
This completes the Minister’s explanatory memorandum. It also refers to Recom-
mendation 188, which the Minister viewed as a guideline for further policy develop-
ment. In his opinion, the recommendation mostly contained provisions that can be 
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characterised as provisions regarding the ethical behaviour of private intermediaries. 
Most of such provisions are self-evident in Dutch labour law.
The Minister wanted to ratify speedily, since this would automatically result in 
the cancellation of Convention 96. Without this opportunity, the Netherlands would 
be bound to this convention for a longer period, i.e. until 2003. In that case, the 
desired abolition of the licence requirement for work placement would need to be 
postponed.
Moreover, the Netherlands did not wish to lag behind other EU member states 
that likewise aimed for imminent ratification. Furthermore, ratification satisfies the 
basic principle that it is useful, since it relates to a regulation that is desirable from a 
global perspective and since ratification contributes to the realisation of a broadly- 
based international labour standard.
In respect of this type of conventions, it is common usage to also consult em-
ployers’ and workers’ organisations. The Dutch employers agreed without comment. 
The Dutch trade union FNV asked for a few additions and for further motivation 
in the explanatory memorandum, but eventually they, too, agreed, as did the fellow 
trade unions CNV and MHP.
8.8 POSTING OF WORKERS THROUGH THE NETHERLANDS TERMS 
OF EMPLOYMENT (CROSS-BORDER WORK) ACT (WAGA ACT)
The Posting of Workers Directive has been extensively discussed in chapter 7. The 
Netherlands implemented it in 1999 through the Posting of workers through the 
Netherlands Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Work) Act (WAGA Act). The dis-
cussion preceding the implementation of the Posting of Workers Directive particu-
larly focused on the scope of the regulation. It was restricted to the construction 
sector, and Dutch Members of Parliament (PvdA, VVD, CDA, GreenLeft) challenged 
this. A level playing field in terms of working conditions should likewise be created 
for other sectors. However, the Minister foresaw that this might engender complex-
ity, and he intended to gain experience first. The issue was put to the Dutch Labour 
Foundation, which presented divided opinions. The employers were in favour of a 
free market, while the workers wanted to be protected from wage competition.
In 2004, a shift occurred, as a result of which the Dutch government did con-
sider extension of the WAGA Act to be a solution for the ever-widening pay gap.
The WAGA Act itself consisted of a limited number of articles. Article  1 ex-
plained several provisions from book 7, title 10 BW (employment contract law) that 
apply to workers posted in the Netherlands. The articles in question were 634 to 642, 
645 ( holidays and leave), 646 to 648 (equal treatment), 658 (occupational safety/ 
liability in case of industrial accidents) and 670, par. 2 (termination ban in case of 
pregnancy).
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While this concerned explicit implementation, implicit implementation applied to 
the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (WML), the Working 
Hours Act, the Working Conditions Act, the Posting of Workers by intermediaries 
Act (Waadi Act) and the Equal Treatment Act (AWGB).
The government took the view that these rules had been mandatory on the basis 
of article  7 of the Rome Convention (1980) and that explicit implementation was 
therefore unnecessary.
Houwerzijl790 argues that this makes the accessibility and quality of the legisla-
tion questionable, particularly because foreign employers and workers need clarity, 
especially regarding the implementation of European law to protect persons.
Article 2 focused on posted workers residing in the Netherlands. These workers, 
who have a foreign employment contract, are also protected by the Posting of Work-
ers Directive.
Article 3 extended article 2 of the Act governing the universal applicability or 
inapplicability of collective labour agreements (AVV). A new par. 6 provided that CLA 
provisions that have been given the force of law apply to posted workers in respect of 
the hard core of the labour and employment conditions; par. 7 restricted itself to the 
construction sector and was said to expire if other sectors would need to be included. 
Key labour and employment conditions were:
 – maximum working hours and minimum resting hours;
 – the minimum number of days of holiday during which the obligation to continue 
to pay wages exists;
 – minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates and excluding supplementary 
pension schemes;
 – conditional to manpower provision;
 – occupational health, safety and hygiene;
 – protective provisions relating to the labour and employment conditions and 
the working conditions of children, young workers and pregnant workers, or 
 workers who have recently given birth;
 – equal treatment of men and women, together with other non-discriminatory 
provisions.
Article 4 WAGA Act amended article 98 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, adding 
a new par. 3 to authorise the regional judge in disputes brought before the court by 
posted workers. Trade unions could also make claims. Houwerzijl points out that a 
subsequent amendment of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure repealed this import-
ant authorisation, which made the Netherlands breach article  6 of the Posting of 
Workers Directive. Moreover, she observed that other provisions of the Posting of 
790 Houwerzijl (2004), p. 335.
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Workers Directive (art. 1, par. 2, art. 2, par. 2, art. 3, pars. 3 and 5, art. 4, pars. 2 and 3, 
art. 5) have not been implemented at all, or insufficiently, or too implicitly.791
That is why Houwerzijl considers the implementation to be more or less prob-
lematic. She quotes Jaspers, who sees the manner in which the authorisation has been 
dealt with as an indication of the legislator’s interest in actively and, if necessary, 
vigorously realising legislation. The weaker the authorisation, the more tokenistic 
legislation becomes.
Houwerzijl concludes that the WAGA Act can be improved upon in many re-
spects. It can be seen in chapter 7 that the application of the ‘equal pay for equal work’ 
principle to temporary agency work is also unclear. Did article 3, par. d, automatically 
commit to this principle if there is adequate legislation in place, or should this still be 
further provided through article 3, par. 9?
In any case, the Dutch social partners have regulated for this in the ABU CLA for 
temporary workers in article 68, in which the ‘equal pay for equal work’ principle, the 
so-called hirer’s remuneration (art. 29 of the CLA) has also been declared applicable 
to posted temporary workers in the sense of the WAGA Act. Whether this is sufficient 
depends, among other things, on the scope of this CLA and on its universal applic-
ability or inapplicability. Moreover, we should realise that posting workers is more 
than merely assigning them. The fact that Minister Asscher of Social Affairs and Em-
ployment, with the support of seven EU member states, started a campaign for equal 
pay for equal work in the same workplace,which had already been rejected by nine 
other member states, makes it clear that there is still work to be done.792,793
Equally important in this context is the implementation of the Enforcement 
 Directive, which was due to take place before June 2016, and the combating of sham 
arrangements, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9.
In February 2016, the Minister introduced a bill in Parliament to implement 
the Enforcement Directive and simultaneously integrate the WAGA Act. The WAGA 
Act has been repealed in June 2016 to be replaced by Terms of Employment Posted 
Workers in the EU Act (WagwEU).
Remarkably, the Minister aims to introduce an obligation to report, applicable to 
foreign enterprises who want to perform work in the Netherlands. This requirement 
would also apply to self-employed workers. The Council of State is more critical, and 
fears an increased administrative burden both for the authorities and for the self- 
791 Houwerzijl (2004), p. 334.
792 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment of 18 June 2015.
793 Letter to Marianne Thyssen, Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour 
Mobility, dated 7 July 2015 on revision of the Posting of Workers Directive.
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employed workers. The Minister argues that this system already applies in eighteen 
other EU member states.794
8.9 EVALUATING THE WAADI ACT
The Waadi Act prescribed that this had to be evaluated within three years follow-
ing its implementation. In his letter to the Dutch Lower House, Minister Vermeend 
 stated:
By and large, the law can be said to meet the objectives, such as more competition 
and deregulation. There is no reason to propose amendments. The various rules of 
conduct are functioning adequately.795
Once temporary employment agencies had been designated as employers, the ABU 
held the view that the time had come to abolish the pay equivalence rule (art. 8  Waadi 
Act). However, the evaluation made clear that this rule continued to be of great im-
portance to the organisation of manpower provision. This applied even more since 
the Dutch Labour Foundation had issued a recommendation796 on how to deal with 
conflicting CLAs. It was particularly recommended that consideration be given to a 
three-month waiting period (except for skilled workers), if parties wish to include 
arrangements in the hirer’s CLA with regard to wages, allowances and compensations 
for temporary agency workers. The ‘no fee to worker’ principle was undisputed, as 
was the so-called ‘scab ban’.
The obligation to communicate safety information was generally adopted as a 
standard, although actions to improve the effectiveness of this article were yet to be 
taken. Thus, there was no need for amendment of the article; nor did the enforcement 
regulations need to be amended.
The special regime of article 12 Waadi Act and the indemnification scheme (art. 
16 and 17) also had to be continued. It became clear that the ABU’s desire to be free 
from the so-called SFT regulation (issuing declarations of good payment conduct) 
could not be honoured for various reasons.
The potential problems resulting from the abolition of the ban on obstructions 
had to be faced on the basis of the principles of reasonableness and fairness.
794 Terms of Employment Posted Workers in the EU bill 09/02/2016; recommendation Dutch Council 
of State 09/02/2016 regarding Terms of Employment Posted Workers in the EU bill. See also Cats 
(2016a).
795 Letter from the Minister evaluating the Posting of Workers by Intermediaries Act (Waadi), Lower 
House of the States General, session 2001–2002, 28365.
796 STAR (2001).
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The abolition of the licensing system for manpower provision had its disadvantages, 
but reintroduction of a generic licensing regime, or selective deployment of such a 
regime as provided in article  12, was out of the question. The policy line was and 
continued to be:
… strict and concentrated enforcement in respect of the breach of existing laws and 
regulations, using severe (partly new) sanctions, including an administrative pen alty. 
Furthermore, additional measures are desired through self-regulation, something on 
which the social partners agree. The added value of a licence in a sector or region is 
decidedly limited, while it entails a lot of effort. In that case, there is a considerable 
risk that, instead of an average of four laws, an extra law/decree is breached (not 
having a licence; which had not hindered fraudulent intermediaries in the past).797
The abolition of the assignment period had coincided with laying down the legal 
position in the Flexibility and Security Act. This development was not assessed neg-
atively in the evaluation. As a result, temporary employment agencies would have 
been able to enter the posting agency market and thus extend their services provision.
Several studies have assessed the flexibility regulation. Interestingly, the longer 
the regulations had applied, the more positive the overall opinion became. While 
most temporary agency employers negatively assessed the flexibility regulation in 
1999,798 this had changed considerably when the second assessment took place in 
2007. Then, approximately 12% of the respondents assessed the regulation negatively. 
Just over 60% were positive and nearly 30% were neutral.799
Table 8.1  Percentages of offices assessing the Flex Act regulations, by branch size and 
total score800
Branch size (representative)
total4–9 10–100 100+
– very negative 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
– negative 11.8% 13.2% 21.8% 11.9%
– neutral 27.5% 33.7% 17.3% 27.9%
– positive 60.8% 47.2% 58.1% 59.7%
– very positive 0.0%  5.9%  2.8%  0.5%
Number of organisations 51 51 41 143
Total score Flex Act assessment * 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.62
* 0=very negative, 0.25=negative, 0.50=neutral, 0.75=positive, 1=very positive.
797 Letter from the Minister to the Lower House of Dutch Parliament, TK 2001–2002, 28365, p. 2.
798 Grijpstra et al. (1999), p. 108.
799 Knegt et al. (2007), p. IX.
800 Knegt et al. (2007), p. 94.
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During the first years after its implementation the assessment of the flexibility legis-
lation boiled down to ‘never change a winning law’, i.e. an increasingly positive feel-
ing about its effect. At the same time, however, the dissatisfaction about fraudulent 
intermediaries grew. The ABU had studies conducted on that subject both in 2004 
and in 2008, in 2008 partly with an eye to the enlargement of the EU and the entry 
of residents from the ten new EU member states into the Dutch labour market. The 
results of the studies have been summarised in table 8.2.
Table 8.2  Fraudulent temporary employment agencies and intermediaries and illegal 
placement801
Number of agencies 
(branches)
Number of fraudulent 
offices
Number of illegally 
assigned workers
Illegal assignments 
in terms of working 
years 
2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006 2004 2006
Organised temporary 
employment agencies
500 
(3,050)
700 
(3,500)
minimal minimal minimal minimal minimal minimal
Registered, non- 
organised temporary 
employment agencies 
1,500 
(1,900)
1,400 
(1,600)
750 
(600–900)
stable 12,000 
(7,000–
15,000)
stable 5,250 
(3,000–
7,500)
increase
Intermediaries not 
registered as tem-
porary employment 
agencies
10,000 10,000+ 4,000 
(3.500–
5,000)
increase 30,000 
(25,000–
35,000)
increase 13,750 
(10,000–
17.500)
increase
Non-registered tem-
porary employment 
agencies
300–750 750+ 300–750 increase 23,000 
(16,000–
30,000)
increase 8,500 
(5,000–
12,000)
increase
Total more than 
5,000
5,500–
6,000
65,000 
(48,500–
80,000)
80,000 
(60,000–
97,000)
27,500 
(20,000–
35,000)
45,000 
(29,000–
56,000)
It becomes clear that in the period 2004–2006 the number of temporary employment 
agencies belonging to the ABU and NBBU increased from 500 to 700 enterprises. 
The total number of offices, including those of non-organised enterprises increased 
from less than 4950 to more than 5100. It is estimated that fraudulent assignment is 
growing by 5 to 10% per year. In 2006, there were thought to be a total of 5500–6000 
fraudu lent temporary agency offices that jointly assigned 80,000 persons (60,000–
97,000) illegally, which amounted to 45,000 working years (29,000–56,000).
As a result, the Dutch temporary agency sector was said to lose 271 to 524 mil-
lion euros in revenue and the Netherlands was said to lose 135 to 260 million euros in 
social security contributions and income tax payments.
801 Dijkema, Bolhuis & Engelen (2006), p. 7.
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The sector had by then started a certification system, which will be discussed further 
below. The researchers recommended enhancing this system and directing the mon-
itoring efforts of the enforcers to the non-certified temporary employment agencies, 
in which category the fraudulent entrepreneurs can also be found. Moreover, it is 
important to develop an after-tax indemnity for user enterprises that work with a 
certified temporary employment agency.
8.10 LICENCE OR CERTIFICATE?
Dutch State Secretary Van Hoof challenged the extent of fraudulence described in the 
last paragraph.802 He argued that the calculations were very much in doubt; they were 
estimations based on expert observations, while the study in question also pointed 
out that no studies had recently been conducted that might have yielded a substanti-
ated estimate of the number of fraudulent temporary employment agencies.
Nevertheless, his predecessor, State Secretary Rutte,803 had held the view that the 
illegal practices called for action. In his Illegals Memorandum,804 he had already made 
a point on combating fraud and illegality in the temporary agency sector. Accord ing 
to Rutte, the Dutch cabinet held the view that self-regulation in the temporary agency 
sector by means of private hallmarking systems, agreements in CLAs and other sec-
toral activities could make a positive contribution to containing fraud and illegality, 
but the cabinet was still in favour of further measures, particularly the introduction 
of a licensing requirement for temporary employment agencies. In order to obtain 
such a licence, these agencies needed to meet a number of requirements, and thus 
a permit system may act as a deterrent to temporary employment agencies that are 
not overly particular about the prevailing laws and regulations. Proposals for a public 
hallmark by the ABU and the Dutch institute for employee benefit schemes UWV were 
rejected for the following reasons:
 – It would increase the annual administrative burden for business and the gov-
ernment.
 – It would have too little appeal for non-organised agencies. A certification system 
mainly effects changes in the healthy segment of the sector, but has little or no 
effect on fraudulent intermediaries and user enterprises. Thus, the cleansing ef-
fect is expected to be disappointing.
802 Letter from the Dutch State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment of 10 October 2006, ref-
erence AM/BR/2006/82822, on the report Grenzen verleggen (‘pushing the boundaries’) and the 
proposals by the ABU.
803 Letter from the Dutch State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment and the State Secretary of 
Finance, The Hague 23 April 2004, to the Lower House of Parliament, TK 2003–2004, 17050 no. 261.
804 Illegals Memorandum, TK 2003–2004, 29537 no. 2.
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 – Connecting the proposed indemnity to the public hallmark would result in loss 
of tax and social insurance premium revenues.
 – The proposal would add little to the existing enforcement scheme.
There was no preference for reverting to the licensing scheme that had been used in 
the past, since that met with the same objections as a public hallmark. Nevertheless, 
the increasing problems in the sector did show the need for a measure to regulate 
access to the market. That is why a less severe variety of licensing was proposed: a 
licensing requirement for the entrepreneur. The licence would only need to be ap-
plied for once, thus decreasing the administrative burden, while it could still serve 
as a sieve or barrier. The licence could also play a role in the decision by the Dutch 
Tax Authority and the UWV to enter into a so-called G-account (blocked account)
agreement at the request of the temporary employment agency.
The licence, which would be granted to the entrepreneur rather than to the 
enter prise, would be valid for a limited period and could be revoked when abuse or 
fraud have been established. The licence would be granted conditional to certain re-
quirements (such as irreproachable conduct, financial sustainability and transparent 
personnel administration). Sanctions should take the form of administrative fines.
A list of licence-holders was to be published online, so that every user enterprise 
could have easy access to this information. Only if assignments are arranged with 
a  licence-holder can indemnity from joint and several liability for the payment of 
premiums and income tax be obtained. Moreover, a deposit of 75,000 euros must be 
paid.
This government proposal failed to be by endorsed by the Dutch Lower House. The 
Member of Parliament for the CDA Bruls tabled a motion. Bruls held the view that 
the licensing scheme had not proved itself as the vigorous and effective approach that 
was needed to combat fraudulent labour. According to him, a combination of public 
enforcement measures, to be initiated by government, and self-regulation, to be de-
veloped by the sector, should be worked out. His motion reads as follows:
Motion tabled by the Member of Parliament Bruls and co.805
Proposed 24 March 2005
The Lower House of Parliament,
Having heard the deliberations,
considering that a vigorous and effective approach to illegal labour and fraud 
through temporary employment agencies is needed;
805 Bruls motion, TK 2004–2005, 17050, no. 287.
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considering that the effectiveness of the proposed licensing scheme for temporary 
employment agencies in this respect has not been proven;
considering that a deposit results in too high a threshold for bona fide employment 
intermediaries in the small to medium-sized enterprise segment;
considering that a combination of enforcement measures by government and 
self-regulation by the temporary agency sector is preferred;
considering that one system of voluntary certification and periodical assessment 
(‘MOT test’) for the entire temporary agency sector should be realised in 2005;
requests the government, in consultation with the parties concerned, including 
temporary agency organisation, to promote such a system of self-regulation rather 
than develop an obligatory licence for temporary employment agencies, and to re-
port to the Lower House on this subject before 1 September 2005,
and proceeds to the regular order of the day.
Bruls
Weekers
Koşer Kaya
Bussemaker
The proposed new licensing scheme did not prove to have a broad support base. The 
system was out of touch with practice, in the sense that five embryonic hallmarks had 
been proposed before. The 75,000 euro deposit was also considered to be  highly prob-
lematic. Moreover, the one-off assessment was looked upon as debatable. In a letter 
dated 10 February 2005 to the standing committees on Social Affairs and  Finance, 
VNO/NCW, MKB-Nederland (representing Dutch SMEs) and LTO-Nederland indicat-
ed that they had great reservations.
According to Bruls, it was unclear why a scheme that had not been effective be-
fore might be thought to work now. His motion was adopted by a large parliamentary 
majority. At the time, motions tabled by the Members of Parliament Bussemaker806 
and Koşer Kaya807 were also adopted. Bussemaker requested the government to pri-
oritise fighting fraud and illegality in the temporary agency sector by intensifying 
enforcement in such a way that the probability of apprehending fraudulent agencies 
would be increased.
Koşer Kaya aimed at changing the administrative liability of temporary employ-
ment agencies in such a way that company administrators could also be made per-
sonally liable.
806 Bussemaker motion, TK 2004–2005, 17050, nr. 288.
807 Koşer Kaya motion, TK 2004–2005, 17050, nr. 294.
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8.11 THE SNA HALLMARK808
The government, which – as we have seen – had been in favour of a licensing scheme, 
was forced to make a U-turn by facilitating self-regulation. A collaboration ensued 
between NEN, the Ministry of Social affairs and Employment and the existing regis-
ters. In due course, this resulted in a single private certification scheme for hiring out 
and hiring in, comprising a single system of standards, laid down in the NEN-4400-1 
for the Dutch businesses and NEN-4400-2 for the foreign businesses, and a public 
register (Dutch Labour Standards Register) that became operational as of 2007. The 
operations were delegated to the Dutch Labour Standards Foundation (SNA), com-
prising four processes:809
 – registration. Businesses are monitored on the basis of inspections, resulting in 
being entered in or removed from the register.
 – standards management. The standards are established by a Central College of 
Experts, consisting of representatives of sector organisations, user enterprises 
and unions; the SNA provides the secretariat.
 – harmonisation of inspectorates. The inspections are conducted by affiliated in-
spectorates. The SNA organises mutual consultations aimed at achieving har-
monisation.
 – administrative harmonisation. The SNA’s board is assisted by an advisory board 
that represents the stakeholders. If a business is deemed worthy of certification, 
it is entered into the Register. The necessary inspections focus on the payment 
of tax, VAT and social security contributions, observance of the Aliens Act and 
of regulations on minimum rates of pay and holiday allowances. In 2014, about 
nine elements of the CLA were added.
The establishment, implementation and maintenance of all procedures is verified by 
monitoring. The basic principle is that every business is monitored twice a year. De-
pending on the risk factors (new application for certification, irregularities during 
the last check, cash flow volume) the monitoring frequency can be increased. If the 
business does not comply with a specific requirement, which would eventually raise 
the level of risk, this is assessed as a minor non-conformity. Non-compliance with a 
specific requirement that immediately raises the level of risk is assessed as a major 
non-compliance. In the latter case, the registration is suspended, i.e. the enterprise is 
removed from the online register. The entrepreneur has a month to rectify a major 
non-compliance. Once it has been adequately remedied, the suspension is removed. 
In the case of a minor non-compliance the entrepreneur can use the time until the 
808 Van der Voort (2013), p. 157 ff.
809 Van der Voort (2013), p. 157.
Part III A national legal framework on temporary agency work: the Dutch context 
384
next assessment to remedy it. If he fails to do so, the minor non-compliance turns 
into a major one.
Certification is obligatory for the members of the ABU and the NBBU. Since 
this system of self-regulation has been developed under the threat of an imminent 
licensing scheme, Van der Voort referred to an enforced regulation that felt more like 
co-regulation. In this set-up, public and private supervisors come across each other 
more and more because of the various forms of collaboration.
Originally, the SNA was aimed at risk reduction for the user enterprise. How-
ever, by adding elements from the CLA to the standard, employee protection has also 
become an objective.
State Secretary Van Hoof was positive about the initiative.810 The most import-
ant thing was that the NEN standard could make an important contribution to allevi-
ating the lack of compliance of laws and regulations in the temporary agency sector 
at the time. He realised that the work for public enforcement institutions only began 
once a certificate was refused or revoked. He also established that the hallmark lacked 
elements that the licence did have, including requirements regarding financial sus-
tainability (i.e. not having been in a state of bankruptcy, suspension of payment or 
debt rescheduling), the requirement of a certificate of good character, sanctioning of 
administrative penalty and the deposit requirement. He argued that the NEN stand-
ard was successful if:
 – the NEN standard were applied on as large a scale as possible, with a broad sup-
port base and accessibility for both organised and non-organised agencies;
 – the value of the certificate would become so transparent to the Tax Authority 
and the Labour Inspectorate that double work could be prevented, so that public 
enforcement could focus on the fraudulent segment;
 – the user enterprise were encouraged to work with certified agencies.
The State Secretary mentioned an ex ante investigation that had been conducted to 
gain insight in the support base and the effects of the self-regulation. This investiga-
tion had shown a broad support base for the hallmark among temporary employ-
ment agencies and user enterprises. There was uncertainty as to whether the hallmark 
would attract more agencies than the various systems existing at the time had.
As per the end of October 2015, 4,052 agencies were entered into the register 
following certification. An estimated total of 12,000 agencies are thought to engage 
in manpower provision. Thus, there is a ‘grey area’ of approximately 8,000 temporary 
810 Letter from the Dutch State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment and the State Secretary 
for Finance, TK 2004–2005, 17050, no. 300, and a letter from the Dutch State Secretary for Social 
Affairs and Employment and the State Secretary for Finance, dated 28 September 2005, reference 
AM/BR/05 170308 on combating fraud in the temporary agency sector.
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employment agencies. From 2007 to 2015, more than 3,000 agencies were struck off 
the register, because they no longer aimed for certification, no longer met the criteria, 
or because they had been liquidated. Out of the certified agencies, 73% only engaged 
in hiring out temporary agency workers, 17% in contracting and 10% in both hiring 
out and contracting.
8.12 ACCOMPANYING MEASURES
The SNA hallmark became operational as per 2007. From that moment on, the num-
ber of certified agencies grew steadily to over 4,000, as became clear above.
In 2008, the ABU, as the principal spiritual father, issued the report Registratie en 
certificering tegen misbruik van uitzending811 (‘registration and certification against 
abuse of temporary agency work’), advocating a series of measures to fight fraud. The 
plan comprised eleven items, i.e.:
1. Every temporary employment agency is obliged to register in a public register.
2. Non-registration results in a fine for the temporary employment agency.
3. Only registered temporary employment agencies can apply for a G-account and 
an income tax number.
4. Certification ensues from registration on the grounds of NEN-4400, but this is 
not obligatory.
5. Non-certification means that the agency data is passed on to the government 
enforcers.
6. Working with non-certified agencies constitutes a large financial risk for the 
user enterprise.
7. A user enterprises using a non-certified agency must make a first-day notifica-
tion (EDM).
8. User enterprises are made jointly and severally liable for payment of at least the 
statutory minimum wage to the temporary agency worker, coupled with reversal 
of the burden of proof. Cooperating with a certified agency results in indemnity 
from this joint and several liability.
9. The government continues to be responsible for enforcement.
10. Registration is easy for the temporary employment agency and can easily be 
verified by user enterprises and enforcers.
11. Obviously, a condition to this model is that the government uses its means of 
enforcement to act directly on signals that have been transmitted, since enforce-
ment and monitoring are essential to the model.
811 ABU (2008).
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The Dutch Labour Foundation supported the outlines of the plan. The SNA had made 
agreements with the Dutch Tax Authority as early as 2007 to exchange information 
on the payment behaviour of (potentially) registered agencies. Moreover, agreements 
were made on the simplification of issuing social security numbers for foreign work-
ers and passing on information regarding fraudulent foreign intermediaries to the 
Dutch Tax Authority. More generally, measures to enhance government enforcement 
were discussed. For instance, an administrative penalty became applicable in cases of 
breaching the statutory minimum wage.
Moreover, an act enhancing tax law enforcement reinforced the position of the 
Dutch Tax Authority. In this act, the application of the 52% anonymous tax rate was 
extended and a six-month notion was included in the Dutch Wages Tax Act (Wet LB 
art. 30a). These are general measures that are not specifically directed at the tempor-
ary agency sector, but they do facilitate the fight against fraud in this sector.
Minister Donner felt sympathy for the ABU plan.812 He aimed to fine-tune the 
existing requirement for registration at the Dutch Chamber of Commerce (item 1 
in the plan), use the existing opportunity to impose fines (item 2 in the plan). The 
registration at the Chamber of Commerce is already public (item 10 in the plan). He 
clearly recognised the opportunity of following up on the SNA signals by the public 
enforcers. He was also positive about joint and several liability for the hirer with re-
gard to paying the statutory minimum wages, which could be regulated for in the BW. 
The Minister did reject items 3 and 4 for the time being, indicating that he wanted 
to verify whether alternatives were feasible. All in all, the Minister stated that some 
of the ABU proposals were worth considering. Soon after, he proposed amending 
article 7:692 BW in relation to realising hirer liability regarding the payment of the 
applicable minimum wage and applicable minimum holiday allowance. His proposal 
was adopted by Parliament. In the second paragraph  of article  7:692 BW the user 
enterprise is offered the option of avoiding joint and several liability by cooperating 
with a certified temporary employment agency.
Minister Donner clearly supported the choice of self-regulation. However, the 
problems of fraudulence were not yet at an end. After studies conducted by the ABU 
in 2004 and 2006 shed light on growing fraudulence, the Dutch foundation for com-
pliance with the collective labour agreement for temporary agency workers (SNCU), 
issued alarming reports in 2008 and 2010, indicating that the problem had not disap-
peared and was actually increasing.813
Politicians responded to the signals and in due course this resulted in the adop-
tion of the Voortman/Spekman motion. This translates as follows:
812 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment dated 19 June 2008, reference 
AM/BR/08/15448, on monitoring the temporary agency sector, 2008.
813 De Bondt & Grijpstra (2008); Walz, Frouws & Grijpstra (2010).
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Voortman/Spekman motion814
Proposed 7 October 2010
The Lower House of Parliament,
having heard the deliberations, observing that more than 50% of the migrant work-
ers in the Netherlands are working through temporary employment agencies;
considering that during the first half of 2010, the SNCU, the CLA police of tempor-
ary agency employers and trade unions, has had to process a record number of 
reported complaints, for instance, about underpayment and bad housing;
considering that on 28 September last, the cabinet indicated that it aimed to have 
temporary employment agencies registered, and that it aimed to broaden its ap-
proach in the field of housing regulations and fighting fraudulent temporary em-
ployment agencies;
holding the view that, in spite of having sectoral certification with supportive legisla-
tion, the number of fraudulent temporary employment agencies continues to grow;
holding the view that the approach to fraudulent temporary employment agencies 
can be enhanced by a licensing scheme combined with instruments such as the 
Bibob Act815;
requests the government to develop, on the basis of the comprehensive package of 
measures, a conclusive approach in order to put a stop to fraudulent temporary em-
ployment agencies, including the implementation of a licence scheme as an option,
and proceeds to the regular order of the day.
Voortman/Spekman
This motion placed the permit as a means of facing the problems back on the political 
agenda. This aim was enhanced by the so-called LURA report, comprising the delib-
erations emanating from the parliamentary inquiry.816
In this context, it was observed that fraudulent temporary employment agencies 
were a major problem, that they were not tackled effectively and that NEN certifica-
tion had failed to be an adequate solution. At any rate, the Ulenbelt/Hamer motion 
ensued,817 observing that self-regulation had failed and that a permit requirement for 
temporary employment agencies should be reintroduced if the number of fraudulent 
temporary employment agencies were not halved by the end of 2012. The motion was 
not adopted, but the ball had been set rolling once again.
814 TK 2010–2011, 29407, no. 115.
815 The Bibob Act (‘Wet Bibob’) is a (preventive) regulatory instrument. If a licence is under threat of 
abuse, the competent administrative body can refuse the application for or withdraw a licence to 
prevent the risk of the government facilitating criminal activities.
816 Parliamentary inquiry: Lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie (‘lessons from recent labour migration’) 
TK 2011–2012, 32680 no. 4.
817 Ulenbelt/Hamer motion; TK 2011–2012, 32680, no. 14.
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Minister Kamp acted resolutely; he introduced a bill on a registration requirement for 
inter mediaries posting workers. In doing so, he went further than Minister  Donner, 
who had wanted to align the ABU plan with existing legislation regarding registration 
in the Dutch Trade Register. Minister Kamp explicitly aligned with the ABU plan by 
proposing a separate act. This act was included in the Waadi Act, as article 7a, stating 
in par. 1:
It is prohibited for anyone to post workers in the Netherlands other than through 
an enterprise or legal body registered in the Dutch Trade Register, designated in 
article 2 of the Trade Register Act 2007 or about which it has been recorded that it 
is engaged in the activity of posting workers.
Paragraph 2 provides:
It is prohibited for anyone to hire and deploy workers that have been posted in 
breach of the provision in the first paragraph.818
In a new article  14b this amendment also regulated that acknowledged certified 
 bodies such as the SNA may be supplied with data regarding administrative fines 
imposed for non-compliance with:
 – article 7a, par. 1, Waadi Act;
 – article 2, par. 1, or article 15 van the Dutch Labour Act for Aliens (WAV);
 – article 5.20 van the General Administrative Law Act (AWB);
 – article 7, 15 or 18b, par. 2, of the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allow-
ance Act (WML).
Thus, the Minister clearly aimed to enhance self-regulation. However, he also prom-
ised to investigate whether reintroducing the licensing requirement would contribute 
to tackling the problems effectively.819 The Minister fulfilled this promise by explor-
ing various possible modalities, i.e.:
 – the current system of public-private cooperation;
 – a certification requirement;
 – licensing by registration;
 – a licensing scheme.820
818 Van Drongelen & Van Rijs (2012), Van Drongelen & Van Rijs (2014).
819 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment dated 14 March 2012, TK 2011–
2012, 32680, no. 28.
820 Letter from the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs and Employment dated 10 September 2012, ref. O/
AMU/2012/12792; see annex 3,’verkenning vergunningplicht’ (exploring the licensing requirement).
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The enquiry assesses the modalities on various relevant effects/characteristics.
Table 8.3
Varieties
Effect
1. Current system 2.  Certification 
requirement
3.  Licensing by 
registration
4.  Licensing 
 scheme
Incentive user 
enterprise
Negative due to 
risk of a fine due 
to hiring from non- 
registered agency 
(through registra-
tion requirement).
Positive due to 
partial indemnifi-
cation.
Negative due to 
risk of a fine due 
to hiring from non- 
certified agency.
Positive due to 
partial indemnifi-
cation.
Negative due to 
risk of a fine due 
to hiring from non- 
registered agency.
Negative due to 
risk of a fine due 
to hiring from non- 
licensed agency.
Incentive tempo-
rary employment 
agency
Small incentive to 
be certified.
Large incentive to 
be certified.
Large incentive to 
be licensed.
Large incentive to 
be licensed. 
Deposit is impedi-
ment to starting a 
business and en-
hances the incen-
tive to circumvent 
the regulations.
Scope Only sna mem-
bers have them-
selves regularly 
monitored. The 
rest of the sector 
do not.
The larger part of 
the sector is in 
sight and has itself 
regularly monitored 
through certifica-
tion.
Public monitoring 
on licensing condi-
tions.
Public monitoring 
on licensing condi-
tions.
Sector costs Only for certified 
segment.
Increase for part 
of the sector due 
to the requirement 
and possible 
fines for non- 
certification.
Remain equal to 
variant 1.
sna certificate 
costs fall away. In 
their stead comes 
administrative bur-
den for the sector. 
Deposit requires 
investment.
Government  
costs
For enforcing legal 
standards.
Remain equal to 
variant 1.
Increase due to 
implementation 
and licence enfor-
cement. Fees may 
cover the costs.
Increase due to 
implementation 
(more so than for 
variant 3) and li-
cence enforcement. 
Fees may cover the 
costs. 
Deposit offers Tax 
Authority more 
guarantee.
According to the Minister, the enquiry shows that licensing has little or no effect on 
the number of fraudulent temporary employment agencies. He stated:
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Moreover, a licensing requirement has considerable implications for the current 
system of public-private cooperation. There is a risk that the private sector will 
cut back on or stop the efforts it has set in motion. This would not be right, since 
fraudu lent practices can only be put an end to by intensive cooperation between the 
government and the sector. Moreover, it will be complicated for the government to 
fill the gap the private sector then leaves behind. The means to do so are lacking.821
In addition to the registration requirement and the legislative possibilities for co-
operation, the Minister presented the following existing and new measures to fight 
fraudulence:
 – AMU (Tackling Fraud at Temporary Employment Agencies) intervention team,
 – AMU reporting centre,
 – tackling fraud by means of increased penalties,
 – hirer liability WML,
 – tighter enforcement policy (as a result of increased monitoring of cost deductions),
 – pilot registration data exchange,
 – Enforcement Directive – measures,
 – tackling bogus self-employment,
 – implementation of registration requirement,
 – public-private data exchange,
 – tax indemnity.
The latter has taken place as a result of the Van Hijum/Spekman motion,822 advocat-
ing indemnity for the user enterprise from additional tax and fines, in connection 
with its joint and several liability for non-payment of social security contributions 
and wage tax. This motion was adopted, and resulted in an amendment to the 2008 
guideline for tax collection. Now, its article 34.6.1 provides that the user enterprise 
hiring from a temporary employment agency can be granted exculpation under spe-
cific conditions. The user enterprise will not be held liable if:
 – it pays 25% of the invoice amount (including VAT) into the G-account of the 
temporary employment agency (in the event of reverse charge VAT this is 20% 
of the invoice amount);
 – on payment it enters the invoice number and any other invoice identification 
data into the comments section of the transaction;
 – its accounts department provides a direct insight into the hiring data, an account 
of man-hours and the payments;
 – it has the hired worker’s citizen service number (BSN/sofi-number);
821 Ibid., p. 5.
822 Van Hijum/Spekman motion. TK 2008–2009, 31833, no. 8.
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 – it can prove the hired worker’s identity;
 – it can prove, if applicable, that the hired worker has a valid residence or work 
permit.
The agency/intermediary must meet the following requirements:
 – The enterprise complies with the NEN 4400-1 and the NEN 4400-2 standard 
and is registered with the Dutch Labour Standards Foundation (SNA). The SNA 
website (www.normeringarbeid.nl/en) lists the temporary employment agencies 
that meet these requirements.
 – The invoice states:
• the number or reference of the corresponding agreement to which the in-
voice applies;
• the period or periods to which the invoice applies;
• the description or reference of the assignment to which the invoice applies.823
Alternative regulations may apply to temporary agency groups.
8.13 TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK DIRECTIVE INCORPORATED 
IN THE WAADI ACT
The Temporary Agency Work Directive was implemented simultaneously with the 
incorporation of the registration requirement through an amendment to the  Waadi 
Act.824 The development of this European directive was discussed extensively in 
chapter 7.
The articles 1, scope; 2, aim; and 3, definitions, of the directive did not need to be 
implemented. Article 4 concerns reviewing prohibitions and restrictions on the use 
of temporary agency work. Two prohibitions are in place, i.e. for bus drivers and for 
workers in youth care. During the corresponding deliberations in the Dutch  Lower 
House, the Minister referred to his colleagues at Infrastructure and the Environment, 
and at Health, Welfare and Sports, who would have to do their homework on this 
matter. Moreover, he referred to a recommendation by the Dutch Labour Founda-
tion, providing for the review with regard to the CLA provisions. In this recom-
mendation, the Dutch Labour Foundation inventoried the following prohibiting and 
restricting provisions:825
823 Amendment of the 2008 guideline for tax collection, Decision of 27 June 2012, no. BLKB 2012/1062 M.
824 Van Drongelen & Van Rijs (2012).
825 Analysis by the Dutch Labour Foundation for the purpose of reviewing the restrictions and pro-
hibitions on the use of temporary agency work in collective labour agreements, 2011.
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 – maximisation by absolute numbers/percentages;
 – maximisation by period or duration of the assignment;
 – CLA provisions on the basis of which temporary agency workers may not per-
form work that ‘by its nature’ is usually performed by the employees of the user 
enterprise;
 – conditions of hiring;
 – NEN (4400)/SNA certification;
 – demand for licensing or another type of recognition or proof of the bona fide 
character of the temporary employment agency that goes beyond the NEN cer-
tification;
 – providing information to and/or gaining agreement of trade unions;
 – provisions that make payments to a social fund mandatory.
A unanimous recommendation failed to ensue. The Dutch Labour Foundation could 
only justify the NEN provisions, the condition of allowing the works councils to play 
a role in the use of temporary agency workers and the provisions that make payments 
to a social fund mandatory. Views on the other elements continued to diverge. This 
was not so much about the implementation of a section of a law, but rather about the 
execution of a concrete assignment. This was different for article 5 of the directive, 
which develops the principle of equal treatment. The Waadi Act already included 
article 8 containing the pay equivalence rule. However, this had to meet the require-
ments of the directive. Instead of ‘wages, benefits and other allowances equivalent to 
the wages, benefits and other allowances that are usual at the user enterprise’ article 8 
now provides the ‘right to at least the same labour and employment conditions as 
those that apply to employees in the same or similar positions at the user enterprise’:
 – as regards the wages and other benefits and allowances;
 – on the basis of a CLA or other non-legal provision of a general nature that is in 
force within the enterprise where the assignment takes place, as regards working 
hours, including overtime, rest periods, work on night shifts, breaks, the dura-
tion of the holidays and work performed on public holidays.
Derogation by CLA is allowed (art. 8, par. 3, Waadi Act).
The rights with regard to company facilities at the user enterprise and the in-
formation on vacancies provided to temporary agency workers are regulated in art-
icle 8a and b Waadi Act.
The no fee to worker principle was included in article 9 Waadi Act. Labour co- 
partnership for temporary agency workers had already been regulated in the Dutch 
Work Councils Act (WOR), which included an obligation to inform the works council 
on the use of temporary agency work in article 31b, par. 1.
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8.14 COLLECTIVE LABOUR AGREEMENT FOR TEMPORARY 
AGENCY WORKERS826
It has been stated previously that the CLA as an instrument has also played an import-
ant role in the development of the regulatory framework on temporary agency work 
in the Netherlands. In particular it has always been an important instrument for the 
social partners to put wages in order in derogation of the pay equivalence rule.
The ABU’s first CLA was concluded in 1972. At the time, it was restricted to the 
administrative and office sectors, where most temporary agency workers were as-
signed. This CLA contained a mere ten pages, providing only the labour and em-
ployment conditions. In addition to this CLA, the ABU had issued a so-called ‘green 
folder’ in which it had unilaterally established the labour and employment conditions 
for skilled and unskilled temporary agency workers. The then existing CLA for tem-
porary agency workers in the administrative and office sectors constituted important 
input for a CLA for the entire temporary agency sector, which was realised in 1987. 
The CLA contained regulations on the commencement and ending of labour relation-
ships, and on the working hours, the hourly rates of pay, bonuses, expense allowances 
and holiday entitlements. A paragraph on remuneration was in place for the admin-
istrative and office sectors, while for other sectors it had been provided that the wages 
should ‘as a rule and preferably’ be in conformity with the hirer’s rates of pay.
A dispute about this was brought before the disputes committee appointed by 
the ABU CLA. This committee indicated that a 10% margin applied compared with 
the hirer’s rates of pay. There has always been pressure on the ABU to establish the 
remuneration at the level of the hirer’s remuneration. The trade union held the view 
that there were also entitlements on the basis of the various CLAs at user enterprises.
The so-called SMU agreement was concluded to solve this issue of conflicting 
CLAs, i.e. the one for temporary workers and those at user companies. To this end, 
the ABU renounced its negotiation rights in respect of wage-setting in favour of the 
hirers’ CLAs. This did require notification, i.e. the partner in the hirer’s CLA had to 
report these specific agreements to the Dutch Temporary Employment Agencies 
 Notification Office (SMU), which had been established in 1991. Thanks to its willing-
ness to comply, the ABU managed to extend the maximum assignment period from 
6 to 12 months (1000 hours). The SMU had only existed for little over a decade, until 
2004. In that year, the ABU concluded its new CLA for 2004–2009. The aforemen-
tioned temporary agency covenant, which was part of the Flexibility and Security 
Agreement, had been developed in the preceding CLA for 1999–2004, which came 
into force on 1 January 1999, simultaneously with the other flexibility and security 
regulations.
826 Van Houte et al. (2004).
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In addition to the usual labour law provisions (including continuation of the SMU 
agreement), the 1999 CLA comprised important provisions in the field of the tem-
porary agency workers’ legal position, i.e. the so-called assignment phases system in 
which the new legal provisions had been developed – statutory provisions – in the 
field of the secondment agreement, the chain system of the fixed-term employment 
contract and the exclusion of the obligation to continue payment of wages.
Besides article  7:690 BW, which legally entrenched the assignment period of 
26 weeks (art. 7:691, par. 2, BW) on the principle that ‘end of assignment equals end 
of contract, a so-called chain system came into being in article 7:668a BW, legally en-
abling three fixed-term employment contracts in a three-year period. The ABU CLA 
developed this provision into four phases.
 – Phase  1 was the 26-week secondment phase subject to the so-called agency 
clause (end of assignment equals end of contract).
 – Phase 2 amounted to an extension of this period by CLA by another 26 weeks.
 – In phase  3, a maximum of eight fixed-term employment contracts had to be 
concluded in a two-year period.
 – Entering phase 4 is only possible under the condition of concluding an open- 
ended employment contract.
Other important agreements that had been developed in the ABU CLA for temporary 
workers concerned pensions and training. In their transition to phase 2, workers ac-
quired rights in these fields.
During the term of this CLA it became clear that the commotion surrounding 
the introduction of flexibility and security and the related CLA had not made matters 
clearer and was also intrinsically complex.
The Dutch Economical Institute (NEI) established in an evaluation study that 
temporary agency workers are actually 34% ‘sideliners’, 55% ‘quitters’ and 11% ‘stay-
ers’. Differentiation into these various groups was called for, for instance, a ‘student 
regulation’. NEI recommended simplifying the phasing system and rendering the re-
muneration regulation more transparent. This was expressed in the 2004–2009 CLA. 
The phasing system was simplified. ABU introduced a phase A constituting 78 weeks’ 
work for the same temporary employment agency, a phase B constituting a maximum 
of eight contracts during a maximum period of two years, and a phase C comprising 
the ‘permanent’ temporary agency workers; those who are working on the basis of a 
fixed-term employment contract.
As regards wages, it was agreed to cancel the SMU construction. From then on 
temporary agency workers were remunerated in conformity with their own CLA dur-
ing the first 26 weeks, after which the remuneration was decided in conformity with 
the hirer’s CLA.
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During the first 78 weeks, a temporary agency worker is not entitled to continued 
payment if the assignment is discontinued; however, if this occurs in the phases B 
and C, the worker is entitled to so-called reversion pay if he or she is willing to accept 
an alternative suitable assignment.
The 2009–2014 CLA for temporary agency workers closely resembled the 2004–2009 
CLA, but new insights regarding remuneration were included. The temporary  agency 
remuneration could be derogated from for skilled workers who had also been regu-
lated for in the hirer’s CLA. A procedure including a remuneration committee provid-
ed the rules for this derogation option.
This CLA was dismantled to make room for the 2012–2017 CLA. According to 
this CLA, the hirer’s remuneration becomes the starting point for determining the 
temporary agency wages (art. 19). The ABU remuneration regulations can be applied 
to four groups, i.e.:
1. allocation group (school leavers, jobseekers under the Dutch Participation 
Act, returners, reintegration target groups, long-term unemployed, temporary 
 agency workers without starter qualifications who attend qualifying training, 
temporary agency workers who attend training at vocational qualification assist-
ant level 1, holiday employees);
2. transition group (the worker is then coached in his/her transition to new em-
ployment);
3. temporary workers who cannot be classified (i.e. they have not been included in 
the hirer’s function classification);
4. temporary workers with an open-ended secondment agreement in phase C.
For the first three groups, the ABU remuneration rate may be applied for 52 weeks.
In addition to the ABU CLA there is also the NBBU CLA. This CLA had no wage para-
graph of its own and opted for remuneration in accordance with the hirer’s standard. 
In the NBBU CLA, the first and second phases added up to 104 weeks, in contrast to the 
ABU CLA, in which it had by then been renamed phase A, and amounted to 78 weeks. 
Both CLAs do have an identical phase B, also known as phase 3, comprising a max-
imum of six fixed-term employment contracts in a maximum period of four years.
In the meantime, the Dutch Work and Security Act (WWZ) has resulted in inter-
ventions in both CLAs, which have brought them even closer together. This will be 
referred to in the discussion of this act.827
827 Collective labour agreement for temporary agency workers 2012–2017, September 2015 (ABU CLA); 
collective labour agreement for temporary agency workers 1 June 2014–31 May 2019 (NBBU CLA).
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We have seen previously how the Dutch regulatory framework for temporary agency 
work has developed since the 1960s, these years being characterised by combating 
abuses. During this decade, the Dutch government introduced its first regulations on 
temporary agency work, i.e. compulsory social security contributions and the Man-
power Provision Act. Subsequently, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed growing recogni-
tion through incorporation of manpower provision in the 1990 Employment Services 
Act, provisionally culminating in flexibility and security regulations.
Since these regulations came into force, various members of the Dutch gov-
ernment have had to occupy themselves with the issue of temporary agency work, 
particularly focusing on combating fraudulent agency work. Preference was finally 
given to self-regulation by way of certification, combined with public enforcement 
of the relevant laws and regulations. The licensing alternative cropped up repeatedly, 
but eventually Dutch government opted for the continuation of the private-public 
course. On the basis of a thorough examination, Minister Kamp of Social Affairs and 
Employment made clear that licensing would not have any added value.
All these deliberations scarcely referred to the foundations that were laid for what 
came to be termed the ‘Flexibility and security approach’.
However, the tide now appears to be turning. During the summer of 2012, the 
Dutch Socialist Party and the Dutch Labour Party jointly introduced their Security 
for Flexibility bill to deal with excessive flexibility. Many elements of this bill were 
used in Minister Asscher’s Work and Security Act, which has since been passed.
The 2013 social partnership agreement supported this bill. The agreement also 
supported tackling sham arrangements, as substantiated in the Act on Combating 
Sham Arrangements, which by now has also been passed. Also, the social partnership 
agreement helped place payrolling on the agenda.
Contracting and self-employment were added as new, fast-growing types of flex-
ible work. Temporary agency work clearly no longer monopolises the wide range 
of flexible work types. Lastly, Minister Asscher made critical observations about 
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 combating fraudulence by means of private certification and public enforcement. He 
was also dissatisfied with the effects of the Posting of Workers Directive.
Following a legislative development that could be described as positive, par-
ticularly since the Dutch government and social partners had finally come to an 
agreement, a turning point appears to be within reach in which consensus is now in-
creasingly harder to find. Due to their complexity, the issues appear to become more 
and more uncontrollable. This is clearly a watershed. Above, the development of the 
temporary agency framework was outlined. To fully understand this development, it 
is necessary to discuss its complications further.
All this contributes to answering the question as to whether Convention 181 as a 
global labour standard is (still) adequate from a Dutch point of view.
9.1 SECURITY FOR FLEXIBILITY BILL828
Towards the end of 2012, the Members of Dutch Parliament Hamer (PvdA) and Ulen-
belt (SP) presented their members’ initiative aimed at considerably amending the 
flexible labour legislation. They established that, at the time, this legislation had been 
adopted by a large majority (143 out of 150 MPs in favour), but thought it was time 
for some adjustments. They submitted proposals on the chain system, on terminating 
the temporary contract, on levying social security contributions, on using the agency 
clause, on the obligation of continued payment of wages, on probation time, on the 
competition clause and on a legal presumption regarding payrolling. These proposals 
were needed to rebalance flexibility legislation. They established that: ‘at the moment, 
the non-secure layer of flexible contracts, temporary agency work and self-employed 
workers has grown to approximately 30%, which shows that the process of flexibilisa-
tion has not been balanced’. This called for modernisation of the labour relationships, 
the initiators argued. They stated that this development is detrimental to innovation 
and productivity growth. Furthermore, there were too few transitions from insecure 
to permanent employment. As they put it, the consequences were immense:
no mortgage, hardly any career opportunities, little education and training, a lower 
remuneration than that of colleagues with permanent contracts, reduced pension 
accrual and fewer social security rights than employees with permanent contracts.
In connection to this, they argued:
828 Bill by MP Ulenbelt to amend Book 7 BW and the Social Insurance (Funding) Act to improve the legal 
position (Security for Flexibility Act), TK 2012–2013 no. 3, 33499, Explanatory Memorandum p. 4.
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However, there is a large group of people that unintentionally become trapped in 
flexible work. The divide in the Dutch labour market between workers with tem-
porary contracts and workers with permanent contracts becomes increasingly pro-
nounced. The losers are the group of ‘outsiders’ with temporary contracts, who 
would like to have a permanent contract but have little or no chance of getting one. 
As a result, a large part of the working Dutch is experiencing sustained insecurity. 
Thus, the fear of a growing multitude of ‘working nomads’ – as foreseen in 1996 
by the Dutch Labour Foundation in the STAR agreement – has become reality.829
The Memorandum points out the so-called revolving door abuse of unemployment 
insurance provisions, which must be acted against. Employers are said to organise 
flexibility chains in such a way that they make maximum use of the employment sus-
pension rules, causing their employees to apply for unemployment benefits in these 
intervals. In this way, no worker would ever be entitled to a permanent contract.
The concrete proposals were as follows:
 – granting severance pay when the temporary contract ends; a month’s salary for 
every year worked;
 – an obligation to inform the worker on ending or extending the contract;
 – the so-called 3-in-3 rule – a maximum of three fixed-term contracts in a max-
imum of three years – is replaced by the so-called 2-in-2 rule – a maximum of 
two contracts in a maximum period of two years;
 – payrolling approach; legal suspicion that ‘commissioning client’ is also the em-
ployer;
 – facilitating the permanent contract by means of lower unemployment benefit 
premiums;
 – no more competition clauses in the case of temporary contracts;
 – no more probation periods for contracts of less than six months;
 – the agency clause may be applied for a maximum of eighteen months;
 – derogating the obligation to continue payment by CLA is further restricted;
 – every contract must be put in writing.
The proposed measures did not aim at combating fraudulence but set out to achieve 
a revision of flexibility legislation. The bill clearly reflected the changing spirit of the 
age. Although at the time they originated from the opposition, these plans ended 
up on the government’s plate due to the ‘recolouring’ that arose through the Second 
Rutte cabinet, and even in the social partnership agreement.
829 Bill by MP Ulenbelt to amend Book 7 BW and the Social Insurance (Funding) Act to improve the legal 
position (Security for Flexibility Act), TK 2012–2013 no.3, 33499, Explanatory Memorandum p. 5.
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9.2 SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 830
In the spring of 2013 a social partnership agreement was concluded. Under the motto 
‘scope for a social and enterprising country: leaving the crisis behind with good jobs 
on our way to 2020’, approximately sixty measures were planned that were to contrib-
ute towards realising this prospect.
The Second Rutte cabinet and the social partners were united in a structural 
approach to the economy and the labour market. The social partnership agreement 
was the guideline.
Among other things, the agreement dealt with dismissal law and the urgent 
 necessity to improve the rights to and protection of people working in flexible work 
relations (so-called ‘flex workers’) and to do everything possible to combat improper 
forms of flexible work. It established:
In practice, parts of the current complex of labour contracts and related legisla-
tion increasingly lead to excesses, while yielding less than optimum results for the 
economy. For instance, more and more use is made of (sham) arrangements that 
only serve to evade CLAs and regulations. Flexible work increasingly overshoots 
its mark.831
In respect of a responsible use of external flexibility and flexible employment con-
tracts, the social partners suggested six routes:
1. combating improper use of flexible labour relations, such as sham arrangements 
and the ‘foreign agencies route’ (use of foreign workers through foreign  agencies);
2. enforcement and compliance;
3. better regulation of contracting responsibilities;
4. combating excessive use of legal forms of flexible labour;
5. improved structuring of so-called tripartite relationships;
6. investing in employability and training of flexible workers.832
Ad 1  Combating improper use of flexible labour relationships
Combating improper use of flexible labour relationships entails addressing the fol-
lowing problems: false self-employment, evading minimum wages, evading social 
secur ity contributions, evading CLAs, and the problematic transport sector. The 
Dutch Labour Foundation asked the government for an action plan, including both 
legislation and enforcement efforts.
830 STAR (2013).
831 STAR (2013), p. 5.
832 STAR (2013), p. 20.
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Ad 2 Enforcement and compliance
Improved enforcement relates to CLA arrangements, improved information, increased 
and tighter control by the Inspectorate SZW (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment), enforcement of CLAs that have been declared legally binding, establishment 
of joint CLA compliance agencies (‘CLA police forces’), extended competences for the 
trade union movement and structural application of the ‘country-of-employment’ 
principle in relation to levying social security contributions and taxation.
Ad 3  Better regulation of contracting responsibilities
The arrangement of contracting responsibilities and legislation must be improved: 
both the commissioning client and the user enterprise are responsible. Moreover, the 
opportunities of the Transfer of Undertakings Act must be viewed in this context, as 
must the application of ILO Convention 94 on respecting CLAs in the case of public 
tenders.
Ad 4  Combating excessive use of legal forms of flexible labour
Excessive use of legal forms of flexible labour must be countered by adjusting the 
general rules on temporary employment, adjusting temporary agency work rules and 
tackling the min-max and zero hour contracts. Measures regarding temporary con-
tracts include:
 – no competition clause for temporary contracts, except for specific cases for 
which clear reasons are stated;
 – a one-month notice period in the event of the termination of a temporary con-
tract with a duration of six months or more;
 – no probation period for a temporary contract for a period of less than six 
months; this also applies to any consecutive contract;
 – the 3, 3, 3 chain system is replaced by a 3, 2, 6 chain system, i.e. a maximum of 
three contracts in a maximum period of three years including a three-month 
break in between contracts is replaced by a maximum of three contracts in a 
maximum period of two years with a six-month break, to be derogated by CLA 
if necessary due to the nature of the work in the sector or enterprise. The ‘chain 
provision’ comes into force on the date of the worker’s eighteenth birthday. 
The Dutch Labour Foundation asked the government to change the temporary 
 agency regulations (art. 2:691 BW) in such a way that the so-called ‘agency clause’ 
(end of assignment equals end of contract) can be extended by CLA up to 78 
weeks. Currently, the extension option is limitless. As regards the min-max and 
zero-hour contracts, the Foundation requests restraint, asking that they be lim-
ited to exceptional situations. Currently, the obligation to continue paying wages 
can be derogated by CLA. According to the Foundation this should only be al-
lowed if the parties to the CLA can substantiate the necessity on the basis of the 
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nature of the work in that sector. Measures to counter pressure on tenders that 
results in lowering wages to the minimum rates of pay, and more information on 
the rules pertaining to this contract type are also called for.
Ad 5  Improved structuring of so-called tripartite relationships
With respect to (new) forms of flexibility, such as the agreement to provide services, 
payrolling, contracting and secondment, it is necessary to structure them so as to be 
subject to labour law, in order that the condition under which such a form may be 
offered becomes transparent. Issues arise that need to be addressed. The trade union 
movement has questions about legitimacy, because of inadequate legal protection. 
In any event, the Foundation wants clarity. The special dismissal regime that was 
developed in the flexibility and security discussion and that is also applicable to pay-
rolling, should no longer be applicable to the latter. The Foundation also suggests 
coupling payrolling to a written employment contract in the absence of which it may 
be  assumed that an employment contract with the user enterprise exists.
The Foundation aims to further analyse other issues regarding tripartite rela-
tionships, in order to take stock of how tripartite relationships are developing in the 
Dutch labour market, what the employers’ and workers’ experiences are, and how 
sustainable relationships offering good prospects and fulfilling justified employer and 
worker needs and interests can be promoted. The Foundation was supposed to sub-
mit an advice before 1 October 2013, but so far has not managed to do so, not even 
after the extension of the deadline.
Ad 6  Investing in employability and training of flexible workers
Flexible workers should be offered training up to minimum vocational qualification 
assistant level 1; they should have access to facilities existing in the enterprise or sec-
tor, and if the contract exceeds two years, a so-called transition compensation should 
be granted.
The social partnership agreement comprises a wide range of measures to tackle the 
 so-called excessive flexibility. Van der Gaag833 questions the alleged excessive char-
acter of flexibility. He observes that since the 1996 ‘Flexakkoord’ (‘flexibility agree-
ment’), the flexible layer has expanded from 24.8% to 30.8% of the active population, 
i.e. by 5 percentage points. And, he argues, this increase is mainly due to the number 
of workers with fixed-term contracts and self-employed workers. The share of tem-
porary agency work in the total flex layer has actually decreased from 12.4% to 7.4%; 
the share of temporary work with prospects of permanent employment increased 
from 10.6% to 18.5%; self-employed workers make up half this flexible layer.
833 Van der Gaag (2013).
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Van der Gaag draws the conclusion that ‘the more severely one regulates a sector, 
the more expensive it becomes and the more often employers resort to other (lesser) 
forms’. We shall discuss below how the flexibility elements of the social partnership 
agreement have been converted into new legislation.
9.3 WORK AND SECURITY ACT 834
Important plans, such as those laid down in the social partnership agreement, were 
incorporated into legislation. The Dutch Work and Security Act was speedily dis-
cussed and duly adopted by a large parliamentary majority. The act addresses revi-
sion of dismissal law and adjustment of the so-called ‘flex provisions’. Termination of 
employment continues to be subject to preventive supervision, but the double route 
with freedom of choice between the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) and a re-
gional judge is replaced by a double route without freedom of choice.
Applying at the UWV for a permit for dismissal is mandatory (a) in the case that 
the job is cut due to financial circumstances and (b) in the event of long-term disability.
Dissolution by the regional judge is the route for dismissal on the grounds of (a) 
regular absenteeism (b) failing to carry out the job adequately (c) attributable acts or 
omissions on the part of the worker (d) refusal to carry out the work for conscien-
tious reasons (e) a breakdown in the working relationship (f) other circumstances 
due to which the employer cannot be reasonably expected to continue employing a 
person (for instance, detention or lack of work permit).
Termination with mutual consent continues to be an option and termination 
with the worker’s consent is added. In this instance, the worker does have a four-
teen-day reflection period, within which he can revoke his consent.
Also, a transition compensation amounting to one third of a month’s wages per 
year of service after a minimum of two years’ service is introduced during the first ten 
years, increasing to half a month’s wages per year of service after ten years’ service. 
The maximum compensation amounted to 75,000 euros or a year’s wages, whichever 
is greater. The worker can appeal to the regional judge against the UWV’s consent. In 
that case, the regional judge may award extra compensation in the case of seriously 
culpable conduct on the part of the employer. The decision can be appealed in court, 
after which the parties can bring an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the period of entitlement to unemployment benefits is reduced from 
38 months to 24 months, with the option of extension to 38 months if the employ-
ment is covered by a CLA. The reduction aims at encouraging workers who are receiv-
ing unemployment benefits to find another job more quickly. The act’s all-embracing 
theme is employment security rather than job security. Dismissal law should become 
834 Joosten & Sprengers (2014a). See also: Houweling & Keulaerds (2015).
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simpler, faster, fairer and less costly for the employer, and be aimed at the employee 
finding a new job, i.e. provide more focus on work mobility.
In addition to dismissal law, flexibility law is also amended. This boils down to six 
categories of changes835 regarding:
1. the chain provision,
2. introduction of a notice period,
3. probation period,
4. competition clause,
5. temporary agency work,
6. the ‘on-call contract’.
Ad 1 The chain provision
The chain provision is reduced from a maximum of three contracts in a three-year 
period with a three-month break in between contracts to a maximum of three con-
tracts in a two-year period with a six-month break in between contracts. As soon as 
this chain rule is exceeded, a permanent employment contract is deemed to exist. 
This system can be derogated from by CLA, with a maximum of six contracts in a 
four-year period with a six-month break in between contracts. This derogation ap-
plies to secondment agreements and jobs and job groups where ‘the intrinsic nature 
of operations requires this extension.’ The minister also has the opportunity to render 
the law inoperative if the intrinsic operations require this, and to substantiate things 
by means of a specific CLA. One example is professional football. The regulations do 
not apply to professional football players under the age of eighteen if they work an 
average maximum of twelve hours per week and if this is required in the context of 
their training.
Ad 2 Introduction of a notice period
Further mandatory notice periods for fixed-term contracts will be introduced. If 
these contracts exceed six months, the worker must be informed on the extension or 
non-extension of the contract and the conditions that apply. This notice is to be given 
one month before the end of the contract. The obligation does not apply if the end 
period of the contract cannot be determined. Non-compliance with the obligation 
will subject to a fine of one month’s salary.
Ad 3 Probation period
Fixed-term contracts can only be included in a probationary clause if they exceed six 
months.
835 Joosten & Sprengers (2014b).
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Ad 4 Competition clause
In principle, competition clauses are forbidden in the case of temporary contracts. 
They are only allowed if ‘serious business or service interests dictate them’.
Ad 5  Temporary agency work
In principle, the ‘agency clause (‘ end of assignment equals end of contract’) con tinues 
to be possible for 26 weeks, as currently provided for, and can be extended by another 
52 weeks if the employment is covered by a CLA (amounting to a total of 78 weeks). 
The chain system applies, according to which a maximum of six contracts can be 
concluded in a four-year period.
Ad 6 ‘On-call contract’
The principle of excluding the obligation to continue payment in writing, as current-
ly occurs in relation to on-call working and zero-hour contracts, is amended in the 
sense that the employer is obligated to pay the wages, if and to the extent that the 
worker has not carried out part or all of the agreed job, unless the worker can reason-
ably be held responsible. The principle thus shifts from ‘no work, no pay’ to ‘no work, 
continued pay, unless…’.
During the first six months, the principle can be deviated from. After this period 
derogations by CLA are possible, but only for jobs to be specified in that CLA, con-
cerning occasional tasks that have no fixed date of commencement. At the request of 
the Dutch Labour Foundation, the minister can provide that the derogation by CLA 
is not possible for certain sectors or parts of sectors.
Clearly, the act hardly yields any material changes for temporary agency work: 
78 weeks of temporary agency work followed by a maximum of six contracts (which 
used to be eight contracts) in a four-year period continues to be possible. The ABU 
CLA already took this into account and the NBBU CLA will need to reduce its optional 
104-week period to 78 weeks.
Generally, the act has met with some criticism, particularly from academia. Loonstra 
and Sick836 observe an increase of complexity; they wonder if the new dismissal law 
will actually work more quickly. Even though it is fairer, they doubt if it will promote 
labour mobility among workers. Also, they think that the dismissal costs will rise, 
particularly for SMEs. Moreover, they wonder whether the flexibility provisions will 
manage to turn flex workers into ‘insiders’ sooner. They conclude that the proposals 
included in the act have fallen short of its intentions.
836 Loonstra & Sick (2014), p. 12 ff.
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Verhulp837 wonders if the increased obligations pertaining to the fixed-term con-
tract may have increased the attractiveness of self-employment. He argues that the 
act lacks a comprehensive vision on the labour market, although in itself it is a step 
in the right direction. Wilthagen838 argues that the act fails to take the reality of the 
labour market into account and sees ‘a mismatch between policy and market’ that 
will cost the Netherlands dearly. The media likewise commented on the act.839
VVD and PvdA also gave comments during the discussion of the act, wondering 
if the flex worker’s position might be weakened rather than strengthened, particularly 
as a result of the amended chain system. Would this not cost employment oppor-
tunities? The minister denied this effect, arguing that ‘on balance, the measures to 
strengthen flex workers’ positions are expected to cause employers to offer more per-
manent contracts’.840 He referred to OECD studies that were said to show this effect. 
The question is whether these studies actually make this clear. They point out that re-
laxed flexibility legislation yields a substitution effect, and in Spain in particular this 
resulted in a considerable increase of temporary contracts. However, this took place 
without any relaxation of Spanish dismissal law. The OECD concludes that relaxing 
flex legislation, which happened to a great extent in the 1990s, is not enough, and that 
dismissal law also needs to be relaxed. The gap between permanent and flex must be 
reduced, the OECD argues.841
The question is whether this applies to the Dutch Work and Security Act. Al-
though dismissal law may have been clarified in some respects, it has not been re-
laxed, and it remains to be seen whether an employer whose opportunities to deploy 
flex workers are now more restricted will really decide to hire workers on a perman-
ent contract basis, if this continues to be unattractive in various other respects.
It is certain that the act has restricted flexibility, however it remains unclear 
whether this will create more permanent jobs. Minister Asscher has not yet proved to 
be right. Statistics Netherlands figures dating from November 2015842 indicate that, 
in comparison with one year earlier, the working population had grown by 81,000 
workers to a total of 8.3 million, although the growth had levelled out. However, the 
number of permanent jobs continued to fall. Since 2008, the number of permanent 
jobs had decreased by more than 600,000. In the third quarter of 2015, the number 
of permanent workers in the Netherlands had fallen below 5 million, 39,000 fewer 
than a year before.
837 Verhulp (2014).
838 Interview with T. Wilthagen in the Dutch daily financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad dated 
28 April 2015.
839 Comments: NRC (2015), Stellinga (2015), Het Financieele Dagblad (2014), Nauta & De Dreu (2014).
840 Boot, Houweling & Keulaerds (2015), p. 114–116.
841 OECD (2013b), p. 72 and 106.
842 CBS (2015).
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There are more flexible workers; during the preceding year, their number increased 
by 87,000 to 1.9 million. The increase is mainly attributable to on-call workers and 
temporary workers, particularly young workers who work less than twelve hours per 
week. The supply of independent workers had likewise increased by 34,000, totalling 
1.4 million workers, nearly all self-employed and without personnel.
All in all, employment was on the rise, but that did not apply to permanent em-
ployment at all. Flex work, on the other hand, did increase, particularly for on-call 
workers and the self-employed. All this evolved in spite of the new act. At the time of 
writing, it is possibly too early to draw conclusions, but for now the results are remin-
iscent of the saying: ‘You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink’. All 
this has induced the OECD to conclude in its most recent report on the Netherlands 
that in order to encourage permanent employment it is essential to relax its dismissal 
law and reduce transition compensations.843
By now, the discussion on reviewing the legislation appears to be well under 
way.844 The main issues have been resolved during consultations with the social 
partners. Sectors that depend heavily on seasonal work can go back to three-month 
breaks in between contracts (instead of six months), to be provided for in CLA. More-
over,  alternative compensating measures are sought to counter the highly restrictive 
effect of the transition compensations on dismissal for financial reasons and for dis-
ability.845
This deal includes an agreement on raising minimum wages, in the sense that 
what applies for 23-year-olds will now come to apply for 22-year-olds, and following 
an assessment, may even be extended to 21-year-olds.846
In his letter about adjusting the minimum youth wages, the minister also indic-
ated that deductions from minimum wages for housing and health insurance costs 
will be possible under certain conditions.
9.4 ACT ON COMBATING SHAM ARRANGEMENTS
The discussion of the social partnership agreement made clear that combating sham 
arrangements and the ‘foreign agencies route’, or combating improper use of flexible 
843 OECD (2016b), p. 41
844 De Koning (2016). See also: Leupen (2016a).
845 Letter from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 21 April 2016, on solutions for 
labour market issues, ref. 2016-0000 107381, TK 2015/2016, 34351. See also ‘Uitkomsten overleg 
over ervaren knelpunten met betrekking tot de uitvoering van de Wet werk en zekerheid’ (‘results 
of the consultation on perceived issues relating to the execution of the work and security act’), 
18 April 2016 (Dutch Labour Foundation), TK 2015/2016, 16871.
846 Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, on revising the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holi-
day Allowance Act (WML), 21 April 2016, ref. 2016-0000 107397.
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labour relations, was at the top of the social partners’ agendas, and therefore featured 
prominently on the cabinet’s agenda.
Minister Asscher stated that the cabinet was receiving more and more signals 
from the inspectorates that some employers were making use of sham arrangements, 
thus evading laws and regulations. This is undesirable and results in unfair competi-
tion on labour and employment conditions. The worker is put at a disadvantage as it 
leads to displacement, underpaid work and even exploitation. It is detrimental to the 
employer since there is no longer a level playing field for entrepreneurship.
The cost cuts that the sham arrangements aim at erode the principle of ‘equal 
labour and employment conditions for equal work’. People are getting increasingly 
inventive at avoiding paying minimum wages. Moreover, people do not comply with 
CLA arrangements. False self-employment likewise occurs, where people formally 
work as independent workers, while they are really employees. Furthermore, people 
are found to be working without work permits.
The Second Rutte cabinet set out to tackle these malpractices, in the sense that 
equal labour and employment conditions apply to equal work. The policy was aimed 
both at legal arrangements with undesired effects and at illegal arrangements. The 
cabinet presented an action plan,847 comprising the following priorities:
 – tackling false self-employment,
 – combating minimum wage evasion,
 – opposing the evasion of social security contributions through, among other 
means, shell companies,
 – countering the evasion of CLAs,
 – fighting fictitious employment,
 – tackling migration constructions,
 – reaching international agreements.
New legislation has been developed for parts of the action plan, including:848
 – amending the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (WML) 
and the BW in respect of:
• clarification of the pay slip requirements, including expense specifications;
• improving the entrenchment of the right to and payment of minimum wages;
• obligation to pay minimum wages by giro;
847 Letter from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 11 April 2014, reference 2013 
0000044872, on combating sham arrangements.
848 Act dated van 4 June 2015 changing the minimum wage and minimum holiday allowance act, 
Book 7 BW and some other acts to improve compliance and enforcement of labour legislation in 
connection with combating sham arrangements by employers. Stb. 2015, 233
 Chapter 9: Complications
 409
• corrections of and deductions from minimum wages are no longer allowed 
as a matter of principle;
 – enabling publication of inspection data;
 – implementation of sequential liability for the wages owed to the worker;
 – improving compliance with and enforcement of CLAs;
 – improving public-private information exchange;
 – improving the enforceability of the Labour Act for Aliens (WAV).
The bill belongs in a broader framework of combating sham arrangements. The act’s 
name does not really fit its objective. After all, the act is mainly about supporting 
workers if the wages they are owed are not paid (in full). To this end, a sequential 
liability regulation is incorporated into the BW.
Figure 9.1 Sequential liability
The starting point is that all the links in the chain – which is created when  other enter-
prises are commissioned – become jointly responsible for the wages of the workers in 
that chain. If the worker does not receive the wages owed to him or her, he or she can 
consecutively make every link in the chain liable to pay the wages.
Sequential liability arises if a chain of enterprises carries out part of the job or 
the commission (including foreign enterprises), if commissioning or contracting 
agreements have been concluded and if the wages that are owed have not been paid 
(in full). In the first instance, the worker can hold both the employer and the direct 
commissioning client accountable to pay the wages owed. If the wages are not paid, 
the worker can go to court. If the judge finds for him/her, he/she can go back to the 
employer or commissioning client. If that is unsuccessful, the worker can hold the 
next link accountable. In the event that the employer or direct commissioning client 
cannot be found, have not registered in the Dutch Trade Register, are bankrupt or fail 
to pay, the worker can hold the next link accountable, as a matter of principle. The 
commissioning client can exculpate himself in court by proving he has made every 
effort to prevent liability.
There is an emergency procedure if no payment has been made after one year 
and in the event that the worker has been seriously underpaid during a period of six 
months (or for three months has been paid less than half the wages due, or less than 
70% of the minimum wages), in which cases the worker can hold the principal com-
missioning client directly accountable. Liability can be prevented by ensuring that:
Main
commissioning
client
Main contractor
(commissioning
the subcontractor)
Subcontractor
(commissioning
assignment,
is also hirer)
Temporary
employment
agency (assigning
or employing)
Temporary
agency worker
or employee
Part III A national legal framework on temporary agency work: the Dutch context 
410
 – the enterprise is registered in the Dutch Trade Register;
 – the enterprise has a certificate or a hallmark;
 – the price is set properly;
 – clear agreements are reached;
 – sufficient action is taken.
Article 7:692 BW, which regulates the hirer’s joint and several liability for payment of 
the minimum wage and indemnification for certified temporary employment agen-
cies, has been repealed, as a general sequential liability has now arisen for the wages 
that are owed. The act has become applicable as of 1 July 2015.
The temporary agency sector was concerned about the possible correction pro-
hibition that was to be incorporated into the WML. An ordinance relating to this 
was due on 1 January 2016. The sector foresaw negative side effects if they could no 
longer pay health insurance and housing costs directly out of the wages. They ex-
pected that fewer workers would be insured for health care and that housing quality 
would deteriorate. By the end of 2016 the WML was amended in that workers could 
authorise their employer in writing to pay for housing and health care costs out of 
their  wages.849
9.5 SELF-REGULATION EXIT?
During the course of 2013, the self-regulation of the temporary agency sector was 
called into question again. In this context, Minister Asscher conceded that he would 
reassess the system of self-regulation and said he aimed to review the reintroduction 
of the licensing system. This put the question ‘licence or certificate?’ back on the po-
litical agenda. The Minister stated:850
Self-regulation as such is not intended to tackle fraudulence, but does make a 
substantial contribution to doing so. Self-regulation aims at entrepreneurs who 
want to comply with laws and regulations. The objective of self-regulation is that 
businesses can distinguish themselves from other businesses by hallmarking. Self- 
regulation ensures that entrepreneurs who want to do the right thing can stand out 
in a positive way. Therefore, businesses do their best to comply with the norm. This 
has a preventive effect. And if businesses fail to meet the norm, there is an incentive 
to improve. This is the remedial effect of self-regulation, provided it is functioning 
properly.
849 https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2016-419.html.
850 Letter from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 12 May 2014 on tackling fraudu-
lent temporary employment agencies and self-regulation, ref. 2014–0000067565, p. 2.
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Self-regulation can also result in a coherent approach through intensive collaboration 
between the SNA (as the hallmark manager), SNCU (the ‘CLA police’) and the govern-
ment. This enhances the effect of public-private enforcement.
However, the minister held the view that the self-regulation was not sufficiently 
effective. He particularly based this view on study results from which it would be ap-
parent that in 2013, 17% of the temporary employment agencies that were inspected 
by the SZW Inspectorate, and 20% of the non-certified temporary employment agen-
cies did not comply with the obligations arising out of the WAV or WML.
What was awkward about these results is that they were not representative of 
the sector in general, but the minister concluded that the system showed deficiencies 
and that private hallmarking is no guarantee that all businesses will observe the law. 
Again, a licensing requirement was considered. This time, the following advantages 
were attributed to licensing:
 – the government can decide on the standards and can thus regulate the market 
more (for instance, by demanding a deposit, which erects market entry barriers);
 – the scope of the supervision is enhanced, since all businesses need to be licensed;
 – a licence can be revoked, denying access to the market.
Also, the following disadvantages were listed:
 – a loss of support in the sector, including the associated private efforts and fun-
ding;
 – thwarting the public-private cooperation that has been developed through the 
years, and the increase of the administrative burden;
 – a licensing scheme does not directly combat fraudulence either. The guarantees 
inherent in a licence are easily evaded (for instance, by using frontmen) and 
even within a licensing scheme a licensed temporary employment agency can 
break the law.
The minister concluded that both a public licensing scheme and private hallmarking 
raised barriers in the market, but neither can prevent fraudulence. Furthermore, he 
argued that, while the public-private cooperation is a valuable complement to tack-
ling fraudulence, he was not happy with the results of improvements made by the 
sector so far. ‘However, hallmarking is not yet distinctive enough. Too many certified 
agencies still break the law.’
Nonetheless, the minister was willing enough to give the sector a last chance. 
In consultation with employers and workers in the sector and with the SNA, he 
 developed a solid package of proposals for improvement. In the course of 2014/2015 
it should become clear whether these proposals would yield positive results. The 
minister stated that if no such results were evident within one year, he would opt for 
an  alternative system. What this system would consist of was not clear. In the letter 
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about this, he also communicated that in 2012 and 2013, the Inspectorate SZW, the 
Dutch Tax Authority, the UWV and the SNCU imposed more than 100 million euros 
worth of corrective measures on offenders in the temporary agency sector.
In consultation with the sector, six points for improvement were established, 
entailing 28 measures to improve compliance behaviour and tackle fraudulence more 
effectively. The six points for improvement were:
 – enhancing compliance with CLAs,
 – enhancing the inspectorates’ independence,
 – enhancing the quality of private inspections,
 – enhancing the intensity and focus of collaboration and enforcement,
 – enhancing the directing role of government,
 – continuing the tackling of fraudulence.
One year later, the majority of the measures had been implemented (see table 9.1).851,852
Through the implementation of the measures, the quality of the inspections and 
the  information exchange was improved and the independence was enhanced. At the 
time of writing, it was too early to establish the effect of some of the measures, which 
included the addition of nine CLA elements to the standard. The improved informa-
tion exchange between the Inspectorate SZW, the Dutch Tax Authority, the SNA and 
the SNCU brought about tremendous progress (see figure 9.2).
Figure 9.2 Information exchange matrix
851 Letter from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 8 July 2015 on the state of affairs 
in the temporary agency sector, ref. 2015–0000158742.
852 Annex to the letter referred to in the last note.
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Table 9.1 Summary table state of affairs (SoA) re improvement measures self-regulation
Sector SoA
1 Reinforcing the foreign standard.
2 Including nine cla elements in the standard. If as a result of this businesses fail to meet the 
standard, the sncu receives a signal.
3 If the nine cla elements do not have the desired effect, a hirer declaration requirement or ano-
ther supported option will be implemented in the standard, so that payment of cla wages can 
be monitored after all.
4 sna produces a survey of normal working hours of the most prevalent clas enforced by inspec-
torates.
5 sna becomes scheme manager through acceptance by Dutch Accreditation Council (RvA).
6 sna randomly checks the inspectorates’ reports.
7 Independence protocol at inspectorates, comprising all possible risks in the field of independ-
ence and associated control measures. The RvA monitors compliance.
8 Applying on-site observations in specific cases.
sna includes into regulations that on-site observations can be used.
9 Introducing risk driven spot checks by inspectorates during inspection.
10 Intensifying and extending the scope of data exchange sncu-sna.
11 sna includes more information on complaints procedure and conditions into regulations.
12 sna studies the feasibility of also registering the director of an enterprise.
13 Study of overall functioning sna.
14 sna studies the opportunities of differentiating between hiring out and contracting.
15 Every enterprise with nen certification has opened a G-account.
Joint measures
16 Reinforcing information exchange: legally regulating earlier information exchange and organising 
three expert meetings.
17 Developing an sna information exchange protocol with Inspectorate szw and Dutch Tax Author-
ity (also related to 22 and 24).
18 Conducting a study to analyse differences between certified and non-certified agencies.
Government measures
19 Introducing regular administrative meetings by szw and Ministry of Finance with sna and sector 
(once every three months).
20 Ministries szw and Finance attend meetings of the sna’s central body of experts (reference 
college) as listeners.
21 Continuing it amu in both 2014 and 2015.
22 More active enforcement by Inspectorate szw as a result of signals received.
23 Social partners have been asked for their views on the proposal to insert a one-page document 
in every cla containing, among other things, normal working hours.
24 Introducing periodic consultations with Inspectorate szw, Tax Authority, sna and sncu on 
exchanging signals (also related to 17 and 22).
25 If possible, introducing director disqualification legislation.
26 Improving enforcement of wml (incorporated in bill for Act on Combating Sham Arrangements).
27 Improving public-private cooperation and data exchange on cla enforcement (art. 10 avv).
28 Introduction civil sequential liability for wages (incorporated in bill for Act on Combating Sham 
Arrangements).
realised source: www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/inhoud/bewindspersonen/
being worked  on lodewijk-asscher/documenten/publicaties/2015/07/08/stand-
to be started up  van-zaken-verbetermaatregelen-zelfregulering-gecomprimeerd
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Moreover, a study was conducted on the distinctiveness of hallmarking. Exactly how 
distinctive it was could not be established on the basis of this study. The Inspector-
ate SZW established that out of a total of 598 certified and non-certified temporary 
employment agencies – compiled on the basis of risk selection, which always causes 
bias – 14% of the certified agencies had breached the Labour Act for Aliens (WAV), 
the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (WML) and the Waadi 
Act, while the non-certified agencies scored 22%, a significant difference.853
Furthermore, it was cautiously established that 5 breaches per billion-euro wage 
bill were observed among the certified agencies, compared with 27 breaches per bil-
lion-euro wage bill among the non-certified agencies. The researchers argue that 
these results must not be regarded as representative. All in all, the minister expected 
that the steps that have been taken during the preceding year and the steps that were 
yet to be started would enhance the quality of self-regulation.
An effective certificate provides bona fide entrepreneurs with a tool for distin-
guishing themselves and controlling risks. Particularly thanks to the addition of nine 
CLA elements, workers likewise have more to gain. The certificate can ensure that 
they receive what they are owed. That is why it is important that both employers and 
workers are represented in the SNA. The government also has an interest, since the 
certificate entails regular self-monitoring. As a result, the government can focus more 
on fraudulent, non-certified agencies. Public and private enforcement can ensure that 
legal loopholes are reduced or closed altogether. That is why the minister continues to 
champion adequately functioning self-regulation by means of a distinctive hallmark 
in combination with enforcement by government.
It is regrettable that the trade unions concerned, FNV and CNV Vakmensen, have 
since then ended their participation in the hallmark.854 The disputes about contract-
ing and placement of self-employed workers, which will be discussed further on in 
this chapter, have made these trade unions unwilling to cooperate. They feel that the 
product development of the temporary agency sector is moving into a direction they 
find undesirable. They no longer wish to support legitimisation of these forms via 
the SNA. Moreover, they feel that monitoring of the proper application of the CLA 
through so-called on-site observations and the supervision of foreign temporary em-
ployment agencies leaves much to be desired.
9.6 AMENDING THE POSTING OF WORKERS DIRECTIVE?
Tackling fraudulence by temporary employment agencies also requires a consid-
erable international agenda. To this end, the minister focuses on three fronts, i.e.: 
853 Visee et al. (2015). p. 10 and 15.
854 Letter from the Dutch trade unions CNV Vakmensen and FNV to SNA dated 12 February 2016.
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(1) amending the Posting of Workers Directive (2) implementing the Enforcement 
Direct ive and (3) improving compliance with and enforcement of the CLA.855
The government continues to promote the principle of equal pay for equal work 
in the same workplace both in the Netherlands and within the European Union. This 
was discussed in some detail in chapter 7. Ultimately, this relates to the amendment 
of the Posting of Workers Directive. Implementation of the Enforcement Directive 
yields tools to enforce the Posting of Workers Directive more adequately, for instance 
through data exchange, cross-border penalty collection and improved supervision of 
compliance with labour law.
However, cross-border work continues to be a complex issue. It concerns questions 
on social and fiscal matters and on social security. From a social perspective, the 
Posting of Workers Directive regulates that the key labour and employment condi-
tions of the country of employment apply. In principle, the tax legislation regulates 
that the country of employment also levies taxes, which has been arranged through 
bilateral agreements. Further, the EU coordination regulations in the field of social 
security (Regulation (EC) 883/2004 and Regulation (EC) 987/2009) regulate that, in 
principle, the social security law of the country of origin continues to apply for a 
maximum of two years.
Actually, in terms of percentage the social security premiums appear to diverge 
little between the countries. However, there are large differences between the tax 
 bases which have been determined by the local tax authorities. Many EU countries 
have tax facilities in place to encourage the export of labour or services, which may 
result in large cost differences. This applies even more if the cross-border work is 
carried out by self-employed workers. This does not necessarily constitute a breach 
in any formal sense. Add to this the fact that the Posting of Workers Directive does 
not provide the necessary clarity on all fronts either, and the issue becomes still more 
complex. Fraudulence exacerbates the problem even further. It remains to be seen 
whether amending the directive, as the Dutch SZW minister proposed, will provide 
a solution. Much can be achieved at a national level by incorporating the key provi-
sions into the CLAs in all the sectors, as is currently happening in the CLAs on the 
temporary agency and construction sectors in the Netherlands.
The differences between fiscal regulations in the EU continue to be the crux of 
the problem. And this is a field where the EU has no competences. The fact that 
a number of EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe have started a 
counter- campaign against amending the directive, as was discussed in chapter 7, can 
855 Letter from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 9 February 2015 concerning the 
third progress report combating sham arrangements, ref. 2015 0000022434.
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be seen as the writing on the wall. Amending the directive has a lot in common with 
tilting at windmills.
Still, self-regulation is not a tool for the prevention of either cross-border or 
 national fraudulence. At most it may contribute to tackling fraudulence and breaches 
of the law. Public enforcement of laws and regulations continues to be necessary. 
In this context, we must also realise that temporary agency work only amounts to 
10–11% of all cross-border postings.
A decade before, State Secretary Van Hoof announced that by 2006 he would in-
crease the number of inspectors engaged in dealing with labour fraud from 65  to 
180.856 The question is whether this number is still in force today. At a later date, 
Minister Kamp857 reported that 15% of his labour fraud capacity was focusing on 
temporary employment agencies, i.e. 27 inspectors. If we realise that there are cur-
rently 4000 certified temporary employment agencies and approximately 8000 non- 
certified temporary employment agencies in the Netherlands, and if we know that 
70 private inspectors are tasked with the 4000 certified agencies, the question arises 
as to whether the number of 27  inspectors is not a little too modest for adequate 
enforcement. If we were to depart from equal standards, private and public in terms 
of staffing, adequate enforcement at the non-certified agencies alone would require a 
capacity of 140 inspectors.
9.7 PAYROLLING
In the context of discussing the social partnership agreement, it became clear that the 
social partners had tabled payrolling. This raises the question as to what payrolling 
actually is, and how academics, social partners and politics interpret this phenom-
enon. Van Houte858 distinguishes five types of payrolling:
1. The payrolling bureau keeps the salary records for the commissioning client, 
who employs the worker.
2. The commissioning client attends to the recruitment and selection of new 
workers. Subsequently the worker is employed by the payrolling bureau and is 
seconded to the commissioning client for a specific period, under instructions 
given to the payrolling bureau. The intention is that the worker will eventually be 
employed directly by the commissioning client, or will be seconded elsewhere.
3. The commissioning client attends to the recruitment and selection of new 
 workers. Subsequently the worker is employed by the payrolling bureau and is 
856 Letter from the Secretary of State dated 15 June 2006, parliamentary year 2005–2006, 17050 no. 326
857 Letter from the Minister dated 14 March 2012, parliamentary year 2011–2012, 32680 no. 28
858 Van Houte (2011).
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seconded to the commissioning client on a permanent basis, under instructions 
given to the payrolling bureau.
4. The commissioning client decides to outsource (part of) his workers to a pay-
rolling bureau. The workers are employed by this bureau and seconded to the 
commissioning client, under instructions given to the payrolling bureau.
5. Workers or freelancers who do not (yet) qualify for a Declaration of Independ-
ent Contractor Status/Business profits (VAR/WUO), but who would like to be 
entrepreneurs in future, join a payrolling bureau. The worker obtains his or her 
own contracts and determines his or her own prices. The payrolling bureau 
posts the worker with the commissioning client, attends to the invoicing to the 
commissioning client and keeps the salary records.
Payrolling has seen an enormous rise in popularity over the past years. Between 2009 
and 2014, organisations’ familiarity with the phenomenon increased from 59% to 
90%. In that same period, the proportion of organisations making use of payrolling 
increased from 8% to 11%. The number of payroll workers grew from 145,000 in 2009 
to 191,000 in 2014. One third of these workers are working in government sectors.859
How can payrolling be interpreted? In the types 2, 3, 4 and 5 they can be qualified 
as a secondment agreement as defined in article 7:690, i.e.:
 – there is an employment agreement in the sense of article 7:690 BW;
 – the posting constitutes the employer’s business or professional practice;
 – the worker is placed at the disposal of the commissioning client;
 – the worker performs work under supervision and direction of the commission-
ing client;
 – the placement is carried out by virtue of an agreement for the provision of ser-
vices between the employer and the commissioning client.
Contrary to Van Houte, Hoogeveen860 and Zwemmer861 argue that payrolling does 
not involve an employment agreement, due to the lack of an allocative function be-
tween temporary employment agency and temporary agency worker.
While discussing the realisation of the legislation in the last chapter (p. 368), it 
became clear that the then minister envisioned a wide range of postings that should 
be included in the definition of the secondment agreement. He argued that it would 
concern ‘temporary employment agencies, labour pools and other organisations that, 
within the framework of their business or professional practice, temporarily post 
workers, of whatever ilk’. This view was apparently based on the assumption that all 
859 Winnubst, Vroonhof & Tom (2015).
860 Hoogeveen (2007).
861 Zwemmer (2012), p. 151 and p. 347.
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these types also involve a so-called allocation function. That means that the demand 
for and supply of temporary work were also matched through the posting. Since this 
allocation function is in place, the regime with the so-called agency clause (end of 
assignment equals end of contract) is justified.
Academic literature fails to see an allocation function with respect to payrolling, since 
only legal employer status is transferred. Van Houte finds this understandable where 
types 3 and 4 are concerned, but challenges types 2 and 5, where the payrolling pro-
vider also fulfils an allocation function. She argues that this function thus coincides 
with the commissioning client’s hiring motive and/or the worker’s supply motive.
Verburg862 holds the view that article 7:690 BW actually does apply to payrolling. 
He considers intra-corporate transfers, which are precluded from using the agency 
clause in article 7:690, par. 6, as a type of payrolling, and deduces that payrolling also 
comes within the scope of article 7:690 BW.
Bevers863 looks at jurisdiction to find indications that a secondment agreement 
between a temporary employment agency and a temporary agency worker cannot be 
converted without further ado into an employment agreement between a temporary 
agency worker and a hirer.864 On the other hand, Bevers does not take this to mean that 
in tripartite relationships, a temporary agency contract always relates to an employment 
agreement between an employment agency and temporary agency worker. She refers to 
the lower courts where an employment relationship between a worker and a hirer was 
taken to exist based on the authority of the employer and/or the lack of an allocation 
function.
Here then, jurisprudence sides with Zwemmer and Hoogeveen. According to 
Verburg they take the view that article 7:690 BW does not apply, and that in that case, 
through the jurisprudence on the qualification of the relationship (the Groen/Schroe-
vers judgment865), an employment agreement will be taken to exist between a hirer 
and a worker. He questions this theory. On the basis of the jurisdiction, he  argues 
that it is equally ‘decisive whether parties have mutually committed themselves’. He 
upholds: ‘that if the hirer does not pay the worker (the payroll services bureau pays 
him) and explains correctly and transparently what the contractual relations entail, 
the worker will find it very difficult to successfully argue that there is an employment 
relationship with the hirer’.866
862 Verburg (2013).
863 Bevers (2015).
864 ABN AMRO/Malhi, HR 5 April 2002 , JAR 2002, 1100.
865 See Groen/Schoevers judgment (HR 14 November 1997, NJ 1998, 149).
866 STAR (2012).
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In 2006, the ABU and the trade unions FNV, CNV and Unie concluded a payroll CLA. 
This CLA provided that eight fixed-term contracts could be concluded in a three-year 
period. The remuneration was largely consistent with that for the employees at the 
user enterprise. Workers became eligible for a pension after two months, and there 
was a dismissal compensation of three to six months upon closing down for business 
reasons. By the end of 2011, the trade unions withdrew their cooperation, since a pay-
roll construction would result in an unacceptable dichotomy in the labour market.
In 2011, the minister asked the Dutch Labour Foundation for advice. Employers 
vigorously defended payrolling; workers wanted legislation that fitted in with Zwem-
mer and Hoogeveen’s views. Particularly the allocation requirement should be added 
to the definition of article 7:690 BW.
It was arranged in the social partnership agreement to amend the special dis-
missal regime for payrolling, which has since taken place. Moreover, a further advice 
by the Dutch Labour Foundation was due on tripartite relationships in general. In the 
summer of 2015, this Foundation reported to the minister that the advice would not 
be forthcoming due to the complexity of the subject matter.867
The minister then undertook to prepare legislation, considering the Hamer 
 motion asking for measures to combat payrolling, which has been adopted by a par-
liamentary majority. The motion was formulated as follows:
Motion by the member of Dutch Parliament Hamer868
Proposed on 13 February 2014
The Lower House, having heard the deliberations,
considering that the social partners have agreed in the social partnership agree-
ment that the use of payroll constructions to evade labour and employment condi-
tions must be prevented;
considering that in the Work and Security Act the dismissal rules that  currently 
 apply to payrolling are already being amended in such a way that the payroll 
 worker who is working for the hirer receives the same kind of protection as the 
hirer’s own employees;
requests that the government ensures equal treatment relating to the labour and em-
ployment conditions between payroll workers working for the hirer and the  hirer’s 
own employees,
and proceeds to the regular order of the day.
Hamer
867 Letter from the Dutch Labour Foundation to the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
 regarding ‘tripartite relationships’ dated 29 June 2015, http://www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/
Nota/2010_2019/2015/20150629-driehoeksrelaties.ashx.
868 Hamer motion, TK 2013–2014, 33818, no. 43.
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It is a pity that the trade unions have ended their cooperation on the payroll CLA. 
This CLA could have been a pilot for the further regulation of tripartite and bipartite 
contracting. It is likewise a pity that the general employers’ association AWVN  stated 
in its Arbeidsvoorwaardennota 2016 (‘memorandum on labour and employment con-
ditions 2016’) that arranging minimum rates of pay in CLAs for the self-employed is 
undesirable, since this would be in breach of the competition regulations.869 A re-
markable statement, since article 1, par. 2 of the Act on Collective Agreements en-
ables arranging labour and employment conditions for the benefit of the agreement 
to provide services and even contracting, and since the CLA for architects bureaus 
has carried out pioneering work in this respect.870
Reviewing the discussion on payrolling, it seems to me that we are dealing with a type 
of manpower provision that has also been regulated in Convention 181. In his study, 
Ricca pointed out seventeen forms of private mediation, including ‘contract labour 
agencies’ and ‘staff leasing agencies’. In ILO terms, we are dealing with ‘labour-only 
contracting’ and it can be deduced from the history surrounding the ‘contract labour’ 
discussion that this is largely synonymous with temporary agency work.
When the Dutch Parliament discussed the ‘flex legislation’, and particularly 
the amendments to the Dutch Civil Code, it also adopted a broad definition of the 
second ment agreement. As it happened, the minister stated that the legislation per-
tains to the agency employment relationship and ‘to all other tripartite relationships 
where the employer places the worker at the disposal of a third party within the 
framework of his business or professional practice, in order to perform work under 
supervision and direction of that third party’.
The discussion attempts to decrease the playing field of temporary agency work 
through the necessary element of the ‘labour allocation’. But who is to say that pay-
rolling does not involve fine-tuning of demand and supply?
A similar question might be asked in respect of contracting or, in ILO terms, job 
contracting, of which we know that the ILO could not attain a satisfactory regulation. 
Nor has this been regulated in Dutch law. The same applies to the phenomenon of 
the self-employed worker. That is why the following paragraphs will discuss these 
phenomena further: (job) contracting and self-employment.
9.8 CONTRACTING
In the Netherlands, questions have by now been raised about both payrolling and 
contracting. Interestingly – as became clear in chapter 3 – contracting also demanded 
869 Leupen (2016a).
870 CLA on architectural firms, 1 March 2015 to 28 February 2017, Chapter II A. See also: Dekkers (2016).
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quite some attention within the ILO in the 1990s. Contracting means that workers 
who are employed by the contracting agency in the framework of a construction or 
assignment agreement are being placed with a third party, i.e. the commissioning 
client, to carry out work under the supervision of the contracting agency. Forms of 
hiring out, payrolling and contracting really are all types of labour that meet the need 
for outsourcing. By now, this need has resulted in 15–33% of all businesses in the EU 
28 making use of outsourcing (see figure 9.4).871
Many years ago, Goldschmeding872 argued that the need of outsourcing had 
arisen because management had become the scarcest production factor in the eco-
nomy. In order to keep management controllable and transparent in an increasingly 
complex world, focusing on the core process is needed, which leads to giving up extra 
and side tasks, i.e. leaving activities that are not part of the core process to others, who 
can subsequently make them their core processes.
Focusing on the core process can, in time, lead to large businesses with market 
power and economies of scale, while also enhancing flexibility. The large business 
develops into a ‘think tank’ encircled by large numbers of smaller businesses. Exam-
ples included project offices, cleaning companies, advertising agencies, organisation 
agencies and temporary employment agencies. All these forms of outsourcing bring 
supply of and demand for work together. Goldschmeding imagined this as follows:
Figure 9.3 Outsourcing and supply and demand 873
The allocative factor was recognised at an early stage, albeit that it did not restrict 
itself to temporary agency work, as seems to have become all but the prevailing doc-
trine by now.
871 Drahokoupil (2015).
872 Goldschmeding (1977), p. 58.
873 Goldschmeding (1977), p. 59.
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ECS 2013, own calculation, weighted by establishment; N: 23,326; χ2P = 0,0000; countries in ascending order of 
percentages; excluding public service cases.
Figure 9.4 Outsourcing of production of goods or services in the EU-28.874 Percentages of 
companies that outsourced the production of goods and services
874 Drahokoupil (2015), p. 31.
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In the early 1990s, the realisation of Convention 181 was preceded by a study by Sergio 
Ricca,875 who analysed how the allocation process in the labour market worked in 
relation to the by then outdated Convention 96. He pointed out seventeen typologies 
that no longer fitted the then definition of work placement, ultimately culminating in 
the new Convention 181. The typologies included contract labour agencies and staff 
leasing agencies. Apparently payrolling and contracting were already in sight. The 
Convention described temporary agency work as ‘services consisting of employing 
workers with a view to making them available to a third party, who may be a natural 
or legal person (referred to below as a “user enterprise”) which assigns their tasks and 
supervises the execution of these tasks’.
In Dutch law, this tripartite relationship of temporary employment agency, tem-
porary agency worker and user enterprise was given further substance in the Dutch 
Civil Code and the Waadi Act. The crux is that the ‘user company’ supervises the 
work. And that essential element is what distinguishes contracting from temporary 
agency work. Contracting likewise involves a tripartite relationship, i.e. contracting 
party, worker and commissioning client. Here, however, the work is supervised by 
the contracting party rather than by the commissioning client. It may relate to a con-
struction agreement as regulated in article 7:750 BW or an assignment agreement, as 
regulated in 7:400 BW.
Contracting mainly occurs in the construction sector, but it may comprise more, 
such as laundering or dry-cleaning clothes and repairing utensils. Essentially, it con-
cerns activities consisting of producing and/or processing material objects. The as-
signment agreement is more appropriate for work of a mental or intellectual nature.
Forms of contracting have increasingly become a threat to trade unions.876 As far 
as cleaning, security and catering are concerned, the outsourcing of which has been 
regulated in the respective CLAs, contracting is still acceptable. However, according 
to FNV, more and more sham arrangements are made, resulting in inadequate wages 
and deviation from other labour and employment conditions.
Meanwhile, jurisdiction has occupied itself with the phenomenon. In its judg-
ment of 21 October 2012877 the ’s-Hertogenbosch court saw through a contracting 
agreement and judged that it really was a secondment agreement. Quatro, as the 
contracting agency, had concluded a construction agreement for the harvesting of 
mushrooms with World Champ as the commissioning client, who also supplied the 
supervisor. The relationships were not very clear. In the event, Quatro was ordered to 
pay nearly 3,500 euros. The case was brought to court by the SNCU, which looked on 
this arrangement as disguised temporary agency work.
875 ILC (1994).
876 FNV (2015).
877 See ’s-Hertogenbosch court, 4 March 2008, JAR 2008/164.
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In another case – the Sieraflor case – production work, the machine-based production 
of flower bouquets for clients, was increasingly outsourced to another party i.e.  Ruigrok 
Productie. Sieraflor applied for a dismissal permit at the UWV for its permanent em-
ployees, who had first carried out this work. The UWV refused to comply. Even though 
the policy rules provide that, in principle, it is possible to make an employee redun-
dant because of outsourcing, they also provide that requests that are only in tended 
for the replacement of permanent employees by flexible workers cannot be granted. 
Interestingly, the regional court in the case at issue did allow the termination of the 
employment contracts. While the court realised that outsourcing can seriously erode 
workers’ rights, termination was decided on since it deemed the freedom to resort to 
outsourcing more important than employee protection.878
In response to publicity about the FNV report on contracting, the minister stated:
There are no objections to outsourcing work as such. In principle, an employer is 
free to organise his enterprise as he sees fit and to have certain activities carried out 
by other, specialised businesses, if this should be desirable or necessary for effective 
business operations.
But he also stated that:
Questions can however be raised about outsourcing an enterprise’s core activities 
(other than for the sake of specialisation). After all, why should an entrepreneur 
wish to outsource activities that are part of his core business other than to cut 
staffing costs?
He reached the following conclusion:
Contracting has both legal and illegitimate forms. The new dismissal law is an ef-
fective tool to combat illegitimate outsourcing of activities that were first carried 
out on the employer’s premises. The employer in question will not be granted per-
mission to dismiss his own employees if outsourcing does not serve the purposes 
of effective business operations and is only meant to replace permanent employees 
by flexible or cheaper workers.
Furthermore the CLA on temporary agency work will need to be enforced with the 
help of the SNCU.879
878 ECLI: NL: RBDHA: 2013: B 27313.
879 Letter from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, dated 17 April 2015 on contracting, ref. 
2015-0000085824.
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On the basis of law and jurisdiction, Zwemmer880 establishes a legally tenable form of 
contracting, provided it meets the following elements and characteristics:
 – the contracting agency has taken over entire production or work processes from 
the commissioning client;
 – the processes or divisions that have been taken over can be effectively demarc-
ated from the rest of the commissioning client’s enterprise;
 – the contracting agency is specialised in providing services in the relevant sec-
tor(s);
 – the contracting agency has entered into a result commitment with the commis-
sioning client as regards the products, jobs, services or other measurable results 
to be delivered, but has not committed itself to manpower provision;
 – the commissioning client does not pay per working hour; instead, he pays a pre-
viously agreed rate per product, work or service provided;
 – the contracting agency makes use of permanent teams of workers;
 – the teams deployed by the contracting agency are largely autonomous and the 
tasks in the workplace are allocated by a supervisor who is also employed by the 
contracting agency;
 – the contracting agency is (financially) accountable for planning, office duties, 
management and supervision and faces or takes on the employer’s risks;
 – the teams deployed by the contracting agency make use of that agency’s means 
of production.
He then arrives at the following legal definition:
In contracting, one party, the contracting agency, commits to carrying out (part 
of) a work process on the premises of another party, the commissioning client. 
This entails a result commitment on the part of the contracting agency, while the 
commissioning client commits to paying a price (per piece) that has been agreed 
on by both parties to the contracting agency. To fulfil the agreement, the contract-
ing agency makes use of its own means of production and the contracting agency 
deploys workers who are outsourced to the commission client as a group that is 
autonomous to a certain extent, under its own management and supervision.
The question is whether the aspect of the autonomous teams can be sustained. After 
all, contracting can also occur if single workers are deployed, often in expert roles.
In an opinion on contracting881 Bijpost indicates that a lack of transparency in 
contracting can have considerable consequences. The contracting workers can cost 
880 Zwemmer (2015), p. 18.
881 Bijpost (2015).
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less if no CLA applies: neither the sectoral CLA, nor – in the Netherlands – the ABU 
CLA. Employers who do apply these CLAs are at a competitive disadvantage. Workers 
have worse labour and employment conditions and are in a position of legal uncer-
tainty. The government is at a disadvantage as it receives lower social benefit contri-
butions and taxes.
It is argued that contracting can best be combated by requiring observance of 
article 8 Waadi Act and of the applicable CLA. Also, the scope of the provisions of 
the CLA must be extended to include contracting, and it must be declared generally 
binding. Furthermore, agreements can be made as to the conditions for outsourcing, 
even including agreements not to opt for outsourcing. It is recommended that a pro-
vision be included in the Act on Combating Sham Arrangements prescribing that 
the employment conditions applicable at the user enterprise also apply to contracting 
workers.
Interestingly, this proposal fits in with the result of the NUON case, which was 
referred to the Dutch NCP by the Dutch trade union FNV Eemshaven. The case con-
cerned an alleged breach of the OECD guidelines by NUON Energy N. V. The parties 
involved eventually agreed that NUON would implement changes in its future con-
tracts with its main contractors in order to promote compliance with arrangements 
throughout the entire chain of suppliers. More specifically this means that NUON 
obligates its main contractors to impose on their suppliers and subcontractors the 
same requirements regarding labour and employment conditions, rates of pay and 
compliance with national and European legislation that are applicable to itself. Thus, 
the main contractor obligates its subcontractors to commit contractually to the law 
and regulations such as the Dutch Civil Code, the Act on Collective Agreements, the 
Act governing the universal applicability or inapplicability of collective agreements 
(AVV), the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act (WML) and the 
applicable EU laws and regulations. The main contractor is to check whether the sub-
contractors and suppliers comply with the obligations by means of audits.882
The social partnership agreement stated:
Social partners hold the view that issues increasingly arise with regard to outsourc-
ing work through contracting and outsourcing or detachment of employership (by 
means of payrolling arrangements or onlending) that urgently require a solution.
It must be prevented that these constructions are mainly used to evade or avoid 
complying with legal regulations and labour and employment conditions, whether 
arranged by CLA or not.
882 NCP (2015).
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The Dutch Labour Foundation was to issue an advice on this matter before October 
2013, but, as mentioned before, responded in November 2013 to the minister that it 
had not yet reached a decision and would therefore not issue an advice.883
9.9 SELF-EMPLOYED WORKERS
In the context of the complications of the regulatory framework on temporary  agency 
work in the Netherlands it is also necessary to examine the phenomenon of the 
self-employed worker. This type of flexible labour has grown rapidly, and increas-
ingly dominates the discussion on flexible labour. Moreover, self-employed workers 
often ask for the assistance of temporary employment agencies in the acquisition of 
jobs. In that case, the temporary employment agency can act as a mediator, follow-
ing which the self-employed worker will either work for the commissioning client 
directly on the basis of a service provision agreement (art. 7:400 BW), or will con-
clude this agreement with the temporary employment agency, which will then assign 
the self- employed worker to the commissioning client. In that case, no secondment 
agreement in the sense of article 4:690 BW will be concluded, since the ‘supervision 
and direction of the third party’ will be lacking. After all, the self-employed worker 
is independent and until recently could prove this by submitting a so-called VAR, 
a statement of independent  contractor status, which was issued by the Dutch Tax 
Authority. The practice of issuing VAR statements was terminated as of 1 May 2016.
Steps have been taken to replace this system of VAR statements with a new 
scheme, to which end the Exemption from Payroll Tax Withholding (Implementa-
tion) Act, was adopted.884
Self-employment has soared in the Netherlands. Between 2003 and 2015, the 
number of self-employed workers grew from 634,000 to 1,034,000, i.e. by 63%.885 The 
increase in the Netherlands has been striking in comparison with other countries.
As a result, the Dutch cabinet established an administrative working group to fur-
ther analyse this phenomenon. The IBO report886 was published after the summer of 
2015 and yielded the following conclusions. Many self-employed workers indicated 
that they chose for the freedom and independence that entrepreneurship offers them. 
The commissioning client and customers indicated that they opted for flexibility and 
883 Letter from the Dutch Labour Foundation to the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment re-
garding ‘tripartite relationships’ dated 29 June 2015.
884 Act dated 3 February 2016 amending several acts on taxation to abolish the VAR Declaration (Em-
ployment Relationships Deregulation Act). Stb. 2016 (45).
885 Flexbarometer, an initiative by TNO, ABU and FNV Flex.
886 Dutch Ministry of Finance (2015), submitted to Dutch Parliament on 2 October 2015.
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specialist knowledge. A small proportion became self-employed, but would have pre-
ferred to have been employed.
The self-employed are a heterogeneous group, and their incomes, reserves and 
the extent to which they are insured varies widely. The range is wider than is the case 
with employees. The growth of the number of self-employed workers in the Nether-
lands is partly due to technological, sociocultural and demographic developments. 
However, it is plausible that the rapid growth in their numbers as compared with 
other countries can also be explained by institutional factors.
In the Netherlands, the self-employed are treated very differently from em-
ployees in terms of labour law and taxes. A comparison between the employee, the 
self-employed worker (an entrepreneur subject to income tax) and the director and 
major shareholder (DGA) in terms of net disposable income with equal gross wage 
costs/profits makes clear that, on the basis of minimum wages, the self-employed 
worker ends up with much higher net earnings, i.e. 87%, compared with the em-
ployee (72%) and the DGA (69%).
Figure 9.5  Net disposable income in the situation of equal gross wage costs/profits in-
cluding and excluding contributions towards pension, illness, disability and 
underutilisation.
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The self-employed worker with an average income also takes home more (66%) than 
the employee (54%) or the DGA (53%). The self-employed worker who earns twice the 
average income has 55% left, the employee 46% and the DGA 48%.
Together with other flexible workers, the self-employed ensure corporate ad-
aptability in the economy. They play a modest innovatory role. Thus, the positive ex-
ternal effects of the increase in the number of the self-employed are limited. New jobs 
are probably being generated, partly because their operating costs are lower. There 
are no indications that the rise in the number of the self-employed leads to a worse 
average worker risk profile or to an increased use of social assistance, and thus to a 
decreasing financial basis for the social security system. It can put pressure on the 
social basis for the system; a large difference in the burden of taxes and social security 
contributions can lead to unfair competition and to feelings of injustice. As indicated 
above, the positive external effects of the rise in the number of self-employed workers 
are limited. However, it results in considerably lower tax- and premium-based rev-
enues and in higher costs of (fiscal) allowances. On balance, the rise in the number 
of self-employed workers probably has a negative effect on government finances, ac-
cording to the IBO report.
This report then establishes that the boundaries between self-employment and 
employment are fuzzy and that the qualifications have major legal consequences, 
which renders entering into sham arangements attractive.
The current policy creates distinctions in the extent of protection between the 
self-employed and employees. It would thus be better to gear policy towards the de-
sired degree of solidarity and towards protection of the various groups of workers.
The reporters state that in this context the future policy should not be directed 
so much at the institutional form in which people work, but rather at the needs of 
the various groups of workers. That is to say: less policy aimed at the employee versus 
self-employed worker axis, and more policy aimed at workers differentiating along 
the dependence-self-reliance axis. This can be achieved by focusing policy more on 
the workers.887 888
887 Hofs (2016).
888 Dutch Ministry of Finance (2015), p. XIV.
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Figure 9.6 From distinguishing 
between self-employed worker and 
 employee to distinguishing between 
self- reliant and dependent 889
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Currently, the fiscal entrepreneur facilities do not all contribute effectively to the ob-
jectives that the instruments aim for (such as innovation and creating employment). 
That is why it is desirable to bring the fiscal systems for entrepreneurs (entrepreneurs 
subject to income tax and DGAs) and employees closer together.
Remarkably, the report that was completed on 12 April 2015, remained in a  drawer 
until October 2015, when it was published. In the meantime, the IMF looks upon the 
phenomenon of the self-employed as one of the threatening weaknesses of the Dutch 
economy. While it does provide flexibility, it also erodes the financial support-base.889 
The cabinet stated:
In the IBO report, it is observed that a large difference exists between the insti-
tutional and fiscal treatment of employees and that of the self-employed. Firstly, 
this contributes to people working independently at the lower end of the market, 
not because they really want to, but because they have no choice. That is why the 
cabinet is taking measures to combat sham arrangements and to make hiring low- 
income workers cheaper. Furthermore, the self-employed have more freedom and 
responsibility to make their own choices regarding their desired degree of protec-
tion than do employees.
The cabinet is willing to support these self-employed workers, enabling them to take 
on the corresponding responsibilities. Moreover, the cabinet has taken measures to 
limit the costs of the employment contract and continues to be alert on the risks 
of hiring workers that employers may experience. Thus, this discussion is not con-
cluded. The IBO report describes some possible solutions, justifiably noting that the 
selection of measures, their precise form and their extent are dependent on political 
and social preferences.
To arrive at a sustainable and future-proof solution with a broad support-base, it is 
necessary to continue raising these social and political issues.890
This discussion had already acquired some form by the AWVN manifesto that trans-
lates as ‘a responsible path to growth’,891 advocating, among other things, a uniform 
basic scheme for social security for all workers, which provides benefits in the event 
of unemployment, illness and disability, and a uniform mandatory basic pension 
scheme for all workers over and above the Dutch state pension (AOW).
889 De Weerd (2015).
890 Covering letter government’s response to IBO report dated 2 October 2015.
891 AWVN (2014), p. 5
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FNV leader Heerts892 fundamentally rejected the report, as he believed it would result 
in the erosion of the Dutch social security system. Van der Heijden893 stated:
The fundamental values for labour law and social security are socioeconomic se-
curity, personal responsibility and solidarity. These values have been eroded to 
some extent. That is why we must study the new values for the 21st century.
Lastly, he stated that a wide range of optional variables could be conceived in respect 
of social security. ‘Just as long as something is happening. Because the undermining 
of legal protection is a fact.’894
In the long run, it is all about political choices. The Dutch liberal party VVD 
cherishes the self-employed worker. Zijlstra stated:895
As a liberal, I admire someone who starts work at his own risk and account. Our 
prosperity is based on such entrepreneurship.
Referring to the by now 35% of the workers being self-employed or having flexible 
contracts, Minister Asscher stated:896
It is a large group that does not equally profit from the increasing prosperity. So 
many people are living in increasing fear for their jobs. They feel like a replaceable 
cog in the machine of the global economy. Unfortunately, their fears are only too 
frequently confirmed (…) In our country, the insecurity resulting from flexible 
labour is a bigger threat to the middle classes.
The words clearly represent two opposing outlooks, with a solution still being a long 
way off. In the meantime, the the Dutch political party CDA holds the view that all 
workers, including the self-employed, must have sickness insurance. Minister  Asscher 
requested the SER to issue a recommendation about this.897
For now, the VAR statement has been abolished and new legislation (the new 
Employment Relationships Deregulation Act) is on the agenda.898 This act, which has 
892 Interview with FNV chairman T. Heerts in the Dutch financial daily newspaper Het Financieele 
Dagblad dated 9 Jime 2015.
893 Interview with P. F. van der Heijden in NRC dated 2 October 2014. See also: Dekker et al. (2012).
894 Hofs (2016).
895 Text Halbe Zijlstra, general debate, www.vvd.nl ‘algemene beschouwingen’, p. 6
896 Asscher (2015).
897 Herdersche (2015); see also: Buma & Heerma (2015).
898 Employment Relationships Deregulation Act, EK 2015–2016, 34.036.
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by now been adopted by Dutch Parliament, aims to clarify the distinction  between 
real and false self-employment. Bureaucratic overload and lack of clarity are feared.899
9.10 DUTCH FIGURES
In the meantime, it can be observed that the issue of temporary agency work has been 
placed in a much wider context. Temporary agency work is only one of many flexible 
forms of work. We have seen previously that, parallel to the international develop-
ments where a discussion arose on contracting, precarious work and non-standard 
forms of employment (NSFE), a similar discussion is ongoing in the Netherlands 
along the lines of payrolling, contracting and self-employment. It is important to 
have a good insight in the extent of these forms of flexible labour and the growth 
trends that are taking place in the Netherlands.
On the basis of the so-called ‘flexbarometer’,900 which the TNO developed  using 
its own data and data from Statistics Netherlands, in collaboration with ABU and 
FNV Flex, the following can be established. From 2003 to 2015 (fourth quarter) the 
labour market containing both permanent employees and flexible workers grew 
from 7,783,000 to 8,294,000 workers, i.e. an increase of 511,000 (7%). In this period, 
the number of permanent employees decreased by 598,000. By the end of 2015, the 
number of permanent employees in the Netherlands approximated almost 5 million. 
From 2003 onward, however, the numbers employed in flexible labour increased 
from 1,171,000 2003 to 1,896,000 workers, i.e. by 725,000 (+62%).
This means that the flexible layer has grown between 2003 and 2015 from 15% to 
23% of the workers. If we add the self-employed, whose numbers increased by 66% 
from 634,000 to 1,022,000 and whose market share thus grew from 8% to 12% of the 
working population, flexible labour now accounts for 35% of the working population 
of the Netherlands.
Table 9.2  Increase permanent/flexible employment 2003–2015 4th quarter (× 1000) in 
the Netherlands
2003 2015 Increase in%
Permanent 5,612 5,014 –11%
Flexible 1,171 1,896 +62%
Self-employed, no personnel   634 1,022 +61%
Self-employed with personnel   366   362 –1%
7,783 8,294 +7%
899 Leupen (2016c).
900 Flexbarometer, initiated by TNO that publishes periodically on the basis of its own and Statistics 
Netherlands’ data, in collaboration with ABU and FNV Flex.
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Table 9.3 Volume in % working population
2003 2015
Permanent 72% 61%
Flexible 15% 23%
Self-employed, no personnel  8% 12%
Self-employed with personnel  5%  4%
TNO foresees a further growth of flexible labour from 23% now to 30% in 2020.901 
Looking at the development of flexible labour as such, it can be established that of 
all flexible labour, on-call/substitute work has grown the most proportionately, i.e. 
by 120%. Temporary agency work lagged, growing by a mere 32%. This resulted in an 
increased market share of on-call/substitute work, also at the expense of temporary 
agency work, which saw its market share decrease from 16% to 13%.
A UWV prognosis indicated that temporary agency work could rally in 2016. 
It foresaw a growth of employment (taking shrinkage into account) by 96,000 
jobs, 65,000 of which being attributed to temporary agency work and 33,000 to the 
self-employed.902
Table 9.4 Increase in flexible employment 2003–2015 4th quarter (× 1,000)
2003 2015 Increase in%
temporary/prospect of permanent 306 426 + 40%
temporary > 1 year 90 163 + 81%
temporary < 1 year 153 163 + 7%
on-call/substitute worker 255 560 +120%
temporary agency worker 182 240 + 32%
permanent/hours unspecified 67 126 + 88%
temporary/hours unspecified   118   218 + 85%
1,171 1,896 + 62%
Table 9.5 Volume in % flexible labour
2003 2015 
4th quarter
temporary/prospect of permanent 26% 22%
temporary > 1 year 8% 9%
temporary < 1 year 13% 9%
on-call/substitute worker 22% 30%
temporary agency worker 16% 13%
permanent/hours unspecified 6% 7%
temporary/hours unspecified 10% 11%
901 TNO study among 900 enterprises commissioned by the ABU. See Flexmarkt (2014).
902 UWV (2016), p. 10.
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The increasing flexibilisation of the Dutch labour market inspired an observation 
by the OECD903 that in the period 2007–2013 the job insecurity has substantially in-
creased. The Netherlands ranks among the top three countries, together with Spain 
and Greece, where job insecurity increased the most.
However, if the income insecurity is factored in, the Netherlands is the eleventh 
most insecure country, in between Belgium and Germany (figure 9.7). 904
903 OECD (2016a), p. 4.
904 OECD (2016a), p. 4.
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The OECD also studies earnings quality, i.e.: the level and distribution of income. In 
this respect, the Netherlands comes first (figure 9.8).905
Figure 9.8  Earnings quality (PPP-adjusted gross hourly earnings in USD, 2013 or the 
latest year available)906
905 OECD (2016a), p. 2.
906 OECD (2016a), p. 2.
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All in all, the number of permanent employment contracts has been reduced signific-
antly, and flexible work has grown considerably. Temporary agency work has not 
kept pace with the growth of flexible work. The numbers of temporary contracts, 
 on-call/substitute workers and self-employed workers grew significantly faster. It is 
only  during the past few years that temporary agency work appears to be catching up 
to other forms of flexible work.
9.11 A COMPARISON WITH CONVENTION 181
The development and complications of the regulatory framework on temporary 
agency work in the Netherlands have been outlined above. But what does this out-
line tell us about the question whether Convention 181 is (still) satisfactory from the 
Dutch point of view? To answer this question, we shall first need to test the elements 
of Convention 181 to Dutch legislation. It becomes clear that the core issues of Con-
vention 181, i.e. ‘non-discrimination’, ‘freedom of association and the right to bargain 
collectively’, ‘forced labour’ and ‘child labour’, have all found their place in Dutch law. 
The Dutch Constitution (art.  1) and the AWGB (General Act on Equal Treatment) 
safeguard non-discrimination, and article 3, par. 3, Waadi Act likewise pays attention 
to this. The freedom of association is entrenched in the general associations law of 
Book 2 BW and the rules for the CLA process are laid down in the Dutch Act on 
Collective Agreements. Forced labour is prevented because article 19 of the Dutch 
Constitution provides that the right of every Dutch national to a free choice of work 
shall be recognised, without prejudice to the restrictions laid down by or pursuant to 
Act of Parliament.
Child labour has been regulated in the Dutch Working Hours Act, which in-
cludes a ban on work being carried out by persons under the age of 16. There are 
exceptions for non-industrial work carried out by children aged 13 years old and over 
and for paper rounds by children aged 15.
Employee protection in respect of working hours is provided for in the Working 
Hours Act. The labour and employment conditions have been extended, particularly 
in the two Dutch CLAs on temporary agency work.
The wages have been provided for in the Dutch Minimum Wage and Minimum Holi-
day Allowance Act (WML) prescribing the minimum rates of pay, and article 8 Waadi 
Act, prescribing that the wages applying at the user enterprise must be paid, unless a 
CLA provides otherwise. Both Dutch CLAs on temporary agency work include pro-
visions on wages that now in essence follow this ‘hirer standard’. Apart from that, the 
ABU CLA has its own wage paragraph that may be used for specific groups of workers. 
Social security is provided for in various Dutch acts: WW, ZW, WIA and WAO and in 
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the CLAs on temporary agency work, regulating complements to the obligation to 
continue payment of wages in case of illness.
Occupational safety and health have been provided for in the Dutch Working 
Conditions Act and in article  11 Waadi Act, which includes an obligation for the 
temporary employment agency to provide information on the required professional 
qualifications and the description referred to in article 5, par. 5, of the Working Con-
ditions Act. The subject of training has been comprehensively provided for in the 
CLAs on temporary agency work (in art. 63 ABU CLA and in art. 30 NBBU CLA).
Insolvency has been provided for in the Netherlands by the WW, providing bene-
fit entitlements in the event that the temporary employment agency is unable to pay 
wages due to bankruptcy. And by now, the sequential liability of the Dutch Work and 
Security Act provides additional safeguards.
The legal status has by now been explicitly entrenched in the registration re-
quirement incorporated in article 7a Waadi Act. Article 12 Waadi Act provides an-
other specific scheme enabling sectoral bans. Article  10 Waadi Act prohibits the 
deployment of temporary agency workers in case of a labour dispute.
And self-regulation has found its own place. Through time, a form of public-private 
cooperation has taken shape that is unique in the world. Although the Ministers Ver-
meend, Donner and Kamp had firmly supported self-regulation, Minister Asscher 
came to question it. However, a reasonably successful set of improvement measures 
induced him to give this unique system the benefit of the doubt. For the rest, Conven-
tion 181 already took into account certification as a regulatory scheme for temporary 
agency work (art. 3, par. 2).
The Dutch privacy regulations are safeguarded in the Personal Data Protection Act.
The no fee to worker principle is entrenched in article 9 Waga. Through the Post-
ing of Workers Directive, migrant workers have been given additional guarantees, 
particularly in the Waadi Act, besides those generally provided by European law and 
regulations.
There is by now a sustained and comprehensive cooperation between private tem-
porary employment agencies, the UWV and the municipalities. They do not merely 
focus on so-called ‘no-job-to-job routes’, but also on ‘job-to-job routes’.907
Dispute settlement has been incorporated into the CLAs on temporary  agency 
work (art. 70 ABU and art. 45 NBBU). Under article 13 Waadi Act, the minister ap-
pointed the Labour Inspectorate as supervisor. Under article  14a Waadi Act the 
 Labour Inspectorate can exchange data with other administrative bodies to enhance 
the enforcement measures. Also, under article 14b Waadi Act, data can be supplied to 
907 Oosterwaal et al. (2015).
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acknowledged certifying institutions such as the SNA, which clearly reinforces private 
hallmarking.
Moreover, the Dutch Labour Inspectorate can assess the enforcement of the 
Waadi Act provisions and issue a report to the worker involved, the employer, works 
council and the relevant workers’ and employers’ organisations. By now, the chain 
provision has the option of naming and shaming.
Reviewing the bottlenecks that were discussed in earlier chapters, such as those with 
regard to stability of work, unequal pay, the weakened position of trade unions and 
excessive use of temporary agency work, the following can be established.
In relation to temporary agency work, stability of work was first provided for in 
the temporary agency covenant belonging to the ‘flexibility agreement’, by the imple-
mentation of the so-called assignment phases system. The CLAs on temporary agency 
work have extensively developed this system (ABU: art. 12 ff., NBBU: art. 13 ff.). The 
Work and Security Act has not brought any material changes to it. It did impose a 
transition compensation after two years’ temporary agency work.
In the current situation, following 78 weeks of temporary agency work subject to 
the so-called agency clause (‘end of assignment equals end of contract’) a new phase 
starts, comprising a maximum of fixed term employment contracts in a maximum 
period of four years, offering more security than the preceding temporary agency 
period. Subsequently, an open-ended contract must be offered to continue the as-
signment. During the second review of the ‘flex arrangement’, it became clear that 
15–20% of the temporary agency workers are now in the latter phase, of which 4 to 7 
percentage points had been given an open-ended contract.
In the Netherlands, the problem relating to wages has been solved through art-
icle 8 Waadi Act and the provisions on wages in the CLAs on temporary agency work 
(ABU: art.  18 ff., NBBU: art.  22 ff.). The fact that since 1971, trade unions and em-
ployers have managed to negotiate increasingly stronger CLAs raises the question 
as to whether the position of the trade union movement with regard to temporary 
agency work is really that weak.
In the Netherlands, excessive use of agency work has been provided for to some 
extent in hirers’ CLAs that regularly lay down quotas. However, this is controversial, 
since employers feel that this is in breach of article 4 of the European Temporary 
Agency Work Directive. Moreover, these quotas have caught the attention of politi-
cians.908
The European Temporary Agency Work Directive has entailed further obligations 
that have (by now) all been provided for by the Waadi Act, for instance, the access to 
908 Mulder (2015).
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company facilities and services in user enterprises (art. 8a Waadi Act), the informa-
tion on vacancies (art. 8b) and the WOR in article 1, par. 2, sub b (counting in tem-
porary agency workers), and WOR article 31b, par. 1 (informing the Works council). 
Furthermore, the Waadi Act regulates the administrative enforcement (art.  16 ff.). 
These are subjects that have been regulated in greater detail than what was prescribed 
by Convention 181.
Dutch legislation appears to conform fully to Convention 181, which has in fact served 
as a satisfactory agenda for the provision of an adequate legal regime in relation to 
temporary agency work. Nonetheless, the afore-mentioned outline also includes 
items that are problematic. Subjects such as payrolling, contracting and self-employ-
ment are new forms of flexibility that, by now, also concern temporary employment 
agencies. A study that the ABU conducted among its members made it clear that 
92% assign temporary agency workers, 66% second professionals, 64% engage in 
payrolling and 76% in recruitment and selection. In the years to come the members 
expected to add activities such as services for self-employed workers, reintegration, 
outsourcing and outplacement. It is thus clear that ABU members intend to widen 
their portfolio of services.909
Interestingly, the Dutch discussion currently focuses on the new forms of flexi-
bility, such as payrolling, contracting and self-employment. This is reminiscent of the 
discussion in ILO circles at the end of the 1990s. On the one hand, Convention 181 was 
adopted by a considerable majority; on the other hand there was a parallel discussion 
on contract labour that ultimately fell through and was turned into a discussion on 
the employment relationship. This has been discussed extensively in chapter 3.
Internationally, the crux is the scope of Convention 181. The question is whether 
it needs to be amended and extended to both bipartite and tripartite contracting, 
or whether a new discussion on contracting should begin, and on how it should be 
 adequately regulated, considering the merits of Convention 181.
Interestingly, the possibility that ‘stronger and tighter regulation of temporary 
agency work would lead to substitution by “freer” alternative employment relations’ 
was pointed out in the Netherlands as early as 1982. According to the researchers who 
had been commissioned by the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment:
The conclusion that can be drawn is that there are alternatives, both including and 
excluding the involvement of third parties. Thus, temporary agency work is one of 
many forms of ‘loose’ employment relations.
909 ABU (2015).
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They recommended the realisation of a more integrated policy on ‘loose’ employment 
relations. Nowadays, so many years later, this conclusion still appears to hold true.910
Social partners in the temporary agency sector would therefore show great cour-
age if they were, for now, to explore the possibility of a CLA on both bipartite and 
tripartite contracting. Incidentally, the 1982 study cited above also pointed out the 
negative effects that restrictions on temporary agency work may have on employ-
ment.
The question is also to what extent all this necessitates further regulations. The 
Nether lands easily complies with the standards set by Convention 181. Labour-only 
contracting is thus provided for. What has not been provided for is both bipartite and 
tripartite job contracting. Internationally, and in the Netherlands, there is a loophole 
that should be dealt with.
Another necessity is that labour law uncouples itself from the employment contract 
as the basis of the employment system. Labour law will need to centre more on the 
plurality of employment forms that has arisen in the meantime. Besides labour-only 
contracting, this also includes job contracting. Labour law will need to become de-
tached from the employee and focus on all workers, regardless the form of their em-
ployment. Labour law that restricts itself to the employment contract should become 
employment law!911
Figure 9.9
910 Andersson, Elffers & Felix (1982).
911 Van der Heijden (2014b).
Covered by: –  Convention 181
–  Temporary Agency Work Directive
–  Dutch Civil Code
Not covered
labour only contracting
labour allocation
contracting
job contracting
temporary agency work bipartitepayrolling tripartite
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Table 9.6 Comparing Convention 181 to Dutch labour law
C 181 Dutch regulations
I Core issues
a Non-discrimination Art 5 Art.1 Dutch Constitution
awgb, art. 3, par. 3 Waadi Act
b Freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining
Art. 4,
Art. 11 a, b
Art. 12 a
ii bw,
1927 Act on collective agree-
ments
c Forced labour Preamble Art. 19 
d Child labour Art. 9 atw art. 1; 2, art. 3:1,2
II Worker protection
a Right to work Art. 19 gw
b Free choice of employment Art. 19 gw
c Working time (rest and leisure, limitation 
hours and periodic holidays)
Art. 11 d,
Art. 12 c
atw
d Conditions of work (just and favourable 
conditions)
Art. 11 d
Art. 12 c
clas on taw
e Minimum (wages) and equal pay for equal 
work/favourable remuneration
Art. 11 c
Art. 12 b 
wml
Art. 8 Waadi Act
f Adequate standard of living
g Social security protection (occasional 
accidents, diseases, maternity, parental 
 protection, benefits protection against 
 unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-
hood, old age
Art. 11 e
Art. 12 d
ww, zw, wia, wao, waz
clas on taw
abu: art. 53
nbbu: art. 25 
h Health and safety Art. 11 f
Art. 12 f
Dutch working conditions 
act: art. 7:658 bw. Waadi Act 
art. 11
i Training Art. 11 f
Art. 12 e
clas on taw
abu: art. 63
nbbu: art. 30
j Insolvency Art. 11 i
Art. 12 h
ww
III Specific issues
a Legal status Art. 3 par. 1,2 Waadi Act: art. 7a, 10, 12
b Privacy and protection personal information Art. 6 wbp
c No fee to worker Art. 7 Waadi Act: art. 9.
eu Treaty
d Migrant workers Art. 8 Waga
e Cooperation public/private agencies Art. 13 Various agreements
f Access to remedy Art. 14, par. 3 Waadi Act: art. 13; 14a, b, c; 
15. clas on taw
abu: art. 70
nbbu: art. 45
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C 181 Dutch regulations
IV Other specific issues
a Stability of work clas on taw
abu: art. 12 ff.
nbbu: art. 1 ff.
b Unequal pay clas on taw
abu: art. 18 ff.
nbbu: art. 22 ff.
Waadi Act: art. 8
c Weakened position trade unions clas on taw
d Excessive use of agency work Quota regulations hirer’s cla
V Other European issues
a Access to employment, collective facilities, 
vocational training
Waadi Act: art. 8 a, b 
b Representation of temporary agency workers wor, art. 1, par. 3
Part b
c Information of workers’ representatives wor, art. 31b par. 1
d Favourable provisions Art. 15
e Penalties Art. 14, par. 3 Waadi Act art. 16 ff.
f Implementation and review Art. 18 Waadi Act art. 23
g Free placement ilo C 88
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
My study focuses on ILO convention  181 and the regulation of temporary agency 
work. The central question is: is Convention 181 (still) an adequate instrument for 
the international regulation of temporary agency work from the perspective of recent 
social law developments and from the perspective of the Dutch context? The social 
law developments that will be set against Convention 181 are: decent work, human 
rights, global social dialogue: IFAs, and increasing attention for the social dimension 
in Europe. Moreover, the Dutch legislative framework on temporary agency work 
will be considered from both a historical and an actual perspective, also in relation 
to Convention 181.
Sub-questions that will be consecutively discussed are:
1. How has the ILO’s regulatory framework for temporary agency work developed 
over the years?
2. Which complications can be perceived in relation to that framework?
3. What do we mean by decent work, and how can this be set against temporary 
agency work under Convention 181?
4. Which human rights developments have occurred specifically for businesses, 
and how can their results be assessed in relation to the achievements of Conven-
tion 181?
5. How has Global Social Dialogue developed, and how does this development 
relate to Convention  181? Are the corresponding IFAs substitutes for and/or 
 additions to Convention 181?
6. How has social law developed at the European level with regard to temporary 
agency work, and what does this mean for the value and scope of Conven-
tion 181?
7. How has the Dutch temporary agency legislation developed; which complica-
tions have presented themselves and how can this be assessed in relation to Con-
vention 181?
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Temporary agency work is a labour market phenomenon that has commanded a 
great deal of attention. A recurring debate on temporary agency work is taking place 
in every country where this phenomenon exists.
Temporary agency work is characterised by a tripartite relationship in which the 
temporary agency worker usually registers as a jobseeker at the temporary employ-
ment agency, which then sets out to find him or her a job and, as soon as one is found, 
hires the jobseeker and assigns him or her to a commissioning client, also known as 
a user enterprise.
Thus, the temporary employment agency is playing an intermediary role in the 
process of balancing supply and demand and becomes an employer in a formal sense 
once the job has been found and the temporary agency worker starts work.
The cause of the recurring debate on temporary agency work referred to above 
lies in the fact that, over time, social law has strongly focused on the bipartite rela-
tionship between employer and employee, while the interference by the temporary 
employment agency creates a tripartite relationship that evokes questions and gives 
rise to confusion.
In the background, a more fundamental reason is related to the objections to 
placement carried out for profit, including hiring out, which conflicts with the ILO’s 
position that ‘labour is not a commodity’. Albeda holds the view that it is hard to de-
fend this attitude while accepting the economic order system that pivots on corporate 
production.
In 2014, an estimated 67 million people across the world were assigned by temporary 
employment agencies. This process generated a turnover of more than 316  billion 
euros. The multinational employment agencies Adecco, Randstad and Manpower 
jointly accounted for 16% of this turnover. The others in the top 10 jointly represented 
9%. That means that 75% was turned over by medium-sized and smaller temporary 
employment agencies.
Worldwide, temporary agency work has a 1.6% penetration rate. This percentage 
indicates the number of temporary agency workers expressed in proportion to the 
total working population. The United States have achieved a 2.2% penetration rate, 
Japan 2% and Europe 1.8%.
Temporary agency workers are often young people; 40% are under 25 and 65% 
are under 30.
Larger businesses make more use of temporary agency work than smaller ones. 
The main reasons for a business to use temporary agency workers are the need for 
flexibility, the need to make sudden adjustments, dealing with peak cycles of produc-
tivity and the opportunity to ‘try before you buy’.
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10.1 DEVELOPMENT
How has the ILO legislative framework developed over the years?
Initially, the international development of social law regarding temporary agency 
work was strongly linked to the development of private work placement, particularly 
work placement carried out for profit. Attention was drawn to this topic soon after 
the ILO was established. Convention 2, dating from 1919, expressed a clear preference 
for public work placement. Recommendation 1 included the request to prohibit com-
mercial placement. The 1920 Maritime Convention laid down that the member states 
were to agree to do everything they could ‘to abolish the practice of finding employ-
ment for seamen as a commercial enterprise for pecuniary gain’.
In 1933, widespread abuses in relation to private placement gave rise to Conven-
tion 34 on fee-charging employment agencies. This convention provided that private 
for-profit placement must be abolished and that non-profit-making placement was 
to be severely restricted.
By the end of the 1940s an attempt was made to relax the regime of placement 
carried out on a for-profit basis, subsequently allowing this to be carried out in future, 
albeit under strict conditions of supervision, licensing, and a prescribed fee structure. 
The fact that only six of the ILO member states had ratified Convention 34 can be 
seen as the writing on the wall. In the relevant committee, this employer-initiated 
proposal was accepted by 26 in favour and 24 against, but eventually the plenary ILC 
rejected the proposal by 39 to 35 (5 abstentions).
These margins were so unconvincing that the topic was tabled for the 1949 con-
ference. Prior to this, the ILO conducted a survey among its member states that made 
it clear that a minority was in favour of regulation, including regulation of private 
for-profit placement, and a significant majority was in favour of abolition. This result 
induced the ILO Office to present a compromise text, opting for a convention with 
two variants. One variant, part  II, was based on the abolition of private for-profit 
placement at a date to be determined later. Another variant, part III, started from the 
regulation of private for-profit placement conditional on supervision, licensing and a 
prescribed fee structure.
Thus, this new Convention 96 allowed member states to run with the hare and 
hunt with the hounds. Although the survey made clear that the majority of the mem-
ber states (13 out of 19 were in favour of an abolition variant), they clearly did not dare 
risk a total ban. The 1948 discussion not resulting in a convincing majority for either 
option, together with the low number of ratifications of Convention 34, apparently 
were sufficient reasons for the ILO Office to present a compromise text.
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It took 43 years for the ILO to put the topic of private employment agencies back on 
the agenda; however, it did continue to be the subject of a great deal of attention. For 
instance, the Swedish government, being confronted with the increasing role of tem-
porary employment agencies within its borders, asked the ILO whether they could 
be considered as fee-charging employment agencies as defined in Convention  96. 
The Director-General of the ILO took the view that they could, and therefore that the 
relevant exemption provisions of this convention must be reconsidered. This opinion 
did not tally with the view held by many countries that designated the temporary 
employment agency as an employer, for which specific national regulations had been 
developed.
In 1973, the member states voted on a draft resolution proposing to analyse 
the role of temporary employment agencies in more detail, but this resolution was 
shelved due to a lack of the requisite quorum.
Eventually the topic, described as ‘the role of private employment agencies in 
the functioning of the labour market’ was entered on the agenda of the 1994 ILC. This 
general discussion was preceded by means of a study by Sergio Ricca. He challenged 
the monopolistic approach to thinking about placement and listed no fewer than 
fifteen types of intermediary services existing at the time. Besides fee-charging em-
ployment agencies, he included:
… overseas employment agencies, agencies for the recruitment and placement of 
foreigners, temporary work agencies (TWA’s), contract labour agencies, job search 
consultants, personnel management consultants, training and placement insti-
tutes, job shops or cooperatives, employment advertising agencies, computerised 
job database agencies, career management agencies, employment enterprises or 
intermediary associations.
Ricca stated that this list was not exhaustive and that there were certainly overlaps; 
moreover, while some types faded away, others emerged. All in all, it was a highly 
dynamic world. He also concluded that a partial or total ban no longer had any value, 
and advocated a new ILO standard that would result in the revision of Convention 96 
and Convention 88, which by then regulated public work placement.
The 1994 ILC demonstrated a clear preference for a wider variety of activities to 
facilitate the process of matching supply and demand in the labour market. There-
fore, revision of Convention 96 was in order, and the Governing Body decided to 
place the topic on the agenda for the 1997 ILC.
Prior to the ILC, the ILO Office conducted a survey among the national govern-
ments. The questions as to whether there should be a convention and a recommenda-
tion on private placement yielded largely positive response. Eventually, Convention 181 
and Recommendation 188 were adopted. Crucially the definition was no longer re-
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stricted to private placement alone, but now also comprised the tri angular relations 
that could arise if the placement agency also acts as a formal employer.
The Convention then formulated provisions on:
 – licence, certificate and scope (article 3);
 – definition (article 1);
 – employee protection (articles 4, 11 and 12);
 – data protection (article 6);
 – no fee to worker (article 7);
 – fundamental labour rights (articles 4, 9, 11, 12);
 – non-discrimination (article 5);
 – migrant workers (article 8);
 – complaints (article 10);
 – public/private cooperation (article 13).
By now, the Convention has been ratified by 32 countries. Of the 177 so-called tech-
nical ILO conventions concluded in total, Convention 181 ranks 59th. At the  beginning 
of 2016, the technical conventions saw an average of 28 ratifications, and Conven-
tion 181 tops that with its 32 ratifications.
If we look at all the ILO conventions adopted since 1990, Convention 181 turns 
out to rank third, together with Convention 185 on the Seafarer’s Identity Documents 
(Revised). Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1995) and the Mari-
time Labour Convention (2006) are ahead by 180 and 70 ratifications respectively.
An ILO survey of some years ago made it clear that 38 more countries were interes-
ted in ratifying Convention 181, and 5 have done so since then. For that matter, there 
are apparently still 23 countries that have ratified Convention 96. In 2009, the ILO 
organised a workshop to encourage further ratifications, stating, among other things:
The Convention can be an engine for job creation, structural growth, improved 
efficiency of labour markets, better matching of supply and demand for workers, 
higher labour participation rates and increased diversity. It also sets a clear frame-
work for regulating, licensing and self-regulation, thereby encouraging reliability; 
ensuring effective protection of workers against unfair practices, for example as 
regards pay, contract conditions, safety and health by unscrupulous providers or 
user enterprises of temporary agency workers; discouraging human trafficking; 
and promoting cooperation between public and private employment services.
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10.2 COMPLICATIONS
Which complications can be perceived?
Convention 181 was adopted by a large majority of 347 votes in favour, 5 votes against 
and 30 abstentions. This meant a positive ending to a discussion that encompassed 
the larger part of the twentieth century. However, this is only one side of the matter. 
The flipside is characterised by unabated discussions on phenomena such as contract 
labour, precarious work and Non-Standard Forms of Employment (NSFE).
In the same year that the subject of fee-charging agencies had been placed on the 
ILO agenda, the topic of contract labour also came up for discussion. The confusion 
that had arisen in respect of this topic caused insufficient social protection of the 
workers concerned.
A distinction was made between labour-only contracting and job contracting. 
Labour-only contracting involved outsourcing work by a commissioning client to a 
contractor in a tripartite relationship, where the commissioning client supervised the 
work to be carried out. Job contracting involved outsourcing work to a contractor in 
a tripartite or bipartite relationship, where the contractor supervised the work to be 
done. A further distinction was that between contracting in and contracting out; in 
the first case the work was carried out on the premises of the commissioning client; in 
the latter case the work was carried out on the premises of the subcontractor.
In practice, many hybrid forms were evident, so that while the topic was under 
discussion the ILO Office had difficulty in creating the desired clarity.
The obvious question arose as to what exactly was the difference between tem-
porary agency work and labour-only contracting. This difference has never become 
entirely clear, but the question did result in numerous attempts to exclude temporary 
agency work from the definitions under Convention 181, in order to prevent duplica-
tion of the regulations. This suggests that the definitions of temporary agency work 
and labour-only contracting overlap.
Eventually a draft convention was proposed which, in the course of the two 
readings in 1997 and 1998 was not adopted. As a result of the confusion regarding the 
concepts, the lack of participation by the governments and the irritations between 
parties the proposal foundered.
It was then suggested that the scope of the consultation be shifted to the em-
ployment relationship. The discussion was to focus on the employer-employee re-
lationship, as regulated in employment law, and on the growing phenomenon of 
the dependent worker, who lacks protection. Although the employers were  initially 
against developing an instrument, they later agreed to a recommendation being 
drawn up.
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This recommendation was realised during the 2006 ILC, but did not obtain the 
employers’ support as they felt its scope was too broad, and because it contained 
indicators on the basis of which the employment relationship could be established 
– something the employers had opposed. Even though there were doubts about the 
legal necessity of doing so, it was established that ‘this Recommendation does not 
revise the Private Employment Agencies Recommendation 1997 (no. 188) nor can it 
revise the Private Employment Agencies Convention 1997 (no. 181)’.
Following the debate on contract labour and its consequential failure in the form 
of Recommendation 198 on the employment relationship, the discussion came to be 
dominated by the concept of precarious work. The trade union movement repeat-
edly made use of this terminology, which expresses the increasing weakening of the 
workers’ position. The term is derived from sociology and raises the question as to 
whether the permanent full-time employment contract is on the way back.
Over the past years, academics have debated extensively on the concept of pre-
cariousness. In the 1970s, French sociologists associated it with poverty. Only later 
did they start using this concept to refer to specific labour relations. To the American 
scientist Kalleberg, precarious work means work that is uncertain, unpredictable and 
risky from the worker’s point of view. Vosko distinguishes a one-dimensional and 
a multi-dimensional approach to the concept. The one-dimensional approach only 
looks at the degree of job insecurity. The multi-dimensional approach – the domin-
ant theory – involves more characteristics. In this case, Rodgers distinguishes:
 – short-term horizon, limited duration or high risk of job loss;
 – little or no control over working conditions, the work itself or wages;
 – little or no worker protection (by law, through collective agreements, in terms of 
access to social security);
 – low income jobs at or below the poverty level.
According to these sociological sources, temporary agency work would also fall  under 
precarious work, certainly from the one-dimensional approach. However, some dif-
ferentiation seems to be in order: precariousness is also a matter of perception, and 
of perspective. Research shows that temporary agency work cannot be classed among 
the worst forms of precariousness. Seasonal work, telework, casual work, zero-hours 
contracts, bogus self-employment and informal work score significantly worse. And 
according to experts consulted in this same research, temporary agency work scores 
nearly as highly as standard full-time employment on several dimensions. Further-
more, OECD research shows that more security in terms of job security and job pro-
tection does not automatically mean that people actually feel more secure. The OECD 
indicates that unemployment benefit is appreciated more than job protection.
In any event, the trade union movement believed this development to be a cause 
for concern. It noted that ‘permanent direct employment is on the way out’ and ‘ social 
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regression rather than progress and the less progress we see, the more agency work we 
find’. The issue is wider in scope; it is about more than just temporary agency work. 
However, the trade union movement asked for a new binding instrument. It asked for 
the examination of the meaning, scope, impact and application of Convention 181.
In a social dialogue on temporary agency work – a Global Dialogue Forum 
(GDF) in 2011 organised by the ILO – the social partners were poles apart as regards 
the course to be steered.
Four aspects emerged as the main bottlenecks:
 – employment is insecure;
 – the wages are not equal;
 – the union movement’s collective bargaining position is weakened;
 – the use of temporary agency work is insufficiently restricted.
On this subject, the following can be established.
Security – as we saw before – is all about perception. According to the OECD, the 
sense of security does not increase proportionally to additional protection of secur-
ity (employment protection) but rather depends on the social safety net (unemploy-
ment benefits), which generates income security. Also, it is apparent that the sense 
of security does not increase in proportion to longer job tenure. Moreover, tempor-
ary agency work appears to score no worse than permanent employment in general. 
In this respect, informal work and bogus self-employment turn out to score worst. 
Furthermore, temporary employment agencies in a number of countries conclude 
open-ended contracts. Thus, security is a relative concept that is determined by more 
aspects than the contract alone.
The principle of equal pay for equal work should be honoured, but in the case of 
temporary agency work the question is what to compare it with. Should a  comparison 
be made with the comparable worker at the temporary employment agency or with 
the comparable worker at the user enterprise? In the labour market, temporary em-
ployment agencies are confronted with wide differences in pay for the same position 
between user enterprises, and for that reason they need their ‘own wage policy’ to 
ensure the re-assignability of their workers. This certainly applies if temporary em-
ployment agencies conclude open-ended contracts and aim to reduce their risk of 
under-utilisation.
Moreover, temporary agency work and precarious work were thought to erode 
the position of the trade union movement. This was the key issue during the aforemen-
tioned GDF, where the trade unions requested that the collective bargaining rights 
of the temporary employment agencies be assigned to the commissioning clients. In 
practice, there appear to be many types of bargaining arrangements, demonstrating 
that the trade union movement also have a strong bargaining position in relation to 
temporary employment agencies. Thus, it would be going too far to ignore the bar-
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gaining rights of temporary agency employers and leave these to the commissioning 
clients.
On the other hand, it is no more defensible for agency employers to claim these 
bargaining rights exclusively. In practice, the various usable forms need to develop 
and the best practices must be held up as examples.
The alleged weakened position of the trade unions may have been partly sug-
gested by the American context, where it is difficult for temporary agency workers to 
join the commissioning client’s bargaining unit. However, it would be going too far 
to generalise this specifically American issue, which is also in breach of international 
labour law.
Some countries have specific legislation in place on the use of temporary agency 
work. However, there is no international standard that restricts the use of tempor-
ary agency work in terms of quantity. In a qualitative respect, Convention 158 and 
Recom mendation 166 provide a possible solution, but by now these instruments have 
been deemed controversial.
An ongoing discussion at the ILO has since been taking place on the topic of 
Non-Standard Forms of Employment (NSFE). This discussion has indicated largely the 
same bottlenecks as those outlined above in relation to precarious work.
Temporary employment and temporary agency work can provide a stepping 
stone to permanent employment, but may also prove to be a dead end, where workers 
relapse into unemployment. The ILO referred to studies that both confirm and deny 
the stepping stone role of temporary agency work. Moreover, the relevant ILO report 
points out ‘wage differences’. Furthermore, it indicates that many countries appear to 
have solved this issue by means of specific regulation.
Regarding the ‘use of temporary agency work’, the report also refers to  specific 
regulation providing the reasons for recourse to temporary agency work and for 
maximising either the duration of the assignment or the number of renewals of the 
assignment.
The trade unions proposed the following measures:
 – the principle of equal treatment for NSFE workers irrespective of the em ployment 
situation;
 – a separate instrument for fixed-term contracts;
 – an instrument for tripartite employment relationships in general (Conven-
tion 181 is too narrow in scope);
 – regulating the use of temporary agency work;
 – clarifying the position of the trade unions in tripartite employment relation-
ships.
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During the expert meeting that was held on the deficits of NSFE, there appeared to be 
a broad consensus regarding these deficits that needed to be tackled. In this respect, 
it is questionable whether Convention  181 should be amended. The convention is 
clear, it addresses the issues that need addressing and meets a growing need. Thus, as 
a minimum standard it is certainly adequate. The deficits respecting equal treatment 
and the use of temporary agency workers can be solved by means of law and regula-
tions, as is currently the case.
Article 12 in Convention 181 actually instructs member states to clarify the posi-
tion of the trade unions.
This still leaves the separate instruments for fixed-term contracts and the tri-
partite employment relationships in general. The most obvious of action would be to 
discuss the fixed-term contracts in connection with a revision of Convention 158 and 
Recommendation  166 on the termination of employment. They are already under 
discussion and it would be good if they were reassessed.
As regards a separate instrument for tripartite employment relationships in 
general: this is reminiscent of the attempts to regulate contract labour. The attempts 
failed, but it may be worth a new try. In that case both bipartite and tripartite con-
tracting should be addressed. For all that, no clarity can be achieved on the trend that 
the open-ended contract is displaced more and more by precarious work, by NSFE or 
by flexible work. Stone claims she has strong indications of this. However, SEO argues 
that during the last decade, flexible work has been stable, approximating 20 to 25% 
of the total working population, with some higher findings in the Mediterranean 
countries and a lower result in the United States. Moreover, no spectacular growth in 
temporary agency work would be evident during the last decade.
10.3 ‘DECENT-ISATION’
What do we mean by decent work, and how can this be set against temporary agency 
work under ILO convention 181?
An antonym of precarious work is the concept of decent work. Whereas the first con-
cept denotes the weakening of the workers’ position, the latter has developed into an 
umbrella term indicating the pursuit of improving the position of workers. It origin-
ated in the wake of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
This declaration provides a framework for globalisation that is also socially just and 
pivots on the following fundamental principles:
 – the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining;
 – the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
 – the effective abolition of child labour;
 – the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.
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The ILO has prioritised eight conventions that are connected to these principles, i.e. 
Conventions 29 and 105 (forced labour), 100 and 111 (discrimination), 138 and 182 
(child labour), and 87 and 98 (freedom of association and collective bargaining).
All these conventions must be observed, whether member states ratify them or 
not. Apart from this prioritisation, in 1999 the ILO also drew up the Decent Work 
Agenda, noting as the primary goal: ‘to promote opportunities for women and men 
to obtain decent and productive work, in conditions of freedom, equity, security and 
human dignity’. As the cornerstones of this goal, four strategic objectives were formu-
lated that constitute the framework of the Decent Work Agenda. The elements are:
 – promoting and realising fundamental principles in relation to labour (funda-
mental labour standards);
 – creating better opportunities for women and men to find a suitable job and gen-
erate an income (employment opportunities);
 – strengthening the coverage and effectiveness of social protection for everyone 
(social protection);
 – strengthening tripartism and social dialogue (social dialogue).
How does temporary agency work under Convention 181 relate to this agenda? To 
answer this question we must know what exactly is meant by decent work. The con-
cept may have gained momentum, but how can we continue to use it in day-to-day 
practice?
To this end, numerous measuring methods have been produced, but ultimately 
no consensus has been achieved on any of them. The scientific reference literature 
was likewise critical. All in all, the 21 indicators that the ILO presented continued to 
be controversial. Employers in particular objected to the creation of an ILO-driven 
methodology that was to serve as a template to take countries’ measures with regard to 
progress towards decent work. If we set out to contrast temporary agency work  under 
Convention 181 with the Decent Work Agenda, we run the risk of being subject ive. 
There is a certain feeling about what is or is not decent, but that may differ from one 
person to another. However, it would be worthwhile to interpret what decent is in 
relation to temporary agency work under Convention 181.
This involves two questions:
 – How must temporary agency work be considered in relation to the four ob-
jectives relating to employment, social protection, employee rights and social 
dialogue?
 – Can temporary agency work in particular be denoted as decent in accordance 
with certain indicators supplied by the ILO Office?
Temporary agency work plays a role in the labour market. The Decent Work Agenda 
looks at promoting employment. The Director-General of the ILO states among  other 
Chapter 10: Conclusion
454
things that ‘employment services have a great deal to offer in overcoming  labour 
market inequality’. While there are doubts as to whether temporary employment 
 agencies create employment, the promotion of employment also benefits from at-
tention  directed at balancing supply and demand, something in which temporary 
employment agencies can likewise play an important role. In his 2003 Report of the 
Employment Taskforce, Wim Kok stated as follows:
Temporary agency work can be an effective stepping stone for new entrants into 
the labour market and hence contribute to increased job creation, for example by 
facilitating recruitment instead of overtime. Acting as human capital managers 
–  rather than mere manpower suppliers – these agencies can also play the role 
of new intermediaries in the recruitment and management of both qualified and 
unqualified staff, offering employers an attractive alternative to traditional recruit-
ment channels.
Thus, Kok’s Taskforce makes a clear statement regarding the positive role that tempor-
ary employment agencies can play in enhancing job opportunities. Although they 
may not directly create employment, at least they will raise the employment rate.
With regard to another element of the Decent Work Agenda, i.e. social protection, 
many countries have a substantial amount of specific legislation in place. Temporary 
agency work is being regulated in relation to various topics. The OECD observes that 
in various countries the regulations on temporary agency work extend beyond those 
on fixed-term contracts.
The fundamental rights regarding the freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining, child labour, forced labour and non-discrimination are safeguarded by Con-
vention 181.
In the temporary employment agency sector, social dialogue takes place at vari-
ous levels: at cross-sectoral level, at sectoral level, at temporary employment agency 
level and at user company level. How social dialogue takes place is heavily dependent 
on the (temporary agency) labour relations as they have evolved in practice
If we compare temporary agency work under Convention 181 and the decent work 
indicators issued by the ILO Office, it becomes clear that nearly all indicators are en-
trenched in Convention 181 in one way or another. The only indicator that is lacking 
in Convention 181 relates to the termination of employment. However, it would be 
going too far to look on temporary agency work as not being decent merely on the 
basis of this hiatus.
We saw before that job security is a matter of perception and that income se-
curity turns out to be more important to workers than job security. Moreover, from 
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the ILO’s perspective, the Termination of Employment Convention (no. 158) and the 
associated Recommendation (no. 166) provide scope for facilitating temporary work 
and temporary agency work, although these instruments are by now deemed contro-
versial, as they no longer fit in with the actuality and dynamism of the labour market. 
Employers state that ‘full employment and open labour markets are more important 
for perceived employment security than strict project dismissal regulation’
This position fits in with Kennedy remarking in the 1960s that ‘a rising tide lifts 
all boats’ when defending plans to cut taxes in order to boost economic growth.
Otherwise, the main challenge to decent work is the informal economy. This is 
where the largest decent work deficit exists. Interestingly, the stricter the regulation 
of temporary employment agencies is, the larger the informal economy can grow. All 
in all, there is no reason whatsoever to look on temporary agency work under Con-
vention 181 as indecent. It more than complies with the Decent Work Agenda and the 
decent work indicators, and can also contribute to the transition from informal to 
formal, more decent work.
10.4 ‘HUMAN RIGHT-IFICATION’
Which developments with respect to human rights have occurred specifically for com-
panies and how can their results be assessed in relation to the achievements of ILO 
convention 181?
Human rights have a rich history of declarations and regulations that were intended 
to protect people from an omnipotent monarch. In his 1941 State of the Union ad-
dress, US President Roosevelt spoke about the four fundamental freedoms (freedom 
of speech and expression, freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, 
freedom from want, and freedom from fear). Later that year, Roosevelt and Churchill 
issued the Atlantic Charter, which stated that ‘all the men in all the lands may live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and want’. This was followed by the 1942 Declaration 
of the United Nations and the 1945 Charter of the United Nations.
In 1946, a commission was established to work on an international Bill of Rights, 
which partly took shape in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
The latter Declaration was developed into other covenants, of which the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Coven-
ant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are the best known.
There are various regional equivalents of these human rights covenants. Follow-
ing the UDHR, the Council of Europe drafted the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) in 1950. At a later date, the Council of Europe also drafted the Euro-
pean Social Charter (ESC), concerning social and economic rights, which can be seen 
as the equivalent of the ICESCR.
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The question has always been how the business sector should deal with these  human 
rights covenants. In 2004, the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights were 
developed. The intention was to impose these norms on the business sector, but they 
triggered widespread resistance. The controversy had to be solved by appointing a 
special representative, who was to clarify the roles of the various parties. In 2005, Har-
vard Professor John Ruggie was appointed, who submitted the Ruggie Framework in 
2008. The framework comprised three principles, i.e. the state duty to protect against 
human rights abuse by third parties, including enterprises; the corporate responsibil-
ity to respect human rights; and the need for more effective access to  remedies.
Ruggie developed his framework into 31 guiding principles, which he submit-
ted in 2011. As of 2011, these guiding principles have also become part of the OECD 
Guidelines, which refer to the internationally recognised human rights incorpor-
ated into the International Bill of Rights. In turn, this bill consists of the Universal 
declaration of Human Rights and the main instruments codifying the Declaration: 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the fundamental 
rights principles incorporated into the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work.
The Global Compact is similarly important, enabling enterprises to voluntarily 
endorse ten principles relating to human rights in general, labour standards, environ-
ment and anti-corruption. The multinational employment agencies Adecco, Man-
power and Randstad all endorse the Ruggie Framework and report on their progress 
in their annual reports. Particularly awareness of the ethical principles ranks high on 
the agenda.
Paying attention to the human rights issue also flows from the corporate need to 
engage in CSR, Corporate Social Responsibility, which forms part of the principles of 
corporate governance. This involves frameworks that are usually indicated as soft law. 
While transcending the law, they are certainly not non-committal, and they can also 
refer to hard law. Moreover, soft law can actually prove to be quite ‘hard’.
Dutch corporate law also includes provisions that can definitely not be seen as 
non-committal. For instance, article 2.8 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW) provides that 
the company and those who are involved in its organisation pursuant to law and 
the articles of incorporation, including the management board (and its individual 
members) must behave towards each other in accordance with what is required by 
standards of reasonableness and fairness. Article 2.9 BW provides that in the accom-
plishments of its duties the management board must be guided by the interests of the 
company and its affiliated enterprise, with explicit provision in respect of the super-
visory board in article 2:140/250 BW.
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The management board is also responsible for pursuing just policy. In the case of 
well-founded doubts as to what constitutes just policy, an investigation by the Dutch 
Enterprise Chamber (‘Ondernemingskamer’) can be requested on the basis of article 
2:345 in conjunction with article 350 BW. Thus, CSR policy, including human rights 
policy, can also be enforced by means of an investigation. Furthermore, criminal law 
could also provide enforcement  possibilities.
How can Convention 181 be appreciated in the light of the ‘human right-ification’?
All in all, a comparison of the regulation establishes that Convention  181 ob-
serves the many human and labour rights that can also be found in human rights 
 covenants. However, in these covenants, they are broader in scope. The correspond-
ing international normative frameworks (ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises) are soft law instruments, but in practice, they can 
 often have ‘hard’ effects.
As regards temporary agency work, however, a ratified covenant such as Con-
vention 181 will entail further obligations. This definitely applies to the specific provi-
sions, for instance in respect of the regulation on the temporary employment agency’s 
status and to the ‘no fee to worker’ principle.
The ‘human right-ification’ of labour relationships also touches on Convention 
181, and the question must be raised as to whether this development has considerably 
weakened the impact of Convention 181. If observing human rights treaties becomes 
more and more important, what is the further use of Convention 181?
The answer is that Convention 181 is more specific, it brings obligations upon 
ratification and also observes fundamental labour rights; thus, it has retained its  value 
next to the human rights treaties. While there is a considerable overlap, the more in-
dividual instruments set course for a certain direction, the more effective they will be.
Thus, it can be established that, from the perspective of ‘human right-ification’, 
Convention 181 has value and that it is substantively adequate.
10.5 ‘IFA-ISATION’
How has the Global Social Dialogue developed and how does this development relate to 
ILO convention 181? Are the corresponding IFAs substitutes for and/or additions to ILO 
convention 181?
Labour law has various sources; there are five of them, i.e. the constitution, the law 
in a formal sense (statutory regulations), employment contract law, international law 
and case law.
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Apart from this variety as to sources, there is also variety as to the nature of labour 
law. Labour law can have both a public and a private basis. Historically, labour law 
belongs in the public domain, but through the years, the private component has be-
come increasingly stronger. In this context, Molenaar referred to ‘autonomous’ law in 
contrast to ‘heteronomous’ law. The former has ‘sprung entirely from society itself ’; 
the latter refers to ‘labour law that has essentially been provided by government’.
There is also the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. The former implies 
legal obligations; the latter implies a weaker obligation or no obligation.
Molenaar preferred autonomous law. Van der Heijden called for a new legal 
 order for labour, in which private law must play a larger role than public law. In this 
context, the ILO uses the concept of social dialogue, which ‘describes the involvement 
of workers, employers and governments in decision-making on employment and 
workplace issues’. This dialogue can be bipartite, between employees and employers 
(as social partners) or tripartite, if the government is also involved.
Social dialogue takes place at various levels, i.e. at national (intersectoral), at sectoral 
and at company level. Collective bargaining relates to fewer than 20% of the workers 
in paid employment in approximately 60% of the ILO member states.
A new form of collective bargaining is Global Social Dialogue. This involves 
international unions entering into dialogue with multinationals and concluding so-
called IFAs (International Framework Agreements).
The international trade union movement consists of GUFs (Global Union Fed-
erations), to which the national sectoral unions of 120 countries are affiliated, and of 
the ITUC (International Trade Union Confederation), which represents the national 
union umbrella organisations. The GUFs are the bodies that conclude IFAs. They do 
so, because IFAs promote employees’ rights, reinforce social dialogue and enhance 
international solidarity.
IFAs matter to multinationals because they are important for maintaining their 
corporate reputation, because they are part of the obligation to establish a European 
Works Council, and because the International Finance Corporation as part of World 
Bank imposes social conditions that can be established in an IFA for granting loans. 
Moreover, IFAs yield stable relationships between management and workers, and a 
positive corporate image.
By now, 115 IFAs have been concluded with GUFs. IndustriALL is market leader 
(43), closely followed by UNI (38). IUF, BWI, PSI and IFJ have 7, 22, 3 and 2 respect-
ively.
Currently, the IFAs focus on entrenching the ILO core conventions regarding free-
dom of association and collective bargaining, non-discrimination and child labour. 
These topics are included in nearly all IFAs. Much attention is also paid to employee 
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protection. The IFAs regulate that wages must be living wages, and that they must be 
‘decent, adequate, reasonable and fair’. Moreover, the working hours must be reason-
able. The directions regarding occupational health and safety must be observed. 
Further more, attention is paid to vocational training and education. A number of 
IFAs provide that the permanent employment relationship is the guiding principle 
for ( labour and employment conditions) policies.
Equally important are the provisions regarding the supply chain, through which 
the IFA regulations are extended to include suppliers and subcontractors. The way 
this is effected ranges from supplying information and encouragement to imposing 
obligations under penalty of breaking the commercial relationship if the supplier fails 
to comply with the IFA provisions.
Apart from referring to the ILO core conventions, IFAs also refer to numerous 
other ILO instruments.
IFAs can have binding powers if they can be characterised as national collective 
agreements and if they refer any disputes to national courts. This is not often the case. 
That is why they usually relate to soft law, not being legally enforceable, even if the 
terminology, which often makes use of the term ‘agreement’, suggests otherwise.
There is also an IFA for temporary agency work, which was co-signed by UNI 
Global Union and the corporate members of CIETT, i.e. Adecco, Kelly Services, Man-
power Group, Olympic Flexgroup, Randstad and USG People. This IFA constitutes a 
Memorandum of Understanding. The parties acknowledge that Convention 181 and 
Recommendation 188 provide a regulatory framework for temporary agency work. 
Also, they commit to the core conventions that safeguard decent temporary agency 
work. Moreover, they state that temporary agency work contributes to the improved 
functioning of the labour market, fulfils the specific needs of both enterprises and 
jobseekers, and in that sense complements other forms of employment. Furthermore, 
they acknowledge that further topics will need to come up for discussion.
In addition to referring to Convention 181 and Recommendation 188 the part-
ners advocate fair treatment of temporary agency workers with regard to their basic 
labour and employment conditions, based on the principle of non-discrimination 
(for instance, equitable, objective and transparent principles for the calculation of 
wages and benefits, in accordance with national legislation and practices). Moreover, 
replacing striking workers is prohibited, without prejudice to national legislation and 
practices.
The Memorandum has evoked criticism since it involves only one GUF. Temporary 
agency work does not restrict itself to the work area of one GUF, and therefore this 
GUF cannot profess to represent all GUFs. A transnational private labour regulation 
is advocated, potentially resulting in:
 – the route through an IFA involving a number of, if not all, GUFs;
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 – a real collective agreement with its own certification and inspection system, 
based on the model in the maritime sector;
 – a social dialogue between CIETT and the Council of Global Unions (the co-
operation of the GUFs).
Besides this Memorandum, CIETT has a Code of Conduct, which calls for respect for 
laws and regulations, for ethical and professional conduct, for the no fee to  worker 
principle, transparent terms of engagement, for health and safety at work, non- 
discrimination, workers’ rights, confidentiality, quality of service, fair competition, 
and access to remedy.
Also worth mentioning is the Charter on Temporary Work, which Volkswagen en-
tered into with IndustriALL. Among other things, the partners agreed on the reason-
able use of temporary employment or temporary agency work and in the phased 
implementation of the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’. As a reasonable meas-
ure of use, a 5% benchmark is adhered to. If the use increases, consultations are in 
order. After nine months, ‘equal pay for equal work’ applies. A temporary agency 
worker who has worked at Volkswagen for 18 months is entitled to be eligible for 
permanent employment, provided he or she meets the qualification requirements. 
What is remarkable about this charter is that the commissioning client leads in these 
arrangements. This raises the question as to how to deal with the negotiating rights of 
temporary agency employers, who also have separate agreements with trade unions.
The IFA can be added to the international relations management toolbox. One IFA 
has been entered into with several multinational employment agencies that promote 
Convention  181. IFAs generally regulate part of what is also provided by Conven-
tion 181, such as the core conventions and provisions protecting employees with re-
gard to wages, working hours, and occupational health and safety. Convention 181 
continues to be valuable, containing many specific provisions that are not included 
in the IFAs. Therefore, IFAs do not replace Convention 181, but they can play an ac-
companying role in tackling bottlenecks relating to temporary agency work, such as 
employment insecurity, unequal pay, a weak trade union position, and excessive use 
of temporary agency workers.
Through supply chain provisions, attention may be paid to decent wages and 
other labour and employment conditions. Labour market provisions can prioritise 
permanent employment and encourage reasoned choices in decisions on the use of 
temporary agency work. Moreover, standards can be set in instances where excessive 
use is made of temporary agency workers. Thus, IFAs can play a complementary role. 
Moreover, IFAs provide trade unions with a prominent position in the  increasing 
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 globalisation. The Volkswagen Charter may be seen as a promising prospect for 
 mature temporary agency relationships.
Attention must be paid to the equally justified interests of temporary agency 
employers. Scope for consultation between all parties involved in temporary agency 
work and opportunities for further synchronisation must likewise be guaranteed.
10.6 ‘EUROPEANISATION’
How has social law developed at the European level with regard to temporary agency 
work, and what does this mean for the value and scope of ILO convention 181?
The European Union has had a vast influence on social law development in respect 
of temporary agency work in Europe. Thanks to the increasing focus on the social di-
mension in the EU, temporary agency work emerged as an object of regulation. This 
was first the case when a question was raised as to how the rules coordinating social 
security should be applied. These regulations provided that only one social security 
system should apply: the system in the ‘country of employment’. However, an ex-
emption obtained (art. 4 Regulation (EEC) 1408/71), providing that the system in the 
‘country of residence’ could continue to apply for a certain period. The question was 
whether this also applied to temporary agency work. In 1970, the European Court of 
Justice answered in the affirmative and in fact thus recognised the temporary agency 
business model.
The Höfner-Marcotron (1990) and Job-Centre (1996) cases jointly constituted a 
major breakthrough in European law on temporary agency work. These judgments 
discussed the monopoly position of public placement offices obtaining in various EU 
countries. The Court ruled that this monopoly violated European competition law. 
The judgments resulted in a de-monopolisation process in all countries concerned, 
providing scope for temporary employment services.
The issue of regulating temporary agency work in general had received some atten-
tion earlier on. Thus, a draft directive had been presented as early as 1982. By way of 
tackling distortion of competition (on the basis of art. 100A EC Treaty) an attempt 
was made to restrict atypical work, which included temporary agency work. Simul-
taneously, steps were taken to improve the health and safety of temporary workers 
and temporary agency workers. (on the basis of art. 118A EC Treaty). The latter was 
successful, resulting in Directive 91/383/EEC, but the attempt to restrict atypical work 
foundered.
Temporary agency work was also placed on the agenda for the development of the 
Services Directive and the discussions that were conducted on that score. The first 
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proposal started from the country-of-origin principle, intending that service pro-
viders could operate throughout the EU, under the conditions that applied in their 
country. Thus, European commissioner Bolkestein opted for the creation of a com-
mon market for services. The proposal met with considerable resistance. It was said 
that this would result in social dumping and to seriously erode the social dimension. 
As an alternative, the equal treatment principle was introduced, aiming to create a 
level playing field for both domestic and foreign service providers. Since hardly any 
regulations on temporary agency work existed, it should certainly be exempted from 
the Services Directive. In due course, the proposal was watered down considerably 
and amended from a social perspective, through which temporary agency work was 
exempted.
This had resulted in highlighting temporary agency work, and the Maastricht Pro-
tocol provided scope for considering a social dialogue that could possibly solve the 
issue of temporary agency work. This social dialogue took place, but prior to this, a 
Posting of Workers Directive was realised, which was to regulate cross-border work, 
including temporary agency work, in more detail. This amounted to the EU member 
states having to ensure that workers posted in their country from another member 
state would be guaranteed a series of core labour and employment conditions.
In practice, the directive, which also applied to cross-border temporary agency 
work, contained numerous deficits, such as inadequate access to and exchange of in-
formation, and inadequate cooperation and supervision. Also, jurisprudence on the 
directive proved disadvantageous for workers. For the European judge, the freedoms 
of the internal market outweighed the social aspects.
Eventually, this resulted in the Enforcement Directive, aimed at remedying the vari-
ous issues. Those issues have still not been resolved by far. By now, seven EU member 
states (the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Aus-
tria) are advocating equal pay for equal work in the same workplace. However, nine 
other member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia) have spoken out against what they consider to be 
harmful to the freedoms of the common market. As yet, the European Commission 
appears to follow the approach advocated by ‘the seven’ and has submitted a proposal 
to this end.
A social dialogue on temporary agency work was meant to solve the issue of the 
general legislation of temporary agency work. ETUC was clearly in favour, UNICE 
had doubts, but came round under pressure from CIETT. Unfortunately the dialogue 
failed after nine months of discussions in 2001.
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From the start, the points of view diverged considerably and in the course of the 
negotiations they failed to move much closer together. The trade unions insisted on 
equal pay, i.e. a remuneration as would be applicable in the user company, unless 
other arrangements had been made by CLA. For labour and employment conditions 
other than wages and occupational health and safety, regulations could be left to the 
member states, following consultation with the social partners. The employers  wanted 
the member states and/or social partners to decide who should be the comparable 
 worker whose wages were to be leading in determining the remuneration. According 
to the employers, a strict reference to wages would also be in breach of European law 
(art. 137, par. 6, TEU). During the negotiations, the European Commission appeared 
to agree with this point of view, which was not conducive to the negotiating process.
In the course of the various negotiation rounds, further items had been added 
to the workers’ wish list, for instance conditions of use, i.e. conditions to the deploy-
ment of temporary agency work, and various elements derived from Convention 181 
and Recommendation 188. Eventually, the employers conceded that the user com-
pany reference was acceptable in respect of occupational health and safety, maximum 
working hours and minimum resting hours. However, it was not acceptable in respect 
of the remaining topics, including pay. Employers were willing to accept sectoral and 
categorial bans, provided they would be evaluated on a regular basis.
In the end, ETUC pulled the plug on the negotiations. A last concession by the 
employers’ chairperson that the user pay reference might yet be acceptable for tem-
porary agency workers with temporary contracts, was ineffective. It was now up to 
the European Commission to develop a proposal.
In 2002, the Commission presented its proposal. Prior to this, the social tempor-
ary agency partners had published their wish lists. They included that non-agency 
employment and the permanent employment contract would be the most common 
types of labour, while it was recognised and respected that temporary agency work 
could contribute to the economic and employment targets of the European Union. 
The wish list underscored the obligations regarding equal treatment ensuing from 
both the temporary employment agency’s relationship with its workers and the tem-
porary agency worker’s relationship with the commissioning client and its personnel. 
Moreover, it included that – following consultation with social partners – member 
states would be asked to remove any impediments to the proper functioning of the 
temporary employment agency, on the understanding that legislation may be needed 
to combat any abuse.
The Commission’s draft directive contained a total of 17 provisions, of which 
articles 4 and 5 can be regarded as core provisions.
Article 4 states that the member states must regularly and at least every five years 
review the restrictions or prohibitions on temporary work, and verify that they are 
still justified. If not, they must be lifted.
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Article 5 prescribes at least as favourable treatment in respect of the essential labour 
and employment conditions, including seniority in the job, as a comparable perman-
ent employee at the user enterprise, unless the difference in treatment is justified by 
objective reasons. Exemptions are allowed for:
 – permanent contracts, if the temporary agency worker continues to be paid in the 
time between postings. (‘German exemption’);
 – by CLA, on the condition that an adequate level of protection is provided for 
temporary workers (‘Swedish exemption’);
 – the first six weeks.
The draft directive was strongly criticised. The British had both substantive and tech-
nical objections. The ‘comparable worker’ was not a viable concept and European law 
rules out the possibility of discussing pay at European level. Moreover, they had no 
tradition of collective bargaining, which facilitates the above-mentioned exemptions.
The Germans, whose legislation on temporary agency work included a 12-month 
period after which user-pay was mandatory, had also objected. An amended proposal 
could not resolve all the issues.
Academics raised doubts as to the feasibility of the equal pay principle. There 
were said to be sufficient international social law indications to make this principle 
objectionable.
No progress was made on the draft directive, until a breakthrough was effected 
in 2008. In the United Kingdom, a deal was concluded between employers, workers 
and government on a twelve-week ‘period of grace’ before the user pay would be-
come effective. This agreement paved the way for a new proposal by the Commission.
In a joint declaration, the sectoral social partners on temporary agency work 
agreed, among other things, that the principle of equal treatment in respect of  basic 
 labour and employment conditions must be applied. Any impediments to the ad-
equate functioning of temporary employment agencies must be identified and elimin-
ated, on the understanding that abuse must be combated. Permanent contracts with 
the temporary employment agency may derogate from the principle of non-discrim-
ination, if the worker continues to be paid between assignments. Derogation by CLA 
is likewise allowed, as is a so-called qualifying period. A new Commission proposal 
was effected largely along these lines.
In 2014 the Commission issued a report of the effects of the directive. It concluded 
that the provisions in the directive had been correctly implemented and applied, al-
though the twin objectives of equal treatment and reconsidering the restrictions on 
temporary agency work had not yet been fully achieved.
As a result of the many derogation options provided for in article  5, no real 
effects may have been achieved in specific situations to improve the protection of 
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temporary agency workers. On the other hand, the review of the restrictions and 
prohibitions provided for in article 4 has mostly resulted in maintaining the status 
quo, and even to an extension of the restrictions and prohibitions, rather than having 
resulted in a new vision on temporary agency work in a modern flexible labour mar-
ket. Jurisdiction has not yielded a broader scope either.
On the European front, the concept of ‘flexicurity’ has also drawn considerable at-
tention. The concept plays a role in the attempt to arrive at a common employment 
policy through the Open Method of Coordination, i.e. by means of employment 
guidelines. This Luxembourg process focused on four main points, i.e. entrepreneur-
ship, employability, adaptability and equal opportunities.
In order to encourage adaptability, as flexicurity was first termed, agreements 
to be concluded between social partners are advocated. These agreements ideally in-
clude flexible working arrangements, which should strike a new balance between 
flexibility and security.
Later on, the European Commission specifically addressed the concept, stating 
that four policy aspects were on the agenda:
 – flexible and reliable contractual arrangements;
 – comprehensive lifelong learning (CLL);
 – effective labour market politics ELMP);
 – modern social security systems.
In their social dialogue on temporary agency work, the social temporary agency part-
ners focused on giving shape and substance to the flexicurity concept.
If we consider the extensive regulations on temporary agency work in the EU, it can 
be established that European law has issued regulations in all the fields provided for 
by Convention 181. Some are less far-reaching, for instance the status provisions on 
licensing and certification requirements; others reach further, for example on the 
equal pay for equal work principle in the Agency Directive, and the key provisions on 
the working and employment conditions in the Posting Directive. Is Convention 181 
still adequate? The EU has regulated 28 topics relating to temporary agency work to a 
greater or lesser extent, while ILO convention 181 regulates 22 topics.
One might contend that this ILO convention regulates matters less extensively, 
but as a result has more focus. In that sense, it is adequate for the EU, albeit as a min-
imum regime.
Looking at those extensive EU laws and regulations on temporary agency work, the 
question also arises as to whether Convention 181 still has value. A number of aspects 
are worthy of attention. Firstly, Convention 181 provides focus and, as an  international 
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covenant, it provides guarantees for the adequate protection of temporary agency 
workers and a proper functioning of temporary employment agencies. As a result 
of ratification, national governments commit themselves to developing regulations 
in accordance with the conditions laid down by Convention 181. This includes the 
fundamental labour rights. Through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, EU law also 
provides guarantees for those fundamental rights, but only to the extent that they 
ensue from EU regulations. This conditional binding force does not apply to a rati-
fied covenant such as Convention 181. In this regard, the ILO provisions appear to be 
stronger than the relevant EU provisions.
Secondly, EU law also comprises contrasts and interpretation issues. The ques-
tions raised by, for instance, the Posting Directive cannot be answered unequivocally.
Thirdly, the ILO convention provides a better guarantee for continuity, as it can 
only be denounced once every ten years.
And lastly, it also provides a guarantee against the prohibition of temporary 
agency services. The essential merit of Convention 181 is that it conditionally allows 
service provision by temporary employment agencies. This does not tally with meas-
ures that render temporary agency services unfeasible, although specific prohibition 
may apply.
All in all, Convention 181 offers more focus, clarity and guarantees for respecting 
fundamental labour rights and continuity of the temporary agency services, also for 
the EU member states.
10.7 THE DUTCH CONTEXT
How has the Dutch temporary agency legislation developed; which complications have 
presented themselves, and how can this be assessed in relation to ILO convention 181?
In the Netherlands, work placement had long been the domain of private parties 
before it became a government concern. Prior to this government involvement, there 
was a federation of Dutch labour exchanges that can be seen as an important trail-
blazer of work placement in the Netherlands. During the First World War, this fed-
eration could not manage the rising unemployment, so that national work placement 
fell under government supervision.
The 1930 Placement Act legislated for what had more or less developed in prac-
tice. Distinction was made between a nationally operating system of public work 
placement services and forms of special work placement that were subject to licens-
ing. For-profit placement was subject to licensing, but it was the intention that this 
system be discontinued. The policy aligned with the ILO’s ideas at that time.
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In addition to work placement, the 1960s Dutch labour market became acquainted 
with the phenomenon of manpower provision, which was taken to mean assigning 
temporary agency workers and posting workers.
Illegal subcontractors were well known, if not infamous, for forcibly recruiting 
workers and posting them illicitly. They had to be stopped. To this end, the Man-
power Provision Act set out to protect the interests of good labour market relations 
and the interests of a socially strong position of the workers involved. The Dutch 
Manpower Provision Act remained a dead letter until 1970, when labour riots took 
place in the Waterweg area. This urged the then Minister to implement a licensing 
system on the basis of this act.
The 1960s and 1970s were characterised by a difficult relationship between the 
temporary agency sector and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. This 
only changed in 1982 after the swearing in of the first Lubbers cabinet, which in its 
first government declaration advocated a generous policy on temporary agency work.
Dutch work placement became more and more comprehensive. It came to be 
termed ‘employment services’ and the eponymous body – the employment servic-
es organisation – now also supervised manpower provision. This was regulated in 
the 1990 Employment Services Act, which also regulated the tripartisation of labour 
market policy.
Due to disappointing results, this tripartisation was reversed in 1996. In this context, 
the question was raised as to how manpower provision and private work placement 
should be regulated henceforth.
On being asked for advice, the SER recommended that under ILO Convention 96, 
which the Netherlands had ratified, a licence was required for private work placement. 
The views on manpower provision were less unanimous. Workers’ represent atives 
were in favour of licensing, and if the licensing system were to be revoked, some legal 
behavioural standards should at least be implemented, such as a ban on obstructions 
and a pay equivalence rule. The employers’ representatives were in favour of abolish-
ing the licensing requirement and opted for legislation on the scab ban.
In 1994, Minister Melkert introduced his ‘flexibility and security’ memorandum, 
which included his policy intentions with regard to temporary employment. He in-
tended to abolish the licensing requirement, but to introduce legal standards, such 
as a pay equivalence rule, a scab ban and a ban on obstructions. Moreover, he aimed 
at improving the legal position of the temporary agency worker. Under strong pres-
sure from the temporary agency sector, the ‘flexibility and security’ memorandum 
was presented to the Dutch Labour Foundation. This foundation presented a large-
ly unanimous recommendation. It proposed henceforth to qualify the temporary 
 agency relationship as an employment relationship, albeit one with a special charac-
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ter, by providing the option of the so-called agency clause, which gave the commis-
sioning client the authority to end this employment relationship. It also provided the 
option to conclude three fixed-term employment contracts in a three-year period. 
These new regulations were to have the character of statutory provisions enabling 
derogations by CLA. Moreover, the foundation recommended establishing a special 
‘dismissal guideline’ for the temporary agency sector. While the pay equivalence 
rule and the scab ban could be maintained, the ban on obstructions was deemed 
 expendable.
Meanwhile, the temporary agency employers ABU and NBBU on the one hand, 
and the FNV, CNV, Unie BLHP and LBV on the other, concluded a temporary  agency 
covenant, agreeing to change the temporary agency relationship significantly. A spe-
cial regime of ‘the longer the work period, the more rights for the worker’ was de-
veloped into a phase structure. During the first two phases, the temporary agency 
relationship legally ended at the end of the assignment; the third phase was charac-
terised by a limited number (eight) of fixed-term employment contracts that could be 
concluded in a two-year period. The fourth phase constituted open-ended contracts. 
Apart from this ‘growth contract’ the temporary agency covenant included agree-
ments relating to pensions and vocational training.
Minister Melkert’s ‘flexibility and security’ memorandum, the temporary agency 
covenant and the STAR agreement comprised the fundamental elements of the new 
flexibility legislation, which have been further developed in the Netherlands Posting 
of Workers by Intermediaries Act (Waadi Act) and the BW (Dutch Civil Code).
In the summer of 1999, after hearing the Council of State, the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs presented Convention 181 to the Upper and Lower Houses of Dutch 
Parliament for tacit approval. The Minister deemed it desirable to raise or maintain 
as few obstructions as possible for (re)integrating jobseekers in employment. Pri-
vate temporary employment or work placement agencies fulfil a useful intermediary 
function in this respect. The Minister indicated that Dutch law complied with the 
convention’s provisions in all respects.
By the end of 1999 the Posting of Workers Directive was implemented through 
the Posting of Workers through the Netherlands Terms of Employment (Cross- 
Border Work) Act (WAGA Act).
Following the turn of the century concerns were raised about increasing fraud in 
the Dutch temporary agency sector. While the government was in favour of a licens-
ing requirement, this was strongly opposed by the temporary agency sector, and the 
Lower House did not endorse the government proposal. Through a motion by the 
MP Bruls, a large majority of the Dutch Lower House preferred a system of self- 
regulation, which was to be periodically assessed, and a certification system. To this 
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end, the Dutch Labour Standards Foundation (SNA) was established. By the end of 
2015, agencies were entered in the SNA register following certification. An estimated 
total of 12,000 agencies are thought to engage in manpower provision. Thus, there is a 
‘grey area’ of approximately 8,000 temporary employment agencies. Since 2007, more 
than 500 enterprises have disappeared from the scene.
Apart from advocating this type of certification, the ABU has also dedicated it-
self to a conclusive approach of a registration requirement at the Dutch Chamber of 
Commerce. Minister Kamp has adopted this proposal and introduced a bill with a 
registration requirement for intermediaries posting workers. The measure was in-
cluded in the Waadi Act as article 7a. As he did so, the minister was challenged to 
reintroduce a licensing system. However, after a thorough examination, the minister 
concluded that this would have considerable implications for the current system of 
public-private cooperation. There would be a risk that the private sector would cut 
back on or stop the efforts it had set in motion. This would not be right, since fraudu-
lent practices can only be put an end to by intensive cooperation between the gov-
ernment and the sector. It would be complicated for the government to fill the gap 
the private sector would then leave behind. The means to do so were lacking, said the 
minister.
The Temporary Agency Work Directive was implemented simultaneously with the 
incorporation of the registration requirement through an amendment to the Waadi 
Act. The Waadi Act already contained a pay equivalence rule. This had to be adjust-
ed to the directive. Instead of wages, benefits and other allowances that are owed in 
conformity with the wages, benefits and other allowances that are usual at the user 
enterprise, article 8 Waadi Act now provides the ‘right to at least the same labour 
and employment conditions as those that apply to employees in the same or similar 
positions at the user enterprise, regarding:
 – the wages and other benefits and allowances;
 – conditions based on a CLA or another non-legal provision of a general nature 
that is in force within the enterprise where the assignment takes place, as regards 
working hours, including overtime, rest periods, work on night shifts, breaks, 
the duration of the holidays and work performed on public holidays.
The reviews of the restrictions and prohibitions of temporary agency work required 
by the directive were conducted by the Dutch Labour Foundation. However, this did 
not result in the lifting or amending of these restrictions and prohibitions. The tem-
porary agency worker’s rights to company facilities at the user enterprise, to informa-
tion on vacancies, and the requirement to encourage vocational training during social 
dialogue were included in the Waadi Act. The labour co-partnership  provisions were 
included in the Dutch Work Councils Act (WOR). Apart from the public- private 
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 approach, Dutch temporary agency work legislation is strongly influenced by the 
CLAs on temporary agency work that have been agreed on since the 1970s.
Following a legislative development that could be described as positive, particularly 
since the Dutch government and social partners had finally come to an agreement, 
a turning point now appears to be within reach, where continuing consensus is in-
creasingly harder to find. It is marked by the Dutch Security for Flexibility bill, which 
aims to restrict flexible labour in general, by means of proposals including the grant-
ing of severance pay when the temporary contract ends; a month’s salary for every 
working year; changing the 3-in-3 rule into the 2-in-2 rule; a payrolling approach and 
restricting the application of the agency clause to 18 months. The proposal originated 
with the then opposition (SP/PvdA), but as a result of the ‘recolouring’ that arose 
through the Second Rutte cabinet, these ideas also ended up on the government table 
and even in the social partnership agreement concluded in the spring of 2013. This 
agreement dealt extensively with the need for a responsible use of external flexibility 
and flexible employment contracts. In this respect, the social partners suggested six 
routes:
1. combating improper use of flexible labour relations, such as sham arrangements 
and the foreign agencies routes;
2. enforcement and compliance;
3. better regulation of contracting responsibilities;
4. combating excessive use of legal forms of flexible labour;
5. improved structuring of so-called tripartite relationships;
6. investing in employability and training of flexible workers.
The Work and Security Act and the Act on Combating Sham Arrangements were im-
portant showpieces ensuing from this social partnership agreement. The Work and 
Security Act streamlined dismissal law and restricted flexible labour. Thus the 3-3-3 
chain provision, i.e. a maximum of three contracts in a maximum period of three 
years with a three-month break in between assignments was changed into 3-2-6, i.e. 
a maximum of three contracts in a maximum period of two years with six-month 
breaks in between assignments. There were notice periods for fixed-term contracts 
exceeding six months, and there was a ban on probation periods for that type of con-
tracts. In principle, a competition clause is forbidden for temporary contracts. After 
the legal period of 26 weeks, the agency clause could only be extended by another 52 
weeks by CLA. On-call contracts were amended by shifting the principle from ‘no 
work, no pay’ to ‘no work, still pay, unless…’.
As regards the regulations on temporary agency work, hardly any material chan-
ges were made. The agency clause for temporary agency work continues to be possible 
for 78 weeks, followed by a maximum of six (formerly eight) contracts in a four-year 
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period. All this had already been taken into account by the ABU CLA. The NBBU CLA 
had to be amended by reducing its maximum agency period from 104 weeks to 78.
The question is whether these amendments will actually lead to an increase of 
permanent contracts, as the act had intended. The signs do not appear to be overly 
positive. The developments are reminiscent of the saying: ‘You can lead a horse to 
water, but you cannot make it drink’.
The Act on Combating Sham Arrangements is part of a more comprehensive set of 
instruments to tackle various forms of malpractice. This act deals mainly with sup-
porting workers in the case of non-payment of the wages owed, or underpayment. 
To this end, sequential liability was included in the Dutch Civil Code. The guiding 
principle is that all the links in the chain that originates when other enterprises are 
commissioned are jointly responsible for the wages owed to the worker in that chain. 
If the worker does not receive the wages owed to him or her, he or she can consecut-
ively make every link in the chain liable to pay the wages.
It was also arranged in the social partnership agreement that improvements 
should be made to the structuring of tripartite relationships. An approach to pay-
rolling and a further analysis of these relationships was necessary in order to pro-
mote sustainable labour relationships that offer good prospects and fulfil justified 
em ployee and employer needs. The Dutch Labour Foundation was expected to sub-
mit an advice on this subject, but apparently has not yet managed to do so.
In 2013, the self-regulation of the temporary agency sector was called into question 
again. Minister Asscher wished to reassess the system of self-regulation and recon-
sider introducing a licensing system. This put the question ‘licence or certificate?’ 
back on the political agenda. In close consultation with all the stakeholders, a pack-
age of 28 measures was agreed on that should result in improving compliance behavi-
our and tackle fraudulence more effectively.
By the end of 2015, nearly all measures had been implemented. The minister 
appeared to be satisfied for the time being and thus continued to strive for adequate-
ly functioning self-regulation involving a distinctive hallmark, in combination with 
enforcement by the government. It is regrettable that the trade unions concerned, 
FNV and CNV Vakmensen, have since then ended their participation in the hallmark. 
They feel that the product development of the temporary agency sector is moving in a 
direction they find undesirable. They particularly do not want to support the legitim-
isation of new forms such as contracting and placement of self-employed workers.
The minister has introduced a bill that not only implements the Enforcement Direct-
ive, but also integrates the WAGA Act. The WAGA Act was repealed in June 2016, to be 
replaced by Terms of Employment Posted Workers in the EU Act ( WagwEU).
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The minister is also occupying himself with the issue of payrolling. A motion by the 
Member of Dutch Parliament Hamer, requesting equal treatment of payroll workers, 
which was adopted by the Lower House, compels the minister to take action.
Payrolling is a growing phenomenon that fulfils the need for outsourcing em-
ployership. However, it also raises questions: for instance, as to whether the flexibility 
legislation incorporated into Dutch Civil Law actually applies to this phenomenon 
and thus whether this would be at all acceptable. Academia is divided and juris-
diction yields variable judgments. The debate has particularly focused on whether 
there is an allocative factor, as is the case with traditional temporary agency work. For 
now, the minister appears to disregard the Hamer motion.
Reviewing the discussion on payrolling, it seems to me that we are dealing with a type 
of manpower provision that has also been regulated in Convention 181. Ricca already 
pointed out 17 forms of private mediation, including contract labour agencies and 
staff leasing agencies. In ILO terms, we are dealing with labour-only contracting, and 
it can be deduced from the history of the contract labour discussion that this is largely 
synonymous to temporary agency work. When the Dutch Lower House discussed the 
flexibility regulation, particularly the amendments to the Dutch Civil Code, it like-
wise adopted a broad definition of the secondment agreement. The Minister  stated 
that legislation not only pertains to the agency employment relationship, but to all 
other tripartite relationships where the employer places the worker at the disposal of a 
third party within the framework of his business or professional practice, in order to 
perform work under supervision and direction of that third party.
The discussion attempts to reduce the scope of temporary agency work through 
the necessary element of the ‘labour allocation’. But who is to say that payrolling does 
not involve matching demand and supply?
A similar question might be asked in respect of contracting. In ILO terms, this 
amounts to job contracting, which, as we know, has not been regulated in inter-
national law. Nor has it been regulated in Dutch law. The same applies to the phe-
nomenon of the self-employed worker. This type of self-employment yields income 
and labour cost benefits, which can be considered as unreasonable when compared 
with employment. Self-employment also raises doubts as to whether it does not 
under mine the financial basis of the social security system.
In the course of time, temporary agency work has been joined by various other 
forms of flexible labour. Ricca already remarked on the vast dynamism of this sector. 
During the past years (2003–2015) flexible labour has increased considerably (62%), 
while the number of permanent positions have been much reduced (–11%). During 
this  period, the proportion of self-employed workers increased by 61%. Temporary 
 agency work has not kept pace with the growth of flexible labour. The proportion 
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of on-call/ replacement workers and self-employed workers grew substantially faster. 
With respect to the Netherlands, the OECD reports a sizeable increase in job insecur-
ity, although it is balanced by a relatively modest income insecurity.
The question is also to what extent all this impels further regulations. The Nether-
lands easily complies with the standards set by Convention  181. Thus labour-only 
contracting has been regulated. What has not been regulated is bipartite and tripart-
ite job contracting. Internationally and in the Netherlands, here is a loophole that 
should be acted upon.
10.8 TO CONCLUDE
To conclude, I shall answer the key question as to whether Convention 181 is (still) 
adequate in the light of what has been noted in the answers to the sub-questions.
There is evidence of unfulfilled wishes in respect of the more extensive international 
regulation of temporary agency work, for instance, further implementation of the 
equal treatment requirements, regulation of fixed-term contracts, a more extensive 
instrument (than Convention 181 is) for tripartite relationships, regulation of the use 
of temporary agency work, clarification of the trade unions’ position in tripartite re-
lationships. However, the question is whether this should be regulated by amending 
Convention 181. The Convention as such is clear, addressing the topics that need to 
be addressed and meeting a growing need. It is one of the most important ratified ILO 
conventions that have been realised since 1990.
As a minimum regulation, it is certainly sufficient. The deficits that have been 
noted can also be solved by means of specific regulations, such as are currently being 
developed.
Regulated in: –  Convention 181
–  Temporary Agency Work Directive
–  Dutch Civil Code
Not regulated
labour only contracting
labour allocation
contracting
job contracting
agency work bipartitepayrolling tripartite
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Temporary agency work under Convention 181 more than meets the indicators used 
by the ILO for the concept of decent work. Only the aspect of job security leaves 
something to be desired. However, ILO convention  158 and the associated recom-
mendation 166 that regulate this issue leave scope for deviation from the open-ended 
contract, which can still be considered the cornerstone of the employment system, 
even though employers request a revision. Now that deviations are possible and the 
convention appears to be somewhat controversial, one might wonder whether tem-
porary agency work should be designated as not decent for this reason alone. The 
importance of Convention 181 in the battle against informal labour and human traf-
ficking is also crucial. Nor has the developing human rights regime of the business 
sector substantially affected the adequacy and value of Convention 181. The conven-
tion is more specific in nature; it implies obligations upon ratification and takes fun-
damental workers’ rights into account. Thus, it has retained its value independently 
from the human rights regimes.
The IFAs are important instruments for additional arrangements relating to 
temporary agency work. Making such arrangements complements rather than re-
places Convention 181.
By now, the EU also has an extensive and growing regulatory framework for 
temporary agency work in place and may have put Convention  181 into perspect-
ive for its member states. Still, even for the EU member states, Convention 181 does 
have value. It provides more focus, clarity and guarantees for respecting fundamental 
workers’ rights and for the continuity of temporary employment agency services.
The Dutch public-private regulatory framework for temporary agency work 
 easily complies with Convention 181. The development and particularly the complica-
tions of this framework support the view that, apart from an ILO regulatory frame-
work for labour-only contracting, which Convention 181 actually is, there should be 
an international and national regulatory framework for job contracting. This frame-
work can also be based on the OECD Guidelines.
All in all, Convention 181 has values and is certainly adequate as a minimum regu-
lation. Labour-only contracting has been decently regulated in this convention. This 
does not hold true for bipartite and tripartite job contracting. It has not taken shape 
at an international level. Drawing up an inventory on the Dutch development and 
complications makes clear that in addition to temporary agency work, other forms of 
flexible labour have emerged, such as payrolling, contracting and self-employment, 
demanding further regulation parallel to the regulation of temporary agency work.
This calls for an integral view on flexible labour, which will create a level playing 
field. In any event, Convention 181 combats informal labour and human trafficking, 
and indicates a need for further promotion of decent flexibility.
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